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SPEECHES, CORRESPONDENCE  
AND POLITICAL PAPERS OF  
**CARL SCHURZ**

IN SIX VOLUMES



## SPEECHES, CORRESPONDENCE AND POLITICAL PAPERS OF

# CARL SCHURZ

SELECTED AND EDITED BY

## FREDERIC BANCROFT

ON BEHALF OF

## THE CARL SCHURZ MEMORIAL COMMITTEE

VOLUME V.  
JANUARY 30, 1889-DECEMBER 27, 1898

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THE WRITINGS OF CARL SCHURZ



# The Writings of Carl Schurz

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TO THOMAS F. BAYARD

NEW YORK, Jan. 30, 1889.

As a loyal American citizen I feel in duty bound to make to you the following confidential communication.

Early this morning I received a note from Count Arco<sup>1</sup> informing me that he would be in this city during the day and requesting me to meet him at such time and place as I might designate—if possible during the forenoon. Having been for years pleasantly acquainted with Count Arco, I called upon him at the Albemarle Hotel on my way down town. He at once asked me for my opinion on the present state of the Samoan business, adding that he intended to write to Count Bismarck to-day.

I replied that as to all I should say I wished him to keep in mind that I could only speak for myself as a private citizen; that I had had no communication concerning this subject with any one connected with the Government, and that I had only the official publications, the newspapers and my acquaintance with people of different classes as sources of information and opinion. From my study of the matter it appeared to me that the Germans had committed the error common to civilized nations coming, in the pursuit of their material interests, into contact with savage or semi-civilized populations—

<sup>1</sup> German Minister to the U. S.

namely the error of relying mainly upon the application of force in the treatment of those populations. The English had frequently committed this error, we had sometimes in our intercourse with the Indians, and the Germans seemed to repeat it in Africa as well as in Samoa. This policy frequently led to acts of injustice, was always costly as well as cruel, but by no means always successful in the way desired. In this case it had produced situations irritating to others more or less concerned.

Count Arco observed that, while, according to reliable information received at Berlin, the hostility of the Samoans to the Germans was largely, if not entirely, owing to constant instigation on the part of Americans, officials as well as private persons, in Samoa, the Government of the United States had made little, if any, complaint in the diplomatic way of the conduct of German officials in Samoa. The whole controversy, if there was any, seemed to be carried on by the subordinate officials among themselves and by the newspapers, but was, perhaps, for this reason all the more exciting [to] the public mind.

I interrupted, saying that I remembered an elaborate despatch or instruction addressed by Mr. Bayard to Mr. Pendleton explicitly stating the things complained of by this Government, and that in the official correspondence I found plenty of criticism of the conduct of the Germans in Samoa by the American officials, but no evidence of their having incited a refractory spirit among the natives. However, these were questions of fact which, thousands of miles away, we might not at present be able to answer.

The conversation then turned upon the more important question what was now best to be done to avoid further difficulty. Count Arco repeatedly assured me that the German Government was most peaceably disposed, and I said, that as I knew the character of the American people and the traditions of the Government, the pre-

vailing disposition here was certainly of the same nature, and that I had been very much surprised to see in some important German newspapers remarks imputing to the Government of the United States, with regard to the Samoan business, a quarrelsome and grasping temper. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Without ever having exchanged a word on the subject with any member of the Administration, I felt confident that the Government, in accord with public opinion, asked for nothing but that the autonomy of the Samoan people and the treaty rights of the United States be properly respected.

Count Arco replied that his Government had time and again declared that it had no purposes in any way hostile to Samoan autonomy or to American treaty rights, and would be ever ready to respect that declaration. In fact, a proposition of Prince Bismarck for another conference on Samoan affairs was on its way to this country, the conference this time to be held at Berlin. The British Government had already assented to it and Mr. Bayard seemed to be favorably inclined.

The Count asked me what else, in my opinion, could be done to avoid further excitement about the matter and to restore the old good feeling. In answering this question I again called his attention to my private station, and said that if the invitation to the new conference were accompanied, by the German Government, with a declaration, in the frankest and most cordial language possible, that the maintenance of the Samoan autonomy and of all treaty rights should be the basis, the recognized fundamental condition, of further understandings between the treaty Powers, it would undoubtedly have a very good effect on public opinion in this country, and, as appeared from the official correspondence and from Senator Sherman's speech reported in to-day's papers, go far to meet the demands put forward by the present Administration

as well as by the party to come into power on the 4th of March.

Count Arco asked whether the situation would not in some important respects be changed by the incoming of the Republican Administration. I answered that if the German Government made a fair proposition accompanied by satisfactory assurances, a situation would, as it seemed to me, thereby be *created* which would have to be dealt with *upon its own merits* by any Administration, whatever its party character.

Count Arco observed that some persons seemed to apprehend that Mr. Blaine, if appointed Secretary of State, might be in favor of annexing the Samoan Islands to the United States, or at least of establishing an American protectorate over them. I replied that I should be slow to give weight to such an apprehension; as was well known, the traditional policy of the country was most decidedly averse to such distant annexations and to the entanglements certain to grow out of such protectorates; and that traditional policy was too deeply rooted in public opinion to be disregarded. The conservative and cautious spirit of the American people in this respect was clearly demonstrated by their refusal to accept Saint Thomas and Santo Domingo when those countries were offered to the United States.

I further suggested that a pleasant impression might be produced by the German Government permitting the publication of the so-called protocols, so as to show that there was nothing to be concealed; and I alluded to what I had said in an interview, that those minutes might at least be communicated in confidence to the Senate—which seemed to strike the Count more favorably than the publication asked for by the Ford resolution in the House of Representatives.

Count Arco expressed the hope that the “war” in

Samoa might by this time be practically ended; possibly the military honor of Germany, after the killing of the German marines, might consider itself satisfied by the bombardment of the Samoan villages; but he did not know. I suggested that, if the war was not yet considered ended, this might be a good opportunity for calling upon the "friendly offices" of the United States, of which the American treaty with Samoa contained a standing offer. I added that I thought the Germans had made a great mistake in trying to impose upon the Samoans, Tomasese, a king not chosen by the natives; that populations of that kind, if unwilling to submit to a foreigner, will be still more unwilling to submit to a man of their own race imposed upon them by foreigners; that under such circumstances conspiracies and revolutions are inevitable; and that, in my opinion, the Germans as well as all others concerned would serve their own interests much better by permitting the natives to choose their own king without foreign influence of any sort. Count Arco observed that this might be so, and he thought the German Government might finally accept Mataafa himself as Samoan king.

The conversation turning upon what the coming conference between the treaty Powers might do, I said, in answer to a question, that as to the future government of Samoa perhaps some proposition intermediate between that advanced by Prince Bismarck and that of Mr. Bayard might be found, satisfactorily securing Samoan autonomy as well as treaty rights, and Count Arco shared that hope.

He expressed regret at the fact that the Consular representatives [of the United States] in Samoa had in most instances been inferior to those of the other Powers in point of mental equipment as well as social standing, and he attributed their unsatisfactory relations in great

part to that circumstance. I said that, not knowing any of the gentlemen in question, I could neither assent nor dissent; but I fear the Count in making that remark was not wholly wrong.

Count Arco asked me whether, notwithstanding the substantial agreement of the purposes of the two Governments with regard to Samoa, I saw any point of danger. I replied that the only danger under such circumstances might possibly arise, as I thought, from the forwardness of some naval officer, or from some indiscretion in the conduct of the diplomatic correspondence, one party taking, or putting the other party into, an offensive position from which retreat with honor would be difficult.

After some final exchange of sentiment as to the desirability of a prompt and complete restoration of the traditional cordiality of feeling between the United States and Germany, the Count said that he would to-day send a cable message as well as a more elaborate letter to his Government, and we separated.

In making this confidential communication to you I trust you will understand that I am very far from desiring to meddle with the business of the Government. But being asked for my opinion on this important affair by the German Minister in a manner manifesting a sincere desire on his part to see all differences between the two countries amicably and honorably adjusted, I thought there would not only be no harm in my giving him my individual views, but I might possibly aid a little in bringing about what all lovers of peace must wish to accomplish. I give you so elaborate an account of our conversation, in the hope that, if anything I said to Count Arco was erroneous in point of fact or conclusion, you will have the goodness to set me right and enable me to correct the impressions I may have conveyed to his mind.

FROM THOMAS F. BAYARD

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
WASHINGTON, Feb. 1, 1889.*Confidential and Personal.*

I read with entire appreciation of its friendly motive and high intelligence your letter of the 30th, and am glad to inform you that to-day Count Arco came with a *note-verbale* from Berlin, which he read to me—to the effect that the extreme action of the German Consul at Samoa in declaring martial law in that region had been disapproved by his Government and that orders countermanding such steps had been sent by telegraph. This apparent return of Prince Bismarck to the line of the perfectly well understood agreement—that native autonomy and independence should be sustained by the three treaty Powers—leads me to be hopeful of a satisfactory adjustment by the conference to which I understood the German Government has decided to invite the United States and Great Britain, and the terms of which may be expected to be presented here in a few days.

You are perfectly correct in your diagnosis of the case—it is a mercenary clash of rival traders in the course of which Germany has allowed official action to be too freely employed in aid of private schemes. In the discussions, which are fully reported in the protocols, this became apparent, and as I told Count Arco to-day, Mr. von Alvensleben was inspired throughout by the counsel and presence here of Mr. Weber, formerly a Consular officer in Samoa, and now connected with the German Company there.

As a result our plans for a sensible and just government in Samoa were drifted away from the original basis of concurrent agreement, into a scheme which would have connected the group into a German dependency. It is, I think, unfortunate that Germany and Great Britain should decline to publish these papers, the contents of which have been discussed in the correspondence with Berlin, and which serve now only as bases for charges of "secrecy" and "suppression," creating mystery where all should be clear as day.

To-day Count Arco intimated that he would ask the con-

sent of his Government for the communication of these protocols to the Senate in confidence.

If that body called for them to be used in confidence, I scarcely see how the President could withhold them, although the point is delicate and I should be very sorry to have it raised.

I am very sure, however, that the various plans for a native government assisted by the treaty Powers, in which no preponderance of control should be awarded to any one of the three, will under candid treatment yield a just and satisfactory solution of the present unhappy and distressing and dangerous condition of affairs. There can be no doubt that the wholly different policies of the United States and Germany in respect of colonies and dependencies increase the difficulties of coöperation, but knowing the whole ground of the Samoan question, I can say to you unhesitatingly it can be adjusted without difficulty if mercenary forces are not allowed to obtrude themselves into the discussions.

When you come to read these protocols, which will some day be done, I have no doubt that our judgments will be at one.

As soon as I received the German note to-day, the President sent it in to Congress, and with an understanding that the natives are not to be crushed, and the Government with whom the treaties were made is to be respectfully considered, and American treaty rights guarded, I believe the mischief-makers will subside and settlement will rapidly progress.

It is difficult to describe the singular bitterness of feeling which seems to control the Republican managers, and which has led to a systematic obstruction, misrepresentation and aspersion of the Administration in every Department, and towards none so fiercely as the Department of State, in which I am just closing four years of constant duty.

They have sought, and only with too much success, to embarrass me in dealing with foreign Governments; and I was only too glad to see in John Sherman's speech signs of an appreciation of the *responsibility* which approaching power naturally brings.

Your criticism on the tone and character of our Consular representatives in Samoa is just. But with the pittance allowed for salary, it was difficult, indeed impossible, to obtain men of adequate ability. Under my urgent applications the pay was raised from \$1500 to \$2000, and at *this* session I have succeeded in getting the salary placed at \$3000.

The Senate Committee have been examining *in secret* the present Consul, to see whether some error or something of discredit to me could not be unearthed. But all I want is the whole history to be made public. Nevertheless you can appreciate such treatment of the head of a Department.

I shall endeavor to get a sensible, good-tempered man as soon as I can, though the time for *me* is short to do so.

I cannot avoid anxiety, lest the indiscretion of some naval officer, on one side or the other, may lead to a broil, which may expand itself. But I have been so single-minded in pursuing justice and friendly relations with Germany, as I believe my correspondence will thoroughly prove, that I believe we will find a clear channel and come to a worthy settlement.

I thank you for your letter, and shall continue to believe you the friend of our country and of

T. F. BAYARD.

I read your letter to the President.

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TO THOMAS F. BAYARD

NEW YORK, Feb. 3, 1889.

I thank you very much for your very kind letter of the first instant, and am glad that my conversation with Count Arco has your approval. I rejoice with you at the favorable turn things have taken, and I am sure that when the whole history of the business becomes known, you will receive full justice at the hands of public opinion. If you could conduct this business to the end, the country might feel perfectly safe.

It would seem to me that, if the conference proposed by

Prince Bismarck is to meet at Berlin, and is thus to be a new conference, the objection to the publication of the protocol, that it concerned a negotiation still pending, would lose much of its weight. I agree with you that the publication is very desirable, and I told Count Arco so.

To-day I wrote a letter to the Count in some respects supplementing my conversation with him. I should have sent you a translation of it had I had time to make it. But if you desire, I shall still do so.

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TO JOHN SHERMAN

NEW YORK, Feb. 4, 1889.

I thank you very much for your kind note and the copy of your speech which you had the goodness to send me. Your presentation of the case is as lucid as your conclusions are wise and statesmanlike. I have informed myself about this Samoan business as thoroughly as possible from all the sources open to me, and I have no doubt that if the negotiations concerning it are conducted in that calm, dispassionate spirit and with that sense of responsibility which animate your speech, all differences will be settled in an honorable manner and without any disturbance of our international relations.

As to the autonomy of the Samoan Islands and the maintenance of all treaty rights, the treaty Powers seem to be in substantial accord now. An agreement among them concerning their participation in the government of Samoa can probably be arrived at more easily after the present excitement than before.

Danger may, however, still arise from two sources. One is the greedy and quarrelsome spirit of the traders on the islands, who are constantly seeking to drag the representatives of their respective governments into their

disputes and do not care, in their hot pursuit of gain and power, whether they disturb the peace of the world. And the other is the possibility that in the conduct of the diplomatic correspondence some indiscretion be committed, raising points of honor, or entangling one party or the other in delicate positions from which creditable retreat is difficult.

It is, therefore, to be hoped that the matter will be settled as speedily as possible, for as long as it is not, all sorts of dangerous accidents may intervene. You have certainly done a valuable public service with your speech and I trust it will bear good fruit. Can you tell me whether it foreshadows the policy of the incoming Administration?

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TO B. B. CAHOON

NEW YORK, Feb. 5, 1889.

Your kind letter of January 31st is before me. I can well understand your desire, after the death of your dear wife, to seek new scenes and a new activity. But when you ask me to give you my views on the project of which your letter informs me, I am somewhat at a loss what to advise. If the position you think of were freely offered to you without your being a suitor for it, it might be acceptable, notwithstanding the uncertainty of tenure. It might be looked upon as a pleasant change and an interesting experience. But unless I greatly misapprehend the signs of the times, there will be a scramble for every place under the Government that is considered desirable. Now, I know what a scramble is, having seen several; and, knowing what it is, I shall never advise a friend of mine to enter into one, as long as he can gain a living or make himself useful in any other way. I have seen men of uncommon ability and high character, whom a laudable

ambition had led to Washington in pursuit of place, curse the day when they had started upon their errand. They found themselves entangled in a competition which sometimes grievously offended their self-respect; but the worst of it was that, being once in, they felt themselves obliged to go on, and even when victorious, they frequently could not shake off the consciousness of having achieved their success at too heavy a cost. If it were only a competition of ability and character, it would be well enough. You seem to think that it is, for only thus can I explain your suggestion that I should write a letter to Mr. Harrison stating what I know of you. Your surmise that it would be a genuine pleasure to me to testify to your high character and qualifications, as I know them, is certainly correct. But you have forgotten that the "regular party politician" hates me more than most others; that a letter from me would be far more apt to hurt you than to help you; and that it would be held up only as a proof of signal impudence on my part, if I, in ever so indirect a way, attempted to meddle with the distribution of the spoil after a Republican victory. And all this because the scramble for office is not a competition of ability and character, but a competition of influence.

Considering all this, and also your personal wishes, I should be glad to see a place such as you desire and deserve come to you upon the strength of the evidences of your worth which can be brought to the knowledge of the Executive; but I should be sorry to see you exposed to those experiences which an active personal pursuit of office under circumstances like the present usually brings with it.

In saying this to you as frankly as I do, I give you, as I think, a proof of the genuineness of my friendship, and what I know of you justifies me in thinking that you will receive it so.

TO OSCAR S. STRAUS

NEW YORK, Feb. 15, 1889.

Your brother tells me that you wish to return home as soon as possible, and I need not say that your friends will be glad to have you here again. The political situation, you will find, is not as pleasing as might be desired. That Blaine will be Secretary of State is generally accepted as certain. What complications his occupying a position of so much power will lead to, nobody can now foretell. It is also generally believed that Mr. Wanamaker of Philadelphia will have a place in the Cabinet, and I must confess that I look upon this as one of the worst developments of these days. He may be ever so good a man and make ever so efficient a Secretary of the Navy or Postmaster-General, still it remains true that the only distinction he ever achieved in public life was won as a contributor and collector of campaign funds, and that, but for this achievement, he would never have been thought of as a man entitled to high office in the Government. And thus it may be said that now for the first time in the history of this Republic a place in the Cabinet of the President was given for a pecuniary consideration. This is a portentous fact, and nobody can tell what we shall come to, what depth of corruption we shall reach, unless this tendency be stopped.

It appears, however, that the popular mind is gradually becoming alive to what this all means, and that a healthy movement for the reëstablishment of higher standards of public morality is impending. There is reason for hoping that we shall soon have legislation in the direction of ballot-reform and against the corrupt use of money in elections in a majority of the States. As a matter of course our Commonwealth Club is up and doing again.

## TO JOHN WANAMAKER

NEW YORK, Feb. 25, 1889.

My attention has been called to a letter published in *Harper's Weekly* February 9th, of which the following is the closing paragraph:

Mr. Wanamaker is now on his way to Europe, but his stay there will be very brief. I am sure that on his return he will be ready, as he has always been, to answer categorically any question put to him in regard to his connection with the campaign by any conspicuously fair-minded public man whose reputation and character afford a guarantee of the perfect good faith of the inquiry. As I write this I recall the noble and thoughtful address lately delivered by Mr. Carl Schurz before the Commonwealth Club, and I have no doubt that, were Mr. Schurz to address Mr. Wanamaker with the view of discovering the exact truth about his relations to the expenditures of money in the late campaign, he would elicit a reply calculated to satisfy every unprejudiced man that the current aspersions against the eminent Philadelphian are absolutely groundless.

This letter seems quite generally to have been taken as having been written by authority; and, in consequence, I have been called upon, publicly as well as privately, to address you in the manner suggested by your friend. Upon reflection I have concluded that in a certain sense I am in duty bound to do so. Nothing could indeed be farther from my mind than any desire to constitute myself an investigator in this case, and however flattering your friend's good opinion is to me, I should have greatly preferred it had the public received the information, which you are ready to give, without any intervention on my part. But if, as your friend evidently thinks, such an inquiry from me would be regarded by you as a welcome opportunity for putting forth statements which you

would feel disinclined to make without it, I am certainly willing to serve as suggested by him in furnishing that opportunity.

I will only add that I should be most happy to see the widespread belief as to the corrupt use of large sums of money in the last Presidential election effectually dispelled by the best possible proof that the campaign funds have been expended for legitimate purposes. And if I can be instrumental in eliciting such proof, I shall consider it a service to the good name of the country which will be to me a source of the sincerest satisfaction. It is in this spirit that I address you, and the first question I have to ask, is, of course, whether the writer in *Harper's Weekly*, in calling for this letter, really represented your views and wishes.

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TO THOMAS F. BAYARD

NEW YORK, Feb. 27, 1889.

I have read the protocol with keen interest and cannot refrain from saying that the American side of the question has been represented by you with the most decided and unquestionable superiority in point of argument as well as vigor of debate. I do not wonder that those among your adversaries who still have some respect for the truth were silenced by the appearance of this document.

I saw a statement in the papers a few days ago that the German Government had formally demanded the prosecution and punishment of Klein, and that you had sent the correspondence concerning this demand, to the Senate. Can you, consistently, tell me whether this is true?

Will you be kind enough to cause a copy of the correspondence concerning the Sackville case<sup>1</sup> to be mailed to

<sup>1</sup> Lord Sackville was the British Minister at Washington during the National campaign of 1888, when the Republicans were very eager to

me? You will add to the many obligations under which I am to you.

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FROM THOMAS F. BAYARD

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
WASHINGTON, Feb. 28, 1889.

*Personal.*

It gratified me to receive your valued criticism of the part I bore in the attempt to arrange in 1887 a fit government for the Samoan Islands, with the British and German agents. I cannot help asking you to read a despatch of mine in January, 1888—which goes by this mail—for Prince Bismarck's eye. I think it states the Samoan case and the Polynesian question generally, truly and succinctly.

To your inquiry, whether the German Government has asked for Klein's prosecution and that [whether] I had sent the correspondence to the Senate, I reply that nothing of the kind has taken place. Now that I have succeeded in attracting Prince Bismarck's attention to the real condition of Samoa, I find his views and disposition very much as I expected them to be—moderate and conciliatory. As I wrote you, the *shopkeepers* at Samoa got hold of official power and abused it, and the scene is so distant that mischief was done before the facts were known.

*Entre nous*, I have been crippled a good deal by poor Pendleton's<sup>1</sup> invalid condition, and but for that, I believe the Berlin

attract the Irish-American voters. A correspondent in California, pretending to be a British-American, asked Lord Sackville's advice as to which party he should vote for. The unsuspecting Minister wrote him a letter marked "private" in which he said that the Democratic party was more friendly to Great Britain, etc. This was the desired answer. The Republican party managers kept it secret until a short time before the election and then used it, with all possible stress, to excite the Irish against the Democratic party. In order to lessen the damaging effect of the plot, President Cleveland, a candidate for reëlection, sent Lord Sackville his passports, with haste that was most abrupt and undiplomatic. For details and comment, see 47 *The Nation*, 345, 348, 369, 387.

<sup>1</sup>George H. Pendleton, U. S. Minister to Germany.

Conference *in re* Samoa would have been now progressing or even probably the matter settled. As it is, Harrison (Blaine! alas!) must appoint the American envoys—but I do not see how they can fail to follow the lines of the protocols as stated by me.

I will see that you receive the full text of the Sackville incident which is delayed in the printing office. I inclose, however, a copy of my last note on the subject which states the reason for my action and the attitude of the United States on the important question.

When you have received the entire case (and it is not long) I will be greatly obliged to you for your candid judgment. I am sure that no two men better agree than you and I in the dogma, that, frame society as you will, personal honor and good faith will be the secure corner-stone of human intercourse. With this postulate how can a defense be made or [there be] any hesitation to condemn Sackville in his conduct? I agree that American politics has foul spots and shameful features, but so has every political theater, but honest and honorable men have nothing to do with such evil features.

Good-by. I have written more than I intended, but I seldom have the chance to write to you.

Ever, dear Schurz, yours sincerely.

FROM THOMAS F. BAYARD

1413 MASS. AVE.,  
WASHINGTON, March 9, 1889.

You can and *must* congratulate me that I am relieved from the post of duty I have held for four years.

It is difficult to let any one who was not a daily witness comprehend the temper and method in which the Republican managers of the Senate have dealt with public business wherever the State Department has been concerned. I have closed four years of service without one word of amity, of ordinary courtesy, much less of coöperation or assistance from any Republican member of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

On the contrary, my best efforts and most useful work have been systematically defeated and thwarted—at what cost to our country the sequel must prove. Therefore you see I am well out of such an anomalous, almost incredible condition of affairs.

If Mr. Pendleton had been a well man, I think I could have arranged the Samoan matter in Berlin two months ago, but I have been sadly crippled. As it is, I have no idea of any collision in Samoa and think the reports are wholly without foundation. Taking up the conference in Berlin on the lines I laid down in 1887, will make a settlement easy and amicable.

*Entre nous*, having seen Blaine (for the first time in seven years), I am compelled to think him a very enfeebled man, and am inclined to expect a much less "aggressive policy" than he started out with in 1881. I hear nothing here but the echoes of very small politics—of a kind that you and I detest and are wholly impatient with. Wanamaker!! Laugh!!

I want a little holiday and when I come to New York will surely sit down with you.

#### TO JOHN WANAMAKER

NEW YORK, April 9, 1889.

I have received your letter of the 5th instant, and in reply beg leave to submit to you the inclosed copy of two notes, one addressed by me to Mr. Isidor Straus, and the other by Mr. Straus to me.<sup>1</sup> They show clearly how it

<sup>1</sup> On April 6th, Mr. Schurz inclosed Mr. Wanamaker's letter in a note to Isidor Straus, in which he wrote: "I understood you to say that your communication published in *Harper's Weekly* of February 9th was the immediate result of a conversation you had with Mr. Wanamaker in Philadelphia; that you had told him in substance what you were going to write for publication, including the reference to my name; that he approved of it and afterwards expressed his thanks to you for what you had done."

To this Mr. Straus answered, April 8th, that "your impression about our conversation and the one I had with Mr. Wanamaker is correct. I ought to add, however, that Mr. Wanamaker did not see my letter before it appeared in print, although I had outlined to him, when I saw him some days before, what I intended to write."

happened that Mr. Straus, as your friend, expressed himself in his communication to *Harper's Weekly* in a manner which made me as well as others believe that he spoke by authority. It is evident that he, in fact, did consider himself authorized to represent you as he did.

If now, differently situated as you are, you declined to communicate with me on the matter in question, upon the ground that, after mature consideration, you had changed your mind, or that you did not remember having given your friend the authority which he thought he had received, I should have nothing more to ask. But I owe it to myself decidedly to object to your now putting your refusal upon the ground that you had reason to question my good faith or the rectitude of my motives in addressing you as I did in response to a public call made upon me by your spokesman. You will admit that I might well have expected different treatment as between gentlemen.

If there are politicians who, under the pretense of seeking the public good, work themselves into the confidence of others with the intention of abusing that confidence for partisan purposes, I have, I trust, by my public life of thirty years fairly earned the right of not being classed with tricksters of that kind.

As you seem to be in the dark as to my party relations, permit me to say that I am "out of politics" and bound to no party. I count myself one of those who think it vastly more important that the Government be well administered, than that it be administered by this or that set of men; and who, while recognizing the usefulness of party as a means to a good end, support whatever appears to them of public benefit, and oppose whatever they consider bad, no matter what party label it may bear. This position may seem very eccentric to the hot partisan on either side, but I assure you it may be conscientiously and also usefully maintained, especially considering the present

condition of our party organizations. More good has already in that way been done than many party men are willing to admit. At any rate, mean trickery to secure a little partisan advantage is probably the last thing which men of that way of thinking would be capable of.

To return to the matter immediately before us, we all know that the character, the good name, of the American people has suffered much by the corrupt practices going on in our political life. I have myself, while abroad, had occasion to defend that character, and tried to do so to the best of my ability. But the charges which have been current since the last Presidential election have evidently made that defense much more difficult. I want, for the honor of this Republic, to see these charges, if they can be, wholly or at least in part disproved and should have been glad to aid in such disproof. But no candid observer will deny that the use of money in elections, as it has of late years developed itself, has really become a great evil—probably the greatest danger now threatening the vitality of our republican institutions; and I think it the first duty of good citizens to combat that evil on whatever side it may appear. I believe one of the effective ways to combat it would be to make obligatory the public accounting of all election expenses in detail. Now, the promise held out in your behalf by Mr. Straus in his published letter looked to me like a step in the right direction. He represented you as a man who, concerning his money transactions in the last campaign, had nothing to conceal, and who was rather anxious to have this fact ascertained and made known through one not his party associate. I thought this very creditable to you; but if, in believing it, and in acting upon that belief, I made a mistake, it was a mistake which, it seems to me, you might have taken rather as a compliment than as an offense or as a part of a Democratic plot to injure you.

You ask me why I did not address my inquiries about alleged corrupt practices first to the Democrats. The reason is simple. I did not step forward in this matter as a volunteer. Nor did I go about seeking whom to investigate. That is not an occupation to my taste. I did address you, because, and *only* because, I found myself publicly called upon by an apparently authorized friend of yours to do so. If such a call had come from the Democratic side, I should have considered it a duty to obey it in the same manner and in the same spirit.

I write this not with any expectation of changing the resolution you have formed, but to show that the step I took in addressing you was respectable in character and might well have been met on a different level.

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TO FRANKLIN H. HEAD

NEW YORK, April 20, 1889.

I thank you sincerely for your letter of the 13th instant inviting me to meet with you on the anniversary of the first inauguration of President Washington; but I regret to say that my engagements here do not permit a journey to Chicago at the present time.

We cannot worthily commemorate the practical beginning of our Constitutional government without doing homage to the man who was the first and highest illustration of its character. Popular hero-worship is to be commended and encouraged when it consists in the admiring contemplation of conspicuous virtue and wisdom. The memory of George Washington is, and will always remain, one of the most important and precious possessions of the American people.

Inestimable as were his services in the War of Independence, yet history tells us of other great generals whose

skill and fortitude turned disaster into victory. But as the head of the civil government, Washington conferred a benefit upon his people which stands unsurpassed if not unequaled in the annals of mankind. It consists in the fact that the first President of the United States was the model President. Whenever the American people wish to remember what the Chief Magistrate and the Government of this Republic should be, and whenever a President in our or any future time wishes to make it clear to his own mind by what rules of political morality he should regulate his conduct, by what motives he should be guided and upon what principles he should act in directing the affairs or in managing the machinery of the Government, they need only look back and they will find it all perfect and complete in the first President's teachings and example. The more clearly those teachings and examples are expressed, the more faithfully they are followed, the purer, the stronger, the more glorious will this Republic become. The more they are lost sight of and departed from, the more threatening will be the danger of its decline in true strength and greatness.

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#### THE NEED OF A RATIONAL FOREST POLICY<sup>1</sup>

MEMBERS OF THE FORESTRY ASSOCIATIONS, AND LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:—I cannot refrain from expressing my thanks to the Committee of Arrangements for doing me the honor of inviting me to take part in this meeting. It is true, not until yesterday could I see my way clear to come, and I have not been able to prepare an elaborate address, such as seems to have been expected of me. All I can offer is a few offhand remarks, more in the nature

<sup>1</sup> Address delivered before the American Forestry Association and the Pennsylvania Forestry Association, at Horticultural Hall, Philadelphia, Oct. 15, 1889.

of a conversational talk than of a formal speech. I pray you, therefore, to divest yourselves of all solemnity of expectation.

Let me in the first place assure you of my most earnest sympathy in your efforts. I am heart and soul with you: nor is this to me a new subject. I know the advocates of the cause to which you are devoted are looked upon by many as a set of amiable sentimentalists, who have fallen in love with the greenness of the woods and break out in hysterical wails when a tree is cut down. I assure you I have been led to take an earnest interest in this subject by considerations of an entirely unsentimental, practical nature, and this, no doubt, is the case with most of you. The more study and thought I have given the matter, the firmer has become my conviction that *the destruction of the forests of this country will be the murder of its future prosperity and progress.* This is no mere figure of speech, no rhetorical exaggeration. It is simply the teaching of the world's history, which no fairminded man can study without reaching the same conclusion.

I am aware that there are people who turn with a sneer from the expression of any fear that our country may become sterile; who profess to be highly amused when those countries in Asia are pointed out to them which once were called lands "flowing with milk and honey"; whose mountains were covered with forests, whose hills with the vine and the fig-tree and whose plains with waving grainfields, which nourished teeming and prosperous populations, building up mighty cities and great monuments of the civilization of their times; now bare soil, barren and desolate wastes and deserts, roamed over by wild beasts and robbers, the ancient prosperity changed into misery, famine and decay, the people relapsed into barbarism; or when we point to Spain, once covered with a

luxuriant vegetation, one of the most fertile countries of antiquity, the granary of the Roman Empire; at the close of the middle ages still the realm in whose dominions the sun never set; now in a great measure stripped bare, the old fertility gone, the people in large districts struggling with poverty and want.

Infatuated persons among us turn up their noses at these and similar lessons and superciliously exclaim: What do we in this great and free country of ours care about abroad? Let me say to you that the laws of nature are the same everywhere. Whoever violates them anywhere, must always pay the penalty. No country ever so great and rich, no nation ever so powerful, inventive and enterprising can violate them with impunity. We most grievously delude ourselves if we think that we can form an exception to the rule. And we have made already a most dangerous beginning, and more than a beginning, in the work of desolation. The destruction of our forests is so fearfully rapid that, if we go on at the same rate, men whose hair is already gray will see the day when in the United States from Maine to California and from the Mexican Gulf to Puget Sound there will be no forest left worthy of the name.

Who is guilty of that destruction? It is not merely the lumberman cutting timber on his own land for legitimate use in the pursuit of business gain; it is the lumberman who, in doing so, destroys and wastes as much more without benefit to anybody. It is not merely the settler or the miner taking logs for his cabin and fence-rails and fire-wood, or timber for building a shaft, but it is the settler and the miner laying waste acres or stripping a mountain slope to get a few sticks. It is all these, serving indeed legitimate wants, but doing it with a wastefulness criminally reckless.

But it is not only these. It is the timber thief—making

haste to strip the public domain of what he can lay his hands on, lest another timber thief get ahead of him—and, in doing this, destroying sometimes far more than he steals. It is the tourist, the hunter, the mining prospector who, lighting his camp-fire in the woods to boil water for his coffee or to fry his bacon, and leaving that fire unextinguished when he proceeds, sets the woods in flames and delivers countless square miles of forest to destruction.

It is all these, but it is something more, and let us confess it, something worse. It is a public opinion looking with indifference on this wanton, barbarous, disgraceful vandalism. It is a spendthrift people recklessly wasting its heritage. It is a Government careless of the future and unmindful of a pressing duty.

I have had some personal experience of this. The gentleman who introduced me did me the honor of mentioning the attention I devoted to this subject years ago as Secretary of the Interior. When I entered upon that important office, having the public lands in charge, I considered it my first duty to look around me and to study the problems I had to deal with. Doing so I observed all the wanton waste and devastation I have described. I observed the notion that the public forests were everybody's property, to be taken and used or wasted as anybody pleased, everywhere in full operation. I observed enterprising timber thieves not merely stealing trees, but stealing whole forests. I observed hundreds of sawmills in full blast, devoted exclusively to the sawing up of timber stolen from the public lands.

I observed a most lively export trade going on from Gulf ports as well as Pacific ports, with fleets of vessels employed in carrying timber stolen from the public lands to be sold in foreign countries, immense tracts being devastated that some robbers might fill their pockets.

I thought that this sort of stealing was wrong, in this

country no less than elsewhere. Moreover, it was against the spirit and letter of the law. I, therefore, deemed it my duty to arrest that audacious and destructive robbery. Not that I had intended to prevent the settler and the miner from taking from the public lands what they needed for their cabins, their fields or their mining shafts; but I deemed it my duty to stop at least the commercial depredations upon the property of the people. And to that end I used my best endeavors and the means at my disposal, scanty as they were.

What was the result? No sooner did my attempts in that direction become known, than I was pelted with telegraphic despatches from the regions most concerned, indignantly inquiring what it meant that an officer of the Government dared to interfere with the legitimate business of the country! Members of Congress came down upon me, some with wrath in their eyes, others pleading in a milder way, but all solemnly protesting against my disturbing their constituents in this peculiar pursuit of happiness. I persevered in the performance of my plain duty. But when I set forth my doings in my annual report and asked Congress for rational forestry legislation, you should have witnessed the sneers at the outlandish notions of this "foreigner" in the Interior Department; notions that, as was said, might do for a picayunish German principality, but were altogether contemptible when applied to this great and free country of ours. By the way, some of the gentlemen who sneered so greatly might learn some lessons from those picayunish German principalities, which would do them much good. I recently revisited my native land and saw again some of the forests I had known in my younger days—forests which in the meantime had yielded to their owners or to the Government large revenues from the timber cut, but were now nevertheless as stately as they had been before,

because the cutting had been done upon rational principles and the forests had been steadily improved by scientific cultivation. I passed over a large tract I had known as a barren heath, the heath of Lüneburg, which formerly, as the saying was, sustained only the "Heidschnucken," a species of sheep as little esteemed for their wool as their mutton—the same heath now covered with a dense growth of fine forest. Instead of sneering, our supercilious scoffers would do better for themselves as well as for the country if they devoted their time a little more to studying and learning the valuable lessons with which the experience of other countries abounds.

What the result of my appeals was at the time I am speaking of, you know. We succeeded in limiting somewhat the extent of the depredations upon the public forests, and in bringing some of the guilty parties to justice. A few hundred thousand dollars were recovered for timber stolen, but the recommendations of rational forestry legislation went for nothing. Some laws were indeed passed, but they appeared rather to favor the taking of timber from the public lands than to stop it. Still, I persevered, making appeal after appeal, in public and in private, but I found myself standing almost solitary and alone. Deaf was Congress, and deaf the people seemed to be. Only a few still voices rose up here and there in the press in favor of the policy I pursued.

Thank Heaven, the people appear to be deaf no longer. It is in a great measure owing to your wise and faithful efforts that the people begin to listen, and that in several States practical steps have already been taken in the right direction.

As the chairman very truthfully and pointedly said, the forestry question divides itself into two branches, preservation and restoration. The first appears at present by far the most important. There are forests in this as

in all countries, the preservation of which is absolutely necessary, because they perform an office which nothing else can perform. Whatever differences of opinion there may be as to the influence of the forest on climate in other respects, it is universally conceded that the forest is in an important sense the regulator of the flow of waters. It is a well-known story. Springs and watercourses which flow with steadiness while the forest stands, are, when the forest has disappeared, dried up or at least largely reduced in volume one part of the year, to be transformed into raging and destructive torrents during another part. In the shape in which it would be a blessing, the water fails. It appears in the shape of a curse. Of paramount necessity, therefore, is the preservation of the forest which covers the headwaters of the great rivers and their affluents, especially in the mountain regions with steep and rocky slopes, where the forest once destroyed can never be restored. Once strip the precipitous mountainside, and the rain and melting snow will soon wash down the scanty soil; the naked rock will appear on the surface, and the growth of a protecting vegetation will be impossible forever. The mountain torrents, swelled by rain and melted snow that no longer find any earth to soak, will then periodically rush down with undiminished volume, inundating the valleys below, and in many cases covering them with gravel and loose rock swept down from the steep slopes, gradually rendering them unfit for agriculture and sometimes even for the habitation of men. I have had occasion to observe such results in more than one instance.

The preservation of mountain forests of this kind is therefore of supreme importance, and where they are still in public possession they should be set apart as permanent reservations, either by the several States or by the General Government—or when they are in private hands, they

should, if possible, be regained by the Government and reserved.

Steps of that kind have fortunately been taken with regard to the Adirondacks in New York, but those steps have unfortunately been too long delayed, for, as is reported, the destruction of the Adirondack forests has already gone far enough to cause a diminution of the reliable water supply in the Mohawk and Hudson rivers of from thirty to fifty per cent.; nor have they proved effective and comprehensive enough, for that destruction is still going on at a distressing rate. As to Pennsylvania, a service of incalculable value would be rendered to her people if the State regained control over the forest lands in the heart of her mountain regions, for the hand of the destroyer is mercilessly active. A few years ago I happened, on a railroad inspection, to penetrate into the mountains of northwestern Pennsylvania and beheld a spectacle of direful import. A corporation, a large majority of whose stock was said to be held in Massachusetts, had acquired an area of forest land of, if I remember rightly, 200,000 acres. They not only cut down every tree, but they destroyed even the underbrush, not leaving a stick or a shoot standing. They made the mountainsides as bare as the palm of my hand. And when I asked the superintending officer of the company what was meant by this radical destruction, which would not even leave a chance for the forest to grow up on these slopes in the future, the answer was, that the company did not wish the forest to grow up there again; it was its object first to sell the logs and then to clear the land for the purpose of selling it as pasture. It is not hazardous to predict that when those mountainsides have been washed by rain for a few seasons, many, if not most of them, will no longer furnish verdure enough to nourish a goat. Such things are going on in the mountains of Pennsylvania, and

unless in some way they be stopped, it will soon be too late.

There is a mountain region in the far Northwest which demands the earliest possible attention of our National authorities. It is the great area of mountain forest covering the headwaters of the Missouri and Columbia. The Government cannot too soon take effective steps to protect these forests, which are among the most important in the United States, against destruction, by making them a permanent reservation and having them carefully guarded.

When speaking of the preservation of forests, we do not, as has already been eloquently set forth by our chairman, mean that they should be kept untouched and unused as the miser keeps his hoard, but that they should be made useful in a way preventing their destruction and even improving their value, as forests are made useful in other civilized countries.

In my first annual report as Secretary of the Interior, twelve years ago, I made some recommendations leading to that end, the main points being in substantial accord with the project of a bill drafted by your committee. Permit me to read them:

All timber lands still belonging to the United States should be withdrawn from the operation of the preëmption and homestead laws, as well as the location of the various kinds of scrip.

Timber lands fit for agricultural purposes should be sold, if sold at all, only for cash, and so graded in price as to make the purchaser pay for the value of the timber on the land. This will be apt to make the settler careful and provident in the disposition he makes of the timber.

A sufficient number of Government agents should be provided to protect the timber on public lands from depredation, and to institute to this end the necessary proceedings against depredators, by seizures and by criminal as well as civil actions.

Such agents should also be authorized and instructed, under the direction of the Department of the Interior or the Department of Agriculture, to sell for the United States, in order to satisfy the current local demand, timber from the public lands under proper regulations, and in doing so especially to see to it that no large areas be entirely stripped of their timber, so as not to prevent the natural renewal of the forest. This would enable the people of the mining States and of the territories to obtain the timber they need in a legal way, at the same time avoiding the dangerous consequences above pointed out.

The extensive as well as wanton destruction of the timber upon the public lands by the wilful or negligent and careless setting of fires calls for earnest attention. While in several, if not all of the States, such acts are made highly penal offenses by statute, no law of the United States provides specifically for their punishment when committed upon the public lands, nor for a recovery of damages thereby sustained. I would therefore recommend the passage of a law prescribing a severe penalty for the wilful, negligent or careless setting of fires on the public lands of the United States, principally valuable for the timber thereon, and also for the recovery of all damages thereby sustained.

While such measures might be provided for by law without unnecessary delay, I would also suggest that the President be authorized to appoint a commission, composed of qualified persons, to study the laws and practices adopted in other countries for the preservation and cultivation of forests, and to report to Congress a plan for the same object applicable to our circumstances.

The provisions your project of a forestry bill has added to this plan are certainly appropriate, especially the proposed Forestry Commission to superintend the execution of this policy.

It has been objected that the introduction of such a system would involve an addition to the number of public officers, and cost money. Certainly it would, as the Army

costs money, as the police costs money, as the building of sewers costs money, as public schools cost money and as so many other things necessary to the safety and well being of the people cost money. But I do not hesitate to say that the money spent for the Army, the police and public schools is not spent to greater public advantage than the money spent for the introduction of a rational forestry system would be. However, a part of the public service already existing might well be used for the purpose of guarding at least the forests belonging to the public domain of the United States. It may well be assumed that although trifling Indian disturbances may still occur here and there, the danger of Indian wars on a large scale is now behind us. If a wise, just and humane Indian policy be followed, we may be sure that it is altogether over. Not a few of our outlying military posts may then be abandoned, and a part of our Army will become disposable for other purposes. Why should not two or three battalions be organized as forest guards or forest rangers, the men, perhaps, also to receive some useful instruction to fit them for their new duties? Surely, no soldier could, in time of peace and there being no prospect of war, be more usefully employed.

Of the influence of forests on climate and of the necessity of planting or replanting them where they fall below the proportion which the area of forest should bear to the aggregate area of the country, men more competent than I am have spoken and will speak to you. We are all agreed also on the necessity of spreading information on this important subject. No respectable university or agricultural college should be without a department in which forestry as a science is taught; and most of us will no doubt see the day when the importance of that science will be recognized by every thinking American. Let us hope that this appreciation will come in time. I regret

we cannot forcibly enough impress upon the American people the necessity of speedy measures looking to the preservation of our mountain forests which, when once destroyed, cannot be renewed. Unless this be done in time, our children will curse the almost criminal improvidence of their ancestors; but if it is done in time, those who are instrumental in doing it will deserve and will have the blessings of future generations.

To bring up the public opinion of this country to the point where it will command such measures, a vigorous and unceasing agitation is required. I do not underestimate the difficulties it will have to overcome. It is the shortsighted greed which acts upon the rule to grab all that can be got at the moment, and "let the devil take the hindmost," not stopping to consider that he who does so may be among the hindmost himself, and that in this case his children certainly will be. It is that spirit of levity, so prevalent among our people, which teaches to eat and drink and be merry to-day, unmindful of the reckoning that will come to-morrow. It is the cowardice of the small politician who, instead of studying the best interests of the people, trembles lest doing his full duty may cost him a vote, and who is not seldom apt to fear the resentment of the thieves more than that of honest men.

Such influences you will have to overcome, but you will meet them in the future as bravely as you have met them in the past, and may a speedy and complete triumph crown your patriotic efforts.

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TO EDWARD L. PIERCE

NEW YORK, Nov. 23, 1889.

Pardon me for not answering your letter of the 18th inst. more promptly. I wished, before doing so, to refresh my own memory by looking over the record.

"The American citizen" who first brought the most important point in the French Arms case<sup>1</sup> to Sumner's and my attention was Senator Patterson. At the time when Sumner's resolutions were under discussion, his name was not mentioned because he had not authorized it. But in the course of proceedings he came forward himself. You will find reference to that matter in my speech of May 31, 1872, reviewing the whitewashing report of the Committee.

I think you underestimate the importance of that case. The transaction was a fairly representative one of the utterly reckless way in which laws were disregarded and international relations compromised under the Grant régime. You are probably aware that Sumner's mind would never master the details of a matter of this kind if they were in any degree complicated. So it was in this instance. His opening speech left the case in a very weak condition, and it was owing to this circumstance that I felt it my duty to take a prominent part in the debate at the beginning, which I had not intended to do. In fact, it was at Sumner's urgent request, if not *demand*, that I made my speech of February 15th. He bent over my seat, his being immediately behind me, and said: "You must speak now, instantly." From that moment the burden of the fight fell upon my shoulders, and you can gather from my speeches (Feb. 15th, Feb. 20th, May 31st) much more information about the subject, than from Sumner's. I had to be on the floor constantly in the running debate. Sumner seemed to look upon my zeal in the matter more or less as a service rendered to him personally and was very grateful to me for it. On one occasion he was especially outspoken. I must tell you of it.

<sup>1</sup> The alleged sale of arms by officers of the U. S. Government to agents of the French Government, for use in the Franco-Prussian war.

The debate created great excitement and attracted large audiences to the galleries. On February 19th, Conkling made an elaborate speech in defense of the Administration, attacking Sumner and me and Trumbull. Grant and the whole White House coterie were in the galleries of the Senate to witness our overthrow. As soon as Conkling was through, I demanded the floor to reply instantly, but Ferry of Connecticut moved an adjournment and carried it. I had the floor for the next day. My wife, who had also listened to Conkling, was very much dejected and told me on our way home that she did not think I could answer Conkling's speech. I tried to restore her courage and then employed the better part of the night in studying the documents once more and in arranging my ideas for the reply. But I could not prevail upon my wife to accompany me to the Senate the next day. When I arrived at the Capitol I found the avenues of the Senate Chamber filled with so great a crowd that I could only with difficulty make my way through it. As soon as I got the floor after the morning hour, Fenton of New York moved that the doors of the Senate Chamber be opened to admit the ladies who could not find room in the galleries. This was agreed to and in a few minutes every sofa and every square foot of standing room in the Chamber were filled. This audience was indeed inspiring and I think I never in my life spoke with so much nervous energy, fire and immediate effect. The crowd on the floor and in the galleries would at last break out at every touch, and the presiding officer found it very hard to restrain them. When I was through, the larger part of the audience, after having indulged themselves in all sorts of demonstrations, rose to depart, and proceedings in the Senate had to be suspended for about a quarter of an hour. I had just closed or was about to close, when my wife, who had after all been too restless

to stay at home, arrived at the Senate Chamber and tried to go up to the gallery, but the attendant, who knew her, told her: "No room in the gallery, madam; but you, as everybody, can go on the floor to-day; your husband is speaking." As she was trying to get in, the crowd was beginning to pour out, and Sumner, who was seeing out some friends, met her in the lobby and stretching out his hand cried out: "Oh, madam, I congratulate you. Your husband has just made the greatest speech that has been heard in the Senate for twenty years!" Afterwards he thanked me profusely. It was indeed, not the best speech, for the subject was comparatively small, but the greatest parliamentary triumph I ever had in the Senate. (Conkling was so deeply hurt that he never spoke to me again.) You can find a description of the affair in the *New York Tribune* of the next day, Feb. 21st.

The Senate constituted the investigating committee for the evident purpose of acquitting. In defiance of well-established customs, those who moved the inquiry were rigidly excluded from membership. On the contrary, they were made to appear as accused parties. I was, however, permitted to ask questions.

Nevertheless, the investigation clearly established two things: 1. That the rule of neutral duty as laid down by the Administration itself had been glaringly violated, and that the defense of the War Department consisted of the most transparent subterfuges; and

2. That in making these sales the laws governing the sale of arms and ammunition of the Government had been most unceremoniously set aside.

The investigation, the report of the majority of the committee and the speeches of the Administration Senators showed also how completely the Grant régime had subjected the moral sense of its adherents in Congress. Perhaps you might read with some profit in

that respect my speech of May 31, 1872, on the majority report.

As to the question whether there had been corrupt motives and practices connected with these sales of arms, I was then and am now convinced that there was illegitimate money-making at the bottom of this business. Some of the reasons for that belief I gave in the closing part of my speech of February 15th. Other reasons were furnished by confidential communications received by Sumner as well as myself, strong enough to produce a moral conviction. That moral conviction has been strengthened by information which has come to me since. But you know how difficult it is to prove such things by legal evidence, and in this case it was made doubly difficult by the determination of the majority of the Committee that nothing should come out. If you could read the testimony taken you would find that we were now and then just on the point of lifting the veil. But it could not be accomplished.

I remarked in one of my speeches that the Secretary of State, Fish, was strongly opposed to these sales, but the War Department, under Belknap, prevailed against him. I knew that the German Government would not remonstrate. Had there been the slightest danger of this, the inquiry would certainly not have been moved in the Senate.

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#### ON THE DEATH OF A CHILD<sup>1</sup>

As a near friend of this grief-stricken family, I am called upon to add a few words to this mournful ceremony, and I feel impelled to do so as a friend, too, of the dear little boy whose lifeless body lies in this coffin. For he felt me to be his friend and he called me so. There was in his

<sup>1</sup> Remarks at the funeral of Henry Hilgard Villard, June 13, 1890.

bright and healthy days between us something of that comradeship that may exist between the old and the young. Many a time we had to sit side by side when I was a guest at the family table, and we had our little jests, and teasings, and romps, and merriments together, the charming memory of which I hope never in my life to lose.

According to the ancient saying, those who are beloved by the gods die young. And this dear little boy certainly could be counted among those beloved. He was the late child of a most happy union. His birth was to his parents like the breaking of a fresh morning in the advanced day. Upon his cradle nature and fortune seemed to shower their choicest favors. That cradle stood in the lap of the purest and most beautiful family life. All that surrounded him was love and concord and goodness. When he first opened his eyes their unconscious glance fell upon this spot, than which there is upon the face of the earth scarcely one more radiant with rich beauty. But more than that. He was to be one of the heirs of his father's and his mother's fair fame and noble deeds. It was like a smiling fancy of fortune that, while he was still a baby in his mother's arms, he should participate in the consummation of his father's greatest achievement. And in their days of adversity his parents found no sweeter comfort than in this baby's bright eyes. Surely, this child was one of the beloved of the gods.

He could hardly stand upon his little feet when he quickly grew up into a distinct individuality. Of singularly delicate, almost feminine comeliness of shape, he soon developed in himself something like a real character, far away from the common. His infant mind seemed to work in channels entirely its own. He had a habit of self-contemplation and self-criticism, looking at his own being and doings as those of a third person, which some-

times broke out in startling utterances. His likes and dislikes of persons and things seemed to spring from other than the ordinary motives governing those so young, and in his conduct there appeared something like a determined and conscious will-power entirely different from the freakishness common among little children. And with all this his whole being bore the charm of an extraordinary—I might say a strange loveliness. There was something in this boy that made older persons not only glad but proud to receive from him signs of friendship, and those who watched his way, as almost everybody did who saw him frequently, would often wonderingly ask themselves what such a development would bring forth, being sure that it would be something very, very extraordinary.

And now this lovely being is gone, never to come back, and we look into the dreary void he left behind him—gone like a sunbeam that made nature smile and gladdened the human heart, and then disappeared behind a cloud. A few minutes ago his father put into my hand some lines written by Emerson which seem to be meant for him:

O child of Paradise,  
Boy who made dear his father's home,  
In whose deep eyes  
Men read the welfare of the times to come,  
I am too much bereft.  
The world dishonored thou hast left.  
O truth's and nature's costly lie!  
O trusted broken prophecy!  
O richest fortune sourly crossed!  
Born for the future, to the future lost!

What such a loss is to father and mother and brother and sister only those can measure whose own lives have been darkened by similar bereavements. They know that there is no consolation in words. We can offer nothing

better to our dear friends upon whom this cruel blow has fallen, than the earnest wish that they will summon all their fortitude to confront the inevitable; that they will remember the dear ones still left to them, and also those high aims of human endeavor which make life still worth living; that their great sorrow, which is now so sharp and seemingly unbearable, will be mellowed by time and the healing force of work and of duties done; and that they may then find a new happiness in the thought that the memory of having possessed such a child is in itself a great and imperishable possession. And if they can find any comfort in the devotion of true friendship, that surely does not now nor will it ever fail them.

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#### THE TARIFF QUESTION<sup>1</sup>

To be called upon for an expression of opinion on the present state of our public affairs by a society so distinguished for its intelligent public spirit and patriotism as the Massachusetts Reform Club is an honor which I highly appreciate. Permit me to say by way of preface that for a long time I have observed political events and conditions, not from the point of view of one active in party strife, but rather from that of a citizen greatly enjoying the quiet of private station, and having no desire to quit it, but, of course, as warmly as ever interested in the public welfare.

The most conspicuous public question at present before the country is that of the tariff. With regard to that subject, I have never taken an extreme position. In economics, I have an instinctive dread of abstract theories and *a priori* reasoning. I think it safer to draw my principles from my facts than to evolve my facts from my

<sup>1</sup> Address before the Massachusetts Reform Club, Oct. 20, 1890.

principles. That economic policy is best which works best. But, when I say "which works best," I do not mean only that which insures the production of greatest wealth; for let us not forget in our economic wisdom that, however necessary bread and meat may be, still they are not all we live for. No, I mean that economic policy which is best calculated to promote, together with the physical well-being, also the moral health of the people, and thus to strengthen the foundations of our institutions of democratic government. There is little danger that this nation will not be rich, but there is danger that it may be rich and rotten.

I have always been in sympathy with some of the objects which the protectionists profess to have in view. I believe in diversification of the occupations and industries of the people as an element of enlightenment and progress. I believe in the establishment of manufactures, and wish to see them grow and prosper. I believe in good earnings for the workingmen, and wish labor to have steady and remunerative employment. I believe also that, as far as we can look into the future, our National Government will have to derive its principal revenue from duties on imports. And I am willing to confess that at one period of my public life I came near jumping at the conclusion that, to attain these objects, a high protective tariff was necessary. The history of this country has taught me a different lesson.

Nobody can study that history with an unbiased mind without recognizing the fact that this country, possessing an almost infinite abundance and variety of natural resources, and inhabited by a people so full of intelligence and energy as ours, has been prosperous and rapidly advancing in wealth and well-being under low tariffs, such as that of 1789 and that of 1846, and that it has been prosperous at other times under a high protective tariff.

But the student of history will also observe the not unimportant fact that the prosperity of the high-tariff periods and that of the low-tariff periods were not the same in point of generality and popular contentment.

Our first tariff was that enacted in 1789, and subsequently somewhat modified under the inspiration of Hamilton's *Report on Manufactures*. It was protective in intention, but so low in its rates that, if Hamilton should arise to propose it to-day, he would be hooted out of the protection church as the rankest of free-traders: cotton goods, 5 per cent.; woolens, 5 per cent.; iron goods,  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent.; pig-iron free,—the general average about  $8\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. Under it there was a steady growth and the most general prosperity and contentment.

Then came the War of 1812, during which the tariff rates were temporarily doubled, the act to expire one year after the conclusion of peace. People rushed into venturesome, speculative manufacturing enterprises, such as will inevitably bring on a crash. In 1816, the war tariff having expired, a new tariff was made, protective in principle, and much higher in its rates than that of 1789. The duties averaged  $24\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. In 1819 the crash came, with general depression, bankruptcy and ruin in its train.

In 1824 the rates of the tariff of 1816 were thought not high enough, and a new protective tariff was made, the average of duties being  $32\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. The country had recovered from the crisis; but already in 1828 duties were again thought not high enough, and again a new tariff was made, the duties averaging this time  $43\frac{1}{3}$  per cent. This was the so-called tariff of abominations.

Now, it will strike you that in these forty years of protective policy, while times of prosperity alternated with times of depression, one thing was constant,—the pressure of the protected interests for higher tariff duties;

the ever-increasing demand for more, more; the rapid growth of appetite on eating; four great tariff acts, not counting the war measure, during a time covering one man's active business life, each one thought sufficient at the time, each one found too low after a little while; stability in the laws affecting business always loudly insisted upon to be the most desirable, and that stability always disturbed by a demand for higher duties; "tariff tinkering" always fiercely condemned as a contrivance of the evil-disposed, and then tariff tinkering recklessly carried on by the protectionists themselves; and thus the tariff duties driven up from an average of  $8\frac{1}{2}$  to  $24\frac{1}{2}$ , to  $32\frac{1}{2}$ , to  $43\frac{1}{3}$ . Whence this uncertainty and unrest?

For the explanation of such phenomena, I like to turn to the friends of the system. In a speech delivered in 1870, my highly esteemed friend, Senator Morrill, one of the most eminent of American protectionists, spoke as follows:

It is a libel to charge, as it has often been charged, that protection is always increasing the demand for further legislative favors. The facts are all the other way. Experienced manufacturers are always moderate in their demands. Only those unskilled or working with inferior machinery clamor for extravagant protection; and such extravagances may be properly rejected, just as the clamor in the opposite direction may be rejected. Prudent men know that large protection rouses a host of wild and reckless competitors, who flourish for a day and go down with a crash, carrying with them even those whose more prudent management deserved success.

My esteemed friend can certainly not have meant to say that tariff duties were constantly raised, during the period I have mentioned, without being asked for by manufacturers and others believing themselves benefited by protection. That they were so asked for, and even

urgently pressed, is no mere conjecture: it is well-ascertained history. Only the first Congress, that of 1789, made its tariff, the lowest one we ever had, untroubled by such pressure; and we have the testimony of my friend himself that one other tariff, belonging to another period of which I shall speak hereafter, was also made without demand. In the making of all other protective tariffs the urgency of the beneficiaries assisted with a vigor unrestrained by any morbid modesty. This is history, notorious and unquestionable. What my friend must have meant is that the clamor for high duties did not come from those manufacturers whom he classes as the "experienced" and "prudent," but from the "unskilled," those "working with inferior machinery" and the "reckless." And here Mr. Morrill touches one of the sorest points of the protective policy.

Yes, it is true that high protective duties encourage the "unskilled," men without solid business ability, to go into manufacturing enterprises in a speculative way, relying upon "legislative favors" to help them; that protection frequently enables them "to flourish for a day"; that their lack of business knowledge and ability then will entangle them in embarrassment until they are in danger of "going down with a crash"; that then they rush to Congress, clamoring for higher duties, in order to get higher prices for their wares, thus to be helped out of the lurch; that, when the higher duties are granted, they go on in the old manner, again "flourishing for a day," until they are obliged to run to Congress once more for still higher duties to be helped out of the lurch again, and so on; that thus the high protective policy keeps a horde of incompetents in business at the expense of the people, and that their reckless ventures, constantly disturbing the business situation, are a danger to those manufacturers "whose prudent management deserved success."

It is true that to the able, experienced and provident manufacturer high protection is rather a curse than a blessing, as it protects the unskillful and reckless against him; and the more prudent and provident he is, the more moderate will he be in his demands.

But it will be a mistake to say that the unskillful and reckless manufacturers are the only class constantly clamoring for higher protection. There are those, also, who are able business men, but whose greed is equal to their ability, who want to get very rich very quickly, and see in high protective duties a facility for making exorbitant profits. They, too, are regularly on hand, clamoring on high patriotic grounds for "increased legislative favors," and usually know how to get them too.

And there is a third agency working in the same direction. Most of our protective tariffs have been constructed not by the House of Representatives and Senate alone, but also by a third house,—and that sometimes the strongest of the three,—the lobby,—the lobby consisting of the agents of many different interests, each possessing more or less power, and each eager to obtain the greatest possible amount of "legislative favors" for itself. Some of these interests stand in each other's way; but they must all be more or less satisfied, so that the tariff will have the least possible opposition to overcome. The consequence is that almost all of our protective tariffs have been the product of that legislative process called "log-rolling." You know what it means. "If you help my iron, we will help your glass. If you hurt our white lead, we will hurt your linseed oil. Unless you take care of our wool, we shall smash the whole protective concern," and so on. Is it surprising that tariff laws born of such confused fights should frequently, by their own operation, defeat the very objects aimed at? Is it a wonder that in such turmoils of conflicting interests the wise saying of Henry

Clay, who, as a protectionist, had, after all, some clear ideas in his head,—namely, that “the admission, free of duty, of every article which aids the operations of the manufacturers” is one of the most effective methods of protection,—should have been entirely consigned to oblivion?

Nothing is more natural than that the manufacturer to whom the promised protection has thus become ineffective by the protection of something else—as, in fact, it has to not a few—should rush up to Congress, clamoring for still higher duties and renewed tariff tinkering. You may take it as a general principle that, when under a protective tariff the protection of one industry works to the prejudice of another protected industry, the tendency will always be in the direction of higher duties.

All these agencies coöperated in making each protective tariff appear insufficient when it had been for a while in practical operation, and to excite a pressing demand for a new and higher one. And thus it happened that during the period I have described even the prosperous times under the protective policy were not free from a restless dissatisfaction with the laws as they stood, and from ever-recurring disturbances of existing business arrangements,—an evil which constantly increased as protective duties grew higher.

Another peculiarity, and a more serious one, of the prosperity during that protective period,—always excepting the first part of it, when the tariff was the lowest we ever had,—consisted in the fact that, as the duties rose, a feeling grew up with them that some interests were promoted by “legislative favors,” at the expense of others. Especially the agriculturists began to complain that they had to buy the things they needed in a market in which prices were artificially and, in many cases, exorbitantly raised by protection, while they had to sell their products in a

market in which prices were kept low by the competition of the world. This feeling of injustice done was then most strongly manifested in the planting States; but it was shared by many in the North, who, the venerable Albert Gallatin prominent among them, in 1831 made strong demonstrations in favor of low duties. When, in spite of all this, in 1832 a revision of the tariff having been made necessary by a redundant revenue, the protective system was defiantly maintained in the tax laws of 1832, the nullification movement broke out in South Carolina, threatening to sweep over a large part of the South. That movement, attacking the very vitality of the Republic, was frowned down by the best patriotic sentiment of the country. But the complaints of injustice done through the high tariff to the agricultural population were nevertheless widely recognized as just. They were, in fact, the same complaints that arise now from the wheat fields of the West, as well as from the cotton fields of the South, in constantly increasing volume. Thus it was high protection which, with all the partial prosperity it boasted of, had produced a discontent among those not favored by it, which at last came near endangering the peace of the country.

Such are the lessons taught by our first protective period from 1789 to 1833. Then came Clay's compromise tariff, practically recognizing the justice of the existing discontent and intended as a great act of conciliation. It put an end to the tariff of 1828, reducing duties by gradual diminution to a maximum of twenty per cent., to be reached in 1842. Crazy speculation and the wildest financial mismanagement, with which the tariff had nothing to do, brought on the great crisis of 1837. The depression following and the insufficiency of revenue were sought to be remedied by the tariff of 1842, again a protective one, but very short-lived. In 1846, when Polk was

President and Robert J. Walker Secretary of the Treasury, the country entered upon the experience of a different system. Walker, in his first report, laid down these rules:

That no more money should be collected by taxation than necessary for the wants of the Government.

That no duty should be imposed on any article above the lowest rate which will yield the largest amount of revenue.

That below such a rate discrimination be made, descending in the scale of duties, or, for imperative reasons, the article might be placed on the list of those free from all duties.

That the maximum of revenue duties should be imposed on luxuries.

That all minimum and all specific duties should be abolished, and ad valorem duties upon the actual market value be substituted.

That the duties should be so imposed as to operate as equally as possible throughout the Union, discriminating neither for nor against any class or section.

The tariff of 1846 was framed substantially upon these principles. Duties averaged about twenty-two per cent. What was the result? The protected interests cried out that American industries would break down; that the laborer would be without work and bread; that the foreigner would have exclusive possession of the American market and levy tribute on the American people; that general ruin and desolation were inevitable. Well, what happened? Let a prominent advocate of the protective system describe the character of that period of low tariff. Mr. Blaine, in his *Twenty Years in Congress*, speaks thus: "The tariff of 1846 was yielding abundant revenue, and the business of the country was in a flourishing condition. Money became very abundant after the year 1849, large enterprises were undertaken, speculation was prevalent, and for a considerable period the prosperity

of the country was general and apparently genuine." The economic history of the time would have enabled Mr. Blaine to say even more: that during that period the development of manufacturing industries was rather gradual than sudden and spasmodic; that foreign competition, instead of undermining and crippling them, served to stimulate the adoption of improved methods of production and a full exertion of American inventive genius; that the profits of manufacturing enterprises were not such as to pour dividends amounting to millions into the lap of shareholders; that no enormous private fortunes were thus quickly accumulated, but that the profits were abundant enough to encourage the extension of operations; that labor found comparatively steady and remunerative employment, the wages of operatives rising; that not only manufacturers flourished, but that our foreign and coast-wise commerce in American bottoms covered the seas as it had never done before and has never since; and that agriculture, wherever it had means of communication, far from complaining of being prejudiced and burdened by "legislative favors" granted to other interests, was contented with having its full share of the prosperity, which was general and harmonious.

The symptoms of that general contentment are thus significantly described by Mr. Blaine:

After 1852 the Democrats had almost undisputed control of the Government, and had gradually become a free-trade party. The principles involved in the tariff of 1846 seemed for the time to be so entirely vindicated and approved that resistance to it ceased, not only among the people, but among the protective economists, and even among the manufacturers to a large extent.

To what extent the manufacturers had become reconciled to the low tariff appears from an act of a very striking

nature, also mentioned by Mr. Blaine. "So general," says he, "was this acquiescence that in 1856 a protective tariff was not suggested or even hinted at by any one of the three parties which presented Presidential Candidates." It was not surprising, therefore, that, with a plethoric condition of the National Treasury for two or three consecutive years, the Democratic Congress enacted what has since become known as the tariff of 1857. By this law the duties were placed lower than they had been at any time since the War of 1812.

It is said that the extraordinary prosperity of that period was owing in great part to a concurrence of fortunate circumstances, with which the low tariff had nothing to do; and this is undoubtedly true. But it is equally true that the remarkably prosperous development of our manufactures, with which the tariff is supposed to have had something to do, did take place under the low tariff of 1846, and thus disproved all the dismal predictions to the contrary. An unprecedented thing happened. It had long been a current saying among politicians that, as often as a Presidential election came around, the manufacturers were on hand demanding of political parties some "legislative favors" in consideration of their votes. Ten years after the tariff of 1846 had gone into operation, the manufacturers asked for nothing; or, if any of them did, they were so few that no party did them reverence.

But, if the general state of satisfaction under the low tariff of 1846 was so great as Mr. Blaine justly describes it, why did the country ever return to a different system? The revenue became so redundant that in 1857 Congress thought it wise to reduce tariff duties still further. The Senators and Representatives of the principal manufacturing States of New England voted for the reduction. The financial crisis of 1857, brought on mainly by our currency disorders, bad banking and excessive speculation, inter-

vened. It interrupted the prosperity of the country only for a short time, except where speculation had been most general and reckless. But the revenue of the Government fell off in an embarrassing degree, and measures had to be taken to replenish the National Treasury. In the session of Congress of 1859-60, a revision of the tariff was undertaken to that end. The result was the so-called Morrill tariff. In introducing it in the House of Representatives, Mr. Morrill, who was always a protectionist on principle, and who on this occasion described the progress of England from protection to free trade, spoke these remarkable words:

In this very process of education, a comparison of our own tariffs of 1824, 1828, 1832, 1842, 1846 and 1857 will show that we have made more rapid strides in cheapening manufactures, and therefore lessening the necessity of incidental protection, than ever England made herself in any equal period of time. Having more than two centuries the start in their industrial enterprise, we are now not more than fifteen years in her rear. The pupil will soon overtake its mistress.

Fifteen years? This was said in 1860. In Mr. Morrill's opinion, then, this country would have been ripe for free trade in 1875. And what did he propose to bring about this consummation? A tariff of which he himself said that while the specific rates proposed in it gave somewhat surer protection, yet these "specific rates were only equivalent for the tariff of 1846, or a change of form rather than of substance."

No stronger testimony could be given for the beneficent influence of the low tariff of 1846 upon the manufacturing industries of the country. But not even this return from the still lower tariff of 1857 to that of 1846 was asked for by the manufacturers. Mr. Rice of Massachusetts, who,

in the same debate, introduced himself, as "one of the representatives of a State whose domestic industry exceeds in value \$1,000,000 for every secular day in the year," declared that the "manufacturers of New England ask for no new enactments of importance for their relief or protection. The manufacturer asks no additional protection." In the same debate, Mr. Sherman said "that the manufacturers have asked, over and over again, to be let alone. The tariff of 1857 (lower than that of 1846) is the manufacturers' bill." And Mr. Morrill himself admitted, on a subsequent occasion, that the tariff called by his name "was not asked for, but coldly welcomed by manufacturers, who always and justly fear instability." The manufacturers asking for nothing! And what is the explanation of that phenomenon which now seems so strange? It is simple. The low tariff had built up manufacturing industries which were healthy, legitimate and ably conducted. Manufacturers had to rely, and did rely, upon their business knowledge, skill and inventive talent. There were no incompetents attracted to manufacturing by "legislative favors" to help them out of the lurch when their own lack of business ability and wastefulness ran them into embarrassment. There were no greedy speculators attracted, depending upon the Government to aid them in filling their pockets rapidly with millions, at the expense of the people. And, moreover, there was no confused mass of high-tariff duties, protecting one industry at the expense of another, and hampering manufacturing production itself with complicated burdens and impediments. I repeat, the manufacturing industries had a clear field before them; their growth was healthy, their spirit self-reliant; and therefore they flourished, not needing more protection and not wishing it. Thus our own history tells us that, while our manufacturers under every high protective tariff had clamored for more protec-

tion, under a low tariff the clamor ceased, because they were satisfied with what they had.

But then a fateful change was brought on by stirring events.

The civil war broke out. The Republic was in danger. It could not be saved without a constant and abundant supply of money. In the special session of Congress of 1861 some additions to the import duties were still deemed sufficient to raise the necessary revenue. But in 1862 the real exigencies of the civil war dawned upon the public mind, and then we beheld some of the wildest experiments in taxation the world has ever seen. On July 1, 1862, an extensive system of internal taxes was adopted. Taxes were laid upon everything within sight,—on all sorts of manufactures, on incomes, on the gross receipts of corporations, licenses on callings and so on. The manufacturers cried out: "If you put taxes on our industrial products, on our receipts, on our incomes, how can we compete with the world under such burdens?" It was not pretended that the manufacturers needed further protection. Not at all. "If manufactures in the history of our Government have been fostered," said Mr. Morrill, "they are now the strongest pillars of our support. If we bleed manufacturers, we must see to it that the proper tonic is administered at the same time." And Mr. Thaddeus Stevens said: "We intended to impose an additional duty on imports equal to the tax put upon the domestic article. It was done by way of compensation." And the act of July 14, 1862, by which this was done, was entitled "An act increasing temporarily"—mark that word "temporarily"—"the duties on imports." It was temporary compensation the manufacturers called for and received.

The fortunes of war were fickle. Abraham Lincoln had to call for new levies of men again and again. The needs of the Government grew more and more urgent.

One temporary measure after another for its relief was adopted by Congress, until finally they culminated in that tornado of taxation, the revenue legislation of 1864. The internal-revenue system was again enormously extended, and again a tariff bill was brought in as another measure of compensation to the manufacturers, which raised duties to an enormous height. This time it was not only the internal-revenue taxes for which they were to be compensated, but also, as Mr. Morrill said, "for the increased cost of production caused by the withdrawal of the large number of men who had gone to the field from productive labor, and the consequent advance in wages." Mr. Morrill earnestly appealed to the House to pass the bill speedily, saying, "This is intended as a war measure, as a temporary measure; and we must, as such, give it our support." And it was passed speedily. Both the internal-revenue and the tariff bill, imposing upon the people a burden of taxation such as they had never dreamed of bearing, went through after three days' debate in the House and but two in the Senate, with scarcely any examination of their economic merits, with only the most superficial inquiry into their details. It was called an urgent duty of patriotism to pass them, and that duty was obeyed. The tariff duties, which had averaged  $18\frac{4}{5}$  per cent., in 1861, went up to an average of  $47\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. in the tariff of 1864.

Look at the situation and attitude of the American people at that moment. I remember it well. There had been three years of fighting. And what fighting! By the hundreds of thousands the people had sent their sons into the field. Every breeze from the South had brought tidings of bloodshed and death. The country was full of mourning fathers and mothers, of widows and orphans. Yet more men were needed to fill the gaps in our shattered battalion. For three years the people had been pouring

out their money, the poor as well as the rich. The tax-gatherer was present everywhere. He followed every man; he followed every woman and child into every relation of life. The merchant, the farmer, the manufacturer, the banker, the railroad man, the physician, the lawyer, the clergyman, the teacher, the laborer, met him at every step. From the city home to the log cabin he sat down with every family at every meal. Tax, tax, tax from morning till night. For three years the people had borne all this, not without bending under the constantly increasing burden; but they bore it with grim resolution, for their country was dear to them. After many vicissitudes of war, days of hope and days of gloomy despondency, the promise of final triumph was at last appearing on the distant horizon. Grant was hewing his bloody road through the Virginia wilderness toward Richmond. Sherman moved upon Atlanta, preparing his great march to the sea. The country gathered itself up for a supreme effort. The Government called aloud for still more men and still more money. That was the time of the "We're coming, Father Abraham!" The people were willing for any sacrifice.

Under these circumstances it was that Congress largely increased the internal-revenue taxes and passed the compensating tariff of 1864. Had anybody—after the general prosperity enjoyed and the universal progress made under the low tariff of 1846—proposed anything like the tariff of 1864 as a measure merely intended to promote domestic industry, as an economic policy, the idea would have been covered with ridicule and contempt as one unworthy of consideration. Had anybody predicted at that time that the tariff of 1864, that huge jumble of imposts piled up helter-skelter, would remain the basis of the economic policy of the Republic for more than twenty-five years after the end of the civil war, he would

have been hooted down as a fool or denounced as a traitor at heart, trying to cripple the financial strength of the Government by throwing suspicion upon the good faith of those who brought forth its financial measures. The people did not think of political economy; they thought of battle, of victory, of saving the Republic. It may have struck many in those days that of all classes of society the manufacturing class was the only one which, for the burdens all had to bear, received compensation by law. There was the farmer. He had sent his sons to the field of war. He had to hire help to till his acres and to harvest his crops. He, too, suffered under the scarcity of labor. He, too, had to pay higher, far higher prices for all he had to buy. He, too, had to pay unaccustomed taxes, direct and indirect, that handicapped him in the struggle for existence. But he did not ask for legislation to compensate him, nor did he receive any. He sighed and groaned under the ever-increasing load; but, as to compensation, he had to be content to take his chances, and he took them like a man and a patriot. So the merchant, the professional man, the laborer,—no compensation by law for them: they, too, had to take their chances. And not only did they bear their own burdens, but every one of them, paying for what he had to buy the prices largely enhanced by the war tariff, contributed his share to compensate the manufacturers and keep them harmless.

Well did the people know that unscrupulous men took greedy advantage of the necessities of the Government to enrich themselves at the public cost; that enormous frauds were practiced; that manufacturers in large numbers had rushed to Congress to obtain “legislative favors” in the shape of protective duties far beyond the measure to which the rule of compensation gave them any color of right, and in the hurry of the moment received them; that unscrupulous avarice was rapidly accumulating

enormous private fortunes by means little, if at all, short of robbery.

But, undisturbed by all this, the people thought of their country. They bore the load of their taxes, a load such as hardly ever had been borne by any people, with the patriotic resolution that the Republic must be saved at any cost.

And had they not been told by statesmen whom they knew to be honorable that these tremendous measures of taxation were but "war measures," that in their very nature they were only "temporary," that the tariff taxes were only a "compensation" to the suffering manufacturer for the internal taxes, and that all this monstrous burden would be lifted off their aching shoulders with returning peace? And had they any reason to distrust such solemn declarations?

The people trusted and struggled on. And when in the Presidential election of 1864 they were asked, "Will you continue to bear the heavy burdens you have borne so long for the salvation of the Republic to the end, and will you continue to intrust those who imposed them upon you with your confidence and with the powers of your Government?" the solemn answer was, "We will." The history of the world has no example of nobler confidence, of loftier patriotism, of a more exalted spirit of self-sacrifice, than this voluntary decision. Truly, such a people deserved that their confidence should be justified, and that they be dealt with in good faith; and those who had made the promises undoubtedly meant to do so.

Well, in 1865 the civil war came to an end. Peace was restored, and the internal-revenue taxes for which the manufacturers had received compensation in high tariff duties gradually disappeared. The protected industries were then expected to give up the compensation. What was the reply? "Oh, no: these tariff duties we must keep.

Whoever seeks to deprive us of them is a pestilent British free-trader and an enemy of the American workingman." And thus the war tariff substantially remained. I will not recount in detail by what shifts a show was made of tariff reduction which left the protective duties almost untouched, and how these long years the Republican party promised tariff revision downward, until finally, after the election of 1888, which put the whole power of the Government into Republican hands, the leaders of the party declared that tariff revision meant revision upward. Whereupon the tariff of 1890 was made, the most monstrous this country has ever seen, one of the most monstrous ever enacted in any country. At the close of the civil war the tariff of compensations, which had been solemnly declared to be only a temporary war measure, averaged, on dutiable goods,  $47\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. To-day, twenty-five years after the war, the average has risen to 60 per cent. And this at a time of profound peace, not the slightest danger of a foreign conflict clouding our horizon, no internal taxation burdening our industries, no exigency in our National finances calling for higher revenues.

The first greeting this tariff received—nay, the greeting which broke forth as soon as it was certain that a tariff like this would become the law of the land—was a loud announcement of the higher prices the people will have to pay for almost every article covered by it. The voice of Mr. John Wanamaker, who is a large seller of goods of all kinds in Philadelphia, and also Postmaster-General of the United States, resounds sonorously in the chorus. "Tinware is advancing in cost," says he to his customers in an advertisement published in the Philadelphia papers, "and very soon the manufacturers will have their way, and you and we will have to pay much more." True, every word of it, and vigorously expressed.

But Mr. Wanamaker does not speak alone. I have before me a number of circulars announcing with emphasis to the trade that glass, china, axes, saws, all sorts of hardware, zinc goods, guns, powder, lead, musical instruments, strings, buttons, flannels, gloves—especially the cheaper kind, hosiery, upholstery goods, woolens, clothing, dress goods, carpets and what not are sharply rising in price, and that the trade must be prepared for it. The list will soon, if it does not already, contain every article on which duties are raised; and rich and poor, especially the wage-earners, the men of small incomes, will have carefully to revise their household budgets. They will find that to-day, with the funds at their disposal, they must content themselves with 15 to 25 per cent. less of the necessities and comforts of life than before the McKinley tariff made McKinley prices. The rich, of course, can manage to get on; but the poor will keenly feel how truly Mr. Wanamaker spoke, when he said that "the manufacturers have their way, and we shall have to pay much more."

The poor man will be less inclined to believe to-day than he was a month ago that precious argument of the protectionists, that the tariff tax is mostly, if not altogether, borne by the foreign manufacturer and the importer. Nor will the poor man be now so much impressed by the other argument, that by the operation of our high tariff a multitude of industrial products have grown cheaper, in the face of the fact that the general cheapening of industrial products has been owing to the wonderful progress of discovery and invention, and the astonishing improvements in the means and methods of production, and the further fact, now clearer than before, that our high-tariff policy, by artificially raising prices, serves only to deprive the American people of their fair share of the benefit arising from that progress.

And what has the protectionist to say by way of con-

solution to the poor man who looks with a troubled mind at this new increase in the cost of everything? "Be patient, friend, and never grow weary in paying. We must persevere in making every one his contribution to nurse our infant industries until they are strong." The poor man may curiously inquire how old these infants are. He looks into the history of his country, and finds that several of them were no babies when in 1789 the Government first began to nurse them, but were then satisfied with so little that at present it would seem no feeding at all. But he finds that the infants thrrove lustily, and that many of them grew strong enough to take care of themselves. He will be surprised to see that after 1816, when they were treated as infants again, they relapsed into the habits of infants, complaining and crying that they could not stand alone, and constantly clamoring for more and more nursing. It will startle him to find that after 1846, when the infants were curtly told to stand up and walk alone, they suddenly felt they could do so, and actually did walk on splendidly, and showed even a spirit of proud manliness, disdaining to ask for further support. He will be still more astonished to find that, when during our civil war they were offered compensation pap, the tall, vigorous fellows at once fell into the childish ways again, growing constantly more helpless, until now, a hundred years after they received the first nursing, these huge, fat, voracious, bawling monsters are put into a most gorgeous, gigantic baby carriage and fed with gold spoons at other people's expense.

This is also a proper time for the poor man to remember another argument addressed to him by the protectionist in the nature of a promise: that in a short time the manufacturers would compete among themselves, and that home competition would make prices lower than foreign competition could ever make them. This promise is

hoary with age, and has been constantly repeated year after year. Of course, this was before the brilliant discovery was made that low prices are un-American. How has the promise been kept?

Just as after the close of the war, when the internal taxes had disappeared, the manufacturers would not let go their compensation in tariff duties, so many of the most potent and important protected industries, when it was time for home competition to show the promised beneficent effect, coolly proceeded to form "trusts," combinations, agreements, understandings among themselves, for the purpose of controlling and, if necessary, of limiting production and of maintaining or even raising prices. In this way, they succeeded in many cases in establishing virtual monopolies.

After foreign competition had been in a great measure excluded by law for their benefit, they proceeded themselves to strangle home competition, too, also for their own benefit.

If there is anything hateful to the American mind, it is the idea of a monopoly. The protectionists began to fear that the open appearance of the "trust," which in fact is only the protective idea carried to its logical extreme, would excite the popular mind against the protective system. Nothing, indeed, suggests itself more naturally to the simplest understanding than this: when a branch of industry is protected against foreign competition by tariff duties, and a combination is formed for the purpose of killing home competition, too, and thus to control prices, the natural remedy is to let in foreign competition by removing the tariff duties and thus breaking up the monopoly.

This is so clear that the protectionists feared that the people would jump to the conclusion. Then laws were devised declaring the organization of trusts unlawful and

punishable. Such an anti-trust law was passed by Congress recently, and the Republicans "point to it with pride." But who believes in its effectiveness? Who does not know that such combinations or trusts, if attacked in their original shape, can easily reform themselves in a variety of shapes, so as to become lawful in form, while yet pursuing their original purpose? What, then, is the anti-trust law? A lightning-rod to prevent the popular feeling against the trusts from striking the tariff.

I have before me a list of twenty-seven industries carried on under trusts, combinations, agreements or understanding of various kinds, having the control of production and of prices in view.

Almost all these industries produce, directly or indirectly, things of common use, the prices of which are of great importance to people of all classes, especially those of limited means. What, then, have we to expect of such combinations under the present tariff? Let us hear Senator Sherman, a protectionist of old standing and a statesman high in Republican councils. Before the final vote on the tariff bill was taken in the Senate, he spoke these words:

The great danger of this tariff, and of all schemes for building up domestic industries by law, is that the beneficiaries themselves, capitalists and laborers alike, will not be content to realize the advantages they enjoy, but will combine and confederate in order to cheat the people of that which they have a right to enjoy. This protective policy must not degenerate into monopoly,—into trusts or combinations to raise prices against the spirit of the common law. I do hope now that this bill, when it becomes a law, will be acted upon by the manufacturers judiciously; that they will avoid those contracts which have been made and which have occasioned popular discontent; that they will invite fair competition, and that they will give the benefit of this competition to the people in

cheaper production. If they do not, I, for one, will be as ready to repeal this law as I am now to vote for it.

What? Not one word about the anti-trust law as a remedy? Not one. That shows what faith Senator Sherman has in its efficiency. What, then, did the Senator's anxious appeal mean? Simply this:

Protective manufacturers, this tariff law delivers the consumers of this country into your hands. Under it you can, if you are wicked enough to do so, "combine and confederate in order to cheat the people of that which they have a right to enjoy," and thereby immensely enrich yourselves. But I pray you to have mercy upon them. Do not yield to the temptation here offered to you: abandon your greed for the rapid gain of wealth, and permit your profits to be cut down by free and fair competition. Be good, be generous, be self-denying. Content yourselves voluntarily with less than this law enables you to get. But, if you do rob the people by extorting exorbitant prices, as this high tariff tempts you to do, I for one shall be ready to repeal it.

This was a cry of nature, doing honor to the Senator's heart. But, if such evils are to be apprehended, would it not have been wise to consider before the passage of such a law whether we have a moral right to make laws which give any class of men the power, for their own benefit, "to cheat the people of that which they have the right to enjoy"? Lead us not into temptation is a good old prayer. I know among the manufacturers there are as many good and high-minded men as in any other class. But I fear the temptation offered by this tariff law will prove too strong to not a few of them. Some may even have had their quiet chuckle over the Senator's appeal to their generosity. Why, at the moment the Senator was speaking, the papers reported a new trust in process of formation. No, there are hosts of men aching to make

hay while the sun shines; and, unless I am greatly mistaken, the consumers will, under this tariff law, be fleeced as they have seldom, if ever, been fleeced before. Nor will the Senator's threat that he and others may vote to repeal the law frighten a single one of them.

Those so disposed, the trust men and the combiners, will make the best of the opportunities presented by the law, and confide in their influence to maintain it. And if the Senator, finding his gloomy apprehensions verified, as he surely will, should really move its repeal, he will be set down as no better than a Mugwump, a member of the Cobden Club, one who has "British gold" in his pocket.

Look back a moment upon this remarkable history: Small protective duties originally designed to foster infant industries, and enormously higher duties given to the same industries one hundred years later; every protective tariff pronounced at first satisfactory, and then a higher one demanded afterward; stability promised each time, and then stability disturbed by the protectionists themselves; the war tariff adopted as a temporary measure, and then continued as a permanency in time of peace; the war duties put on to compensate the manufacturers for certain internal taxes, and then the compensation kept on after the internal taxes had disappeared; a reduction of prices promised to be effected by home competition among the protected industries, and then home competition strangled by means of trusts to keep up prices,—until things now come to such a pass that a grave Senator, himself a protectionist, finds it necessary solemnly to beseech the protected manufacturers to be merciful to the people and not to plunder them too much. I ask you all in candor, Would not—but for the fact that honorable men were in good faith engaged in it—this whole high tariff historically look very like systematic imposture, or, to use a popular parlance, like a huge

“confidence game” practiced upon the American people? Nor has it the public good for an excuse; for the same history teaches us that the country was most generally and harmoniously prosperous, progressive and contented in all its interests, agricultural, commercial and industrial, during the periods when the tariff was lowest.

But what now? Republican protectionists insist that the tariff is firmly established for ten years. It has ceased to be an issue, says one. It is history, says another. How blind those are who do not wish to see the truth! Even if the opponents of this tariff let it alone, its friends and beneficiaries will not. Why, the conference report on this tariff bill was still pending in the Senate, the child was not yet fairly born, when a Representative already introduced a bill in the House to raise the duties on binding twine. More than ever will the incompetents and speculators rush into manufacturing, and, getting into difficulty, clamor for higher duties to help them on. More than ever will greedy candidates for millionairedom seek to improve their opportunities and clamor for higher duties. More than ever will, under this jumble of inconsistencies, one protected industry be clogged and hampered by the protection given to another, and clamor for higher duties. The demand for higher and higher duties will irresistibly assert itself, unless the great mass of the people rise up against this system of injustice and extortion, and call a halt in thunder tones.

When will this be? How long so many people will permit themselves to be befogged by those well-worn sophistries about the infants to be nursed, the home market for the farmer and the tariff as the only support of the workingman’s wages; how long they will suffer themselves to be diverted from their true interests by the past record of a “grand old party,” by the stale demagogue screech about the rebel brigadiers, or the more recent

silly device of “the new secession in the House of Representatives,”—how long people will dance to these tunes and pay the fiddler, I shall not undertake to predict. But I believe it will not be very long. We are constantly told that this is now a very prosperous country. Is it true? Unquestionably, some people are prosperous, very, —so prosperous, indeed, that Mr. Butterworth, a Republican, could say on the floor of Congress: “There are industries in this country in which the dividends have been enormous. I can name upon my ten fingers men whose combined profits in the last decade have exceeded those of all the agriculturists of any State in this Union.”

There are among us not only prosperous men, but prosperous classes. But the prosperity of a country in the true sense depends no less on the distribution of wealth than on the creation of it. Do you think you can make the American farmers, the largest class of all, believe that they belong to the prosperous ones? You hear them loudly bewailing their constantly growing indebtedness, and in anxiety for their future you see them wildly groping about for measures of relief. That is no sign of prosperity nor contentment. To whatever cause they may to-day ascribe their troubles, they cannot long fail to see that it is a losing business to sell their staples at the low prices determined by the increasing competition of the whole world, while being obliged to purchase all their necessaries at prices artificially enhanced by our high tariff. No, a disadvantage felt by a majority of our population is bound at last to tell.

Another feeling will tell that, growing up among the wisest of our manufacturers, a grab-game tariff like ours is, in the long run, not only not a help, but rather an obstacle to a healthy development of their industries. You must not be surprised if at some day not far distant the manufacturer of New England joins hands with the

farmer of the West and the South against a common foe.

And, thirdly, while the American in general is a patient being, and will permit himself to be plundered for a while to make an experiment, there is a limit to his good nature. And I believe that limit is now being rapidly reached.

The reaction will inevitably come. I believe it is not far off. Those who predict a ten years' existence to this tariff rely upon the composition of the Senate. They forget that the Senate may have a majority of Republicans, but at the same time not of high-tariff men; for there are Republican Senators who listen to the voice of their constituents. When that reaction comes, I, as a conservative man, hope it will not come as an avalanche, crushing everything in its path, although it may. I hope it will come as a peaceful reform, beginning with what Henry Clay called "the admission, free of duty, of the articles which aid in the operations of manufacturers," the policy outlined by Grover Cleveland in his famous tariff message, which rendered the country the inestimable service of placing the issue boldly before the people,—that beginning to be followed by a corresponding reduction of duties on the manufactured articles. Our situation is very like that under the tariff of abominations after 1828, with slavery and nullification eliminated. The remedy will be like that laid down in the principles of the tariff of 1846.

But the economic side of our tariff is not its worst. Infinitely more dangerous is its effect upon the development of our institutions and our national character. We have recently had some significant experiences. The Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mr. Reed, fairly electrified his party by his saying, "Thank Heaven, this House is no longer a deliberative body!" To the wise patriots who made our Constitution, this jubilant

exclamation would have had a strange sound. Ever since modern systems of government have been thought of, the truest and most enlightened friends of liberty and progress have believed that the meeting of representatives of the people as law-makers, freely to exchange their opinions and deliberate upon the public affairs, was the institutional embodiment of the people's rights and the main safeguard of their interests, and that not only the power to resolve, but the freedom, aye, the duty, to speak and deliberate,—not only to act, but to give reasons for so acting,—was one of the essential virtues of the system. And now we hear the Speaker of our National House of Representatives triumphantly exclaim that his House is a deliberative body no longer.

It was, however, not his own triumph alone. It was that of the interest served by his party. Do you not remember, when the tariff bill was before Congress, how the press organs of protection shouted in one chorus: "Let discussion be stopped at once! Why this unnecessary talk? Action we want, and silence!" That was the voice of the real master. It demanded even that in the Senate, where, fortunately for the country, so far discussion has been free and unrestrained, rules should be adopted to shackle it. And why this? One protectionist journal spoke out frankly: "It is not the bill that will hurt us so much as the discussion." Therefore, no more deliberation; silent action is demanded,—demanded with characteristic arrogance. While in the House of Representatives debate has long ceased to be as free as it originally was, and the most important part of the business is done in the secrecy of the committee room. Speaker Reed did all in his power to render the secret work of the committee room still more decisive by making the public deliberations of the House still more insignificant. "The House no longer a deliberative body!" Do you know

what this means? A powerful interest demanding secret government, and an important step in the direction of it. Let us not forget that the more a government becomes secret government, the more it will tend to be irresponsible government, and that irresponsible government will soon be arbitrary and corrupt government.

Nothing could be more deceptive than the plea put forth that all the hurry, all the unprecedented arbitrariness of proceeding, had no other aim than to execute the will of the majority of the people. Even had that been the true aim, the means would have been none the less reprehensible. But was it the true aim? The Speaker and the majority were bent upon pushing through two bills,—the tariff bill and the election bill. And with regard to both they had good reason to think that they were not the will of the majority of the people. Why? They knew that in the last Presidential election the Republican party polled only a minority of the popular vote. They knew that now there is wide-spread opposition in the Republican ranks to both the tariff and the election bill, in addition to the united opposition of the Democrats. Thus they had the best reason to think that these bills did not represent the will of the majority of the people. And it was not in spite of this, but because of it, that they resorted to unprecedeted means to rush them through. They took snap judgment, for they feared that they would not have another House of Representatives with a Republican majority to pass the measures dictated by the ruling interest. To defeat the true will of the majority of the people, not to obey it, was the object.

Do you observe how the one-man power is growing in our government? There never was a time when a Speaker so boldly and so successfully usurped the functions of the House, when he counted quorums, unceremoniously suppressed the opposition and made it evident that no

legislative measure could pass that had not the Speaker's consent, and that what he approved had an enormous advantage. This is, indeed, the Speaker wanted by those interests which demand action without debate.

Another instance of the strengthened one-man power is the so-called reciprocity clause in the tariff act. If, after January 1, 1892, any country producing sugar, molasses, hides and so on, levies duties upon agricultural and other products of ours, and the President thinks that the treatment that we there receive is "reciprocally unequal and unreasonable," he shall have the power to proclaim the imposition of certain duties on our part upon sugar, hides etc. By the way, there is something intensely ludicrous in this sort of "reciprocity." We admit now sugar up to a certain grade free, professedly, that our people may have cheaper sugar. We admit hides free, very sensibly, to make the manufacturing of leather, of boots and shoes and other leather articles in this country possible. And now we tell those foreign countries substantially this:

If you refuse to admit certain products of ours free, and thus make our President think that we are not fairly treated, he will have a rod in pickle for you. He will have the power, if he thinks you deserve it, to make all our people pay more for their sugar and to ruin all the shoe factories in the United States. And he will do it, too, to punish you. Now take heed!

But this matter has a more serious side. It is held by Constitutional lawyers of high standing, among them Republicans, that in this case the President is empowered to proclaim the impossibility of tariff taxes, not after the mere ascertainment of certain tangible facts, but according to the judgment he forms in his own mind as to the tendency and effect of such facts, a matter upon which there

may be differences of opinion, and that this is a delegation of power to the President not warranted by the Constitution. And I must confess that I myself think so. But even if it were Constitutional, it is certain that its wisdom must be doubted; and that Congress, while it has repeatedly delegated to the President powers contingent upon the mere ascertainment of facts, has never in the recognition of the one-man power gone as far as now. And why did it do so now? In order, by this mock reciprocity, to obviate truer reciprocity, which would have been dangerous to high protection.

I have mentioned the election bill together with the tariff, and you may ask me whether the two serve any interest in common. A word about that.

Whatever specious pretenses may have been put forth, the election bill, as everybody knows, is designed mainly to affect the elections in the Southern States, in several districts of which, we are told, Republican members of Congress would be elected if the negroes were permitted to vote. A free ballot and a fair count, it is said, we must secure to them.

Look a moment at the South. By the sudden emancipation and enfranchisement of 4,000,000 slaves a social revolution was thrust upon the South greater and more rapid perhaps than any that history tells us of. A part of it I have witnessed myself. Immediately after the close of the civil war in 1865, I was sent by President Johnson into the Southern States to inquire into their condition. The spectacle I beheld was frightful. Hordes of negroes wandering idly about to enjoy their own freedom. Bands of impoverished whites, not a few almost wild with the excitement of distress, seeking to force the negroes back to work. Blood flowed, atrocious things were done. The South seemed to be on the brink of a race war. How would this appalling confusion end?

The National Government interposed to keep the peace and to regulate the relations between the former slaves and the former masters. The negroes were endowed with the right to vote. They exercised that right, plantation hands and all, the National Government holding its shield over them. The upshot was the carpet-bag governments, many of them nothing but barbarism led by rascality. Of the profligacy, rapacity and corruption of these it is difficult now to form a conception. The war itself had hardly been more destructive. "Negro supremacy" became the horror, the nightmare, of the Southern people, and, naturally, justly so. In 1877 the National troops were withdrawn, the carpet-bag governments fell, governments controlled by Southern whites took their places, the South began to grow rapidly in prosperity. Where the negroes were in the minority, they found themselves soon in the enjoyment of their political rights. Where they were in the majority, the whites resorted to various devices, from force to fraud, to keep them out of the control of political power; for the carpet-bag days were not forgotten, and negro rule was the nightmare of the South still.

In 1885, twenty years after my mission of inquiry, I visited those States again. I found a marvelous change. The people, white and black, were at work in earnest, with astonishing results. I found the Union truly restored in a new patriotism. It was, indeed, a new South. I inquired carefully into the relations between whites and blacks. I found them steadily growing in a friendship fruitful of beneficial results. True, there was that one dark spot remaining,—where the negroes were in the majority, the dread of negro domination and the old endeavor to prevent the negro from gaining political ascendency,—less by violence now, more by cunning tricks. The evil was indeed growing less; and, moreover,

many negroes were joining the Democrats, since the election of 1884 had shown them that a Democrat in the Presidency did not endanger their freedom. But I was driven to the conclusion that the trouble will continue to exist—do what you will—wherever and so long as the Southern white sees reason to fear the return of negro rule; and he will fear it so long and wherever politics are run on the color line, the great mass of the blacks on one side, the great mass of the whites on the other.

No candid mind can fail to see that the remedy lies in the distribution of the white and of the colored vote among the different parties, thus wiping out the political color line. Each party will then seek and hope to obtain its share of the colored vote, and thus become the natural protector of the colored voter. This process is necessarily slow, but it is perceptibly going forward. New interests have sprung up in the South, and new public questions. The ruling party, in many States overstrong, more and more breaks into rings and factions. Independent movements are the order of the day. See what is happening this moment in South Carolina. Whites and blacks everywhere are gradually changing sides. Slow as this process is, it will be quickened by the rising prosperity of the South and by the fading away of the old dread of negro rule.

Only let no disturbing hand touch it, and, after all the confusion and agony the South has passed through, the consummation which every American citizen should devoutly wish will gradually work itself out.

Now the election bill steps in. It is useless to say that this bill refers only to the Congressional elections and not to the local governments. Not its provisions in detail, but its general effects, are the thing of real importance. And what will they be? Let Southern Republicans speak.

Here is Mr. Ewart, Republican Member of Congress from North Carolina:

Suppose [said he, in the House of Representatives] you place this law on the statute books: how have you helped the negro? You again solidify the white voters of the South, now on the eve of disintegration; you again solidify the black vote, thus entirely destroying the kindly relations which exist between the two races to-day. You frighten away Northern capital now pouring into the South. You retard our industrial interests, and all to do what?

Here is Mr. Coleman, Republican member from Louisiana:

I am opposed to any Federal election law at this time. If you think the South has not yet suffered enough from the war and its results, then start afresh the echoes of those dreary years of reconstruction. Roll back into the past the present march of progress and development. Pass a Federal election law, and many who are now willing to separate from the Democracy will immediately get back into the so-called "white man's party" rather than risk "negro supremacy."

Here is Mr. Baxter, the Republican candidate for governor in Tennessee: "One of the worst consequences of the passage of this bill will be the irritation produced in the South and the consequent retardation of the fraternal feelings between the two sections of this Union now slowly, but surely, being cemented."

I might go on for hours quoting the voices of Southern Republicans, politicians, merchants, manufacturers, clergymen, aye, and of colored men, imploring Congress not to throw this brand of discord into the South, wantonly endangering its peace, fraternal feeling, progress and prosperity. And what is the answer? "The negro has the right to vote. He must be protected in the exercise

of it now, cost what it may." But when you have two ways to attain that end,—one a gradual, safe process, working by the forces of peace, friendly feeling and common well-doing, and the other a measure sure violently to disturb a beneficent development and to endanger what has been gained, after so much suffering and such painful struggles,—which of the two will true statesmanship choose? Nay, which will the patriot who has a heart for his country choose? I know the old saying, "Let justice be done, though the heavens fall!" But I know also that it is the part of statesmanship to see justice done in such a way that the heavens may not fall. I do not hesitate to say that in my long experience I have not seen a measure of legislation which, in view of its inevitable effects, was more unstatesmanlike, more reckless, more mischievous, aye, more wicked, than this election bill.

It has found so much opposition among Republicans, North and South, that many believe its postponement at the last session of Congress meant its death. I fear they are mistaken. Why do I fear this? When the postponement was moved in the Senate, the *New York Tribune*, the chief organ of Republicanism and protection in the country, angrily protested, saying, "The election bill carries within itself the assurance of future tariff bills by the hundred!" Let the peace and prosperity of the South go to the bottom of the sea, if only the protectionists can gain some more Congressmen in negro districts to pass more tariffs in their interests! This is the milk in the election bill! Those who gave us the McKinley tariff are determined to have it—if they can get it.

But worse remains behind. The American has always been thought somewhat fond of the dollar. But, as I understand our history, in no period of our national life has the millionaire been in the same measure as now the

ideal of youth and the subject of attention, envy and emulation. There never was a time when great wealth, as such, played so important a part, not only in business, but in society and in politics. Never has its influence been so general and so potent. Never has the rapid acquisition of riches been so largely the aim of endeavor, and at no time has that endeavor to such an extent sought to make, and succeeded in making, the Government serve its ends. Yes, without exaggeration, it may be said that it has at last become the principal business of our National Government to enable one class to take money out of the pockets of others and to put it into its own. I need scarcely add that of this our high tariff is one of the main incentives and the most systematic instrumentality. I might be asked, May not the same be said of all our tariffs in the past? It cannot, or to only a very slight extent; for the industries affected by the tariff are now an immeasurably larger part of our national activity than ever before. Nor have the favors obtained from the Government ever been so enormous.

There was a time when the American stood before the world as the finest type of self-relying manhood. He was the representative "help yourself" man. It was his pride. What do we behold now? From day to day grows the number of American citizens who look to the Government to set them up in business, to insure their profits, to protect them against losses. Even the farmers, once the sturdiest and most self-reliant of all our people, now, when they feel themselves in trouble, instead of simply demanding the removal of the burdens the Government has put upon them, cast about for all sorts of contrivances by which the Government is to take them into its paternal arms and to charge itself with their welfare. And, indeed, they reason, why should they not be as well taken care of as the owner of a copper mine or a woolen mill? If one,

why not another? Why not all? Is it surprising that such reasoning should become more and more general? Does not the notion rapidly gain ground that the Government is a sort of grab-bag, full of spoil for those who are smart enough to get their hands into it; that those who succeed in doing so are not to be blamed, but only to be envied and imitated, and that the opportunity to put in the hand is something worth paying for? And have you considered how demoralizing an effect such a tendency must have on our political life? Is it not time that we should pause and inquire how far we have already drifted?

Some time ago, a Republican Senator, whom his colleagues had honored with the presidency *pro tempore* of the Senate, gave expression to these significant sentiments:

The purification of politics is an iridescent dream. Government is force. Politics is a battle for supremacy. Parties are the armies. The Decalogue and the Golden Rule have no place in a political campaign. The object is success. In war it is lawful to hire Hessians, to purchase mercenaries, to mutilate, to kill, to destroy. The commander who lost a battle through the activity of his moral nature would be the derision and jest of history. This modern cant about the corruption of politics is fatiguing in the extreme.

I can remember no period in the life of the Republican party, once proud of being called the party of moral ideas,—no period before this in which a Republican leader would have dared to avow such sentiments. Now we may indeed be startled by the brutal cynicism of the utterance; but must we not admit that Senator Ingalls truthfully portrayed the character of that political warfare which is to decide the question whether certain favored industrial interests shall be enabled to gain enormous profits or not? Do we not remember the last Presidential campaign, in which sums of money contributed by those favored inter-

ests were employed to an extent never heard of before? And if it be true, as has been said, that the McKinley tariff bill was nothing but a bill to reward the signers to the campaign fund and to induce further contributions, does not Senator Ingalls simply speak for those who hold that this is a perfectly proper measure of political war?

Behold this spectacle: A few months ago the Republican State convention of Pennsylvania, the high-tariff State *par excellence*, adopted jubilantly the following resolution: "For the chairman of our National Committee, M. S. Quay, we feel a lasting sense of gratitude for his matchless services in the last campaign. As a citizen, a member of the general assembly, as secretary of the Commonwealth under two succeeding administrations, as State treasurer by the overwhelming suffrage of his fellow-citizens, and as Senator of the United States, he has won and retains our respect and confidence." Who is this great man, and what were his matchless services? Is he a statesman who has originated beneficent laws or systems of administration, or who eloquently advocated great truths, or who boldly attacked and abolished grievous abuses? To say this of Mr. Quay would be a roaring joke. No. His "matchless services" consisted merely in collecting an enormous campaign fund, or in enlisting pious men to do it for him, and in employing that money to "hire Hessians," to "purchase mercenaries," and to do various other things for his party, "in which the Decalogue and the Golden Rule had no place." And more than that. He is the same Quay who for months has stood arraigned before the whole country, by responsible men, among other disgraceful things, of having, while a high officer of this State, taken \$200,000 out of the public treasury, of having used that money in speculation and lost it, and of having been saved from exposure and the penitentiary by friends who replaced the money for him. He is the

same Quay who does not dare to deny that charge. And this man, with this past history branded upon his brow, demanded of the Republican convention of his State the nomination of one of his creatures, for the purpose of making the election of that creature serve as his vindication and of strengthening his power. And he obtained that nomination, obtained a resolution glorifying him, obtained the abject obedience of his party to his will.

True, there are at least some Republicans in Pennsylvania who will not bear upon their foreheads the burning shame of such thraldom, and who bravely struggle to purge their State of the dark disgrace. All honor and success to them!

Yet, in spite of all this, Quay is not only still the leader of his party in his State, but he stands to-day at the head of the national Republican organization; and there has not been a man yet among his colleagues nor among the powerful leaders of the party who had the spirit to drive him from the high place polluted by his presence. And this was once the party of great ideas! This was the party of Lincoln and Sumner! Oh, what a fall is here!

But let us look our condition calmly and squarely in the face. So long as there is in our politics a great money power, enjoying very valuable favors from the Government, and that money power finds it in its interest to help a political party in maintaining its ascendancy, then, to receive further profitable favors, so long will our political warfare be conducted on the Ingalls principles, and so long will the Quays be the natural leaders of campaigns. So long will their "matchless services," in which the Ten Commandments and the Golden Rule have no place, be in urgent requisition and win "lasting gratitude." And if one Quay falls, another will soon rise up in his stead.

Fellow-citizens, Americans, mark my words. No people governing themselves by universal suffrage can have a

series of general elections, the stake in which consists in scores upon scores of millions of gain for a strong money power, without becoming utterly demoralized and corrupted in their political life. It is high time that every American who loves his country should open his eyes to this incontestable truth. Here, indeed, is the greatest evil brought upon us by our high-tariff policy; and nothing can cure it but the removal of that stake from our elections.

I certainly do not underestimate the importance of the tariff in its economic working. But with us the tariff question has ceased to be only a question of economics. It has become a question touching the character of the American people, and the very vitality of our free institutions. Let us hope that the American people will know how to restore the Ten Commandments and the Golden Rule to their places in our political contests, and that they will prove the purification of their politics to be something more to them than a mere iridescent dream.

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#### TO ALLEN G. THURMAN

NEW YORK, Nov. 8, 1890.

My dear Mr. Thurman: I have just written a letter to the committee of invitation, who had done me the honor of inviting me to the banquet to be given to celebrate your 77th birthday, expressing to them my regret at being prevented from joining them by my engagements here. But I wish to say to you personally how glad I should have been to take you by the hand once more, especially on such an occasion, and how sorry I am to find it impossible. The memory of the old days when we sat together in the Senate Chamber, and of the struggles in many of which we stood side by side, and of the cordial feelings we always entertained toward one another, is

still very vivid in my mind, and I trust you have not forgotten them. You may well believe me when I assure you that every word I wrote to the Invitation Committee came straight from my heart.

I congratulate you most sincerely upon the appreciation of your merits which now comes to you so abundantly, although you are out of public life—which, by the way, you ought not to have been as long as your strength held out—and wish you many, many more happy days. Let me call you my old friend, as you may be sure I am

Yours.

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FROM ALLEN G. THURMAN

COLUMBUS, O., Dec. 15, 1890.

My dear General: Your very kind letter of the 8th ult. was duly received and gave me the greatest pleasure. I should have thanked you for it before this, but for weeks I have been unable to write, owing to a severe attack of rheumatism; and even now, owing to a lame wrist, I can scarcely hold a pen. I am therefore obliged to avail myself of a typewriter.

You may rest assured that I shall never forget our pleasant intercourse in the Senate, and I shall always recollect it with the highest pleasure. The banquet was a wholly unexpected compliment, and of course I am sincerely grateful for such a mark of friendship and esteem. I am but a private man now and shall never be anything else. Indeed I never desire to be anything else. My family, friends and books give me all the pleasure that a man of my age can expect to enjoy; and I leave to the younger men the active management of public affairs.

I have not received your speech on the tariff, to which you refer. I fear that it has miscarried, but it may be that it will turn up. Whenever I get hold of it I shall certainly read it with great interest. I read your *Life of Clay* with great interest and think that as a literary production it is of a very high

order. What are you writing about now, or do you confine yourself to business? You say nothing of your health, how is that? I hope you will find time occasionally to drop me a line, if it is only to let me know that you are well and happy.

I am, very sincerely, yours faithfully.

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FROM EX-PRESIDENT HAYES

DAYTON, O., May 29, 1891.

My dear Friend: I came here this afternoon to speak at the Memorial Services to-morrow. On my way down and since I arrived I have read your "Lincoln" in the June *Atlantic*. It is simply perfect. I congratulate you on this splendid article. It is the best picture of Lincoln. Every merit belongs to it. Be happy over it. Nothing better will be written about the greatest, most interesting and most wonderful character who has appeared in public affairs in any age. I am happy!

God Bless You.

Sincerely,

RUTHERFORD B. HAYES.

Gen. SCHURZ.

P.S. My kindest regards to the young ladies. Let them enjoy your triumph.

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TO MOORFIELD STOREY

NEW YORK, Nov. 1, 1891.

I have read your speech with great attention and interest. It is admirable. I agree with you in the opinion that if the Independents can, by united action, do anything to secure Cleveland's nomination for the Presidency by the Democrats next year, it should by all means be done. The question is—what?

As you will remember, we had such a manifestation of independent sentiment in 1876—the "Fifth Avenue Hotel

Conference." That conference may have contributed a little towards Blaine's defeat in the Republican National Convention of that year, but it certainly did not effect the nomination of the candidate we had in view, Mr. Bristow. We had a similar manifestation at a Washington Birthday dinner in Brooklyn in 1884, which was directed against both Blaine and Arthur. It had no effect at all.

I do not mean to say that a similar demonstration in favor of Cleveland some time before the National Conventions are held would be likewise without the desired effect. But it is carefully to be considered what shape that demonstration is to take. It seems to me that we should have a meeting of a few men—say four or five weeks hence—to discuss that question confidentially among themselves, and I shall be glad to be one of the number. Will you not visit New York one of these days? It would give me very great pleasure to talk the matter over with you.

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#### TO MOORFIELD STOREY

HAMBURG-AMERICAN PACKET COMPANY,<sup>1</sup>  
37 BROADWAY, NEW YORK, March 1, 1892.

Your letter of yesterday reached me this morning. The meeting at my house last week was attended by Mr. Curtis, Mr. Hale, Mr. Potts and myself. It was concluded to send to a number of persons in sympathy with us a short circular simply mentioning the points of agreement and asking for the formation of committees of correspondence to communicate with us as soon as possible. I was asked to draft the circular and have done so. I sent it to Curtis for criticism and such amendment as may be

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Schurz was a director of this company, 1888-1892.

deemed advisable, and you will soon have a copy submitted to you.

I saw Cleveland yesterday and had a good talk with him. He indulges in no illusions but is not without hope, and has evidently made up his mind to stick. I think a meeting in Boston, of a Democratic character, presided over by Governor Russell, declaring vigorously for Cleveland, would be an excellent thing, and I earnestly hope you will bring it about.

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TO ANDREW FISKE

NEW YORK, April 8, 1892.

I regret most sincerely that my engagements here do not permit me to accept the invitation of the Massachusetts Reform Club to the dinner to be given to the Hon. Geo. Fred. Williams "in recognition of his distinguished services upon the Coinage Committee and on the floor of the House of Representatives in opposition to Free Silver Coinage."

The honor of that recognition Mr. Williams has fairly and fully earned. It may be said that he has done only his duty; but that duty he has done with signal ability, courage, energy and success, and that, too, as one of the youngest Members of Congress.

He and his brave companions in the struggle against the free coinage movement have rendered the country a service that cannot be too highly appreciated. Trusting in the justice of their cause they dared to hope against hope. They gallantly breasted an adverse current which others considered irresistible. They boldly threw aside the old policy of trying to appease a popular delusion by making concessions to it—a policy almost always apt to increase the danger it is intended to avert. They met the specious fallacies of their opponents with uncompromis-

ing firmness. They called things by their right names. They took the bull by the horns. They loudly proclaimed their determination never to yield to what they deemed wrong no matter what the consequences might be to their party standing. And thus they extorted respect from their very opponents. Thus they demonstrated how such a fight can be won even against apparently overwhelming odds.

I think I am not exaggerating when I say that, thanks to them, the fight is actually won. I believe the defeat the free-coinage fallacy has suffered in the House of Representatives has been decisive. That movement may attempt a few more demonstrations of strength, but they will be only the spasms of its death struggle. The paper inflation mania, some years ago, died in the same manner.

Now the time is coming for a vigorous assault on the vicious features of the silver law of 1890, and I trust Mr. Williams will appear again on the same field in the front rank of the champions of the public interest.<sup>1</sup>

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#### TO EX-PRESIDENT CLEVELAND

[June, 1892.]

I congratulate you most heartily upon your nomination. You have won a triumph of extraordinary significance. It is the triumph of the healthiest kind of public opinion. You have been nominated *by the people* over the heads of the politicians; and the people have preferred you for those very qualities which in the eyes of the machine politicians disqualified you. And for the same qualities the people are going to elect you too. The more the people

<sup>1</sup> In 1896 Mr. Williams became an advocate of the free coinage of silver, at the ratio of sixteen to one.

become convinced that you will courageously follow your sense of right without fear of consequences, the more votes you will get. There will be half a dozen Independents and even Republicans voting for you in the place of every disaffected Democrat, if such there be.

Will you be so kind as to convey my congratulations also to Mrs. Cleveland. There will be general joy to see her in the White House again.

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TO W. H. P——

BOLTON LANDING, LAKE GEORGE, N. Y., Aug. 28, 1892.

I have had some correspondence with Mr. W—— about a loan you wish to be made to you, and as I happen to have at present \$5000 at my disposal, I informed him that I would let you have that sum on the terms proposed by you. On looking at those terms more closely I find that your offer of a one year's note of \$5500 for \$5000 involved the payment of interest at 10%, more than the legal rate. If you prefer the one year loan I shall ask you to reduce your note to \$5300 which makes the interest the regular 6%. I do not wish to make any money out of you, the principal things I have in view being to help you and at the same time to be well secured in my investments—this because my fortune is very limited and my time for acquiring wealth past. All I ask therefore is that you secure me as well as you can—not as if I had not the most perfect confidence in your good intentions, but for the event of something unforeseen happening to you or your enterprise.

I hoped to be in New York about this time but my health is in such a condition that I am obliged to postpone my departure from here. How goes the campaign? I fear I shall not be able to do as much as I expected.

THE ISSUES OF THE NATIONAL CAMPAIGN OF 1892<sup>1</sup>

BOLTON, LAKE GEORGE, Sept. 8, 1892.

GENTLEMEN:—I highly appreciate and sincerely thank you for the great distinction you confer upon me by your request that I should publicly discuss the issues to be decided by the American people at the coming Presidential election. In compliance with your wish, I should be glad to deliver an address before a public meeting were I not, to my sincere regret, prevented from doing so by ill-health. I shall, however, with great pleasure lay before you in writing what would have been the substance of my speech. You do me the honor to say that it has been my “custom to discuss public questions with a sincere regard to the larger and enduring interests of the whole country rather than to the partisan exigencies of the moment.” Such has at least always been my endeavor, and I shall submit to you now with entire candor what I think the most important consequences will be, of the action of the people, one way or the other, at the coming election. And the terms of your letter assure me that I am addressing men who always conscientiously consider in what manner they can best serve the public interest before making up their minds as to how to vote.

We are told that the tariff is the chief issue of this campaign. I certainly do not underestimate the importance of any of its aspects, but I regard it as only a part of a far more comprehensive question which is not merely economic, but political in its nature, and concerns the general working, in fact the moral vitality, of our democratic system of government. And this is of far greater consequence than mere considerations of material interest. Let us look at our present political condition.

<sup>1</sup> A public letter in answer to an invitation to address a meeting in Brooklyn.

There is a school of pessimists growing up among us who, whenever anything goes wrong, are ready to declare democratic government a failure and to despair of the Republic. I do not mean that insignificant and ridiculous class of poor beings who affect to be ashamed of calling themselves Americans, ape the customs of foreign aristocracies and run after foreign titles. They are simply snobs. But I mean certain more serious persons whom the contemplation of the frequent mishaps in the conduct of popular government has made faint-hearted and gloomy. If their dismal state of mind only led them more sharply to find fault and criticise, it would do no harm, and might do good. But when it goes so far as to discourage every attempt at improvement as useless, it is harmful indeed. Let us remind these pessimists that if they apply the same methods of criticism and the same reasoning by which they make our democratic government a failure to aristocratic or to monarchial government, they will surely make them out failures likewise; and so every other kind of government, until at last they will reach the conclusion that all forms of government are failures, and that it is absolutely useless to try any. Only anarchy will remain, and they are not likely to make that out a success.

I, for my part, although being beyond the time of youthful illusions, believe that a democratic republic will prove the most excellent form of government, if administered, not necessarily by angels, but by a fairly virtuous, self-respecting, patient, self-restraining, sensible, industrious, liberty-, peace- and order-loving people; and that the Americans, in the same measure as they are and remain such a people, will successfully maintain such a government, and be strong and happy in its enjoyment. It must essentially be a government of public opinion expressed in the forms of law. Such a government will,

of course, have its shortcomings and make its mistakes, perhaps serious ones and plenty of them. But as long as the growth and action of public opinion in the body-politic is free and genuine, the good sense of the people may be trusted to bring about in time the correction of errors and of existing evils—not completely, perhaps, nor perfectly, but measurably, sufficiently to make things in the end come out about right, to keep our system of government in steady working order, and to secure to our people more freedom and contentment than they would have in any other way. Paradoxical as it may sound, this is the country in which, so governed, things may go badly in detail, but yet well on the whole. This is, and will remain, true, *provided always* that we do not permit certain evil influences in politics, tending to obstruct the growth and to pervert the expression of an honest public opinion among the people, to continue and become stronger than they now are. The most obvious of the evil influences in politics I speak of are money and the machine.

I know there always has been, and always will be, some money used in elections for perfectly proper ends. But it is a notorious fact that sums are now spent in Presidential and even in State campaigns which a generation ago would have been thought fabulous; that the election of United States Senators by some legislatures occasions financial arrangements as large as those of the starting of a big bank; that in some Congressional districts and some municipalities the cost of a canvass is enormous; that much of that money is used for the purpose of bribery in a variety of forms; that not a few constituencies, not long ago pure, are thoroughly debauched, and that the evil has been growing and spreading of late from year to year. Indeed, we have reached the point where the raising of big sums for use in elections is officially recognized as a

high political function deserving signal recognition. Look at Mr. John Wanamaker, whose only title to rank as a statesman, when he was made a Cabinet Minister, consisted in the collection of a large electioneering fund, to be spent where it would do the most good by his brother statesman, Matt Quay. And the frankness and gravity with which party managers nowadays discuss the statistics of purchasable voters—floaters, so called—and the methods of buying and watching them, shows this part of party warfare to have risen to the dignity of a recognized and important branch of the science of practical politics, and its masters are gratefully praised as “peerless leaders.”

As to the machine, we are sometimes told by well-meaning persons that some sort of a party machine is necessary. Let us distinguish. Public-spirited citizens form a party because they have substantially the same objects of public interest in view; they seek to serve these objects by organized effort, and to that end form committees and clubs and whatever else an effective organization requires, all being composed of men animated with the desire of furthering the same public ends. This is a healthy, legitimate party organization. What is the machine? An organization within a party, composed of officeholders or officeseekers, or both, who ostensibly serve a public cause for the purpose of having that cause serve them; politicians clubbed together for mutual support and benefit; well disciplined under shrewd and energetic leaders; seeking, in the first place, to rule the party to which they belong, so as to make its victory their spoil; striving to control its caucuses and nominating conventions so that only such men be selected for public positions of power and emolument as can be depended upon to serve their interests, and caring little or nothing for any cause or any party or any candidate, unless their interest is served. They may sometimes support, with apparent

zeal, a candidate of whom they can expect no service, but only because they would otherwise forfeit their party standing and lose future opportunities. This is the machine. Whether it operates only in municipalities or spreads its power over whole States, its spirit is the same. Nor is that spirit very different when the officeholding force of the National Government is called into political service to promote personal ends. On the whole, it may be said that the development of party organization has of late years been largely in the direction of machine methods.

What will be the effect of all this on our political life? Money wrongfully used in elections corrupts public opinion; the machine, as far as its influence reaches, strives by the action of selfish, well-drilled and disciplined organization to obstruct, override, falsify, enslave public opinion. Thus both tend to poison the very fountain-head of democratic government. They do more. They serve to raise up systematically a race of unprincipled, self-seeking, mercenary politicians, and to repel from public life men who with patriotic ambition wish to serve the public welfare according to their honest convictions. Wherever money and the machine are strong and successful, they teach the youth of the country that not ability, knowledge, honesty, public spirit, fidelity to duty, devotion to the country will keep them in public position, but that subserviency to a self-seeking organization, the willingness to sacrifice to it all higher aims, is necessary to political success; that the low arts of the political manipulator are worth more to the public man than true statesmanship; that those who are constantly troubled by principle and a high sense of duty are impracticable visionaries and dudes and Pharisees; that such fools may seem to get a start occasionally, but not for long; that he who wishes to prosper in politics must discard such squeam-

ish notions; that, if he be rich, he must liberally shovel out his money without asking where it goes; or, if he has ability, he must place it at the service of the organization for weal or woe.

How this sort of politics practically works where money and the machine are strong, we know from the experience of municipalities and of States. What it would accomplish if it spread over the whole nation, we can well conjecture. These evils are not confined to any one party. Both of them have their sins to answer for. But a candid study of our recent political history and our present condition has forced the conclusion upon me that in the Republican party these tendencies have, owing to peculiar circumstances, come to their most dangerous development.

I cannot say this of the Republican party without a feeling of profoundest regret. As a political being I grew up in and with that party. During its great endeavors for human freedom I saw in it all that was noblest and best. In its struggles I enjoyed the glorious sunshine of a youthful enthusiasm undisturbed by doubt or misgiving. And whatever of honor and distinction in public life fell to my lot I had under its auspices. I clung to it with almost filial affection and devoted allegiance, and hoped to belong to it all the days of my life. But the citizen of a republic is not permitted to forget that the duty to his country must be more sacred to him than all party sentiment or obligation, and that he has no right to be swerved from that duty even by the impulse of gratitude. I know well convictions of duty are different and lead different men different ways. I have to walk the path that my conviction leads me, although it leads me away from grateful attachments and cherished memories.

The Republican party has indeed a glorious past. It sprang into being at the call of the popular conscience,

which rose up against the spread of slavery. This gave it its title of the party of freedom and of moral ideas. It conducted the Government during the war for the Union, and under its auspices the life of the Nation was saved. This made it in its time preëminently the party of National patriotism. Its aims were simple, clear and noble; its spirit that of patriotic devotion. But when its first great ends had been achieved, the civil war was ended, and the work of reconstruction begun, then the lust of power crept into its councils. While the life of the Union was still hanging in the balance of battle, the Republicans had felt, not unnaturally, that the ascendancy of the Republican party was necessary to the salvation of the Republic, and that, in maintaining that ascendancy, the end would justify the means. This belief became so firmly rooted in the minds of multitudes of Republicans that, even when the vital crisis was over, they continued to look upon any attempt to deprive the Republican party of power as a heinous offense little short of treason; and they sanctioned even the most arbitrary measures adopted at that period to keep the late rebel States under Republican rule as measures absolutely required for the protection of the liberated slave and the preservation of the Union.

But the prejudices and passions of the civil war could not remain alive forever to demonstrate the necessity of Republican ascendancy. People would at last begin to think that the anti-slavery and Union-saving mission of the Republican party was really fulfilled. Then the tariff question was advanced to the foreground. By the exigencies of the war, shrewdly taken advantage of by protectionists, the Republican party had been drawn into a protective policy. The protective tariff, however, had at first been presented only as a "war measure," as a "temporary necessity." And after the war the continuation of the protective system had been advocated in a

more or less apologetic way, with constant promises of revision in the direction of lower duties. In election campaigns it had figured only by the side of other more prominent issues upon which the Republican party relied for success.

Even then, carried to that length, our tariff policy had begun to produce a very deleterious effect upon the ways of thinking and the character of the American people. The Americans had been in their daily life, in the employment of their energies, their enterprise, their struggle for success on every field of activity, the most independent, self-reliant, self-helping people in the world. This quality was the glory of American manhood. To it more than to anything else the American people owed their rapid progress, their prosperity, their greatness, aye, even the preservation of the vital element in their democratic institutions. But the protective system, in its more recent expansion over constantly widening fields, is teaching them, impelling them, seducing them—not a mere handful of manufacturers, but almost all classes of the people—to look to the Government for aid and support and protection against loss in almost everything they do. I maintain, and I cannot lay too much stress upon it, any economic system that has the effect of weakening the spirit of self-reliance, self-help, individual responsibility among the people and of making them look to a paternal Government for what they should look for to themselves—every such system will deteriorate our National character, will eventually undermine our free institutions, and is essentially an un-American system. That system is bringing forth a most characteristic fruit even now.

In 1884 something happened which by the Republican politicians had been represented as equivalent to the destruction of the country. The Republicans were defeated in a Presidential election. A Democratic

President took the helm of the National Government. And still more, the country was *not* destroyed. The Democratic Administration proved eminently conservative, patriotic and safe. The old political capital upon which the Republican party had successfully banked so many years was irretrievably gone. Something desperate had to be done to regain the lost power. And it was done. In its National Convention of 1888 the Republican party gave itself over body and soul to the money-power interested in the protective tariff, expecting from it substantial aid in the election.

I know this is a grave assertion. But if you are not yet satisfied of its truthfulness, you need only study the history of the campaign of 1888 and what followed. There was not the slightest *popular* demand for higher tariff duties. The Republicans had till then substantially admitted the desirability of reductions, and only asked that they, as the friends of the system, be permitted to make the alterations themselves. But in 1888 the scene changed. With the most cynical frankness, Republican leaders notified the protected manufacturers, openly recognizing them as the beneficiaries of the tariff, that unless they permitted the "fat to be fried out of them" for the benefit of the Republican party, they need not expect any further tariff favors—in fact, the tariff might be let go by the board—but that they would be well taken care of if they paid up. The Republican National Convention took extreme protection ground. A vista of indefinite increases of duties was opened. The fat-frying process proceeded vigorously. The beneficiaries of the tariff contributed with profusion. The Republican campaign fund received unprecedented sums of money to be expended by Mr. Matt Quay. Thus the victory was won. Then the helpful beneficiaries of productive duties demanded and received their reward, and that reward was the McKinley

tariff. It is a notorious fact that for not a few of the new tariff rates scarcely any reason could be given, except that they had been asked for; and the demand for them was enforced by the argument that they had been earned.

I shall not discuss the economic, but only the political aspect of the McKinley tariff, which seems to me the most important. As has been truthfully said many a time the natural resources of this country are so enormous that in a sense it may prosper for a long period in spite of any economic system ever so vicious; or, if it suffers, it may speedily recover. The American people can endure being plundered by a favored few in this or any other way a while without danger of permanent injury. But, whether they are plundered—or, as the protectionists say, enriched by this system—what they cannot endure without danger of lasting detriment is the political demoralization which this sort of tariff policy inevitably brings with it. This is pollution of the blood.

Examine the case with care and candor. The Republican party, as the advocate of the protective tariff, is fond of calling itself the champion of American labor. The only pretext for this pretension lies in the fact that the Republican party by its tariff policy enriches certain employers of labor and then trusts them with being so philanthropic as to pay their workingmen more than the market rate of wages—according to the well-known scheme of benevolence which consists in making the rich richer, so that they can take better care of the poor. In fact, the Republican party is the champion of the capitalists deriving profit from the tariff duties protecting certain industries. The capital invested in these industries constitutes a gigantic money-power dependent for the magnitude of its profits on legislative favors, and therefore interested in influencing legislation for its own benefit. With this moneyed power, compacted by a

common interest, the Republican party has a sort of tacit partnership agreement—and not quite tacit either—to this effect: The party of the first part, the moneyed power, is to do all it can by way of furnishing campaign funds to be used in National elections, to keep the party of the second part, the Republican party, in possession of the Government. The party of the second part, the Republican party, is in return to do all it can by way of tariff legislation to keep the party of the first part, the moneyed power, in the enjoyment of large financial profits. And the larger these profits are, the more able and the more willing will be the party of the first part, the moneyed power, to furnish the party of the second part, the Republican party, with a big corruption fund for buying the next election, expecting, of course, for itself again ample returns in the shape of still more profitably devised tariff laws. And so on.

It is true, the Republicans tell us that the McKinley tariff is the closing act, the final consummation of the protective policy, and that beyond it nothing will ever be asked. This is the old song. I know it well. This country never had a protective tariff in its whole history, before the enactment of which the people were not assured that this was the utmost measure of the demands that would be made, and after the enactment of which the clamor for more protection—higher duties—did not soon again begin. It is the experience not only of this country, but of the world, and it is in the nature of high protection. So it will be again with the McKinley tariff, if the Republicans are entrusted with full power. More will be asked for; more will be granted by the Republican party for more subsidy needed to keep the party in the possession of power. But even if the duties were not increased, the arrangement to preserve those now existing would be substantially the same.

But I hear some people answer: "Why, is it not perfectly natural that those who are profited by the tariff should contribute money for the success of the high-tariff party, and that this party should then do the best it can for the benefit of its supporters?" Quite natural? Yes! But just there is the rub! That there should be an economic policy followed by the Government which makes relations between a moneyed interest and a political party, involving the substantial purchase of legislation, appear entirely natural, in fact almost inevitable. Just that is the significant, the awful fact! That there are so many people finding such a bargain perfectly natural and talking about it with the utmost coolness as an ordinary business transaction—just that proves how far the dreadfully demoralizing influence of such a practice of corrupt bargaining has already done its work. Who was there in 1888 that dared to defend Colonel Dudley's famous circular about the buying up of purchasable voters in "blocks of five"? The Democrats indignantly denounced it, the Republicans blushingly quibbled about its genuineness or its meaning. Even Mr. Garrison, the beneficiary of the work done with the "fat fried out of the manufacturers," found it proper to banish Colonel Dudley from the grace of his countenance. And yet, would not the buying of the "blocks of five," and all that Colonel Dudley was charged with, if standing alone, unconnected with a far-reaching system, have been a very trifling incident compared with the grand bargaining of legislation for material support between the Republican party and the moneyed power profiting by the tariff—a bargain of the execution of which Colonel Dudley's scheme was only a modest, although significant detail?

We are all agreed as to the enormous dangers to the vitality of free institutions flowing from the illegitimate use of money in elections. But can you find among all

methods of raising money in elections, one that is farther reaching and threatening in the long run more pernicious results than the systematic investment of money by a great financial power in a political party, to obtain through that party legislation securing large pecuniary profits to the investor? Can you imagine a more effective machinery for the use of money in elections, and all that it implies, than a great political party lavishly subsidized by rich men and corporations who seek through it the enactment or continuance of laws to make them still richer? I say to you, the most fertile genius of evil in his most ambitious flights of fancy cannot invent a surer method fatally to demoralize the political life of a people governing themselves by universal suffrage, than a policy putting up a stake of untold millions of money in its general elections, that stake of untold millions to be won by a strong financial power through the victory of one of the political parties of the land. The result is inevitable.

You may object that after all there are many good men among the leaders and the rank and file of the Republican party. Unquestionably there are. Let me be clearly understood. I certainly do not mean to say that a man holding to the theory of protection may not be a perfectly honorable man, and that the rank and file of the protection party may not very largely consist of perfectly honest and patriotic people, meaning only to benefit the country by the policy they support. It is undoubtedly so. I do not mean to say that there has been no corruption and no use of money in elections on the Democratic side, for I believe there has been. I do not mean to say that the protective policy is the original source of corruption and of the use of money in elections, for I know a certain measure of both these evils has existed, and may still exist, without it. Neither do I mean to say that the plenipotentiaries of the Republican party and the pleni-

potentiaries of the protected manufacturers bodily sat down together and formally drew up, signed, sealed and delivered a corrupt compact. What I do mean to say is that, the high-tariff policy having been adopted under the circumstances mentioned, the compact made itself and was mutually understood without being signed and sealed, but as well as if it had been; that the campaign funds were actually delivered by the moneyed power with the expectation of higher tariff duties yielding larger profits; that the higher tariff duties were actually delivered with the expectation of further and larger electioneering funds. What I do mean to say is, even admitting for argument's sake, the good of the country, as the Republicans understand it, to be their main object, and the money contributions of the beneficiaries of the tariff only a mere incident, that this incident will, as to the demoralization of our political life, have practically the same effect as if it were the main object. What I do mean to say is, that while the high-protective policy is not the only source of political corruption, it is, in its present development, the most insidious and most powerful promoter of it, and that it will inevitably, in the very nature of things, if continued, produce a state of political demoralization in the highest degree dangerous to the vitality of our free institutions. What I do mean to say is, that the Republican party, however great its history, and however honest and well-meaning many of its leaders and the bulk of its rank and file may be, by the natural working of its high-tariff policy becomes the greatest engine of political corruption on a grand scale that this country has ever seen.

It is useless to point to the fact that Dudley was sent to the rear and that Quay, confronted with his record, had to give up the Chairmanship of the Republican National Committee, as an evidence of the power of virtuous influences. Do not indulge in delusions. So long as the

Republican party keeps that stake of untold millions of gain in our National elections, to be played for by a strong moneyed power; so long as the Republican party is willing to be helped to victory by that power and then to do its bidding, so long it will need its Quays and Duddleys for the work to be done, and it will have them under whatever names; and its innocent good men will some day wake up and rub their eyes and wonder to what kind of work they have given their aid. Two or three years ago the Republican Senator Ingalls expressed these political maxims: "The purification of politics is an iridescent dream. Government is force. Politics is a battle for supremacy. Parties are the armies. The Decalogue and the Golden Rule have no place in a political campaign. The object is success. In war it is lawful to hire Hessians, to purchase mercenaries, to mutilate, to kill, to destroy. The commander who lost a battle through the activity of his moral nature would be the derision and jest of history. This modern cant about the corruption of politics is fatiguing in the extreme." When confronted with the startling nature of his utterance, he is said to have answered that this was not an expression of his own sentiments, but a description of the actual condition of things. So it is, a truthful description of our political warfare as the Republican tariff policy has made it, a political warfare for a large money prize.

All this has convinced me that for reasons superior to any economic considerations the true interests of the country demand the defeat of the Republican party and its candidate, Mr. Harrison, unless there be objections of an overshadowing nature to the candidate opposed to him, Mr. Cleveland.

As to the Democratic party, I think I give myself to no illusions. It has its share of high-minded, patriotic and able men, and it has its bad elements. I do not

overlook the dark spots in its history. It has had its period of stagnant partisanship. It has its weaknesses as a party long out of power, little used to the active responsibilities of government, and accustomed to the feelings and ways of an opposition. Even thus it might be looked upon as a convenient, perhaps as the only, available club with which to beat down a great iniquity. But it is now something more than that. It has not only a bad cause to fight against, but a good cause to fight for. It has again a living policy. Its best elements are inspired with new hope. It is drawing to itself the young intelligence of the country. Thoughtful men, old and young, in active sympathy with the best aspirations of the American people, are giving it their support, seeing in it great possibilities for good government. It is true it has its internal struggles; but with all its conflicts and waverings, it differs from the Republican party in this essential point: the more strongly the Republican party adheres to its leading principle and policy, the more corrupt it will become, and the more baneful its influence as an agency of political demoralization; while the Democratic party, the more faithfully it clings to its leading principle, the stronger will it become morally, and the healthier its influence upon our political life. And it has a candidate who represents its best tendencies, and shows in his character, record and known opinions the best qualifications for high executive office. More than that, this candidate has been nominated in a manner which indicates a most healthy reaction against the worst tendencies in politics of our time, and which, for that reason alone, if there were no other, would make his election in a high degree advisable.

I certainly do not pretend that Mr. Cleveland is the ideal man or the greatest statesman of all times. He, no doubt, has his limitations, weaknesses and shortcomings.

But he possesses in uncommon measure those qualities which are especially desirable in a public servant charged with great responsibilities. He has a conscience. He has a will. He has a patriotic heart. He has a clear head. He has a strong sense of right. He has a good knowledge of affairs. He is a party man, but not a party slave. He is true to duty regardless of personal interest. This is not only the judgment of his friends, but also of his opponents, who, in a campaign like this, wish they might not have to admit it. There is to-day no public man in America so widely and well known and so generally and sincerely respected as Mr. Cleveland is. Even those politicians of his own party who opposed his nomination had to respect him for those very qualities on account of which some of them thought him objectionable as a President.

I do not say that the "practical politicians" wish a President to have no conscience. But they do not wish him to have so much of a conscience that it will stand in their way. They do not wish a President to have no will, but they do not wish him to have a will stronger than theirs. They do not wish a President to have no good sense, but they do not wish his good sense to be so keen as to see through their schemes and motives. They prefer a nice, comfortable, amiable, pliable sort of a President, who will easily accept their view of the fitness of things, consider himself their agent, and readily understand that taking care of the country means taking care of the party, and taking care of the party means taking care of them. In this respect Democratic politicians are not peculiar.

The practical politician is the same in all parties.

Now, as Mr. Cleveland possessed the most essential qualities of a good President to an extent beyond their liking, and the qualities most acceptable to them only in

a small degree, many of the active politicians in the Democratic party, high and low, were opposed to Mr. Cleveland's nomination, and many others, frightened by this opposition, although appreciating Mr. Cleveland's eminent fitness, became doubtful about his availability. How, then, was his nomination brought about? By a spontaneous uprising of the bulk of the rank and file of the party against that opposition; by a demonstration of public opinion inside of the party so vigorous, so clear, so imperative, that the opposing politicians could not withstand it. What may well be called *the people* of that party, North and South and East and West, peremptorily demanded the nomination of Grover Cleveland, and they carried their point. There was no machinery in motion behind that movement. There was no work in it. Whatever there was of machinery and work was against him. So the district and State conventions pronounced in Cleveland's favor; so the National Convention was carried. As a gentleman who occupied the best post of observation wrote me about the Chicago Convention: "It was not a fight at all. We had not to swear fealty to one another. It was a grand enthusiastic rush over the whole field. You never saw anything like it."

What was it that produced among the people so strong a feeling for Grover Cleveland? Not magnetism of personality, for he cannot be said to be a magnetic man; not brilliancy of abilities, for he is more a solid thinker and worker than a brilliant man; not anything in his past life appealing to the popular imagination, for his past life has been rather prosy than interesting in the romantic sense. Nor can it be said that there was between Mr. Cleveland's political and economic views and the wishes of the people so inspiring a correspondence as to kindle a flame of enthusiasm for his person. To be sure, he was looked upon as the natural standard-bearer in the struggle

against the high-tariff policy. But there was even a decided disagreement between him and many Democrats, especially in the South, on the silver question, which they believed to touch their interest even more directly than the tariff. And yet, even while they knew that he was conscientiously inflexibly opposed to their views and wishes, they joined with fervor in the demand for his nomination.

Nor was it mere party spirit, inspired by a general belief that of all possible Democratic candidates, Mr. Cleveland was the one most certain to carry the election; for the regular delegation from his own State loudly declared that he was the most likely to be defeated; in short, those influences which in this respect usually sway the judgment of parties and conventions were so strenuously exerted against him that the chances of his success might have been questioned even by his devoted friends.

What, then, was it that gave Mr. Cleveland his amazing popular support? More than anything else the impression produced upon the popular mind and heart by the *moral* qualities displayed by Mr. Cleveland as a public man. The plain people said to themselves: "Here is an honest patriot. He conscientiously studies his duty and he has the courage to do it, without fear or favor, without regard to his own interests. He is not afraid of his enemies and not afraid of his friends. He is no demagogue; with him public office is indeed a public trust. No matter whether he agrees with us on all points, he can be depended upon to speak what he thinks true and to do what he thinks right and for the best of the country. No matter whether he will get more votes than another candidate, he is our man, and we would rather be defeated with him than nominate a man less worthy."

This is the sentiment which nominated Grover Cleveland, aye, which with its irresistible strength accomplished

a thing hitherto unheard of and deemed utterly impossible—the nomination of a candidate for the Presidency, not only without the support but against the emphatic protest of the regular delegation from his own State. He was nominated by the people over the heads of the politicians and against a kind of opposition hitherto deemed insuperable, for identically those qualities which many of the practical politicians regard as inconvenient.

I look upon Grover Cleveland's nomination under such circumstances as one of the most encouraging political events—aye, the most encouraging political event—since the close of the civil war. It means a vigorous assertion of public opinion in favor of conscientious, clean politics on the greatest scale. It means a decided reaction against machine principles and methods in the conduct of political parties. It means that the people really wish to see the best man they know at the head of affairs, and that they can find a way to make their will prevail against adverse influences ever so formidable. Consider what a lesson this event teaches the young men of the country! What does it say to them? "It is not true, as you may have been made to believe, that, in order to achieve success in politics, you must be rich enough to bribe people, or demagogue enough to flatter people, or unprincipled enough to pretend to be what you are not, and always to trim your sail to the wind; or mean-spirited enough to make yourself the tool of spoils-hunters and wirepullers. It is not true that in order to maintain your hold upon the support of the people and your chances in public life, you must be prepared to renounce your sense of duty and your standard of honor and your pride of manhood. Here you have the living proof that a public man may courageously and unflinchingly stand by his convictions of duty; may pronounce his honest opinions upon matters of public interest with defiant straight-

forwardness, no matter whether they are shared by others or not; may refuse to stoop to the low arts by which, according to the current notion of the time, a following must be organized and support must be won; may not be everything to everybody, but may be himself in the best sense of the term; and may *just because of all this* be preferred to all others and chosen at the command of an overwhelming public opinion for the highest honor a party can bestow. Here is your example! Here is the road to public usefulness and distinction and success with honor!"

This is the true significance of Mr. Cleveland's nomination, and this will be the highest significance of his election by the people. Think out, I pray you, what such an object-lesson will be worth to the future of the Republic; what a new courage it will infuse into our political life; how it will clear away the miasma of demoralizing examples, impressions and experiences; how it will put to shame that pusillanimous despondency, that dreary pessimism that always despairs of the Republic, and hampers so many useful endeavors; how it will strengthen the confidence of the people in their own power for good; how it will lift up the spirit of the doubter, and ennable the ambition of the aspiring; how it will elevate the ideals of our young generation, and attract again to political life so many who might be eminently useful but have turned away in disgust!

I repeat, since the end of the civil war there has been no event in our political history so full of good promise, hope and encouragement as Mr. Cleveland's nomination, and so it will stand in the annals of the Republic if ratified by the popular vote. That it be so ratified is indeed an essential condition of its effect; for if it could be said that the uprising of a healthy public opinion might perhaps be potent enough to bring about the nomination of a

man on account of the metal of his character, but that such a man could, after all, not be elected, it would not only mean a great opportunity lost, but the new hope might be turned into deeper discouragement. His defeat might render the agencies of evil in our politics more daring and more powerful than they have ever been before.

I must confess, from this point of view, I look upon the election of Mr. Cleveland as so important to the future of the Republic, that, did I disagree with him on ever so many questions of policy, I should feel inclined to sacrifice all other considerations. And I trust, in fact I am confident there will be many patriotic and wise citizens, hitherto attached to the Republican side, who will recognize the importance of securing to the country the incalculable benefit of this consummation, break through the bonds of party and cast their votes for Grover Cleveland.

I know some Republicans will object and say: "Well, was not Mr. Harrison, too, nominated by his party in obedience to a healthy public opinion on account of his superior moral qualities, and will not his election be of the same service?" I should be sincerely happy could I answer "Yes"; but I cannot. I must most emphatically deny it. In the first place, he represents the party subsidized by the money-power of the protected interests in consideration of legislative favors, the party most strongly embodying the demoralizing political tendencies of our times. In the second place, the circumstances of Mr. Harrison's nomination were most essentially different from those attending the nomination of Mr. Cleveland.

We are all glad to acknowledge that Mr. Harrison's private character is excellent, and I would be the last man to attack it. Nevertheless, he had not been a popular man in his own party when his reëlection was thought of. Long ago it became evident that if he wished to be renominated he had to work for it; and he did. The office-

holding machinery was set in motion for him all over the land. I know of no instance in the history of this country when the local caucuses and conventions in towns, districts and States, which had to elect delegates to the National Convention, were so largely and so ruthlessly invaded by postmasters and revenue officers and district attorneys and marshals, as they were this year in favor of President Harrison. Every Cabinet officer was expected to do his utmost, and to present to the President the delegation from his State with his compliments.

Still, this array of official influence would probably not have sufficed to secure Mr. Harrison's renomination, had some Republican statesman of high character and influence openly taken the field as a competitor. Mr. Harrison was lucky. The leadership of the opposition to him was usurped by some of the most disreputable machine politicians in the country, and they put forward as their candidate a man who, aside from other grave objections, could hardly have accepted the nomination without a breach of faith. Against this crowd Mr. Harrison's force in the National Convention appeared very respectable—which was not difficult—and his nomination looked like the victory of the conservative and decent element of his party over a lot of despicable freebooters.

But it is nevertheless true that Mr. Harrison's majority in the Minneapolis Convention had been got together by the most unsparing exertion of official influence in the election of delegates; that it consisted, with not very many exceptions, of officeholders and of delegates elected by officeholders; that our Consul-General in London, known as an adroit political manager, was summoned from his post of duty to take command of the Harrison forces at Minneapolis; that a crowd of Federal officers of high position were on the spot to work under him and to win votes for their chief; and that as the case of Crum of South

Carolina and other indications show, the patronage of the Government was unblushingly employed as a bribery fund to swell the Harrison vote. Mr. Harrison's nomination was, therefore, not, as it has been called, a victory of public opinion over the machine; it was the victory of one machine over another—the victory of the officeholders' machine over the machine of the disappointed office-seekers. And considering that every one of the countless placemen taking part in the local caucuses and conventions, and in and around the National Convention itself, was for the possession of his office dependent on the pleasure of the very man for whose continuance in office he was to vote and work, the renomination of Mr. Harrison has been one of the most scandalous exhibitions of the misuse of official power ever beheld in this country—the culminating triumph of a system corrupt in itself and tending to demoralize the whole body-politic.

The Republicans themselves feel the disgraceful character of this business. They do not even attempt to deny or to justify it. In the soreness of their embarrassment they resort to the childish expedient of trying to meet the charge with the counter-charge that some of Mr. Cleveland's former Cabinet Ministers took an active interest in promoting his nomination. Well, why should they not? For four years they have been private citizens, and so has Mr. Cleveland. There is no official relation between them. For four years they have not had any official influence to exercise. They have no power to appoint any one to office, nor to remove any one. They have absolutely nothing to do with the Government service. Was there even the faintest shadow of an impropriety in what they did as independent private citizens? No. If there ever was an excuse carrying with it a confessed consciousness of guilt, it is this pitiable quibble about gentlemen who some years ago were in Mr.

Cleveland's Cabinet to cover the scandalous debauch of the public service, the barefaced misuse of official influence resorted to, to continue Mr. Harrison in office. And if the manner of Mr. Harrison's nomination proves anything, it is that, even for reasons other than his own merits, Mr. Cleveland should surely be elected.

"Granting all this to be true," I hear a timid business man say, "but if the Democrats, with their extreme doctrines on the tariff, come into power, will they not hurt our industries and cause injurious business disturbances? Are you not asking of us too great a sacrifice for the general good of the Republic?" No, I do not. In the first place, there is no sacrifice too great for the general good of the Republic. This is not the talk of an idealist, a visionary. I only do not think meanly of the American people. I remember the time, the time of the civil war, when the Americans showed themselves ready to sacrifice everything, their comfort, their wealth, their lives, for the general good of the Republic, and I do not think we have so degenerated that the spirit of self-sacrifice for the common good is dead.

But I do not ask for any sacrifice. You might, perhaps, call it natural that I should think so, because I am known to believe that the abandonment of the high protective system would be a great boon to this country, morally as well as economically—morally, because it would stop the most dangerous source of corruption and revive among our people the old spirit of self-reliance; and economically because, instead of destroying our industries, it would only put them upon a healthier footing by giving them cheap raw material and enabling them to conquer the markets of the world. Instead of lowering wages, it would raise and steady them by steadier employment; instead of unsettling business, it would only relieve it of the constant changes which every high-tariff policy brings with it, and

give it that stability which is possible only with an economic system based upon just and rational principles. For these reasons I wish to see, not indeed a precipitate, but a systematic and steady advance toward a revenue tariff. But I will tell you candidly what I think will happen if the Democrats win this National election. I once apprehended, if the protectionists went to extremes, as they did in the McKinley tariff, there would be danger of some quick, radical revolution sweeping away the whole system with a suddenness threatening disastrous confusion. The Congressional election of 1890 pointed that way. But I must confess that the attitude of the Democratic majority brought by that election into the House of Representatives has entirely cured me of that fear, at any rate for the time being. Instead of there being danger that the Democrats in power will be too radical and energetic, I see more danger that they will not be radical and energetic enough. They are sound enough in theory, and sometimes brave enough in talk, as, for instance, in this year's platform. But as to action, the greatest danger which, as I think, the industries of the country have to fear from a Democratic victory, is not that the Democrats in power would ruin any of them by sweeping, violent, precipitate changes in the tariff laws, but that the changes which would redound to the great benefit of our industries will be too timidly planned, too narrowly circumscribed and too haltingly carried out to do all the good that might be accomplished. If the Republicans carry the election there will be constant changes in the direction of higher duties, and a restless economic condition in consequence; for no high protective tariff ever lastingly satisfied its beneficiaries. If the Democrats win, the utmost we may expect will be the removal of duties from most of the articles usually considered as raw material, and a corresponding reduction of duties on the finished product; and

perhaps some reductions to prevent the formation of trusts and monopolies. This will be a movement in the right direction, but nothing like a sudden and violent revolution. This is my candid opinion, and I apprehend the record of the Democratic majority in the House of Representatives bears me out. Of the economic side of our tariff I should like to speak at greater length, but I have to put off that pleasure to another time.

"But what about the free coinage of silver and a consequent financial crisis?" I hear another business man say. No man can be more anxious to secure and preserve to this country a sound monetary system than I am; and it is my candid conviction that the election of Mr. Cleveland will not only not endanger but greatly promote that end. The free-coinage movement is essentially not a partisan, but a sectional movement. In the silver-mining States, in some of the Western agricultural States and in the Southern States it swept into its current Republicans and Democrats alike. In the rest of the country Democrats and Republicans alike were opposed to it. In the Republican Senate of the United States Republican free-coinage men took the leadership and carried a free-coinage bill twice through that body. But free coinage was numerically strongest in the Democratic party, simply because so large a number of Democratic Senators and Representatives hailed from the South. Still the energetic opposition of the Northern and Eastern Democrats, united with the Northeastern and some Northwestern Republicans, succeeded twice in defeating free coinage in the Democratic House of Representatives. The fact is, it was the Republican party that made the most dangerous political use of the silver question. It was the Republican party that began the deplorable policy of concession to the mining interest, which, bringing forth more and more extravagant demands, led us on the dangerous slope. It

was the Republican party which in its platform of 1888 formally denounced the Democrats for being hostile to silver. It was the Republican party that, having thus stimulated the greed and excited the expectations of the mining interest, passed, without any necessity, the law of 1890, which, even without free coinage, threatens finally to sweep us over the precipice.

On the other hand, considering the fact that the free-coinage movement was numerically strongest among the Democrats, nothing has done more to weaken and practically to defeat it than Mr. Cleveland's influence with his party. When he, well knowing that a large portion of his party was clamoring for free coinage, boldly raised his voice against it, the spectacle of a man who seemed at that time to be sure of the nomination for the Presidency if he would only remain silent, but who threw to the winds his chances for the highest place in the Republic by antagonizing, in obedience to his convictions of the public good, so powerful an element in his party—that spectacle was so novel and so impressive that it powerfully staggered multitudes of free-coinage Democrats, who became convinced that a man who acted thus must be very sure of being right. From that time on, the reaction set in, and the free-coinage movement among the Democrats, especially in the South, lost not only in numbers but in spirit. Its aggressive force was gone. It made, on the Democratic side, thenceforth, only half-hearted fights in Congress, and accepted its defeats with perfect meekness. It could not prevent the adoption by the National Democratic Convention of an anti-free-coinage resolution much stronger than that of the Republican platform, and it would not resist the nomination of an anti-free-coinage candidate. And, more than to anything else, all this has been owing to Mr. Cleveland's moral influence with his party.

I regard the free-coinage movement as gradually dying out, on one condition. If Mr. Cleveland is elected to the Presidency, he will have much more prestige with his party as well as with Congress than he had during his first term; in fact, more than any President has had for the last twenty years. And all that influence will work vigorously in favor of sound finance. There is one service he will render to that cause which Mr. Harrison, be his financial principles and purposes ever so correct, will be incapable of rendering. Under Mr. Cleveland's leadership the free-coinage heresy will lose its foothold in the party in which it was numerically strongest. And thus the fight will indeed be decisively won and ended.

There is one thing, however, which may restore the free-coinage movement to new hope, life and strength. That is the removal of Mr. Cleveland from the leadership of the Democratic party by his defeat in the election. He might die, and the moral influence of his teachings and example would survive. But if he is defeated, he is sent to the rear, and that powerful moral influence he exercised will be a thing of the past. For there is at present no other Democratic leader who can fill that place, as there is at present no public man who can exert such an influence in either party. I, therefore, cannot impress it too strongly upon those who are anxious as to the soundness of the financial policy of the Government, that they can serve that cause in no better way than by keeping Mr. Cleveland, under whose first Administration not a single objectionable financial measure was enacted, in the leadership of the Democratic party; and that can be done only by electing him President again.

Or would any one be deterred from voting for Mr. Cleveland by the Republican complaint regarding the suppression of the negro vote in some of the Southern States? There again every consideration of sound states-

manship is in Mr. Cleveland's favor. That the means of force and of fraud employed to keep the negroes in certain States from voting were in themselves of evil, goes without saying—notwithstanding the circumstances adduced to excuse such practices. But the difficulty is now solving itself as well as it can be solved, and the only thing needed is that it be let alone. Every well-informed and candid man will admit: (1) that the efforts to suppress the negro vote arose mainly from the fear of negro domination; (2) that this fear was stimulated and in a certain sense justified by the unexampled profligacy of most of the so-called carpet-bag governments during the reconstruction period; (3) that the fear of negro domination subsides whenever the negroes cease to vote as a compact mass on the side of one party and divide their votes among the different parties controlling the elections. As soon as that is done, the different parties bid for the vote of the negro as they bid for the vote of any one else, and vie with one another in protecting him in the exercise of his rights. This process is now going on and will soon remove the trouble in a perfectly peaceable and orderly way.

The only thing that threatens to prevent the consummation of this salutary development is the desire of Republican politicians to reunite and secure the whole negro vote for the Republican party again, and thus to capture some of the Southern States. This end is to be served by what is commonly called the force bill. Although this measure is nominally to provide only a machinery of control for Congressional elections, it is looked upon, not unnaturally, as another attempt to organize, with the aid of the National power, the negro vote again as a compact and obedient party engine for general party purposes. The inevitable effect of the enactment of the force bill or anything like it would be the revival of the fear of negro domination in the South,

and, with it, a violent and disastrous disturbance of the relations between the two races, which in the course of time had shaped themselves in a friendly manner highly advantageous to the general prosperity.

Consider what this means. The South came out of the civil war impoverished and desolate. The sudden abolition of slavery put it through the throes of a tremendous social revolution. There was the defeated and humiliated Southern white man not knowing what to do with the new, unaccustomed system of labor, confronting the emancipated slave not knowing what to do with his newly acquired freedom. It was a fearful situation everywhere: distress, perplexity, convulsive efforts and collisions; society, utterly disorganized, staggering on the brink of a bloody war of races. The army, still present, kept something like order, but, under its protection, white adventurers, at the head of the ignorant negro voters, set up those carpet-bag governments from which some of the Southern States suffered almost as much spoliation as from the war itself. After long agony a ray of hope dawned. President Hayes withdrew the troops from the South. The Southern whites overcame the negro majorities, partly by violence, partly by stratagem—still a bad and deplorable state of things, indeed, but one under which the energies of society revived and its working forces got into fruitful activity again. The spirit of enterprise returned and a new prosperity followed. The relations between the white and the black races grew steadily more friendly and favorable to mutual coöperation. But the fear of a return of that negro domination from which the South had suffered so fearfully still hung like a dark, threatening cloud over society, as long as the colored people threw their vote compactly on the side of one political party. And that fear brought forth all sorts of sinister efforts to avert the danger.

At last this cloud is lifted too. The negro vote has actually begun to divide. If the process now going on continues, the fear of negro domination, and with it the greatest obstacle to a harmonious coöperation of the two races on the political field, as well as that of productive labor, will soon be a thing of the past. No true friend of the colored race can wish a happier solution of this difficulty, for the political rights of the negro will stand under the active protection of all political parties. No true friend of the Southern people will fail to hail it as a most auspicious event, for it will take a burden of dread from the minds of the Southern whites; it will powerfully promote peace and good will between the different elements of the Southern population; it will give the Southern people increased confidence in their future and inspire them with fresh courage and energy in the development of their prosperity. No good citizen who has the common interests of the whole country, North and South, at heart will fail joyfully to hail it as the removal of a source of irritation between the two sections, as a new bond of cordial feeling, as a new guarantee of material progress in the South, and of those advantages which come to every part of the country by the growing prosperity of every other part.

Into this hopeful situation the force bill is to be thrust as a new brand of discord. No matter whether it be advocated by mere partisan lust of power or misguided zeal in behalf of a principle—the effect of the measure, if enacted, will be the same; an insidious stretch of governmental power, the incitement among the Southern negroes of unwarranted political ambitions and expectations by the reappearance of the Federal Government as a meddler with elections; the interruption of the salutary division of the negro vote between different parties; the revival among the Southern whites of the old dread of negro

domination; new distrust and discord between the two races; the poor and ignorant negroes, for whom the Republican politician pretends to care so much, hurried into a hopeless contest with the numerically strong, intelligent and wealthy whites; the fruitful coöperation of the two races in the South again violently disturbed; the peace of society again endangered; enterprise again discouraged, the social energies again lamed, the progress of prosperity again impeded by the prospect of incalculable trouble—and all this at a time when, after long, long years of social convulsion and terrible suffering, the more threatening perplexities are sure to solve themselves, if only let alone.

In view of all this I must confess that whatever specious pretences may be put forward as to the objects of the measure, I look upon the force bill as one of the most reckless, most cruel, most revolting partisan contrivances ever devised. I know the Republicans are artfully disclaiming that the force bill is an issue in this campaign. Mr. Harrison himself tries to evade it in his letter of acceptance by an adroitly soft-spoken recommendation of a commission of inquiry. But no well-informed and prudent man will be deceived. The Republican platform substantially endorses the measure. Almost every prominent Republican of influence has been a strenuous advocate of it, among the most strenuous President Harrison himself. They have been made cautious by the obvious current of public opinion against it, but not one of them has openly, unequivocally declared that he will cease to favor it. No, you may be sure, the party, as it is led to-day, will do anything—it will recoil from nothing, however desperate, to keep itself in power. There is not the slightest shadow of a doubt in my mind that the Republican party, if it keeps the Presidency and gets sufficient strength in the two houses of Congress, will make the

force bill the law of the land, whatever the consequences may be. Only its defeat can surely save us from this fate.

I cannot, without unduly taxing your patience, discuss here the flagrant failures of Mr. Harrison to redeem his solemn pledges with regard to the reform of the civil service. Our lamented friend, George William Curtis, passed just judgment upon that in his last address to the Civil Service Reform League, an address which no candid man can read without admiration and profit. And Mr. Curtis then knew nothing of the shameful use of official influence in packing the Minneapolis Convention with officeholders and the representatives of officeholders for the dispenser of patronage. Nor can I permit myself here to review President Harrison's conduct of our foreign affairs, a careful study of which has forced the conclusion upon me that in some of the most important cases, of which President Harrison seems inclined to speak with especial self-appreciation, the established principles of international law as well as the good traditions of our own diplomatic history were disregarded with—to call things by their right names—a demagogic recklessness compatible neither with the dignity nor with the safety of the Republic.

I have said enough to show that I cannot but consider it my duty as an American citizen, having the present and future welfare of the Republic at heart, to support Mr. Cleveland's candidacy in this contest and to advise my fellow-citizens to do the same. I know we are always, in a degree, taking chances when casting our ballots. We can only form our judgment conscientiously as to where the chances for the public welfare are best, and we must, above all things, be careful to subordinate things of less moment to those of a higher order of importance. Doing this, we shall, I trust, unite in the confident expectation that by the election of Mr. Cleveland to the Presidency of

the United States the country will be assured of a wise, honest, conservative and safe administration of public affairs; that its material interests will be promoted by a rational economic policy; and, what is of greater consequence, that the growth of demoralizing influences in our political life will be checked, and that our youth will be inspired with nobler ambitions and loftier conceptions of public duty, usefulness, success and distinction.

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TO EDWARD M. SHEPARD

BOLTON LANDING, Sept. 9, 1892.

Many thanks for your kind note of the sixth. The German translation, which I dictated yesterday, as well as the last pages of the English manuscript, went to New York this morning by the early train.<sup>1</sup> I think it necessary that I should read the proof of those last pages, as the manuscript is not very clear, and serious mistakes would be irksome. This may cause another delay of a day or so, but it is better that the work be well done, than that it be quickly done. The epistle has become awfully long and I was really frightened when I saw the bulk of it in print in the proof slips.

Whatever arrangement you may make as to the distribution of the slips will have my approval.

I think it of supreme importance that Mr. Stevenson in his letter of acceptance should come out squarely and without circumlocution against free coinage. A mere indirect declaration, as for instance the indorsement of the platform would be, will not be sufficient. It will be taken from him as an evasion. I suppose Mr. Cleveland's influence would be very strong with him, in regard to this

<sup>1</sup> This refers to the campaign letter dated Sept. 8th and printed *ante*; but it was not sent until several days later, as is shown by this and the following letter to Mr. Shepard.

subject. Could you not call Cleveland's attention to the very great importance of this matter, and get him to say a word to Stevenson? Mr. Cleveland will also have to take very high reform ground in his letter of acceptance to recover the ground among Independents which has been lost by obnoxious party arrangements.

I have had another savage attack of my trouble, and I fear I have now to accept it as certain that I shall not be able to take any part in the campaign as a speaker.

P.S. I regret extremely to hear that you will not be able to visit Lake George again before the 22d. I shall then probably be gone. Your appearance here has always been to me like a ray of sunshine. I wish I had had it oftener.

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TO EDWARD M. SHEPARD

BOLTON LANDING, Sept. 11, 1892.

Since I wrote you last, I have read with great interest the newspaper accounts of Mr. Cleveland's conferences with the Democratic leaders of the State. Among those with whom Mr. Cleveland had been in confidential intercourse and consultation I found, aside from Mr. Whitney, only the name of the chiefs of Tammany and of the Hill faction, while the Democratic leaders not belonging to the machine were conspicuously absent. The impression conveyed was, that the management of the Cleveland campaign in this State looks upon the conciliation of the machine as the most important object to be accomplished, regardless of what it may otherwise involve. I do not mean to discuss the nature of this policy here, but merely wish to say that my letter to the citizens of Brooklyn, who invited me to speak, does not fit this situation. I should not consider the matter of so much consequence had not Mr. Cleveland himself, personally, become so conspicuous in it.

As things now stand, I might, after the publication of my letter, be pertinently asked, whether I know that Mr. Cleveland agrees with the sentiments I express concerning him; and if I answer that I think so, the occurrences in New York might be pointed at as a reason why I should not think so. Or Mr. Cleveland might be asked whether he agreed with these sentiments, and if the conduct of his campaign is what it seems to be, this might be to him a very embarrassing question. He might perhaps say, he was much pleased to see me think so well of him, but that he took in some respects a view of things different from mine. You will readily understand that under such circumstances my position would be a somewhat ridiculous one. Now, I do not wish to embarrass Mr. Cleveland, nor do I wish to appear ridiculous myself. It seems to me necessary therefore that the situation should become somewhat clearer before I go further.

I believe, for these reasons, that in the first place the publication of my letter should be suspended; and, secondly, I should be very much obliged to you, if you would lay the printed proof slips of my letter before Mr. Cleveland, for expression of his judgment, as to whether the things I say of him may be said without danger of being in any manner contradicted or weakened by him or by those who have authority to speak for him. If he assents, then the letter can be published; if he does not assent, then I shall withdraw the letter, and in a few lines express to the Brooklyn gentlemen my regret, at not being able to comply with their invitation—which would be perfectly true, for I have been quite ill again these last days, and it is questionable whether I shall be permitted to go to my new abode near Tarrytown this week, as I intended to do.

I am extremely sorry, dear Mr. Shepard, to put you to so much trouble, but, as you see, the situation has become a very peculiar one, in consequence of Mr. Cleveland's

appearance in New York; and as you have had the matter in your hands, and as you are probably much nearer to Mr. Cleveland than I am, I thought of you first and foremost, when considering in what way the existing confusion could be solved. You will certainly understand me as readily admitting that there are strong reasons for Mr. Cleveland's election, other than those which I have set forth. But I believe also that the reasons I give should not be put before the public unless it can be done in perfect truthfulness and in entire good faith. If you will undertake this mission, as I hope you will, you are at liberty to communicate to Mr. Cleveland this note if you see fit to do so. Of course all I say here, and what may be said further, will be regarded, on my part at least, as strictly confidential.

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## TO PRESIDENT-ELECT CLEVELAND

POCANTICO HILLS, Nov. 9 [1892].

Accept my joyful congratulations. You have great reason to be proud of the result. Next to the justice of your cause it was your personal character, commanding the confidence of the people beyond the boundaries of the party, that made such a result possible. Your triumph is a glorious victory over the most dangerous tendencies in our political life. Let us rejoice.

Present my most respectful regards to Mrs. Cleveland and believe me

Sincerely yours.

## TO MOORFIELD STOREY

"SOLITUDE," POCANTICO HILLS,  
WESTCHESTER Co., N. Y., Dec. 12, 1892.

Your letter of the 5th inst. has remained unanswered longer than I intended. I wished to see Mr. Cleveland

before answering your questions. I had a short conversation with him at the Reform Club banquet Saturday night, and told him substantially what you had written. As to the steps contemplated by civil service reformers to get President Harrison to extend the operations of the rules, he said he wished the reform associations to go ahead by all means. I have no doubt he would feel very much relieved by any extension that could be had. I am convinced from the conversations I have had with him, that his intentions are of the very best and that he also will act with much greater confidence in his own influence and power. On the whole I must say that the impressions I have received from him are most encouraging.

As to the conference of a delegation of civil service reformers with him, I had no opportunity to talk with him about that at the banquet. But I shall write to him to-day or to-morrow and advise you as soon as I get his answer.

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#### TO PRESIDENT-ELECT CLEVELAND

"SOLITUDE," Jan. 11, 1893.

Yesterday I received the enclosed letter from Mr. Sherman Hoar, a Member of Congress from Massachusetts, one of the young Democrats, whom you probably know. Although the letter is of a somewhat confidential character, I think it best to communicate it to you with the request that you return it at your convenience. As to the recommendation he makes concerning Mr. Roosevelt, I agree with him in every essential respect. I may add to what he says that, as I have very good reasons to believe, it has not been Mr. Roosevelt's wish to remain a member of the Civil Service Commission and that he has been prevailed upon to consider the possibility of remaining only at the urgent solicitation of several friends of the

civil service reform cause. I am convinced, as Mr. Hoar is, that you now occupy a position in which you can deal a blow to the spoils system from which it will never recover; that by doing so you will render the country a service no less great, if not greater, than even by the reform of the tariff, and that in performing this task you can hardly find a more faithful, courageous and effective aid than Mr. Roosevelt.

Since you in our last conversation confidentially mentioned to me your difficulties in the construction of your Cabinet, you will perhaps not think it presumptuous if I add to what I then said, this further remark:

The observance of certain general principles in making appointments being a matter of detail, and the President not being able to watch every case in person, it seems important that he should have at least in the great patronage Departments, the General Post-Office, the Treasury and the Interior Departments, Secretaries upon whose sympathy and coöperation with him as to the observance of those principles he can safely depend. This appears especially necessary with regard to the General Post-Office, which owing to the multitude of the places at its disposal has usually attracted the greatest attention and caused the most scandal. The laying down of certain definite rules for the government of its operations and for the resistance to be offered to the pressure which is unavoidable, would seem to be especially called for.

Concerning the question whether the chiefs of division in the Departments should be brought under the civil service rules which was touched upon in our last conversation, I might say in addition to what I said, that it would perhaps be harmless to leave the appointment of the chiefs of division to the discretion of the chiefs of the bureaus subject to the approval of the heads of the Departments, were the chiefs of the bureaus permitted to

make the selections themselves without outside interference. But such is not the case. When it is known that the chiefs of the bureaus have the potential voice in the appointment of the chiefs of division, they are at once set upon by Congressmen or other influential politicians who urge them to make removals for the purpose of putting their favorites, or importunate place-hunters they want to get rid of, into the places thus vacated. This goes so far that while I was Secretary of the Interior several of my chiefs of bureaus came to me with the earnest request that I relieve them of this pressure which harassed them excessively, by making a rule enabling them to say that they had no power to dispose of such places. The pressure then came upon me and gave me a great deal of trouble until it was generally understood that I would not yield to it. The extension of the civil service rule would obviate all this and, withal, furnish the most efficient men considering that the power of removal remains unimpaired.

If you should have time for an exchange of views upon this and kindred subjects, it would give me much pleasure to put myself at your disposal. I notified Mr. Roosevelt that you wish to see him on Jan. 17th at 12 o'clock.

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TO PRESIDENT-ELECT CLEVELAND

NEW YORK, Feb. 27, 1893.

I have been asked by the Harpers to write an article for *Harper's Weekly* on your inaugural, which I shall be glad to do. But as the manuscript, to be in time for the next issue, should be in the hands of the printers by Saturday evening, might I ask you, as a special favor, to instruct your secretary to send me an advance copy to my city address, 210 West 57th Street, as soon as may be? You might, of course, count upon its being treated as strictly confidential until the inaugural is delivered.

I have a standing invitation from the Harpers to write for the *Weekly* on whatever political subject may seem important to me, my articles to appear at the head of the editorial page and thus to be laid before the quarter of a million readers of that journal. Will you permit me, when I write on anything of special consequence, to communicate the articles to you, not only as an expression of my own opinions but also of the opinions of a large class of your supporters? I shall do so with pleasure if you will signify to me that it will be agreeable to you. It may serve to keep us in touch. I intend soon to write something on the foreign policy of the United States which may be of interest.

Permit me to express the hope that the annexation of Hawaii may be avoided. All the advantages we might gain by it can be secured without irrevocably abandoning the safe, time-honored traditions of our Government.

Pardon me for suggesting as an American of foreign birth, that when the time comes for appointing a new Minister to Berlin, a man of high culture be selected who would be likely to have such standing in the best society of the German capital as George Bancroft and Andrew D. White had. It would be received as a compliment by the German-American population here.

With the warmest wishes for your health and prosperity, and for the amplest success of your Administration, I am

Faithfully yours.

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FROM PRESIDENT-ELECT CLEVELAND

LAKWOOD, N. J., Feb. 28, 1893.

Your letter of yesterday is at hand.

I finished my inaugural a day or two ago. I do not intend to have it put in type until I reach Washington, and it will be Friday before it is printed. My secretary will be here this

afternoon and if it is possible for me to have it typewritten or copied and in your hands before that time you may rely upon its being done.

The friendly tone of your letter has caused me the greatest satisfaction and you will add to the obligations already incurred if you will put me in the way of seeing the articles in *Harper's* of which you speak.

I am glad to receive your suggestion touching the German mission and surely shall not lose sight of it.

I am extremely anxious and perplexed and contemplate the duties of the next four years with the greatest solicitude. I know what my purposes and aspirations are, but I do not know how well I shall carry them out.

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#### TO PRESIDENT-ELECT CLEVELAND

210 W. 57TH ST., March 1, 1893.

Accept my sincere thanks for your very kind letter of Feb. 28th and for the great favor you have done me by sending the advance copy of the inaugural. I can well appreciate your anxiety in the face of the problems to be solved. If I can be of any use to you in expressing to you my candid judgment on public questions as they arise, I shall consider it a duty to do so. There is one immediately before us the importance of which cannot be exaggerated. It is that of the calling of an extra session to open in a few weeks.

I have thought of this matter a great deal and arrived at the conclusion that the meeting of Congress cannot be put off many months without danger.

The business community looks to you to save it from a financial disaster. It expects the early calling of an extra session to stop the silver purchases. Your refusal to call it would be a great disappointment and have a very discouraging effect, at a time when discouragement and

lack of confidence are especially dangerous. It may possibly be taken as indicating—quite erroneously to be sure, but none the less alarmingly—that the last prop of sound finance was giving way.

Every month of continued silver purchasing will bring us nearer to the premium on gold and a financial crisis. It is doubtful whether the selling of bonds will prove a sure preventive. At any rate it will be a costly method of staving off the worst. It is certainly not a cure. There will be no certainty and confidence until the silver purchase law is actually repealed, and every day of inactivity involves a loss to the country.

From the point of view of party policy, your failure to call an extra session immediately will be virtually an admission that the Republicans were right in dallying with the matter, that there was really no urgency and that *the best* of the Democrats are no more determined and energetic than the Republicans were. I apprehend it would not be wise to permit the opposition to say this *with reason*.

I am told there would be a good prospect of the repeal of the Sherman law if Congress were called together at once. In any event, your influence with Congress would undoubtedly be stronger now than it will be four or five months hence. The doubtful, the wavering, would now be apt to turn to you. Four or five months hence the class of the disappointed will be numerous and you will have new opposing elements to deal with. I think, therefore, your chances would be at least no worse, and probably far better in an extra session called immediately, than in a session later on.

But however that may be, if you call Congress together now, everybody will have to acknowledge that you have done all you could. You will have discharged your duty by giving Congress a chance to do its duty. But if no

extra session is called and a financial disturbance occurs in the interval from whatever cause, it will be ascribed to the silver trouble and charged to your responsibility. The selling of bonds will not prevent this. And as you well know, in such a case the best excuses are of little avail.

The situation is evidently a very perilous one and it seems to me your Administration will best serve the country and most surely maintain itself in the public confidence by prompt and energetic action. Every sign of hesitation will be calculated to increase the danger.

I have read your inaugural with very great enjoyment. It is excellent, and will, I have no doubt, make a very good impression.

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TO PRESIDENT CLEVELAND

NEW YORK, March 11, 1893.

Taking advantage of your kind permission I enclose an article I have written on the policy of annexation with special reference to the Hawaiian business.<sup>1</sup> Of the political aspects of the question much more might be said that would apply to all acquisition of territory outside of the Continent, especially of tropical countries. I discussed this matter at length in the Senate years ago when the San Domingo scheme was up.

Yesterday I attended upon urgent invitation a small private meeting of citizens of this city who have taken alarm at certain clauses supposed to be contained in the extradition treaty made, by the late Administration, with Russia. It is believed that in this treaty the extradition of persons as provided for was shown *prima facie* to be guilty not of an actual attempt upon the life of the Czar

<sup>1</sup> "The Annexation Policy," in *Harper's Weekly* of March 18, 1893.

but of direct or indirect participation in a conspiracy looking to that end. If this is the case, the apprehension would, I think, be well founded, that any person conspiring for, or seeking to bring about, a change of government in the sense of free institutions in Russia, would, at least by the Russian authorities, be made to appear as a conspirator against the life of the Emperor.

I am not one of those who entertain any sentimental sympathy with dynamiters or manslayers generally. But I appreciate the sentiment stirring up some very good and worthy people here, that when we make an agreement of this nature with a Government which in some respects may be called only semi-civilized, a Government which sends persons to Siberia without any judicial proceeding, by mere "administrative order," it is of the greatest importance to guard against such a treaty being turned to political use. The greatest Republic in the world would indeed appear in an unenviable light if it directly or indirectly aided the most ruthless despotism in the world in suppressing every liberal aspiration among its subjects. The United States should certainly not be more willing to do such things than Great Britain is.

Pardon me for troubling you with the inquiry what the present status of the treaty is. The citizens who spoke to me about it contemplate a *purely American* public demonstration against the treaty, but as they have nothing to go on except mere rumor, I advised them to postpone all further steps at least until they had the facts clearly before them, assuring them at the same time that whatever mistake might have been made by the late Administration, you would no doubt do all to set it right. I enclose a printed paper bearing upon this subject which was put into my hand.

I beg leave also to enclose some letters concerning appointments which I have recently received and which

may possibly be of some interest to you. I am not myself acquainted with the circumstances therein referred to.

You were so kind as to tell me that you were glad to receive my suggestions as to the German mission. Have you thought of President Angell of Michigan University and of Prof. William M. Sloane of Princeton College as possibilities? I am told that years ago Professor Sloane served as a member of the American Legation at Berlin under Mr. Bancroft.

I congratulate you most sincerely upon the hearty applause with which your inaugural address has been received in all quarters.

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#### FROM PRESIDENT CLEVELAND

EXECUTIVE MANSION,  
WASHINGTON, March 19, 1893.

If *any* extradition treaty is or ought to be made with Russia, there need be no fear that the points which seem to disturb the imaginations of some good people will not be fully covered.

Though the matter cannot, I suppose, be regarded as beyond the mystery and secrecy that accompany such things to their last stages, I may, I think, properly say, that Senate amendments, in my opinion, remove all cause of apprehension as stated in your letter. Of course, those who think that we ought not to have any extradition treaty with Russia, no matter how well guarded, have abundant cause of complaint—or perhaps, I should say they probably will have such cause of complaint.

I have about concluded to send the name of Ex-Chancellor Runyon of New Jersey to the Senate to-morrow for Minister to Germany. I believe he is a first-rate man.

I read your articles in the *Weekly* with great satisfaction and was especially pleased with the one on Hawaiian annexation. I do not now say that I should hold annexation in all circumstances and at any time unwise, but I am sure we ought

to stop and look and think. That's exactly what we are doing now.

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## TO PRESIDENT CLEVELAND

NEW YORK, March 30, 1893.

What you said to me some time ago about the "hard taskmaster" is still well remembered. I know the part of the "candid friend" is an ungrateful one, but to a man in your high position the friend who says things is sometimes more useful than the friend who wants things.

If it were true what the newspapers say of the new United States district attorney in Indiana, Mr. Burke—that he is a very improper person, representing the worst tendencies in politics, and that you appointed him to placate Senator Voorhees—it would mark the first step on the road to ruin. If only half of it is true—that Mr. Burke is an improper person—and if the other half, that he was appointed to propitiate Mr. Voorhees—although untrue, is widely believed to be true, the appointment will bring you no end of trouble. I do not mean only public criticism, for no reasonable person should blame you for making an occasional mistake, although it is to be deplored. But it will immensely aggravate the difficulties you will have with Congress. The Senators and Members who are after patronage will think that they have detected your weak spot and they will try to make the most of it. As soon as they see any reason for believing that you are willing to give them "favors" to secure their support of your policies, they will give you their support *only* on condition of getting favors. They will never have enough and constantly strike for more. Some of them will even invent schemes embarrassing to you for the very purpose of having something to sell. It is needless to say that you can not satisfy them without

ruining your Administration. It would forfeit its moral character with the people and, as to its favorite policies, be at the mercy of the worst influences in Congress.

I enclose some cuts from newspapers. The one from the *Times* was evidently written by a friend who strongly emphasizes his confidence in you. But there is an undertone of apprehension in what he says. The Washington correspondence of the *Evening Post* shows how far the mischievous effect of this matter has already developed itself. It is certainly to be deplored that Mr. Voorhees is at the head of the Finance Committee of the Senate. He would not have become so important a person in it, had Mr. Carlisle remained there. You remember perhaps what I said to you about dismantling the Administration in that body. It was just this I foresaw.

I do not presume to advise. But if you will pardon me for saying what I would do were I in your place, it is this: I would send a trusty friend to Indiana to make a searching inquiry into Mr. Burke's antecedents and standing. If it were satisfactorily shown that Mr. Burke is an improper person for the district attorneyship, I would unhesitatingly remove him. This action would at once kill all the rumors and surmises as to "placating" or "bargaining." It would be notice to Senators and Representatives that in recommending men for office they cannot deceive the President with impunity. It would strengthen the President immensely with public opinion and consequently with Congress. It would, indeed, offend Senator Voorhees, but at the same time cripple him. For if thenceforward he sought to embarrass the President, all the world would know the reason why. As things now stand he cannot support your policy so far as it differs from his former position without incurring the imputation of having sold himself. Even if he does not recoil from this, he will certainly ask for his support much more than you

have given and than you can give without disgrace. The character of the political school to which he belongs is warrant for this.

You are far stronger than all these politicians combined—and they know it—so long as you can overawe them with the confidence the people repose in your fearless rectitude. Any favor you grant them at the expense of your standing in the popular confidence will weaken your power over them and strengthen them against you.

I beg leave also to invite your attention to the enclosed article of the *Evening Post* on "The Postal Scramble." I do not know who wrote it, but every editorial writer on the *Post* is your warm friend. I agree with every word he says. When the papers announced that the "executioner in the General Post-Office was busy," I must confess that I read it with a feeling of shame as to the present and of alarm as to the future. If you, in your exceptionally strong position, with your principles and your professions of purpose and your courage, cannot stop this National scandal and disgrace, who is ever to do it? Will you not have it arrested now, direct the post-office to confine itself for the present to the filling of existing vacancies, of which there are said to be several thousand, and to cases in which removals are distinctly necessary in the interest of the service, and then slowly and gradually to divide the post-offices equally between the two parties as a basis for a permanent regulation of things? I assure you, as the work of decapitation goes on, there is much shaking of heads among your friends, and we have to meet many a derisive grin on the faces of your and our opponents.

I write this not wholly as a private individual. I am now at the head of the National Civil Service Reform League, and have to deliver the annual address on April 25th, and review the close of Mr. Garrison's and the

beginning of your Administrations from the standpoint of the civil service reformer. It is extremely distasteful to me to find fault. Having advocated your election and greeted you after your triumph as I have, I should be most happy to speak only in praise. But I have to tell the truth. If I am in error as to any of the facts here mentioned, I shall be grateful for being set right. And if you will instruct one of your private secretaries to inform me about appointments to high places in the Departments by way of promotion, of which I have read something in the papers, and about other things giving evidence of a reformatory spirit, you will greatly oblige me.

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FROM PRESIDENT CLEVELAND

[WASHINGTON,] March 31, 1893.

There were two principal candidates for the office of district attorney for Indiana; both were endorsed by good people. Judge Gresham knew both of them and his advice and such other information as I could gain led me to appoint Mr. Burke as rather the better qualified of the two.

It seems that he was not one of my early and earnest supporters for the Presidential nomination—a fact I knew nothing about and one which I did not think ought to influence me very much in making the nomination. Thompson, the Cleveland man, and newspapers began to howl in true Indiana fashion and I suppose gave the cue for attack. Of course the talk of conciliating Senator Voorhees or any one else is sheer newspaper twaddle which ought not for a moment to deceive any one.

Thus far I am entirely satisfied with the selection. I enclose his letter of thanks which I read for the first time this morning just after reading yours. In determining his application there was presented to me a protest from certain labor people based upon his refusal to aid, when in the legislature,

certain schemes of theirs which were hardly in the line of conservative and wise legislation. I may perhaps be at fault in not regarding such conduct as an objection to his selection.

I am sorry thus early in my work to be put at the mercy of Indiana political wrangles.

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TO PRESIDENT CLEVELAND

"SOLITUDE," April 5, 1893.

Your letter of March 31st reached me in due time. I thank you for what you say of the Burke case and return herewith Mr. Burke's letter.

You do not mention the subject of the removal of postmasters. I cannot refrain from entreating you once more not to let the scandal of wholesale removals go on. This year on the occasion of the great World's Fair we are on exhibition before all civilized mankind, the working of our republican institutions as well as the products of our industries. Among the visitors from abroad there will be statesmen, philosophers, publicists, and students of all kinds, earnestly intent upon inquiring into what we are and what we do. The result of this observation will go far to determine the reputation of this Republic throughout the world for some time to come. They will soon begin to arrive. Are they to read day after day in their morning papers that the guillotine in the General Post-Office is lustily at work and that the heads are falling at the rate of a hundred or a hundred and fifty a day? Are we to treat them to a full view of our spoils carnival, and that, too, under a President whom they know to have been elected as the strongest representative of the reform sentiment? I most earnestly hope and pray that you will cover your name with honor by being the first President to put a stop to that scandal and that you will let the world understand your determination to do so.

If you stop it now, no successor of yours will ever dare to revive it.

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FROM PRESIDENT CLEVELAND

EXECUTIVE MANSION,  
WASHINGTON, April 6, 1893.

This is about the way the fourth-class postmaster record stood on April 3, 1893:

Vacancies by resignation on the 4th of March—501.

Removals from the 4th of March to April 3—374.

Those removals include many for cause—probably a majority are in that category. We have been at work twenty-four days. Three hundred and seventy-four removals in that time certainly do not justify your suggestion that “the guillotine is lustily at work and that heads are falling at the rate of a hundred or a hundred and fifty a day.”

I do not claim it to be relevant, but it is a fact, that on the 4th of March, 1889, there were 500 vacancies by resignation, and that the removals between that date and April 3, 1889, numbered 849.

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TO PRESIDENT CLEVELAND

“SOLITUDE,” April 10, 1893.

Your letter of the 6th inst. is in my hands. I need not remind you that since the beginning of your great career I have been your devoted friend and that you always could count upon my cordial and active support whenever there was any call for it. What my motives and purposes were, you know best. I may have troubled you with criticism and remonstrance, but only in behalf of the public interest and your own success and honor. I say this merely to emphasize the fact that I cannot possibly *wish* to find fault with your Administration and that nobody can be more delighted than I am to find

unfounded an unfavorable impression I may have conceived.

The figures I mentioned as to the removals of fourth-class postmasters were based upon the newspaper reports which were my only source of information. I am sincerely glad to know that the number of removals has not been as large as supposed. But the question of numbers, is after all, not the important one. If Mr. Maxwell's doings differ from those of Mr. Clarkson only in the quantity of mischief, the difference is unessential. Some papers report that postmasters who have served four years, or nearly so, are selected for removal. If this is true, they will all have been changed before the Administration is over, and nothing substantial will have been gained. It will only be an additional reaction of that four-year law which has done more harm to the public service and to our political life than any other legal enactment. With a change of party in power, the scandal of the clean sweep will be repeated and we shall be where we were before. But if you declare it to be your policy and purpose, to divide the postmasterships about equally between the two parties, and make only removals for cause, of which there will probably be plenty, with a view to that end, it will not be very difficult to carry a measure through Congress regulating the appointment of fourth-class postmasters upon sound civil service principles. Then the back of the spoils system will be broken forever. What still remains to be done will easily follow.

I know you have never made any specific promise to do this. But what you have said on various occasions about the evils of the spoils system and the remedial policy to be adopted, fairly implies it, and there is no doubt that it is expected of you. Your enemies have expected, no less than your friends, that you would never permit the Clarkson scandal to be repeated in any degree.

Anything that works in the direction of a clean sweep, whether rapid or slow, under *your* Administration, is a very serious disappointment. As your sincere friend I am in duty bound to tell you this. It is not the impatience of the reformer that speaks out of me, but calm and candid observation when I say that there is a very general disgust with the old nuisance, and an equally general feeling that the time for abolishing it and for putting a decent and civilized system in its place has now come. If this feeling is crossed, you may be sure that as the bulletins from the General Post-Office come day after day, you will never hear the last of it. The public mind is now fixed upon this point, and you must not be surprised if your action with regard to just this matter is taken as the measure of your practical fidelity to the principles you possess. If you turned the patronage of New York State to Murphy, Hill and Sheehan, the sensation would be more painful than that created by the continuance of old abuses in the post-office although, in a less degree. I think I am not going too far in predicting, that a clean sweep, or anything approaching it, would sufficiently discredit your Administration to defeat the Democratic party in 1896.

As an ardent friend of tariff-[reform] and currency-reform I need not be told that civil service reform is not the only concern of your Administration. But it is certainly not the least important one. On the contrary, you have a chance of doing the country a more lasting service and of gaining greater renown on this field than on any other. Moreover, it is my honest opinion that by such a measure of civil service reform you will immensely strengthen yourself in carrying the reform of the tariff and of the currency, for you will have the most potent opinion of the country more strongly on your side and wield a much greater moral authority over Congress.

It cannot be repeated too often that your peculiar power consists in your standing with that public opinion and nothing else. When we spoke at the Reform Club banquet about the "moral forces in politics," we meant just this. You cannot try to carry your points by making concessions to the spoils politicians without being ultimately beaten, for you leave the ground on which you are strong. To the enlightened opinion, to the moral sense of the country, to the confidence of the most patriotic and public-spirited part of the people you owe all your personal successes. With these forces at your back you can do anything. Without them, you will be at the mercy of your enemies, for a man like you can never successfully play with them at their own game.

Pardon my frankness and my persistency. As a citizen I wish to serve our common cause, and you as a friend. This I can do in no better way than by telling you without reserve what I think. I am now engaged in preparing the annual address for the reunion of the National Civil Service Reform League. It would make me a very happy man, if, instead of expressing in that address merely the hope that you would stop the old scandal in the Postal Department, I were able to thank you for having declared your determination to do it.

I enclose an article from the Springfield *Republican*, one of your friends, showing the run of public sentiment.

I am, dear Mr. President,

Faithfully yours.

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TO WM. A. AIKEN

POCANTICO HILLS, N. Y., April 13, 1893.

I heartily sympathize with you concerning the reappointment of Mr. Caruthers on the state of things you

give. But it has been my inflexible rule not to sign any applications for office and no recommendations, unless I am asked by the Administration in a given case. I find it important that in my position I should adhere to this rule. I am in correspondence with President Cleveland on the subject in a general way and make every possible effort to dissuade him from making, or authorizing the Post-Office Department to make, removals, or, which amounts to the same thing, refuse to make reappointments after the expiration of the four-year term, for other than business reasons. I think it advisable to confine my correspondence with him to the discussion of the general principle without going into individual cases. I am persuaded upon consideration of the whole matter, you will agree with me in this respect.

I hope, however, you will leave no stone unturned in the Norwich [Conn.] case and wish you the best success.—Cordially yours.

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#### CIVIL SERVICE REFORM AND DEMOCRACY<sup>1</sup>

When I was honored with the request to deliver this annual address, I accepted the charge with very serious misgivings. For I remembered that many successive years, on occasions like this, you have been wont to listen to a voice the exquisite charm of which still lingers in our ears and will never cease to echo in our hearts. No man can succeed George William Curtis here without being oppressed by the consciousness of inability to fill his place. It would be a vain attempt to rival his annual addresses in their abundance of knowledge and illustration, their ripeness of thought, their strength of reasoning,

<sup>1</sup> Address delivered before the thirteenth annual meeting of the National Civil Service Reform League in New York City, Apr. 25, 1893.

their delicacy of humor and their literary grace. They were so complete an arsenal of facts and arguments that it is almost impossible to speak on the same subject without repeating him, and the repetition will always fall short of the original. And no one succeeding him at the head of this National League can hope to be so naturally, so spontaneously accepted as the ideal leader of an organized endeavor for purity, justice and honor in politics. It may be said without in the least straining the sense of words that George William Curtis and the cause of Civil Service Reform were made for one another. All that the Reform aspires to was illustrated and exemplified in his personality.

Who can speak of him in other than terms of eulogy? It is a consoling satisfaction to the soul of a friend to do so. We, members of the League, who have worked with him so long, are fond of recalling the many titles he held to leadership among us; his sincerity, unselfish devotion and singleness of purpose; his profound understanding of the subject and large experience; his fearlessness in the defense and in the application of his principles; his keen discernment of opportunity; his absolute freedom from small jealousies; his cheerful and generous recognition of the merits and services of others; his gentleness in meeting adverse opinions; his sense of justice and his fine tact in composing differences; the inspiration flowing from his very being in the common endeavor for high aims. All these things gave him without question the first place in our councils. The leadership, therefore, fell to him by a general consent, the absolute unanimity of which, never broken, proved that we all felt it to be due to our cause and due to him. Thus the death of Mr. Curtis is to us, in the truest meaning of the word, an irreparable loss. He could not bequeath to us his genius nor his virtues. He could leave us only his teachings to remember, the inspira-

tion of his zeal to quicken our own and his noble example to follow as best we can.

But if he were now here to dictate my speech, he would call it away from himself and direct it to the cause which he cherished so much, and which was in so large a sense his own. Indeed, the ultimate victory of this cause will be the fittest monument of this great citizen whom we who knew him well so warmly loved, and whose memory the American people can never too highly honor.

It is a comfort to his surviving friends to know that, although he did not witness the full consummation of his endeavors, he lived at least long enough to see his cause rise from small beginnings to a measure of success promising complete triumph at no very distant day. The question is only what President and what political party will carry off the greatest honors of the achievement.

I speak of this with so much assurance because civil service reform has grown and flourished in spite of the bitter hostility of an overwhelming majority of the professional politicians in both parties. They have exultingly proclaimed its death and burial a hundred times. It has survived an endless number of obituaries. They have derided it, and reviled it, and plotted for its destruction a hundred ways. Without knowing it, by their very enmity they have advanced its progress. Men have begun to respect and to love it for the enemies it has made. We have not far to seek for the reason. What is civil service reform? It is the application of common-sense and common honesty to the public service. And the American people are in the main a sensible and an honest people. It is the restoration to full power of honorable and patriotic motives in our political life. And the Americans are, in the main, an honorable and patriotic people. Therefore they will insist upon the general application and enforcement of civil service reform principles in the same measure

as they recognize how sensible and honest and patriotic those principles are. In the acquisition of this knowledge they are at times powerfully aided by striking object-lessons. Recently they had one of them.

The 4th of March last a new Administration went into power. Untold thousands of men poured into the National capital clamoring for office; not for offices that were vacant, but to be vacated in order to make room for the clamorers. No matter whether he was ever so good a public servant, the man who was in was to be kicked out to let him in who was out, no matter whether he would be not half so good a public servant. The office-hunting throng swept into the White House and into the Departments like a cloud of locusts. The President, sturdy as he is, could hardly stand up before the impetuous onset. The Cabinet Ministers, all new men in their places, who felt the urgent need of studying somewhat their Departmental duties, were hunted down so that they had hardly time to eat and sleep, much less to study. When their cry for pity availed nothing, they at last barricaded their doors with strict regulations. They went into hiding in order to save some hours for the business of the Government. The Post-Office Department was not only overrun by the crowd, but snowed under with written applications and recommendations for office which in huge heaps covered the floors of the rooms, and the whole force of the Department had to work after business hours merely to open and assort them. Senators and members of the House of Representatives ran wildly about like whipped errand boys to press the claims of greedy constituents or mercenary henchmen. It was what Mr. Cleveland calls the madness for spoils in finest efflorescence.

And what are these claims for office that are so vehemently urged? I know them well from long and varied experience. Special fitness for the duties of the office is

the one thing which even the most daring claimant but seldom dares to claim. He does, indeed, claim that he can do one thing as well as another if he is only permitted to try; like the Yankee who, when asked whether he could play the violin, answered, he guessed so, but he had never tried. So the officeseeker is ready to try his hand at administration. In most cases the claim to office is based upon party service, the payment or collection of money for the campaign chest, the making of speeches or other political work deserving reward. And this claim is fortified with all sorts of reasons appealing to sympathy. Here is a patriot who has a large family to support and needs a post-office to help him along. There is another who wants a consulship abroad because he himself or his wife is in bad health and a change of climate would do good, or his daughter has a fine talent for music which should be developed in Europe. There is still another who wants the prestige of official recognition in the shape of a collectorship or a marshalship to enable him to exercise still higher political authority over the minds of his fellow-citizens. A man in Kansas, so the papers report, recently urged the appointment of his daughter to some place in the postal service in connection with the World's Exhibition at Chicago, on the ground that she would be the largest public servant in the country, weighing four hundred and seventy-two pounds. And for aught I know, this qualification is as good as many of those seriously urged.

This spoils carnival has been going on since the 4th of March, and it is not ended yet. In a measure it continues through the larger part of the Presidential term. I affirm and maintain that the American people are heartily disgusted with a spectacle so absurd, so ludicrous and at the same time so barbarous, shameful and revolting—a spectacle exposing the American name to ridicule and reproach. When speaking here of the American people I

do, of course, not mean *all* the people. I do not mean the machine politicians of the two parties, who live on spoils. I do not mean Tammany Hall. I do not mean those poor creatures in Congress and in other high places who know they have not ability enough to sustain themselves as statesmen, and depend upon a following bought with patronage to prop them up. I do not mean the selfish speculators in politics, who find in the corruption underlying the patronage trade a congenial element. Nor do I mean those who like to be fed at the public crib, no matter whether they furnish an equivalent for their salaries. All these classes are the fast friends of the spoils system; but they form only a small minority of the American people. When I speak here of the people, I mean the men and women who earn an honest living by honest industry. I mean the patriotic citizens who have the welfare of the country, the success of free institutions and the honor of the Republic sincerely at heart.

In their earnest endeavor to serve the public interest, these people may be warm partisans. They wish their party to be successful and to win control of the Government. But a large majority of them are in their inward souls disturbed and disgusted when they see, after a party victory, hordes of partisans pounce upon the offices of the Government like a band of greedy mercenaries plundering a captured city. They are ashamed when, after the incoming of a new Administration, they hear of a President wishing to abolish this scandal but not being permitted to do so by the ravenous spoilsmen of the party, and of an official guillotine at work and of so many heads falling every day. This shame and disgust may not, by all who feel it, be loudly expressed in words; but nevertheless it exists, as in times gone by the conscientious abhorrence of slavery existed among the masses of the Northern people long before exciting events loosened their tongues.

But there is one part of the public service which now remains untouched by the tumultuous debauch of the spoils carnival. It is like a quiet, peaceable island, with a civilized, industrious population, surrounded by the howling sea. The President and the chiefs of the Government Departments contemplate this part of the service with calmness and contentment, for it gives them no trouble while the turmoil of the office-hunt rages all around it. The good citizen, anxious for the honor of his country, beholds it with relief and satisfaction, for here he finds nothing to be ashamed of, and much that is worthy of this free and great Nation. This is the "classified service," covered by the civil service law, the creation of civil service reform. On the portals the words are written: "Nobody enters here who has not proved his fitness for the duties to be performed." The office-hunting mob reads this and recoils. The public servant within it calmly walks the path of his duty, undisturbed by the thought of the greedy cormorant hungering for his place. He depends upon his merit for his security and advancement, and this consciousness inspires his work. This is the application of common-sense and common honesty to the public service. It is civil service reform.

The present civil service law was enacted under President Arthur. Under the rules established by virtue of it applicants for clerkships and other subordinate places in the Government Departments in Washington and in the greater customhouses and post-offices in the country have to pass appropriate competitive examinations to prove their fitness for the places they seek, and the appointments are made from those rated highest, without any regard to political affiliation or influence. Removals are discretionary with the appointing power; but inasmuch as the element of favoritism is eliminated from appointments, removals are no longer made merely to make room

for more favored individuals. The public servant who proves himself faithful and efficient is, therefore, wherever the law is honestly observed, substantially secure, no matter to what party he may belong. And it may be said that under the National Government, the law, as far as it reaches, is honestly observed. That it is universally recognized to be so is due, more than to any other man, to Mr. Theodore Roosevelt, who, as a member of the United States Civil Service Commission, has performed his duties with rare fidelity, energy and fearlessness. All the high officers of the Government whose working force has been under the operation of the civil service law have, without any notable exception, borne emphatic testimony to the fact that the law has relieved them of serious difficulty and trouble, and has given to the country a greatly improved service.

At the close of President Arthur's Administration in 1885 the number of places classified, that is, covered by the civil service law, was about 15,500. At the close of President Cleveland's Administration in 1889 it was about 27,300. At the close of President Harrison's Administration in 1893 it was about 43,400, to which should be added several thousand laboring men in the navy yards placed under similar rules by the voluntary and most laudable act of Secretary Tracy. As the whole number of places under the National Government amounts to about 180,000, we may say that more than one-fourth of the service of the National Government has ceased to be treated as mere spoils of party warfare. In one-fourth the party boss has lost his power. One-fourth is secure from the quadrennial loot. In one-fourth influence and favoritism go for nothing. One-fourth has been rescued from barbarism. One-fourth is worthy of a civilized country. So much civil service reform has accomplished in the time of three Presidential terms. But great and encouraging

as its progress has been, civil service reform, having conquered only one-fourth of the service, has done only one-fourth of its work.

There are still the laborers in the Government Departments and the higher grades of the clerical force, such as the chiefs of division, to be brought under the civil service rules. These rules are to be extended to many offices in which they are not yet in operation. The quadrennial slaughter, this relic of American savageness, has to be abolished first with regard to the fourth-class postmasters, of whom there are at present about 65,000, and whose execution *en masse* has so frequently caused conspicuous scandal. A bill regulating the appointment, and in effect precluding the wholesale removal, of this class of public servants has already been before Congress. This or a similar measure should be pressed until it becomes a law. Meanwhile it is reasonable to ask that the spirit of civil service reform be observed in all Executive appointments. Although the President, in making the so-called Presidential appointments by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, cannot under the Constitution be bound by rules restricting his power, yet he may impose rules upon himself for the government of his own conduct in the exercise of the appointing power, so as to strip the offices of the character of party spoil and to treat them as what they are really intended to be: places of trust and duty, to be administered for the benefit, not of a political party, but of the people.

I know patience is one of the most necessary and most useful of virtues, especially in the pursuit of great reforms. But this virtue should not be cultivated to the extent of disregarding and neglecting any really existing possibility. And even the soberest view of the circumstances surrounding us at present persuades that the time is fully ripe for a further and a very essential advance in the reform of the

civil service. Since the enactment of the civil service law every President of the United States has done something to extend the area of its operation. As it is said that no rich man in Boston can decently die without leaving a sum of money to Harvard University, so it seems no President can quit office without commanding himself, by a tribute to civil service reform, to the merciful judgment of posterity. But President Cleveland has authorized us to expect from him a legacy of extraordinary value.

He is known as a man of genuine convictions, and may be trusted to mean what he says and to act according to his meaning. On no subject of public concern, neither on the tariff, nor on the currency, nor on Constitutional principles, has he expressed himself with deeper earnestness, with more emphatic directness, than on the necessity of civil service reform. Here are some of his words:

I venture to hope that we shall never again be remitted to the system which distributes public positions purely as rewards for partisan service. Doubts may well be entertained whether our Government could survive the strain of a continuance of this system, which upon every change of Administration inspires an immense army of claimants for office to lay siege to the patronage of Government, engrossing the time of public officers with their importunities, spreading abroad the contagion of their disappointment and filling the air with the tumult of their discontent. The allurement of an immense number of offices and places, exhibited to the voters of the land, debauches the suffrage and robs political action of its thoughtful and deliberative character. The evil would increase with the multiplication of offices consequent upon our extension, and the mania for officeholding, growing from its indulgence, would pervade our population so generally that patriotic purpose, the support of principle, the desire for the public good and solicitude for the Nation's welfare would be

nearly banished from our party contests and cause them to degenerate into ignoble, selfish and disgraceful struggles for the possession of office and public place.

And in his last inaugural address he said:

One mode of the misappropriation of public funds is avoided when appointments to office, instead of being the rewards of partisan activity, are awarded to those whose efficiency promises a fair return of work for the compensation paid to them. To secure the fitness and competency of appointees to office, and to remove from political action the demoralizing madness for spoils, civil service reform has found a place in our public policy and laws. The benefits already gained through this instrumentality, and the further usefulness it promises, entitle it to the hearty support and encouragement of all who desire to see our public service well performed, and who hope for the elevation of political sentiment and the purification of political methods.

These are patriotic and statesmanlike utterances. The man who pronounced them showed that he well understands the nature of the disease, and he would not permit us to doubt his honest determination to apply the remedy. It is true, his words do not distinctly promise this or that specific measure. But he points out so clearly the evil to be redressed and the end to be reached, that the adoption of efficacious means is obviously implied. If "the system which distributes public positions purely as rewards for partisan service," which "debauches the suffrage and robs political action of its thoughtful and deliberative character," the system which makes it doubtful whether the Government will survive its continuance, is to be done away with, if "the demoralizing madness for spoils" is to be stemmed for the sake of the better performance of the public service and "the elevation of political sentiment and the purification of political methods," then, evidently,

public offices must cease to be regarded as political patronage and be treated in the truest sense as public trusts; the civil service rules, recognized as efficacious, must be extended to all the branches of the service to which they are applicable, and the principles of civil service reform, recognized to be correct, applied to all appointments, whether they can formally come under the rules or not. Nothing could be plainer.

We may, therefore, reasonably expect that President Cleveland, who now has the benefit of a larger knowledge of men and things than during his first term, will exert his whole power to do what the Administration which preceded him promised but failed to do—extend the civil service rules to all branches of the service to which they are applicable, and cause the spirit and purpose of civil service reform to be observed in all Executive appointments. It is especially to be hoped that, as to Executive appointments and removals, a beginning may be made with the 65,000 fourth-class postmasters; that the sweeping changes in this branch of the public service formerly customary may yield to civilized methods, and that the savage spectacle of the quadrennial postmasters' massacre may forever disappear, to be remembered only as a relic of barbarism which strangely survived among the freest people on earth, down to the last decade of the nineteenth century.

When a President announces his firm determination to stop this savagery without fear or favor, and to be governed only by the public interest in making such changes in any branch of the service as may be necessary, it will probably no longer be difficult to carry through Congress a law regulating the appointment of the minor postmasters upon sound civil service principles. Then the superstition that every branch of the administrative machinery must be manned with adherents to the party in power will

be thoroughly exploded, and the back of the spoils system will be broken forever.

I venture to affirm that the President who gives the decisive impulse toward such a consummation will render the Republic a more lasting service, will entitle himself more to the gratitude of posterity and will achieve greater renown for himself by this one act than he could by the most ingenious device of taxation and the most brilliant financial policy. For he will have removed an evil threatening not only our material welfare, but the very vitality of our free institutions. He will have imparted a new moral spirit to our political life rendering infinitely easier the rational solution of the other problems hanging over us.

To doubt that President Cleveland sincerely wishes to accomplish this would be to doubt that he is an honest man. The question may be asked whether his party will not throw discouraging obstacles in his way, such as the Republican party threw in the way of President Grant, and his successors, and whether he can be moved by them from his purpose. But the Democratic party should be the last to do so, if it is to deserve the name it bears; for civil service reform is, in its field, the perfect realization of the true democratic principle.

The truest definition of democratic government is furnished by Abraham Lincoln's famous saying that it is "Government of the people, by the people, and for the people": *of* the people, for the people constitute the sovereignty from which it springs; *by* the people, for the people through their chosen representatives and servants conduct it; *for* the people, for it is to be conducted solely for the people's benefit. The people are, therefore, evidently entitled to the best service they can get, and no interest, neither that of a political party nor that of any citizen, has a right to stand in the way. Those entrusted

with the power of appointing officers are, consequently, in duty bound to regard office solely as a public trust, and to appoint only persons found fittest to give the people the best possible service.

Democratic government rests upon the principle of equal rights. It abhors privilege and favoritism. But it is privilege and favoritism upon which the spoils system rests—the privilege of those in authority or of influential politicians to dispose of the public offices as their patronage, distributing that patronage by way of personal or political favor. It is justly said that the offices belong to the people and must be open to the people. Most certainly. But what does this mean? Does it mean that they must be open only to those who have influence themselves, or who have the influence of powerful politicians behind them? No; according to true democratic principle it means that the offices must be open to all citizens according to their fitness to fill them; that they must be *most* open to those who are *most* fit to fill them; that free and equal opportunity must be furnished to all for showing who are the most fit, whether they be rich or poor, politicians or no politicians, backed by influence or not backed. Under the spoils system the offices are open only to the privileged few—those favored by the influence of the powerful. Civil service reform has undertaken to open the offices to all according to their ability to serve the people. The spoils system asks the candidate for office: “Does your Member of Congress recommend you, or does the party boss in your State or your county ask for your appointment? Or are you backed by a man that gives much money to our campaign fund? What men of influence have you behind you? If you have none you can have no place.” Civil service reform asks the candidate: “Are you a man of good character, and what can you show to prove it? What do you know? What

can you do? What qualifications have you for serving the people? Have you more than other candidates for the place?" On the one side, under the spoils system, the aristocracy of influence—and a very vulgar aristocracy it is—robbing the man who has only merit unbacked by power, of his rightful chance. On the other hand, civil service reform, inviting all freely to compete, and then giving the best chance to the best man, be that man ever so lowly, and be his competitor ever so great a favorite of wealth or power. On that side the aristocracy of "pull," on this the democracy of merit.

This is the true democracy, and, as a civil service reformer, I have a right to say, "I am a Democrat," Senator David B. Hill to the contrary notwithstanding. But what are you, spoilsman? You may be whatever else, but as a Democrat you are an impostor.

The spoils politician is fond of objecting that civil service examinations do not always point out the fittest man for the place. Perhaps not always. The best marksman does not hit the bull's-eye every time, but he misses it rarely. The civil service examinations may have a small record of failures. But what the system fairly conducted *always* does is to snatch public office from the undemocratic control of influence and favoritism. And there is the point which stings the spoils politician. It would trouble him little whether or not the fittest man is put in the proper field of action. That is not what he cares for. But that the reformed system so effectively repels the demoralizing touch of political favor, that it so thoroughly takes away from the office the character of spoil, that it does not tolerate public place to be a means of bribery and an article of barter—this the spoils politician will never forgive us, for it destroys his trade. The very democracy of civil service reform makes the spoilsman's heart sore with sorrow, and in the bitterness of his soul he wildly

denounces it as an aristocratic notion imported from England, and as a thoroughly un-American contrivance.

There is no better illustration of the democratic character of civil service reform than its history in England. Our opponents might read with profit, although they would read with dismay, the excellent work of our friend Mr. Dorman B. Eaton on the civil service in Great Britain. They would find that England, too, had its spoils system once, with all the characteristic attributes of tyranny, corruption and demoralization. They would find that the struggle against the spoils system there was a struggle against the abuse of the royal prerogative and the predominance of the aristocracy. They would find that England had its movement for civil service reform, and that it was a movement for honesty and economy in government, and for the rights of the citizen. They would find that the growth of civil service reform in England went hand in hand with the decline of aristocratic influence, and with the growth of the democratic idea in government. They would find that the progress of the democratic idea there in the shape of civil service reform has banished from the service the power of influence and favoritism; that it has truly opened the public offices to the people; that it has given the poorest child of the people the right freely to compete with the son of the richest peer to show his fitness for official employment within the civil service rules, and to obtain it according to the showing; that it has vindicated the right of the best man to the best chance. They would find themselves forced to the conclusion that the spoils system, as it has grown up in this Republic in the last sixty years, is only a relapse into the corrupt and demoralizing patronage system of monarchical and aristocratic England when it was at its worst, and that civil service reform is the embodiment of the truly democratic principle there as well as here.

That it is so here as there, does that make it un-American? What fool is there to pretend this? It is just as little un-American as Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights, just as little as the common law, trial by jury and the writ of habeas corpus; just as little as constitutional government, free press and free speech; just as little as common honesty and common-sense. In fact, the principles of civil service reform are none other than those which governed the original Democracy of America. Thomas Jefferson is called the father of the Democratic party. The sons would do well to learn and inwardly digest and keep living in their souls the lessons taught by the sire. What are those lessons? Jefferson was elected to the Presidency after one of the hottest party contests this country has ever witnessed. He went into power in 1801. There was a heavy pressure for place from members of his party, the offices being almost all in the hands of the defeated Federalists. What did Jefferson do? Let us see. On March 24, 1801, he wrote to Dr. Rush:

With regard to appointments, I have so much confidence in the justice and good sense of the Federalists [the defeated party] that I have no doubt they will concur in the fairness of the position that after they have been in the exclusive possession of all the offices from the very first origin of party among us to the 3d of March, at nine o'clock in the night, no Republican [Democrat] ever admitted, and this doctrine newly avowed, it is now perfectly just that the Republicans should come in *for the vacancies that may fall in, until something like an equilibrium be restored.* But the great stumbling-block will be removals, which, though made on those just principles only on which my predecessor ought to have removed the same persons, will nevertheless be ascribed to removal on party principles.

He then designates some persons that should be displaced, and proceeds:

Of the thousands of officers, therefore, in the United States, a very few individuals only, probably not twenty, will be removed, and those only for doing what they ought not to have done. I know that in stopping thus short in the career of removals I shall give great offence to many of my friends. That torrent has been pressing me heavily and will require all my force to bear up against ; but my maxim is *fiat justitia, ruat cælum.*

And in his letter of July 12, 1801, to the merchants of New Haven, he said:

It would have been a circumstance of great relief had I found a moderate participation of office in the hands of the majority. I would gladly have left to time and accident to raise them to their just share. But their total exclusion calls for prompter corrections. I shall correct the procedure, but that done shall return with joy to that state of things when the only question concerning a candidate shall be, Is he honest? Is he capable? Is he faithful to the Constitution?

I invite the modern Democrat to contemplate in a spirit of candor and soberness, and perhaps with some reverence, the example set by the father of the Democratic party. The Federalists, the first party in possession of the Government, had filled almost all the offices during three Presidential terms. When after a furious contest the Democrats came into power, the provocation for sweeping changes was as great as it has ever been since. What did Jefferson do? He was a warm partisan himself, and a keen politician too. But did he permit himself to be swept off his feet by the greedy clamor of his adherents? Did he resolve upon a clean sweep and, in the sanguinary parlance of to-day, "set up the guillotine" to make the heads of Federal placemen promiscuously fly into the basket? Did he proceed upon the idea that under a Democratic Administration all Government officers must

be Democrats? Not he. He deplored that the Federalists should have found it necessary to fill almost all the offices with Federalists. He denounced this as an injustice; but he did not propose to retaliate by being as unjust as they had been. He simply declared his purpose to equalize the possession of the offices between the parties by making a small number of removals, but only for cause, and then by filling vacancies as they might otherwise arise in the ordinary course of things with a just proportion of Democrats. This done, then Jefferson would joyfully return to the regular practice of making appointments on the sole ground of fitness without regard to party.

It was thus clearly Jefferson's professed object, not to make the Government service a partisan service, but on the contrary to take from it the character of a partisan service which it had borne before; and then to start it anew on a distinctly non-partisan basis.

How did he carry out this plan? He did, indeed, make some removals, perhaps a few more than he had originally intended, and more than his Secretary of the Treasury, Albert Gallatin, wished him to make, but in the eight years of his two Presidential terms he made after all only thirty-nine; and, as he often solemnly affirmed, not one of them solely for party reasons. There being at that time no law limiting the tenure of offices to four years, and officeholders being not in haste to die and unwilling to resign, the process bringing about the equilibrium was necessarily trying to patience. But Jefferson saw no danger to his country nor to his party in the circumstance that a large number of the offices still remained in Federalist hands; for, being a sensible man, he knew that a postmaster had to receive and distribute not Democratic or Federalist letters, but simply letters; that a collector of revenue had to handle not Democratic or Federalist

money; that the officers of the United States courts had to secure and enforce not Democratic or Federalist justice, but simply justice; that Indian agents had to take care of not Democratic or Federalist Indians, but simply Indians; and so on. This was Jeffersonian Democracy—the Democracy which Thomas Jefferson not only preached but practised.

He stood not alone. With him James Madison and Albert Gallatin formed the famous triumvirate which initiated the Democratic epoch and has ever since remained the most brilliant constellation of the Democratic firmament. Of these James Madison was the greatest Constitutional authority. He had been one of the makers of the Constitution and he has always been respected as one of its weightiest contemporary expounders. He expressed it as his opinion that under the Constitution the power of removal from offices filled by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate rested in the President alone. But did he think that the President had the lawful power to remove meritorious officers merely to put party friends in their places? Let us hear him: "The President who does that," said Madison, "will be impeachable by the House before the Senate for such an act of maladministration, for I contend that the wanton removal of meritorious officers would subject him to impeachment and removal from his own high trust." Nor were these idle words. These principles were well kept in mind by the Democratic Presidents of that period; for we find it recorded that Madison, during the eight years when he was President, made only five removals; Monroe, during his eight years, only nine; and John Quincy Adams, during his four years, only two.

Nor was Gallatin, the great financier and administrator of the triumvirate, of a different mind. In a circular to the collectors of revenue he emphatically expressed his

desire "that the door of office be no longer shut against any man merely on account of his political opinions, but that, whether he shall differ or not from those avowed either by you or by myself, integrity and capacity suitable to the station be the only qualification that shall direct our choice." And then he went on to say that officeholders should not use their official standing and opportunities as a means of partisan influence.

Such was the Democracy of Jefferson, Madison and Gallatin, the greatest apostles of the Democratic church in America. And it may not be presumptuous to suggest that Jefferson, Madison and Gallatin are as Democratic authorities preferable to Hill, Murphy and Croker, and even to Senators Gorman of Maryland, Voorhees of Indiana and Vance of North Carolina, to whom civil service reform is an abomination and the distribution of offices as spoils a necessity of political life.

It may be profitable to consider what an Administration conducted on the principles of Jeffersonian Democracy would do under existing conditions. It would, of course, scorn the idea of making "a clean sweep," turning out all public servants belonging to the opposite party to put in its own. It would not make a removal except for good cause connected with official conduct, and it would utterly reject the notion that such a cause is furnished by the circumstance that a man has been in place four years—a notion, by the way, from a business point of view, so strikingly preposterous that it is amazing how it could ever be seriously considered among sensible people. Imagine a merchant discharging his salesmen and bookkeepers, a manufacturer discharging his foremen and artisans, a railroad corporation discharging its engineers and switchmen, a bank discharging its cashiers and tellers every four years on the ground that they have been in their places long enough and somebody else ought to

have them now—would you trust a bank conducted upon such principles with your deposits, and would you like to travel on such a railroad?

The Jeffersonian Administration would, therefore, as a matter of common-sense, never think of applying to the far more important Government business a rule which would be scouted as criminally absurd when applied to the business of a railroad or a bank. It would go further, and consider as an improper removal the non-reappointment of a meritorious officer to whose place the existing four-year-term law applies, and it would do all in its power to bring about the repeal of that mischievous law. It would remember that this law was in its very inception a fraud practised upon the people. Crawford, the Secretary of the Treasury under Monroe, instigated its enactment under the pretence that it would give him better control over officers handling the public money, a pretence the futility of which became soon apparent. His real purpose was to strengthen his hold upon the officeholders and to make them further, as a political machine, his chances for the Presidency. The bill was passed without debate and Monroe signed it in a hurry without consideration. Thomas Jefferson, in a letter of November 29, 1820, addressed to James Madison, called it “the mischievous law vacating every four years nearly all the Executive offices of the Government.” And thus he described, with admirable foresight, its effects:

It saps the Constitutional and salutary functions of the President, and introduces a principle of intrigue and corruption which will soon leaven the mass, not only of Senators but of citizens. . . . It will keep in constant excitement all the hungry cormorants for office, render them, as well as those in place, sycophants to their Senators; engage these in eternal intrigue to turn out one and put in another, in cabals to swap

work; and make of them what all executive directories become, mere sinks of corruption and faction.

Madison replied: "The law terminating appointments at periods of four years is pregnant with mischiefs such as you describe." And in a letter to Monroe he raised serious questions as to its Constitutionality. Its repeal was urged by the foremost statesmen in our history, Clay, Webster, Calhoun and others, but in vain.

An Administration conducted on Jeffersonian principles would not permit so iniquitous a law to survive; for if the law was mischievous then, it is, in consequence of the multiplication of the offices to which it applies and the greater "madness for spoils," infinitely more mischievous now. A Jeffersonian Administration would certainly never think of still increasing the mischief by applying a four-year rule to offices to which the four-year law does not apply—such as the minor post-offices. And I am glad to learn that the rumor which ascribed to the Post-Office Department the intention of adopting such a rule is unfounded.

A Jeffersonian Administration would recognize that the mere practice of permitting officers belonging to the opposite party to serve out their four-year terms, then to be all supplanted by men of the ruling party, would not be a reform of real value. It might be an improvement upon more brutal practices formerly prevailing, but it will in the course of four years result in a general partisan change. It will be a clean sweep slowly and bashfully executed, a clean sweep ashamed of itself, but a clean sweep for all that, to be followed by another clean sweep when the other party comes into power; a substantial continuation of the old demoralizing abuse. It will have only one merit, the merit of carrying the proof of its own inconsistency on its face. Look at it. A Democratic Executive

permits Republican officeholders to continue in place, one, two or three years until their terms expire. The Democratic Executive thereby recognizes two things: firstly, that these Republican officers are good officers—for if they were not, they would have been removed for cause; and secondly, that Republican officers may continue to serve under a Democratic Administration without detriment to the public interest. In other words, the Democratic Executive practically recognizes that the public interest does not demand the displacement of these Republican officers; and yet, taking advantage of the mischievous four-year-term law, the Executive displaces them—displaces them confessedly without valid reason.

The Jeffersonian Administration will not do things so irrational; but, casting aside all inconsistencies and subterfuges, it will simply follow the precept given by Jefferson, Madison and Gallatin, remove only such officers as are, upon fair ascertainment, shown to have become obnoxious to the public interest; fill vacancies in such a way as to give the service an unpartisan character, and ask about candidates only: "Is he honest? Is he capable? Is he faithful to the Constitution?"—employing, in order to secure to such questions reliable answers, the most trustworthy methods and instrumentalities. This is Democracy according to Jeffersonian teaching. It is the destruction of the spoils system. It is civil service reform. And he is no Jeffersonian Democrat—he is no true Democrat at all—who will obstruct, or rather, who fails actively to support the President in any endeavor to bring about a practical return to these sound Democratic principles.

Is such a consummation beyond reasonable hope? Why should it be? I do not underrate the difficulty of uprooting abuses which seem to have become imbedded in popular habits and ways of thinking. But no brave

man will recoil before an error because it appears popular; and frequently he will find it in reality far less popular than it appeared before he resolutely attacked it. Those of us who witnessed the first beginning of the civil service reform movement might well have been discouraged by the seeming hopelessness of the undertaking. The politicians despised it as an idle dream of visionaries, and waved it aside with a sneer. The people seemed to ignore it with stolid indifference. The first practical attempt resulted in dismal failure. That public sentiment was in any degree prepared for it when the work was begun, few of us would have been sanguine enough to affirm. But that public sentiment became rapidly prepared for it as the work went on, nobody will now deny. The present danger is, not that those who have the matter practically in hand rush ahead of public sentiment, but that they lag behind it.

One by one the old fictions by which the spoils politician sought to discredit civil service reform are vanishing into thin air. Of the demagogic pretence that it is an outlandish notion imported from England, and an un-American contrivance, I have already spoken. We still hear sometimes the silly story that it will build up an officeholding aristocracy. That people should fear the growing up among us of an aristocracy of millionaires—that I can conceive. But think of an aristocracy of revenue collectors, customhouse appraisers, district attorneys and United States marshals! Imagine a nobility composed of postmasters, Indian agents and Department clerks! If there be anything like a feudal aristocracy in politics, it is that born of the spoils system—the party bosses, the machine leaders, the dealers-out of patronage—such as King Croker, Duke Murphy, Marquis Sheehan, Earl Gilroy and the sturdy barons holding fiefs and wielding power as Tammany district leaders here—a somewhat

rough nobility to be sure, but quite as enterprising as any that levied tax on unprotected merchants' wagons and upon the unwary traveller's purse in the Middle Ages. It is for the Jeffersonian Democracy to deal with this precious chivalry.

There is the other curious conceit that the spoils of office are necessary to hold political parties together, to create an interest in public affairs among the people and to give life and spirit to our political contests. Is this possible? Look at England, where, after the overthrow of one party and the coming into power of another, scarcely more than sixty offices change hands. Look at Germany, where the victory of one and the defeat of another party involve no change in the administrative machinery at all. There are no spoils there, but are there no parties? Are there no party contests stirring the popular mind to its very depth? And now, in the freest of all countries, where the people in the largest sense are called to govern themselves, where the people owe so much to their democratic institutions and are said to be so proud of them, here there should not be patriotism and public spirit enough, here it should require the sordid allurement of spoils and plunder to inspire the citizens with an active interest in their own affairs? Shame upon the slanderers who revile and blacken the American name with so infamous a charge! For it is a slander, wanton, foul and abominable. There was as much interest and ardor in our political contests as there ever has been anywhere in the world *before* the spoils of office were an element in American politics. There was more interest, more patriotic fervor, more self-sacrificing devotion, than anywhere and at any time in history, in the greatest political contest this country has ever seen—in the struggle for the salvation of the Union—in which hundreds of thousands freely offered their lives without any

thought of spoil. And now should it be necessary to stimulate the patriotism of the American people with plunder? In the name of the National honor I repel the calumny.

If there has been anything calculated to chill patriotic zeal in public affairs, and to drive high-minded public spirit out of active political work, it was the intrusion of the spoils system that did it. It has injected the virus of mercenary motive into political endeavor. It has attracted to political organizations bands of greedy camp-followers, and enabled them to crowd out men of self-respect with their disgusting predominance. It has put the political boss, the leader of organized selfishness, in the place of the statesman. It has tended to make the political parties mere machines in the service of sordid greed. Instead of imparting healthy life and spirit to our political contests, it has sought to degrade them to the level of scrambles for plunder. Take out that spoils element and there will still be parties, but they will not become mutual assurance companies of speculators and self-seekers. These parties will not be smaller, but they will be better. There will still be political workers, but they will be workers for public measures and policies, no longer the mercenary crowd working for loot. There will be leaders, but statesmanlike leaders of thought and endeavor—no longer leaders of hireling bands. There will be party contests, but contests of opinion fired with the enthusiasm for great principles—no longer miserable cat-fights for post-offices and collectorships. It is true the political trickster whose whole statesmanship consists in the art of political barter, and the patriot whose whole public spirit springs from a desire to be fed at the public crib—they will be sadly discouraged and chilled; they may perhaps sullenly retire from the trade. But the real patriotism and statesmanship of the country, inspired with

new zeal and hope, will move untold thousands to more than fill the gaps.

We hear it said that the "heelers" and the men of dirty work are necessary for party organization. Remove the spoils system, and you will see how superfluous they are. Their places will be taken by men who attend to organization with no less zeal and far more honorable purpose. This city groans under Tammany dominion, and Tammany asserts that its methods are necessary to hold an effective party organization together. Take away the spoils, put all the non-elective places, from the department commissioner to the street-sweeper, under sound and strict civil service rules, and there will be the end of Tammany. But the city will have other organizations for government, and then a government of public spirit, a government in which the best men will be proud to take part; and it will at once appear how little the political ardor and activity of the Tammany kind was required to make New Yorkers happy. We hear it said that the possession and the use of the spoils of office are needed to render a political party strong and successful. It is refreshing to see what the American people have of late come to think of the virtue imparted to a political party by the possession of the plunder. In 1884 the Republicans had all the offices, and they were defeated; in 1888 the Democrats had all the offices, and they were defeated; in 1892 the Republicans had all the offices, and they were defeated. And if in 1896 the Democrats should have all the offices again, that possession would certainly not save them from defeat.

As an element of party strength the possession of the offices has clearly proved a failure. The wise politician will seriously consider, in the light of recent history, whether it is not really an element of party weakness. How much stronger than a party gorged with spoil would

that party be in the respect and confidence of the people that could truthfully say: "I was in control of the Government, and I have not selfishly abused my power. I have removed no meritorious public servant, although many of them were politically opposed to me. For every appointment I had to make, I have carefully selected the fittest man regardless of party. The interest of the people was my supreme consideration. I have faithfully treated the public offices as public trusts." Would not a party able to say this win for every discontented officeseeker ten recruits among our good citizens?

I say, therefore, that civil service reform is not only right, not only democratic, but also "good politics." It is good politics in a larger sense now than it has ever been before. The rapid repetition since 1884 of sweeping changes in the public service, with the scandals of absurdity and brutality inseparable from them, has stirred up a moral sensitiveness among good citizens all over the land, which is constantly increasing. The ravages committed by Mr. Clarkson in the postal service during Mr. Harrison's Administration called forth much severer criticism than anything done by Mr. Stevenson before him; and fifty removals made by Mr. Maxwell now, whatever explanations may be given, cause a far more painful sensation than five hundred removals made by Mr. Clarkson did four years ago. The national pride begins to be stung by a feeling of shame at the thought that abuses so glaring have been permitted to live so long in this mighty Republic of ours; and this feeling will be especially keen at this period of the World's Exposition—it might be called the world's meeting—upon our soil, when merchants, manufacturers, workingmen, artists, men of science, men of letters, statesmen, publicists, thinkers of all nations visit this Republic. They will study not only our natural resources, our material development and

the productions of our industries, but the working of our political institutions, our morals, our customs, our manners, our ways of thinking, all the fruits of our civilization. The patriotic American, mindful of the honor of his country, asks himself with anxious interest how the spectacle of the passage of our National Government from the control of one party to that of another will strike these keen observers, and how their experiences, communicated to the world, will affect the standing of this Republic in the opinion of civilized mankind.

Imagine such men to go to Washington in order to look into the machinery of what may without exaggeration in some respects be called the greatest, and certainly the freest Government on earth—the one which ought to be the model Government of the world. Imagine them to find the National capital occupied by eager crowds clamoring for the public offices as the hireling soldiery of past centuries may have clamored for the booty of a town taken by assault. Imagine them to find the President of the United States, the greatest elected officer in the world, literally besieged by the throng of office-hunters demanding his instant attention. Imagine them to see the President, as well as the Secretary of the Treasury, at a moment when the financial interests of this people of sixty-five millions are drifting into the perils of a great crisis, obliged to confess that the place-hunting invasion does not leave the highest officers of the Government time quietly to study the pressing dangers of the situation and the means to avert them. Imagine the observers to inquire into the “claims” of the impetuous office-hunters, and to find in an overwhelming majority of cases mere party service urged as their only title to public employment, coupled with an impatient demand that all officers of different politics be instantly ousted to make room for the victors. Imagine them to see Senators

and Representatives, the lawmakers of the Republic, vehemently pressing such action. Imagine them to take up their daily papers and to find in one of them a despatch announcing that yesterday 150 new postmasters were appointed, among them fifty in the place of persons removed, mostly because they have been in office four years; just long enough to make them experienced and useful postmasters; in another paper a jubilant outcry that the "headsman" in Washington is vigorously swinging his axe and making the heads fly; and in still another a threatening growl at the slowness with which the executioner is doing his work, and which is chilling the enthusiasm of the party. Imagine these bedlam scenes to be the pictures these observers would carry home with them of American practical sense, of the American development of democratic institutions, of the fruits of American civilization, of the character of this great Republic of ours, which we proudly think should be in all things an elevating example, a guiding star to all nations on earth!

The shame of the fact that the spoils system, of which all this is but the natural outgrowth, has prevailed among us for more than half a century, we cannot hide from the searching eyes of mankind—just as in times gone by we could not hide the hideous blot of slavery. Nor is the existing evil of less moment than that which we have overcome. We find it recorded that a few days after the fall of Richmond, Abraham Lincoln pointed out to a friend the crowd of office-seekers besieging his door, and mournfully said: "Look at this. Now we have conquered the rebellion; but here you see something that may become more dangerous to this Republic than the rebellion itself." But as we overcame slavery and the rebellion, so the American people can again furnish the proof that, however strongly an evil may be entrenched in power

and in habit, they are, in the exercise of their democratic government, wise enough, patriotic enough and vigorous enough to deal with it. And nothing would redound more to the glory of this Republic than such a demonstration now, when, more than ever, it is the observed of all observers.

When thinking of the means to abolish the spoils system, our eyes turn not unnaturally to the man whom the people recently put at the head of the National Government. He has the power to strike a decisive blow; he has the opportunity, and it would be an offense to doubt that he has the will. He knows, as we know, that the people put him where he is because he was trusted to be opposed to the vicious methods which so long have poisoned our political life. He was believed to be able and willing to secure to the people not merely a smaller measure, but the opposite of the tyrannous and demoralizing spoils politics, of which they are tired. He owes his elevation to the hope that his Administration would be different from most of those which preceded it, not merely in degree, but in kind. We, who are an organization of devoted volunteers in the struggle for this cause, may without presumption speak to him and say: "You are beset by politicians great and small who, for their own advantage, seek to drive you from your noblest purposes. Tell them once for all that the President of the United States, as you understand his duty, has in the use of his power only one interest to serve, and that is the common welfare. You have told us that it is very doubtful whether our Government could survive the strain of a continuance of the spoils system. Tell the spoils-seekers that it is the sacred duty of the President of the United States to guard the Government against this perilous strain, that he has no right to continue it and that, therefore, the distribution of offices as party spoils must cease altogether. You have

told us that the use of offices as rewards for partisan activity involves 'a misappropriation of the public funds.' Tell them that the President of the United States has no right to misappropriate the public funds, no right to increase the cost of the Government and the burdens of the people, by displacing efficient public servants because they belong to the opposite party, and by filling the places by inexperienced and therefore expensive men of his own. Tell them this with decision and firmness, and soon the wild scramble will cease which harasses you and your aids beyond endurance, almost blocking the wheels of the Government and exposing us to the scoffs of civilized men. Let all concerned well understand that only the public interest will be served and no spoils are to be had while you are President, and you will find Congress more willing than it ever has been to regulate the service permanently by rational legislation. It may be said that by doing this you will offend many politicians. So you will. You will offend the same men whom you have offended many times before, and whose hostility has been your glory and your strength. And they will be equally offended if you do only half of it. But by doing the whole you will win the support and the lasting gratitude of a patriotic people. No living man has more reason than you to know that the people can be trusted, that as to all questions of political morals they are far in advance of the professional politicians, and that they are capable of enforcing their will. If they were not, then you would not be where you are. We read of able and brave men in history whose achievements remained crude and commonplace, while a little more of bold decision at the moment of great opportunity would have made them heroes and placed them among the immortals. Yours is the opportunity of a generation. It is an enviable opportunity, worthy of the noblest, the most patriotic ambition. As

Abraham Lincoln stands in our annals as the liberator of the slave, you may stand there, if you will, as the re-generator of our political life."

Members of the League, we look forward to the year before us with high hopes. May we be permitted, when we meet again, to rejoice over accomplished results.

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TO LUCIUS B. SWIFT

POCANTICO HILLS, N. Y., May 13, 1893.

When I received your telegram of the 11th I was just on the point of leaving Washington for home. I agree with you completely and have preached the same doctrine to Messrs. Bissell and Maxwell. I have especially tried to convince Mr. Bissell, who is a well-meaning and sincere man, of the necessity of forming and making known a definite plan as to the object to be reached—a non-partisan service—and the means by which to reach it. I think I have made an impression upon him.

Did you notice the anti-spoils-system talk Mr. Bynum has been indulging in?

I have some reasons for hoping that there will be an improvement in the method of the Post-Office Department from this time on, and also that the civil service rules will soon be extended over the chiefs of division. The President and all the secretaries are profoundly disgusted with the things the spoils system has brought upon them, and I think we have a good chance of making a substantial advance. I shall keep up a vigorous correspondence with them. Our relations are in this respect all that can be desired.

## TO PRESIDENT CLEVELAND

POCANTICO HILLS, May 13, 1893.

Before leaving Washington I had a conversation with Secretary Carlisle about the financial situation, in the course of which he expressed himself as more and more inclined to think that the earliest possible calling together of Congress—earlier than September—would be advisable. I am very much of the same opinion. The financial condition of the country is becoming more critical every day. The failures and restrictions of credit which have already occurred are only a premonitory symptom. Whatever measures the Executive alone can take will only be palliative, temporary makeshifts. I fear you take too great a responsibility upon yourself for what may happen if the meeting of Congress is put off unnecessarily long. As to the chances of getting the required legislation, they would probably be as good now as they may be four months hence.

My conversation with Mr. Carlisle also drifted upon the Sturtevant case, and Mr. Carlisle gave me the same reasons for the removal that I heard from you. You probably had them from the same source. After I had seen Mr. Carlisle I met several newspaper correspondents, some of whom I know to be very honorable and responsible men. The story I heard from them was very different; that Mr. Sturtevant was a man of moderate fortune, "well off" for a Government clerk; that he had acquired his means by economy, prudent management and a few fortunate investments; that the charge of his supplying [?] newspaper men with stationery etc., was utterly unfounded and absurd; that he was much esteemed as a citizen; that if the fact of a Government clerk's getting into good circumstances by legitimate means were to subject him "*ex ipso* to suspicion" and tell against him, it

would probably have a bad effect upon the morals of the force; that Mr. Logan Carlisle, the appointment clerk, was boastingly proclaiming his purpose to clean out the Republicans from the Department as far as his power would reach, very much in the Eugene Higgins style; that he professed to be especially after those who were said to have made themselves indispensable; and that he would see them removed simply because they were Republicans.

I heard these things from several different sources which I have reason to consider trustworthy, and I must confess that I believe them to be substantially true. This seems to be "a case of a young man" whose head is turned by the possession of power and who wishes to show what he can do. His performances are attracting the same kind of attention that Eugene Higgins's antics attracted eight years ago. You will certainly stop this some day. Would it not be well to stop it promptly before more mischief is done?

I am by no means of the opinion that there should be no removals at all. I think the removal order by Secretary Lamont to clear his Department of incapables will be approved by every fair-thinking man. The manner in which he proceeded was admirable. Why should not a similar method be adopted in every Department? If after such an inquiry a man like Sturtevant is found unworthy to remain in the service, nobody will have a right to find fault. But when the same thing is done, or caused to be done, by a young appointment clerk attempting to run a great Department, it has a very different look.

I spoke with Secretary Carlisle about putting the division chiefs under the civil service rules. He expressed himself heartily in favor of it; the sooner it were done the better. I would again submit to you, whether it would not be well to do this *now*. I had a talk with Mr. Roosevelt

about it, who assured me that the Commission had ample machinery for it and the measure could be immediately executed without the slightest difficulty. If it had been done at the beginning of the Administration it would already have obviated a good deal of criticism and I am sure the sooner it is done now the better it will be for the service and the more it will relieve you of trouble. It will not in the least interfere with the necessary cleaning out of the Departments, for the power of removal will remain intact. But it will put the reason for which removals are made, above suspicion. Besides, the adoption of the measure would silence much of the criticism now heard.

In connection with this I would suggest that it would be very desirable to have the Civil Service Commission put in permanent working order. I know you have been too much overrun to get to it, but it would probably not consume much of your time if you took it up. From all I can learn, General [Joseph E.] Johnston is really a mere obstruction to good work in the Commission, not much better than the late Edgerton. He seems to be at present studying how to prevent a further extension of the rules, and how to secure to the postmasters, whose offices have recently been put under the rules, an opportunity for making a clean sweep of their subordinates before the rules go actually into force. This would be like the scandal caused by the ravaging of the railway mail service at the beginning of the Harrison Administration, and ought certainly to be prevented.

Will you pardon me for confessing that something you said to me last Wednesday after dinner has really alarmed me? It was that I would be one of the first to blame you if you failed to get the necessary financial legislation through Congress by the "want of a little tact." I have thought of it since a good deal and I cannot refrain from expressing again my conviction that the employment of

tact in the shape of patronage, for the purpose of carrying the desired legislation through Congress would be an utterly ruinous course. I have been in public life thirty-five years, part of the time in official position and all the time an attentive observer. I know of no attempt by a President thus to put through an important and warmly contested piece of legislation without arousing violent animosities and without ultimate disaster. Usually it has proved entirely useless too, as to the immediate object in view. Congressmen ask for places to strengthen themselves with their constituencies. Those who do this will not cast votes which they think will weaken them with their constituencies after having taken the places. But in your case such a policy would amount to the forfeiture of the greatest of your opportunities. You have those problems before you—the financial question, the tariff question and the abolition of the spoils system. With regard to the first two, your success is uncertain, for it depends upon Congress. As to the third, your success is in your own hands. And that success, if fully achieved, will send your name to posterity with immortal honors. If you proclaimed now, in addition to what you have already declared, that your recent experience has more than ever convinced you of the viciousness of the spoils system, that you are inflexibly determined not to make a removal and not to refuse a reappointment without conscientiously ascertained cause, and to make appointments only in the interest of the public service, and thus to put an end to spoils politics, you would not lose a single vote on your financial and your tariff policies that you otherwise would get, and you would array a public opinion on your side that would come to your aid with tremendous force. You would be recognized as one of the greatest benefactors of the American people. You might lose some partisans, but you would win a much larger number

of a much higher character and make your party stronger than it ever was before. You have the most enviable opportunity of this generation, and I pray that it may not be lost. Pardon these warm words of a faithful friend.

I have taken the liberty of addressing a letter to you introducing Mr. Francis E. Leupp, the editor of *Good Government*, the organ of the National Civil Service Reform League. He may be of good use in presenting his conceptions and promoting a just understanding between the Administration and the League.

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#### GERMAN DAY<sup>1</sup>

We meet to-day, on the hospitable soil of the American Republic, to do honor to Germany in the peaceful contest of nations. We have come from far and near to render homage to the genius of the German nation. When I received the distinguished invitation to express this homage in the name of my compatriots, many obstacles stood in the way of acceptance, but my German blood would give me no peace; so here I am to mingle my voice with yours in a joyful greeting to the old Fatherland. How little they know us, our kinsmen over there, if they believe that a selfish pursuit of the dollar has cooled the German-born American's blood and that he no longer loves the old home. To-day our affection shall speak.

We are, indeed, faithful citizens of the great American Republic—as loyal as the truest. We are proud of our citizenship, proud of our commonwealth, for this self-government is our government, its growth is also our growth, its destiny is our destiny. We are proud of the mighty and noble Nation of which we feel ourselves a part, proud of the glorious Stars and Stripes, the symbol of

<sup>1</sup> Speech delivered in German at the World's Fair, Chicago, June 15, 1893. Translated by Miss Schurz.

dearly-won National unity, the emblem of a great past and a still greater future—of all these we are as proud as the proudest. We recognize our duties as citizens and joyfully fulfil them. Whenever our new country has called her sons to arms against foreign or domestic foes her German-born citizen has been among the first to rush to the defense of the flag and on the battlefield to offer his blood and his life to the common cause. On the roll of heroes and martyrs of the Republic, German names have never been wanting. In the domain of thought and in the workshop, the German mind and the German hand have toiled with diligence, and with abundant results; and we may well say that the soil of America has been enriched by the sacrifice of German blood and German labor. Whenever there has been a question of putting into practice those political rights which the new Fatherland has bestowed upon us with such generous liberality in order to serve the cause of justice, of liberty and honest government, we may well boast that the great mass of German-born citizens has always found its way into the ranks of those in whose hands the honor and welfare of the country was most secure. Temporary blunders may have been made, but there have been extremes to which not even the enticing voice of party spirit could allure the German-American citizen. Ask the political humbug and he will confess to you that the "German vote" has always given him much trouble and anxiety. Ask the true patriot and he will tell you that he confidently relies upon the sane and fair sense and the patriotic inspiration of the German-American citizen.

And more than this. However fervent may be the sympathy of the German-American with the fortunes, the aspirations and the struggles of the old home; however ardently his good wishes may follow all the enterprises of his old country, he never allows his sense of duty to-

wards the new Fatherland to become shaken by the idea of leading this Republic away from the secure path of its traditional and wise policy, nor to attempt to involve it in the quarrels or conflict of interests of the old world. Never has he tried to mingle European politics with those of America. One wish, indeed, he has always cherished and will cherish to the end. It is a German wish, but none the less loyally American, and patriotic—that the friendship which has existed between the United States of America and Germany from olden times may never be troubled by a cloud of discord or even of misunderstanding, and that our old and our new Fatherland may give the world the beautiful spectacle of the indissoluble friendship of nations.

We look back upon the dark days of the war of the rebellion, when the Union seemed to be tottering on the verge of ruin, when our armies suffered one defeat after another, when not only our foes and those who wished us ill, but also our good friends prophesied the dissolution of the great Republic; when the credit of the Republic had sunk to its lowest ebb, and the hope of the bravest began to falter. We remember with happy satisfaction that then the German nation alone, of all peoples of the world, did not lose its confidence in the ultimate victory of our good cause and in the future of America. That it unhesitatingly lent millions upon millions of its savings to the Republic and thus gave her new strength in her dire need. That was the friend in deed who confidently gave assistance to the sorely tried friend in need, and this trust was amply rewarded as it deserved to be. Ever to preserve this National amity between the old and the new Fatherland, in its unchanged strength, that is the ardent wish of every German-American, and every magnanimous and patriotic native American will reëcho this sentiment.

He who does not honor the old Fatherland is not worthy

of the new. He who does not revere his old mother will not truly love his bride. And so from the fullness of our German hearts we send our greeting across the sea. Proud as we are to belong, of our own choice, to the American Republic, we are also proud to be the offspring of a great nation that for a thousand years has won the laurels of victory in countless hard-contested fields where thought and labor were her only weapons—of a nation that was a mighty power for culture long before Columbus saw the shores of America. Let us proclaim loudly to-day how truly we love the country where our cradles rocked. With tender yearning we see in memory the green waters of our native Rhine, where are reflected the castles gray with age, around which legendary poetry has woven its magic—where grows the precious grape—where man is gay, often without knowing why—where German song seems doubly poetic—where the victorious figure of Germania looks proudly from the Niederwald across the border. We see again the beautiful, dear land of which every foot is precious to us, from the dark woods of the Black Forest and the Bavarian Alps, to the dunes of the North Sea, from the oaks a thousand years old, growing on the red soil of Westphalia, to the Silesian mountains and the beech woods of the Baltic.

How deeply we of the older generation felt the humiliation of the German name when the old Fatherland lay powerless and torn asunder, when Germany was only a geographical idea, when patriotic enthusiasm was being dissipated in thoughtless efforts, when the nation of thinkers appeared to be only a nation of impotent dreamers and the future of the Fatherland only a dreary waste! Only we can fully understand how uplifting was the feeling that stirred our hearts when the message came across the ocean that the evil charm was broken and that Kaiser Barbarossa, according to the old legend, had arisen from

his tomb in the Kyffhäuser and that the ravens of ill omen no longer wheeled around the mountain. What a spectacle it was when the much ridiculed and scoffed at German Michel was suddenly aroused from his sleep! How he stretched his huge limbs, how he shook his shield until the thunders of Heaven were awakened! How Europe trembled when he stamped upon the ground! How he threw the insolent foe into the dust with a mighty stroke of his sword! How he called with the voice of a trumpet—“Das ganze Deutschland soll es sein!” (“All Germany, united, our Fatherland shall be!”) And how all mankind looked with amazement upon the gigantic hero!

What a glorious time! Every German heart, the wide world over, beat with admiration and gratitude for the kinsmen in the old home, and wherever the German mothertongue was heard, the joyful chorus resounded: “At last Germans again have a Fatherland!” Every German breast thrilled with a bolder assurance and every drop of German blood was warmed by the newly arisen sun of German honor and German greatness.

Many years have passed since then, and again we see Germania before us in the wreath of victory: now she is not crowned with the laurel won on distant battlefields; she is here before our eyes, on our own soil, adorned with the civic crown, which she gained in the peaceful contest of nations on the fields of invention, of art, of creative labor, of fruitful endeavor, of civilization. Here she stands, not only one of many, but among the first in the contest. All the world knows, it has heard and read, what she can do in war—but what Germany can do in peace, that she shows us here.

Let us confess that many of us had hardly dared to hope for so much. We still remembered the humiliating display of Germany at the Philadelphia Exposition in the

year 1876. That exhibition had not only been insignificant as to quantity but inferior as to quality. It bore the marks of the old time before the new birth of the Empire, when in the dismemberment of the Fatherland, Germans lived the narrow life of the small principalities and their thoughts were provincial; when the idea of competing for the first place in the contest of nations still seemed to most Germans like presumptuous audacity; when in business enterprise the narrow methods of making a small profit by underbidding prices debarred the spirit of enterprise and a bold grasp of future contingencies.

The new German Empire had, indeed, existed for five years, at the time of the Philadelphia Exhibition and Germany had already become the leading power of the continent, but these five years had not sufficed for the national industrial growth to overtake the national political development. The consequences of two great wars had to be overcome, and that old curse of the German, a certain spirit of pettiness and narrowness, had to be broken completely by the development of broader views, more daring aspirations and higher aims. And this development has come, as it must, to a sound, capable people under the most powerful of all inspirations—the inspiration of a noble, proud, national self-esteem. It is with a nation as it is with an individual; self-respect is character.

In the struggle of business competition there are two kinds of business policy which are indicative of the character of the business man and of the business he is engaged in. One is, as I have already indicated, the narrow policy of underbidding in price with the motto, "Cheap and Nasty." This is the policy of the narrow-minded provincial who seeks his profit by means of petty cunning and appeals to a petty custom; a narrow, cowardly, short-sighted policy, overreaching itself by its own tricks. It

may temporarily succeed, but will not long be able to hold the field, and limited success will make failure all the more certain; this is a policy which is unworthy of an honest, capable man and of an honest, capable people.

The other is the policy of offering larger values, with the motto: "The best goods for a fair price." This is the policy of the business man of a wide outlook and pride of character, of a man who studies the demands of the time with an open mind and seeks the best means to satisfy them, who follows the progress of invention and the development of opportunities with a keen eye, and who, with a liberal mind and generous hand, makes art and science his assistants; who wins an honest custom by honest dealing, and who with bold enterprise ventures greater things where he has inspired confidence. That is the policy of a people who aspire to build up its industry and trade on a great scale—of a people possessing broad intelligence and who understand how to use it—of a people who have confidence in their own strength and respect for their own character. That policy will conquer the world-market and keep it.

The policy of underbidding prices dominated Germany at the time of the Philadelphia Exposition; it was a sad survival of the old times of dismemberment, of impotence, of narrowness, of self-depreciation, of doubt of her own strength. The policy of bidding for higher values is shown in Germany's exhibits in the great white city of Chicago. This is characteristic of the Germany of modern times, of the mighty Empire, the Germany with the exalted love of country, its self-esteem, its great inspiration, its mighty power, its lofty aspirations—great in its glory of war, but no less great in peaceful achievements. It is this Germany that we to-day salute.

With the proud consciousness of accomplishment, Germany can say to the nations to-day: "Come and

behold!" In these halls not only the material products are displayed, but here breathes our national spirit. After the victories in the Franco-Prussian war it was said: "That was not merely the result of brutal force, it was the German schoolmaster who had his part in the victory." The same words can be applied here, if under the head of "schoolmaster" we include the German University. In no other country of the world is science so much fostered for its own sake, for the sake of pure knowledge, and in no other country is science so extensively utilized. We see the example before us, and what a variety of products is here amassed: from the Nurnberg toy to the giant monster cannon of Krupp; from the artistic wonders of wrought-iron and Berlin and Meissen porcelain to the most modern products in the domain of machinery, of mining, of railroads, of chemistry, of electricity used as a motive power and for illumination (and the German electric light is the brightest and reaches the farthest), to the magnificent results of the textile industry and the splendid creations of painting and sculpture; from the simplest type of ordinary book-printing to the gorgeous editions enriched by sumptuous illustrations; from the primer of the German "*Volksschule*" to the most delicate scientific apparatus;—all these and many more are German products—all that is useful and beautiful has been brought together in a variety, an abundance and splendor, and imbued with the grace that only a people of many hundreds of years of culture can possess. Here all these are so amazing and still so undeniably real and convincing, that criticism is overcome by admiration, and even envy and jealousy are silenced.

We German-Americans feel as if we had had a part in the glorious triumph of our kinsmen. May we be permitted to sun ourselves in the radiance of the old Fatherland. With pride we point out what is exhibited here,

and say: "Look, this is Germany, the land that gave us birth. This is the German people, the people from whom we have sprung; honor to this land and to this people!" Without envy we concede to all nations the triumphs they have earned,—we are satisfied with ours. And for this triumph we send to the Fatherland, our heart-felt gratitude. Thanks to the fertile German mind and the prolific German energy that have created all this. Thanks to the Kaiser for the powerful stimulus he has given to this work in Germany by his personal favor, by the care and assistance he has bestowed upon it. Thanks to the commissioner of the German Empire, Mr. Wermuth, who has prepared, promoted and superintended this work with rare circumspection and ability, with unfailing tact and untiring devotion and energy. His name will always be remembered here with high esteem and friendship. Thanks to every German who has contributed his share, be it great or small to this brilliant proof of German skill.

Our warmest greetings go with our thanks. May there be many years of untroubled peace vouchsafed the German Fatherland in which to develop what has been so vigorously begun and so gloriously achieved. May it be strong to endure the trials which destiny may have in store for it. The horizon of Germany is not, indeed, without clouds. Not only its position between two dangerous neighbors, but no less the heated conflict of interests and the ferment of parties that disturb domestic affairs, may well give cause for anxiety to the German patriot. But, I confess, I am not greatly disturbed as to the outcome. What seems a disquieting condition in Germany is not unusual in history. When new national unions are formed consisting of parts that formerly had a separate and independent existence, there is always a period of confusion to be overcome, until the component parts arrive at a realizing sense of what are the essentials

and what are the questions of secondary importance in the new composite state. How long did it take our American Union before this process had been accomplished? And as it has been here, so it will be there. The German people will never forget that its unity, personified in the Empire, is the principal condition of its power, its greatness and its prosperity. And the Empire will infallibly find the surest guarantee of its stability in the progressive development of free institutions. The Germans are like every other strong people—fidelity will increase with freedom. So we wish most sincerely and we confidently hope, that united Germany may flourish and blossom forever, a glory and a blessing to herself and to all the world!

And may what we see here be a reminder and an inspiration to us Americans of German blood. May we never forget that we ought to enjoy the fame of our kinsmen only to the extent to which we are worthy of it ourselves. I have said: who does not honor the old Fatherland is not worthy of the new, but I say also he is not worthy of the old Fatherland who is not one of the most faithful citizens of the new. *Noblesse oblige.* To be a German now means more than it meant before he belonged to one united nation. He who calls himself a German now must never forget his honorable obligation to his name; he must honor Germany in himself. The German-American can accomplish great things for the development of the great composite nation of the new world, if in his works and deeds he combines and welds the best that is in the German character with the best that is in the American. And here, on this day, when we do honor to Germany, let us pledge ourselves faithfully to perform this high task.

This is the greeting which we send across the sea. Great, glorious, dear Fatherland, we salute you, with our affec-

tions for what you are, with our gratitude for what you have achieved, with our good wishes for your welfare, with our solemn vows to be worthy of you!

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#### MANIFEST DESTINY<sup>1</sup>

Whenever there is a project on foot to annex foreign territory to this Republic the cry of "manifest destiny" is raised to produce the impression that all opposition to such a project is a struggle against fate. Forty years ago this cry had a peculiar significance. The slaveholders saw in the rapid growth of the free States a menace to the existence of slavery. In order to strengthen themselves in Congress they needed more slave States, and looked therefore to the acquisition of foreign territory on which slavery existed—in the first place, the island of Cuba. Thus to the pro-slavery man "manifest destiny" meant an increase of the number of slave States by annexation. There was still another force behind the demand for territorial expansion. It consisted in the youthful optimism at that time still inspiring the minds of many Americans with the idea that this Republic, being charged with the mission of bearing the banner of freedom over the whole civilized world, could transform any country, inhabited by any kind of population, into something like itself simply by extending over it the magic charm of its political institutions. Such sentiments had been strengthened by the revolutionary movements of 1848 in Europe, which invited a comparison between American and European conditions and stimulated in the American a feeling of assured superiority, as well as of generous sympathy with other less-favored nations. There was,

<sup>1</sup> Published in *Harper's Magazine* for October, 1893. Hearty thanks are given to Harper & Brothers for generous consent to this reprint.

indeed, no lack of sober-minded men in the United States who, although by no means devoid of high ambition for their country nor of warm sympathy with others, did not lose sight of the limits of human possibility. But they could not prevent a large number of their more enthusiastic and less discriminating fellow-citizens from cherishing the dream of a Pan-American republic to be realized in a lifetime. It was, however, the Southern "manifest destiny" movement, with a strong organized interest behind it and well-defined purposes in view, that exercised the greater influence upon the politics of the country. But as these purposes became more apparent, and the slavery question was by the Kansas-Nebraska bill thrust upon the country as the dominant political issue of the period, the merely sentimental conception of "manifest destiny" gradually vanished, and many of those who had entertained it turned squarely against the acquisition of foreign soil for the benefit of slavery.

The civil war weakened the demand for territorial expansion in two ways. With the abolition of slavery the powerful interest which had stood behind the annexation policy disappeared forever. And as to the sentimental movement, the great crisis which brought the Union so near to destruction rudely staggered the jubilant Fourth-of-July optimism of former days and reminded the American people of the inherent inadequateness of mere political institutions to the solution of all problems of human society. The troubles and perplexities left behind by the civil war sobered the minds of the most sanguine. A healthy scepticism took the place of youthful over-confidence. It stimulated earnest inquiry into existing conditions, and brought forth a strong feeling among our people that we should rather make sure of what we had, and improve it, than throw our energies into fanciful foreign ventures.

Only very few of the public men of the time still delighted in "manifest-destiny" dreams. The most prominent among them was Seward, who in 1868 predicted that "in thirty years the city of Mexico would be the capital of the United States," and whose brain was constantly busy with schemes of annexation. But public opinion received his projects with marked coldness. The purchase of Alaska found very scant favor with the people, and it would have failed but for Sumner's efforts and the popular impression that Russia had in some way done us a service in critical times, and that it would be ungracious to repel an arrangement agreeable to this friendly power. Moreover, Alaska being a part of the American continent in a high northern latitude, its acquisition appeared less objectionable than that of non-continental territory, especially in the tropics. Seward's treaty with Denmark for the purchase of St. Thomas died of inanition in the Senate, where everything of the kind was received with instinctive apprehension. When President Grant sought to effect the annexation of Santo Domingo, neither the gorgeous pictures drawn of the advantages to be gained, nor General Grant's personal prestige, nor the determined efforts of his powerful Administration, could prevail against the adverse current of public opinion, or save the treaty from defeat in the Senate.

The recent attempt made by President Harrison to precipitate the Hawaiian Islands into our Union has again stirred up the public interest in the matter of territorial expansion, and called forth the cry of "manifest destiny" once more. This attempt would no doubt already have been buried under popular disapproval had not Republican politicians and newspaper writers seen fit, for the purpose of making party capital, to defend President Harrison's action, and to discredit the cautious course of President Cleveland with deceptive appeals to American

pride. To draw a matter of importance so far-reaching into the ordinary game of party politics is an act of recklessness much to be deprecated. While in all probability it will have no serious practical effect at the present time, it may result in spreading among well-meaning people misleading impressions about matters of the highest consequence to the future of the Republic.

The new "manifest-destiny" precept means, in point of principle, not merely the incorporation in the United States of territory contiguous to our borders, but rather the acquisition of such territory, far and near, as may be useful in enlarging our commercial advantages, and in securing to our Navy facilities desirable for the operations of a great naval power. Aside from the partisan declaimers whose interest in the matter is only that of political effect, this policy finds favor with several not numerically strong but very demonstrative classes of people—Americans who have business ventures in foreign lands, or who wish to embark in such; citizens of an ardent National ambition who think that the conservative traditions of our foreign policy are out of date, and that it is time for the United States to take an active part and to assert their power in the international politics of the world, and to this end to avail themselves of every chance for territorial aggrandizement; and lastly, what may be called the navy interest—officers of the navy and others taking especial pride in the development of our naval force, many of whom advocate a large increase of our war-fleet, to support a vigorous foreign policy, and a vigorous foreign policy to give congenial occupation and to secure further increase to our war-fleet. These forces we find bent upon exciting the ambition of the American people whenever a chance for the acquisition of foreign territory heaves in sight.

As to the first of these classes, it is certainly not to be

denied that among the American adventurers in foreign parts there are many respectable characters, whose interests are entitled to consideration, and may be, under certain circumstances, entitled also to active protection by our Government. But when they ask, under whatever pretext, that for the advancement or protection of their interests the countries in which they are engaged in private business should be incorporated in this Republic, the apparent patriotism of their demand should be received with due distrust. If it were once understood that a combination of Americans engaged in business abroad could at any time start a serious annexation movement in the United States, there would be no end of wild attempts to drive the American people into the most reckless enterprises.

The patriotic ardor of those who would urge this Republic into the course of indiscriminate territorial aggrandizement to make it the greatest of the great Powers of the world deserves more serious consideration. To see his country powerful and respected among the nations of the earth, and to secure to it all those advantages to which its character and position entitle it, is the natural desire of every American. In this sentiment we are all agreed. There may, however, be grave differences of opinion as to how this end can be most surely, most completely and most worthily attained. This is not a mere matter of patriotic sentiment, but a problem of statesmanship. No conscientious citizen will think a moment of incorporating a single square mile of foreign soil in this Union without most earnestly considering how it will be likely to affect our social and political condition at home as well as our relations with the world abroad.

According to the spirit of our Constitutional system, foreign territory should be acquired only with a view to its admission, at no very distant day, into this Union as

one or more States on an equal footing with the other States. The population inhabiting such territory, and admitted into the Union with it, would have to be endowed with certain rights and powers, and the United States would have to undertake certain obligations with regard to them. The people of the new States would not only govern themselves as to their home concerns, but also take part in the government of the whole country through the Senators and Representatives sent by them to Congress, as well as through the votes cast in the elections of our Presidents and in adopting or rejecting Constitutional amendments. More than this: as the party managers would study and humor their likes and dislikes in order to obtain their votes, the newcomers would soon exercise a considerable influence upon the conduct of our political parties. The United States, on the other hand, would be bound to guarantee to them a republican form of government, to protect them against invasion and, upon proper application, against domestic violence. In other words, this Republic would admit them as equal members to its National household, to its family circle, and take upon itself all the responsibilities for them which this admission involves. To do this safely it would have to act with keen discrimination.

If the people of Canada should some day express a desire to be incorporated in this Union, there would, as to the character of the country and of the people, be no reasonable doubt of the fitness, or even the desirability, of the association. Their country has those attributes of soil and climate which are most apt to stimulate and keep steadily at work all the energies of human nature. The people are substantially of the same stock as ours, and akin to us in their traditions, their notions of law and morals, their interests and habits of life. They are accustomed to the peaceable and orderly practices of

self-government. They would mingle and become one with our people without difficulty. The new States brought by them into the Union would soon be hardly distinguishable from the old in any point of importance. Their accession would make our National household larger, but it would not seriously change its character. It might take place—and, in fact, it should take place only in that way—as a result of a feeling common to both sides that the two countries and peoples naturally belong together in their sympathies as well as their interests. Nor would the union of the two countries excite among us any ambition of further aggrandizement in the same direction, for the acquisition of the Canadian Dominion would give to the United States the whole of the northern part of the continent.

Very unlike would be the situation produced by the acquisition of territory to the south of us. In the first place, it would spring from motives of a different kind—not the feeling of naturally belonging together, but the desire on our part to gain certain commercial advantages; to get possession of the resources of other countries, and by exploiting them to increase our wealth; to occupy certain strategical positions which in case of war might be of importance, and so on. It is evident that if we once are fairly started in the annexation policy for such purposes, the appetite will grow with the eating. There will always be more commercial advantages to be gained, the riches of more countries to be made our own, more strategical positions to be occupied to protect those already in our hands. Not only a taste for more, but interest, the logic of the situation, would push us on and on.

The consequences which inevitably would follow the acquisition of Cuba, which is especially alluring to the annexationist, may serve as an example. Cuba, so they tell us, possesses rich natural resources worth having. It

is in the hands of a European power that may, under certain circumstances, become hostile to us. It is only a few miles from the coast of Florida. It "threatens" that coast. It "commands" also the Gulf of Mexico, with the mouths of the Mississippi and the Caribbean Sea. Its population is discontented; it wishes to cut loose from Spain and join us. If we do not take Cuba "some other power will take it." That power may be hostile. Let us take it ourselves. What then? Santo Domingo is only a few miles distant from Cuba; also a country of rich resources; other powers several times tried to get it; if in the hands of a hostile power it would "threaten" Cuba; it also "commands" the Caribbean Sea; the Dominican Republic, occupying the larger part of the island, offered to join us once, and will wish to do so again; to acquire the Haitian Republic we shall have to fight; it will cost men and money, but we can easily beat the negroes. We must have Santo Domingo. Puerto Rico will come as a matter of course with Cuba. The British possession of Jamaica will still be there to "threaten" and "command" everything else. It will be difficult to get it and the other little islands from the clutch of the British lion. Thus all the more necessary will it be to have possession of the mainland bordering and "commanding" the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea on the western side. We must have all the "keys" to the seas and to the land, or at least as many as we can possibly get, one to protect another. In fact, when once well launched on this course we shall hardly find a stopping-place north of the Gulf of Darien; and we shall have an abundance of reasons, one as good as another, for not stopping even there.

Let us admit, for argument's sake, that there is something dazzling in the conception of a great republic embracing the whole continent and the adjacent islands, and that the tropical part of it would open many tempting

fields for American enterprise; let us suppose—a violent supposition, to be sure—that we could get all these countries without any trouble or cost. But will it not be well to look beyond? If we receive those countries as States of this Union, as we eventually shall have to do in case we annex them, we shall also have to admit the people inhabiting them as our fellow-citizens on a footing of equality. As our fellow-citizens they will not only govern themselves in their own States as best they can—the United States undertaking to guarantee them a republican form of government, and to protect them against invasion and domestic violence—but they will, through their Senators and Representatives in Congress, and through their votes in Presidential elections, and through their influence upon our political parties, help in governing the whole Republic, in governing us. And what kind of people are those we take in as equal members of our National household, our family circle?

It is a matter of universal experience that democratic institutions have never on a large scale prospered in tropical latitudes. The so-called republics existing under the tropical sun constantly vibrate between anarchy and despotism. When we observe there a protracted period of order and quiet, we find almost always something like martial law at the bottom of it. President Porfirio Diaz has succeeded in establishing in the republic of Mexico a tolerably stable government; but he has bodies of soldiers constantly marching through the country and shooting down disturbers without ceremony. The rule he exercises there with so firm a hand may, all things considered, be a blessing to his country, but it hardly corresponds to our principles of Constitutional government. We would regard it as little, if at all, short of a military dictatorship. Under a government less vigorous in the employment of drastic measures the Mexican

republic, even now frequently discomfited by little insurrectionary outbreaks, would certainly have relapsed into the old revolutionary disorder; and it is the chronic character of this revolutionary disorder, the tendency to effect changes by force instead of the peaceable and patient process of discussion, that is characteristic of the tropics. It cannot be said that the people of the American tropics have lacked opportunity for the progressive development of democratic institutions. Ever since they threw off the Spanish yoke they have been their own masters. They have long been as free and unhampered as the people of the United States to rule their home affairs and to shape their own destinies. Why have they not succeeded, as we have, in developing the rich resources of their own countries and in building up stable democratic governments? The cause is obvious to every unprejudiced observer.

Democratic government cannot long endure without the maintenance of peace and order through the ready acquiescence of the minority in the verdict of public opinion as expressed in the manner provided by law—the minority, if it continues to consider that verdict wrong, reserving to itself only the right of seeking to change it by another appeal to public opinion through the means of peaceable discussion. This presupposes a state of society in which peace and order are felt by the masses of the people to be needed for their everyday occupations, their regular activities—in other words, a state of society in which everybody, or nearly everybody, being steadily at work for his own sustenance or benefit, feels himself interested in the maintenance of peace and order to insure to himself and those dependent upon him the fruit of his labor. Such a state of society is not found where, on the one hand, nature is so bountiful as to render steady work unnecessary, and where, on the other hand, the cli-

matic conditions are such as to render steady work especially burdensome and distasteful. This is the case in the tropics.

I do not mean to say that under the tropical sun there may not be found localities with climatic conditions comparatively pleasing. There are such in the mountain regions of India, on the plateaus of Mexico and on many islands. But they are exceptions; and when the annexation of great countries is considered, the exceptions cannot be taken without the rule.

I do not say that in the tropics there are not some persons who perform comparatively hard and steady work. But it is a well-known fact that the great mass of the people in those regions, in a state of freedom, labor just enough to satisfy their immediate wants; and these are very limited in a climate of perpetual summer, where most of the time food is easily obtainable, and where extremely little is needed in point of clothing and shelter. As in addition to this the high temperature discourages every strenuous and steady exertion, it is but natural that wherever in such climate labor is left to itself it should run into shiftlessness, and that efforts to stimulate or organize labor for production on a large scale should have a tendency to develop into some sort of coercion.

Neither do I say that in tropical countries there are not persons who understand the true theory of democratic government, or who are in favor of it. But democratic government cannot long be sustained by mere sentiment or political philosophy. It must live in the ways of thinking and the habits of the people who have to carry it on. And experience shows that the tropics will indeed breed individual men who know how to govern others, but not great masses of men who know how to govern themselves.

We are frequently told that this is not a mere matter

of climate, but of race, and that if those countries were under the control of Anglo-Saxons the result would be different. There are tropical countries under the control of Anglo-Saxons. But what do we see? History teaches us that the Anglo-Saxon takes and holds possession of foreign countries in two ways—as a conqueror, and as a colonizer. In his character as a conqueror he finds governments to rule the conquered. In his character as a colonizer he finds democracies to govern themselves. The governments to rule the conquered he finds in the tropics. The democracies to govern themselves he finds in the temperate zone. It matters little that a conquest in the tropics was begun by a mercantile settlement, as in India, or that settlement in the temperate zone was enlarged by conquest, as in Canada; the result was government over the conquered in the one case, and the establishment of a democracy in the other. Nor is there a single instance of the growth of a strong Anglo-Saxon democracy in tropical latitudes. The nearest approach to it, with a large distance between, is found in some clusters of commercial establishments in tropical towns, and some feeble communities of planters who have their work done by people of another race. The vast empire of India, in which there is hardly more than one European to 3500 natives, is governed by Great Britain through what might be called administrative and military garrisons, who, so far as they are composed of Englishmen, have to be renewed from time to time from the mother-country; for as Professor Seeley says in his book on *The Expansion of England*, “Nature has made the colonization of India by Englishmen impossible by giving her a climate in which, as a rule, English children cannot grow up.” The effect of the climate of the American tropics may not be equally destructive, especially on some of the smaller islands and in high altitudes, but in general it is such as

will exert its characteristic influence. Nowhere in the tropics do we find Anglo-Saxon settlements spreading over large stretches of country and developing into towns, counties and great self-governing commonwealths as they have done in North America and Australia. Indeed, in Australia the difference between the settlements in Queensland and those in the southern part of that continent furnishes a striking object-lesson.

The reason is that the tropical climate is not congenial to men of Germanic blood. They may seek the tropics as adventurers, succeed in making their fortunes, and then depart again. But when they go there to establish permanent homes for themselves and their posterity, the succeeding generations, if not the first settlers, will always prove a deterioration of the race in physical as well as in mental and moral vigor. The American tropics form no exception to this rule. If the United States acquired them, they would, no doubt, be overrun by American adventurers trying to get rich quickly, and then to enjoy their wealth somewhere else. There would be branch establishments of American business houses in the towns, with a more or less frequently changing *personnel*. There would be short-lived attempts by speculators to draw American farmers into agricultural settlements, to end as all such enterprises have ended, but little beyond this. Only Europeans belonging to the so-called Latin races have ever in large masses become domesticated in tropical America. They adapt themselves more easily to the influences and requirements of a hot climate, and commingle readily with the natives. Thus was produced that Spanish-Indian mixture which, with a strong African ingredient in some regions, forms so large a part of the population of the American tropics. It is evidently far more apt to flourish there than people of the Germanic stock, and will under climatic influences so congenial to

it remain the prevailing element and the assimilating force. American influence might succeed in modifying somewhat the character of a few commercial towns, but not of the country and its population at large.

Imagine now fifteen or twenty, or even more, States inhabited by a people so utterly different from ours in origin, in customs and habits, in traditions, language, morals, impulses, ways of thinking—in almost everything that constitutes social and political life—and these people remaining under the climatic influences which in a great measure have made them what they are, and render an essential change of their character impossible—imagine a large number of such States to form part of this Union, and through dozens of Senators and scores of Representatives in Congress, and millions of votes in our Presidential elections, to participate in making our laws, in filling the Executive places of our Government, and in impressing themselves upon the spirit of our political life. The mere statement of the case is sufficient to show that the incorporation of the American tropics in our National system would essentially transform the constituency of our Government, and be fraught with incalculable dangers to the vitality of our democratic institutions. Many of our fellow-citizens are greatly disturbed by the immigration into this country of a few hundred thousand Italians, Slavs and Hungarians. But if these few hundred thousand cause apprehension as to the future of the Republic, although under the inspiriting influence of active American life in our bracing climate the descendants of the most ignorant of them in the second or third generation are likely to be Americanized to the point of being hardly distinguishable from other Americans in the same social sphere, what should we fear from the admission to full political fellowship of many millions of the inhabitants of the tropics whom under the influence of their climatic

condition the process of true Americanization can never reach? It was a happy intuition which suggested to Mr. Seward that the policy of annexation would transfer the capital of the United States to the city of Mexico, for after the annexation of the American tropics there would certainly be an abundance of Mexican politics in that capital.

The annexation of the Hawaiian Islands would be liable to objections of a similar nature. Their population, according to the census of 1890, consists of 34,436 natives, 6186 half-castes, 7495 born in Hawaii of foreign parents, 15,301 Chinese, 12,360 Japanese, 8602 Portuguese, 1928 Americans, 1344 British, 1034 Germans, 227 Norwegians, 70 French, 588 Polynesians and 419 other foreigners. If there ever was a population unfit to constitute a State of the American Union, it is this. But it is the characteristic population of the islands in that region—a number of semi-civilized natives crowded upon by a lot of adventurers flocked together from all parts of the globe to seek their fortunes, some to stay, many to leave again after having accomplished their purpose, among them Chinese and Japanese making up nearly one-fourth of the aggregate. The climate and the products of the soil are those of the tropics, the system of labor corresponding. If attached to the United States, Hawaii would always retain a colonial character. It would be bound to this Republic not by a community of interest or national sentiment, but simply by the protection against foreign aggression given to it and by certain commercial advantages. No candid American would ever think of making a State of this Union out of such a group of islands with such a population as it has and is likely to have. It would always be to this Republic a mere dependency, an outlying domain, to be governed as such. The Constitutional question involved in an acquisition of this nature

has recently been so conclusively discussed by an eminent jurist, Judge Cooley, that not another word need be said about it.

But there is a practical feature of the case which deserves the gravest consideration. The Hawaiian Islands are distant two thousand miles from our nearest seaport. Their annexation is advocated partly on commercial grounds, partly for the reason that the islands would furnish very desirable locations for naval depots, coaling-stations and similar conveniences, and that Hawaii is the "key" to something vast and important in that region. Thus we find in favor of the scheme a combination of the interest of commercial adventure with the ambition to make this Republic a great naval power which is to play an active and commanding part in the international politics of the world. Leaving aside the question whether the occupation of this "key" would not require for its protection the acquisition of further "keys," admitting for argument's sake all that is claimed for this project, might we not still ask ourselves whether the possession of such an outlying domain two thousand miles away would really be an element of strength to us as against other powers?

In our present condition we have over all the great nations of the world one advantage of incalculable value. We are the only one that is not in any of its parts threatened by powerful neighbors; the only one not under any necessity of keeping up a large armament either on land or water for the security of its possessions; the only one that can turn all the energies of its population to productive employment; the only one that has an entirely free hand. This is a blessing for which the American people can never be too thankful. It should not be lightly jeopardized.

This advantage, I say, we have *in our present condition.*

We occupy a compact part of the American Continent, bounded by great oceans on the east and west, and on the north and south by neighbors neither hostile in spirit nor by themselves formidable in strength. We have a population approaching seventy millions and steadily growing, industrious, law-abiding and patriotic; not a military, but, when occasion calls for it, a warlike people, ever ready to furnish to the service of the country an almost unlimited supply of vigorous, brave and remarkably intelligent soldiers. Our National wealth is great, and increases rapidly. Our material resources may, compared with those of other nations, be called inexhaustible. Our territory is large, but our means of interior communication are such as to minimize the inconveniences of distance. In case of war a hostile naval power might, indeed, sweep what maritime commerce we have from the seas—a compliment we could return with a comparatively small number of cruisers—and it might blockade some of our seaports, and molest some of our coasts, without, however, seriously impairing our strength or doing more than excite the war spirit among our people to greater heat. But no European enemy could invade our soil without bringing from a great distance a strong land force; and no force that could possibly be brought from such a distance, were it ever so well prepared, could hope to strike a crippling blow by a sudden dash, and thus to force us to a peace, or to effect a lodgment within our boundaries without the certainty of being soon overwhelmed by an easy concentration of immensely superior numbers. Nor could a European enemy hope to raise a sufficient land force by alliances on this continent, for neither north nor south of us can armies be mustered strong enough seriously to threaten us. In other words, in our compact continental stronghold we are substantially unassailable. We present no vulnerable point of

importance. There is nothing that an enemy can take away from us and hope to hold. We can carry on a defensive warfare indefinitely without danger to ourselves, and meanwhile, with our enormous resources in men and means, prepare for offensive operations.

The prospect of such a war will be to any European nation, or any league of European nations, extremely discouraging, especially as not one of them has the same free hand that we have. Every one of them is within the reach of dangerous rivals, whom a favorable opportunity might tempt to proceed to hostilities, and such an opportunity would certainly be presented by a long and exhausting war with the United States. And this very circumstance would afford to this Republic in such a case the possibility of alliances which would enable it to pass from its defensive warfare to a most vigorous offensive one.

Seeing the impossibility, under existing conditions, of striking against us a quick blow that would have any decisive consequences, and seeing also that a war carried on upon our own ground would, owing to our unlimited staying power, be practically a war without end, and present chances of combinations most dangerous to them —recognizing these obvious facts, all those powers will be naturally disposed to go to the extreme of honorable concession in order to avoid hostilities with the United States. In fact, we can hardly get into a war unless it be of our own seeking. And this inestimable advantage of commanding among the nations of the world the greatest degree of consideration and deference, without any necessity on our part of keeping up burdensome military and naval establishments, we enjoy now and shall continue to enjoy so long as we are so situated that in case of war we can defend all our possessions without leaving our own continental ground, on which we can fight with every condition in our favor.

This advantage will be very essentially impaired if we present to a possible enemy a vulnerable point of attack which we have to defend, but cannot defend without going out of our impregnable stronghold, away from the seat of our power, to fight on ground on which the enemy may appear in superior strength, and have the conditions in *his* favor. Such a vulnerable point will be presented by the Hawaiian Islands if we annex them, as well as by any outlying possession of importance. It will not be denied that in case of war with a strong naval power the defence of Hawaii would require very strong military and naval establishments there, and a fighting fleet as large and efficient as that of the enemy; and in case of a war with a combination of great naval Powers, it might require a fleet much larger than that of any of them. Attempts of the enemy to gain an important advantage by a sudden stroke, which would be entirely harmless if made on our continental stronghold, might have an excellent chance of success if made on our distant insular possession, and then the whole war could be made to turn upon that point, where the enemy might concentrate his forces as easily as we, or even more easily, and be our superior on the decisive field of operations. It is evident that thus the immense advantage we now enjoy of a substantially unassailable defensive position would be lost. We would no longer possess the inestimable privilege of being stronger and more secure than any other nation without a large and costly armament. Hawaii, or whatever other outlying domain, would be our Achilles' heel. Other nations would observe it, and regard us no longer as invulnerable. If we acquire Hawaii, we acquire not an addition to our strength, but a dangerous element of weakness.

It is said that we need a large navy in any case for the protection of our commerce, and that if we have it for this

purpose it may at the same time serve for the protection of outlying National domains without much extra expense. The premise is false. We need no large navy for the protection of our commerce. Since the extinction of the Barbary pirates and of the Western buccaneers, the sea is the safest public highway in the world, except, perhaps, in the Chinese waters. Our commerce is not threatened by anybody or anything, unless it be the competition of other nations and the errors of our own commercial policy; and against these influences warships avail nothing. Nor do we need any warships to obtain favorable commercial arrangements with other nations. Our position of power under existing circumstances is such that no foreign nation will, at the risk of a quarrel with us, deny our commerce any accommodation we can reasonably lay claim to. Nor would our situation as a neutral in case of a war between foreign nations be like that we occupied during the French-English wars at the beginning of this century. Then we were a feeble neutral whom every belligerent thought he could kick and cuff with impunity. Now the United States would be the most formidable neutral ever seen, whom every belligerent would be most careful not to offend. When our maritime commerce was most flourishing we had no navy worth speaking of to protect it, and nobody thought that one was needed. The pretense that we need one now for that purpose reminds one of the Texas colonel, who thinks he must arm himself with a revolver when walking on Broadway because he might be insulted by a salesman.

Nor are we under any necessity to prepare for war by building a large navy. For the reasons given, every nation will avoid war with us, and we should not seek it with any one. Moreover, no sensible Government, unless driven by the necessities of its situation, will undertake extensive naval construction while the modern war fleet is

still in the experimental stage. No living authority can with assurance predict how the great modern battle-ships will prove themselves in actual combat. We know for a certainty only how they sink one another at maneuvering drills. Why should we waste millions and risk human lives in experiments entirely useless to us while the race between armor and ordnance is still going on, and nobody can tell whether after the first great naval engagement the unwieldy steel-plated monsters will not be discarded, as the mailed soldier has been dispensed with in consequence of the progressive perfection of the firearm? With entire safety we may content ourselves with a moderate number of swift cruisers, capable of doing high police duty, and with some floating batteries and a good supply of torpedo-boats, and other contrivances for coast defence sufficient for the first necessity, if indeed any trouble should happen.

In another respect a large navy might prove to the American people a most undesirable luxury. It would be a dangerous plaything. Its possession might excite an impatient desire to use it, and lead us into strong temptations to precipitate a conflict of arms in case of any difference with a foreign Government, which otherwise might easily be settled by amicable adjustment. The little new navy we have has already perceptibly stimulated such a spirit among some of our navy officers and civilian navy enthusiasts, who are spoiling for an opportunity to try the new guns. We remember their attitude during the late Chilian difficulty, when it was absolutely certain to any candid mind that our little sister republic would, after a little bluster, ultimately make every apology demanded. And there is no project of territorial acquisition or of "vigorous foreign policy" ever so extravagant that does not find hot advocates in navy circles. Every new warship we build will be apt further to encourage this

tendency; and nothing will be wanting but the growth of the belief among navy officers that they can make themselves heroes of a new era by using their opportunities for carrying on some vigorous foreign policy on their own motion to render the navy the more dangerous to the peace and dignity of this Republic the more ships we have. No great Power can do so much among the nations of the world for the cause of international peace by the moral force of its example as the United States. The United States will better fulfill their mission and more exalt their position in the family of nations by indoctrinating their navy officers in the teachings of Washington's farewell address than by flaunting in the face of the world the destructive power of rams and artillery.

Nothing could be more foolish than the notion we hear frequently expressed that so big a country should have a big navy. Instead of taking pride in the possession of a big navy, the American people ought to be proud of not needing one. This is their distinguishing privilege, and it is their true glory

The advocates of the annexation policy advance some arguments which require but a passing notice. They say that unless we take a certain country offered to us—Hawaii, for instance—some other power will take it, and that, having refused ourselves, we cannot object. This is absurd. Having shown ourselves unselfish, we shall have all the greater moral authority in objecting to an arrangement which would be obnoxious to our interests.

We are told that unless we take charge of a certain country it will be ill-governed and get into internal trouble. This is certainly no inducement. This Republic cannot take charge of all countries that are badly governed. On the contrary, a country apt to get into internal trouble would be no desirable addition to our National household.

We are told that the people of a certain country wish

to join us, and it would be wrong to repel them. But the question whether a stranger is to be admitted as a member of our family it is our right and our duty to decide according to our own view of the family interest.

We are told that we need coaling stations in different parts of the world for our navy, even if it be a small one, and that the rich resources of the countries within our reach should be open to American capital and enterprise. There is little doubt that we can secure by amicable negotiation sites for coaling stations which will serve us as well as if we possessed the countries in which they are situated. In the same manner we can obtain from and within them all sorts of commercial advantages. We can own plantations and business houses in the Hawaiian Islands. In the American tropics we can build and control railroads; we can purchase mines, and have them worked for our benefit; we can keep up commercial establishments in their towns—in fact, we are now doing many of these things—and all this without taking those countries into our National household on an equal footing with the States of our Union, without exposing our political institutions to the deteriorating influence of their participation in our Government, without assuming any responsibilities for them which would oblige us to forego the inestimable privilege of being secure in our possessions without large and burdensome armaments. Surely the advantages we might gain by incorporating the countries themselves in the Union appear utterly valueless compared with the price this Republic would have to pay for them.

The fate of the American people is in their own wisdom and will. If they devote their energies to the development of what they possess within their present limits, and look for territorial expansion only to the north, where some day a kindred people may freely elect to cast their lot with this Republic, their “manifest destiny” will

be the preservation of the exceptional and invaluable advantages they now enjoy, and the growth on a congenial soil of a vigorous nationality in freedom, prosperity and power. If they yield to the allurements of the tropics and embark in a career of indiscriminate aggrandizement, their "manifest destiny" points with equal certainty to a total abandonment of their conservative traditions of policy, to a rapid deterioration in the character of the people and their political institutions and to a future of turbulence, demoralization and final decay.

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#### MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SERVICE REFORM<sup>1</sup>

I beg leave to invite attention to a phase of the problem of municipal government which in the consideration of schemes of reform should never be lost sight of. It will be admitted that there is not a municipal government in this country, on whatever pattern organized, which will not work well when administered by honest, public-spirited, capable and well trained men. On the other hand, the best form of municipal government will work badly when administered by bunglers or knaves, the worse the longer they are in office. It is a matter of experience that municipal misgovernment develops its worst attributes when selfish and unscrupulous politicians succeed in continuing themselves, or their kind, in the possession of official power by the support of a large force of voters organized in their interest. This becomes possible in the same measure as the municipal officers have a more or less large mass of patronage to dispose of by a skillful distribution of which they can attract to themselves persons of local influence who together with their dependents and friends, and with the large number of expectants

<sup>1</sup> Address delivered at first meeting of the National Municipal League, Philadelphia, Jan. 25, 1894.

whom the prospect of spoil always attracts, will muster a powerful host at the polls. Such a voting force, impelled by a mercenary interest, is easily organized and drilled. It will obediently follow the command of the chiefs from whom favors have been obtained and further favors are expected, and it will be always ready for united action. It may constitute only a minority of all the voters of the community, but its compact organization, its strict discipline, its constant readiness for united action, will usually give it a great advantage over the majority, which but seldom can be united against it without the impulse of an uncommon excitement. From time to time an outraged and indignant community will rise up and sweep the dishonest rulers from power; but if the same means for alluring, and the same facilities for organizing the mercenary element remain in existence, the same class of men will continue to regain the temporarily lost places when the watchfulness and energy of the public-spirited citizens become less effective or when the opposition to the dishonest permits itself to be distracted by party polities, and then the same kind of misrule will return. This is in a few words the history of most of the municipal governments in our large cities.

It is always wise to learn from the enemy. The politicians who look upon our municipal governments as mines to be worked for their benefit and who wish to entrench themselves in the municipal offices against the assaults of the so-called "better element," naturally desire and endeavor to increase as much as possible the mass of patronage to be manipulated by them. And as the patronage mainly consists of places in the public employment drawing salaries or wages, and of contracts expected to yield profit, they will to the utmost of their opportunities seek to multiply official employments as well as public works, regardless of the public interest.

They will also, by exacting little work for good pay, make the offices as attractive, and by granting favorable terms to the contractors, the contracts as profitable as possible. The more favors they have at their disposal for distribution among faithful adherents, the larger a following they can organize and hold at their command; the more strongly they will be fortified in their seats of power; and the easier it will be to them, after a reverse, to keep their organization in fighting trim and to restore their power upon the same basis. In fact, the very existence of a large patronage to be distributed by way of favor will always be a temptation to abuse it for selfish purposes. This temptation will be the more seductive, the stronger the mercenary element is among the people; and this element is naturally strongest in the large cities.

The mercenary element can as such be enlisted for political work only when there are means for gratifying it. In the same measure as the means of that gratification cease to be available, the mercenary element will cease to be a potent factor in politics. Strip Tammany Hall permanently of the means of feeding its adherents out of the public purse, and Tammany Hall, such as it is at present, will no longer be a power. To this end it is not sufficient merely to defeat the Tammany candidates at the polls, for so long as the plunder exists, the organization will stick together in the hope of recovering that plunder at the next election. It is, therefore, necessary so to limit the quantity of patronage subject to distribution by way of favor, that Tammany Hall, after a defeat, has not only nothing, or only very little, to give for the time being, but that it has nothing, or only very little, to promise in case of a return to power. Then its mercenary forces will gradually scatter and its power will crumble away. The same applies to similar organizations of the mercenary element in other places.

The area of patronage subject to distribution by favor should therefore be restricted to the narrowest possible limits. The first step to this end is to place the whole clerical force of the municipal government by law under rules regulating appointments similar to those which govern the so-called classified service of the United States. This requires a system of examinations upon the result of which appointments are to depend; and these examinations should throughout be competitive—the men rated highest to receive the places—for only competitive examinations honestly conducted exclude the exercise of favor. Nor should exceptions from the operation of the competitive rule, such as still exist in the United States service, be admitted. Most of these exceptions are not only unnecessary but hurtful in their effect. There is, for instance, no good reason why an employee of the Government who is required to give bond should be exempted from the competitive rule while another charged with similar duties is subject to it, for those who are graded highest in the examination are probably the most able to secure the required bond. Many of the so-called confidential places which have been exempted on the pretended ground that they are confidential, have no confidential character worth speaking of. It is now admitted by every well-informed man that the exemption from the civil service rules of the chiefs of division in the great offices is not only not in any sense demanded by the public interest, but that it has a demoralizing effect upon the service. In general it may be said that the exceptions serve only to save for the spoils-monger as many places as under any plausible pretext could be saved, and that their existence is a constant incitement to circumvention of the law.

The second step is to put the whole laboring force of the municipal government, skilled as well as unskilled,

under rules to govern permanent as well as temporary employment, similar to those which are in force in Boston under the registration system for laborers, and as have been introduced in the navy yards of the United States by Secretary Tracy and are continued in force by Secretary Herbert. As a general principle, skilled labor requiring specific accomplishments for the work to be done, the possession of which can be well ascertained and relatively measured by competitive tests, should be put under the competitive rule. As to unskilled labor, such as street sweeping and the like, an examination as to physical fitness and a good report as to character will be sufficient to qualify for registration, those who have been registered to be employed in the order of their application for registry.

Opinions have somewhat differed among the friends of civil service reform as to whether promotions from lower to higher grades should also be regulated by competitive tests. It is readily admitted that a good title to promotion may be established by practical efficiency and the qualities constituting what is called executive ability, the evidence of which cannot be furnished by an examination in the ordinary sense. It is also true that ordinarily the superior officer knows best which of his subordinates are deserving of promotion, and that on this point no better authority can be invoked than his judgment. But it is no less true that when a public officer is subject to political influence, it is usually this influence, and not his personal judgment, that determines the promotion of his subordinates, and that this influence usually pays no regard to those considerations of the public interest by which promotions should be governed. And it is a common experience that the pressure of this influence is but seldom effectually resisted even by dutiful public officers unless their power of resistance finds some outside support. They have to be protected against that pressure by a

bulwark of law behind which they can shelter themselves and which political influence cannot easily surmount. To this end a rule to govern promotions may be made providing for examination touching the knowledge required by the duties to be performed, together with an impartial and methodical inquiry into the official record of the candidate to verify as nearly as possible his practical efficiency and his executive ability. Even such a method may not always suffice accurately to fix the relative merits of different candidates for promotion and to furnish in every case the best possible man for the superior place. But it will at least tend to remove promotions in the service from the reach of political influence, which of all the powers determining appointments and promotions is the most regardless of justice to individuals as well as to the public interest.

This is in fact the feature of civil service reform which cannot be too strongly emphasized. Its object is not merely to discover by means of examinations among a number of candidates for public employment the most competent, but to relieve the public service as well as our whole political life as much as possible of the demoralizing influence of political favoritism and mercenary motive, and thus to lift them to a higher place not only intellectually but morally. Its improving effect upon the practical efficiency of the service will indeed be considerable. It obliges the candidate for appointment to stand solely upon his merit and therefore to prepare himself for a good showing. It makes the public servant thus appointed feel that his retention in office will depend not upon the favor of any influential individual, but only upon his own zeal and competency in discharging his duties. It tells the aspirant to promotion that his ambition will be gratified only if he furnishes proof of superior ability, knowledge and practical work. All this will inspire the public ser-

vants with a self-respecting purpose to do their utmost, not to please a political patron, but to give to the public the best of that kind of service for which they were appointed.

But what is at least equally important—the farther this system is extended, the more public places are withdrawn from the reach of political favoritism, the more the patronage is curtailed with which the selfish political manipulator can organize and hold his mercenary following, the more difficult will it become to keep a political machine composed of the mercenary element in working order, the less influential a part will spoils and plunder play in our political life, the less profitable will politics become to the political speculator, the more congenial will the occupation with public affairs become to the good citizen and the better will be the chance for good government.

It is important, therefore, that the system which restricts the selection for public employment to persons of ascertained fitness should be made to cover as many places as possible. This applies not only to the lower but also to the higher grades. To this end it seems to me desirable that when municipal offices are to be filled the discharge of the duties of which requires professional knowledge, skill and experience, the selection should be confined to professional men of good standing. Let us take for an example a department about which there may be some doubt in this respect, the department of public works, meaning the department which has in its charge the matter of drainage, of water supply, of street paving and similar things. It is certainly one of the most important branches of the municipal government. There is no doubt that the administration of that department will serve the community best when not only all the laborers employed are able-bodied, steady, moral, hard-working men, each skilled according to the work he has to do, but when

the men charged with the planning and the direction of the work are able, trained and experienced civil engineers. That there should be a staff of engineers answering this description nobody will dispute. The question is whether it would not be wise to make it an invariable rule that the responsible head of the department, the commissioner, or by whatever name he may go, should also be an engineer of good standing in the profession.

I know it is said that the head of such a department should possess certain qualifications other than mere professional skill; that he should have business experience and a high degree of what is commonly called executive ability. This is true. But among civil engineers executive ability is probably as abundantly found as among any other class of persons; and it will not be denied that the required executive ability *combined* with engineering skill and experience will in that office be especially valuable. There is, however, another point of importance to be considered. A commissioner of public works who is not an engineer, but only an able politician, or, let us assume for argument's sake, an able business man in the general sense, will be much more exposed to political temptation than an engineer of good standing would be. The engineer would have a professional reputation to take care of, and it would be, aside from his duty to the public, his natural ambition to use the opportunities of his office for making a great name for himself in his profession. He will, therefore, be likely to make every possible effort to get rid of the intrusion of political influence, which he will soon recognize as a great danger in his path, and to make his department in the best sense a business department.

I may be reminded of the fact that in the freest countries in the world, the United States and England, it has been found wise to confide the government departments of war and of the navy to non-professional men, to

civilians. But the offices of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are political offices. There are political duties connected with them. It is therefore proper that they should be given to politicians. It may be remarked, however, that almost every other government of note, the constitutional as well as the absolute, prefer for the war department a general and for the navy department an admiral. But the office of the commissioner of public works is in no sense a political office. On the contrary, politics should be kept away from it as far as possible. And I doubt whether anything else would be more calculated to keep politics permanently away from it than, in conjunction with the extension of the civil service rules over all the inferior places, the establishment of a rule making only engineers of good standing eligible to the office of commissioner.

It may also be objected that a thoroughly upright and very able business man, not a professional engineer, may sometimes be found to fill quite successfully the office of commissioner of public works. Mr. White, who has recently been appointed to that place by the reform mayor of Brooklyn, Mr. Schieren, may be pointed out as an instance. Mr. White happens to have been educated as a civil engineer. But as he has for many years past followed mercantile pursuits, we may accept him as a merchant, and as such as the model of a public-spirited business man in office. I am far from denying that his appointment was the ideal one under the circumstances. I am far from asserting that Mayor Schieren could have done better. I am far from fearing that Mr. White will be accessible to political influence. But I do say that the appointment of Mr. White has attracted so much attention because it is so far above the ordinary level. And I venture to say further, that, taking a period of twenty-five years, a majority, if not a very large majority, of

non-professional men put into that office on the ground of general business ability would either be politicians at the start, or soon become subjected to political influence, to the detriment of the public interest. On the other hand, I am far from pretending that every civil engineer put into that place would be absolutely proof against political influences. But I think I risk nothing in saying that, taking a period of twenty-five years, a large majority of professional engineers in that position would not become subjected to political influence, but fight it off, greatly to the benefit of the public interest. And it is such averages that we have to look to in considering the wisdom of a general rule.

The same reasoning applies to the sanitary department, which certainly should be under the exclusive control of men versed in sanitary science, who have a professional conscience to guide them, a professional reputation to take care of and a professional ambition to spur them on.

It applies equally to the police department, the direction of which should be confided not to a board composed of politicians who almost necessarily will think it their principal business to distribute spoils and to put the police to political uses—nor to mere amateurs in the police business, but to one responsible man to whom the discharge and the study of police duties has become a life-calling, who has won a reputation in that line, a professional policeman, whose natural ambition it will be to make a name for himself as a great chief of police, and who, being charged with full responsibility for the conduct of his department, will not be inclined to permit politics to deprive him of that name. The same may be said of the fire department, but it is unnecessary to elaborate.

The selection of fit men for these places, under such restrictions as indicated, would properly be confided to the executive head of the municipality, the mayor. He

will, of course, be liable to err, and he may be controlled by motives not in accord with the public interest. These are contingencies against which it is impossible to provide by any legislative contrivance. The problem is as much as possible to enlarge the power of such an officer for good, and to circumscribe his capacity and his opportunities for mischief. With a civil service law, and rules under that law stripping the chiefs of the city departments of patronage for distribution by favor, and with legal provisions cutting off the pay of persons not properly appointed, the inducement to select for these places men with a view to the use of their offices for political ends would be greatly lessened, and it is probable that gradually a custom would grow up to select men for chiefs of the departments, when such places become vacant, from the number of the professional assistants already in the service. In general, the promotion for ascertained merit from one place to another up to the top would be greatly facilitated; and it requires no argument to prove that this would redound in a high degree not only to the benefit of the service but also to the moral elevation of municipal politics.

I am very far from asserting that the mere formal introduction of the system I speak of would be a panacea for all the ills in municipal government that afflict us. No system however wisely devised will work automatically. It will require faithful and competent men to direct and watch over its working. As experience shows, no sooner is the merit system introduced anywhere in the service, than the spoils-politicians exhaust all the resources of their ingenuity in the endeavor to "beat the law." They fight it desperately for they know that it threatens their means of subsistence. They usually succeed for a time to a certain extent, and then, taking advantage of their own wrong, they cry out that civil service reform is a

humbug. But after a while fortune turns against them, the fraudulent circumventions of the law are exposed, the proper remedies are applied and the reformed system not only regains its foothold but advances step by step. Of this, too, present experience furnishes us an object-lesson in New York where civil service reform lay in a torpid state during the glacial period of the Hill régime, but is now thawed out again by a recent change in the weather and makes itself decidedly disagreeable to many of the scoffers and evil-dóers. It has evidently come not only to stay but to grow. Of course, to make it bear its full fruit in municipal government the vigilance of an enlightened public opinion and the active and constant participation of public-spirited citizens in municipal affairs can never be dispensed with.

Neither do I mean to detract from the importance of other measures of municipal reform, such as the proper definition of responsibility and its conspicuous lodgment in officials who can be held to account; or legislation to prevent election frauds, or to facilitate the nomination and effective support of independent candidates, or to separate municipal from State and National elections, and the like. The great value of such reformatory measures I fully appreciate. I believe, however, that the widest possible application of civil service reform principles to all the departments of municipal government is not merely a desirable, but an indispensable complement of all the other reforms, for it touches the most of the evil; that as appointments to office cease to be made by way of favoritism and for political ends, and as they are bestowed solely according to merit, and in the higher grades upon men of professional skill and standing, not only the service will be improved in point of character, efficiency and economy, but the means for attracting, feeding and organizing the mercenary element will be curtailed, and the influence of

that element will grow less; and that in the same measure as the influence of the mercenary element dwindle, municipal government will again become an attractive field of endeavor and honor to men of self-respect, of enlightened public spirit and of noble ambition.

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#### THE PENSION SCANDAL<sup>1</sup>

Our pension system is like a biting satire on democratic government. Never has there been anything like it in point of extravagance and barefaced dishonesty. Everybody knows this; but the number of men in public life who have courage enough to admit that they know it is ludicrously small. Whenever the general assertion is put forth that, in view of the immense size of the pension roll and the notorious laxity that has long prevailed in the Administration of the law, a large number of the pensions paid must be fraudulent, the answer is: "Vague assertions prove nothing. Give us specific cases." The New York *Times* has done the American people an excellent service by furnishing the thing thus demanded. It has, indeed, not undertaken the gigantic task of overhauling the whole pension roll, but it has laid before the public a demonstration sufficiently conclusive. It has sent its reporters to several inland towns in this State to inquire into the cases of individual pensioners living there, and thus it has been able to spread before the public an array of evidence, the representative character of which no fairminded man will deny. Here we have lots of men drawing pensions for "disabilities incurred in the service and in the line of duty," who have given no evidence of the existence of the disabilities alleged—men who were for twenty years after

<sup>1</sup> Editorial article in *Harper's Weekly*, May 5, 1894. Grateful acknowledgments are made to Harper & Brothers for generous permission to reprint this article.

the war notably strong and able-bodied; men who draw increased pensions for increased disabilities, while they are no more disabled than before; men who draw the maximum pension for total disability preventing them from "earning a support at manual labor," but who are earning a living by manual labor as well as they ever did before; men who have for years been drunken loafers indulging in all sorts of excesses, but are drawing pensions under a law which provides that no disability which is the result of his own vicious habits shall entitle a man to a pension; men who are rich, and should be ashamed to help in draining the Treasury; women drawing widows' pensions long after having forfeited their right to them; and so on. And the proportion of such cases to the total number of pensioners in those localities is more than sufficient fully to justify the saying that the pension roll is "honeycombed with fraud."

The long series of reports and articles published by the *Times* has thus completely shut the mouths of those who asked for further proof of what to any fairminded man is already conclusively proven by the eloquent figures of our pension statistics. It may reasonably be assumed that ten years after the close of the war nearly all those really disabled by wounds or disease in the service had applied for pensions and had been provided for. The war closed in the spring of 1865. In 1876 the number of pensioners on the rolls was 232,137, and the amount paid to them \$28,351,599.69. It might justly be assumed that in the ordinary course of things the number of pensioners and of soldiers' widows and of dependent soldiers' parents would decrease by death, that the pensioned orphan children of soldiers would come of age and that therefore the amount to be paid out in pensions would steadily grow less. So it has been in all other countries and in all times. Instead of which we find that in 1893, nearly thirty years after

the war, the pension roll had risen to 966,012 names, and the amount paid out to \$156,740,467.14. This year it is still larger, and the number of new applications for pensions is incredible. In the seven months ending last October no less than 55,399 of them came into the Pension Office. There are, according to the last report of the Commissioner, 711,150 claims, original and for increase in the Office still to be acted upon. The number of names on the pension roll, not counting the applicants, is much larger than was the number of men in active service at any period of the war. We are paying more for pensions than all other nations together. Our pension expenditure is heavier than the expenditure of the largest military Power on earth for its military establishment.

In the face of these fabulous figures the assertion that our pension system is a worthy monument of the generous gratitude of the American people sounds like a fiendish mockery. We need only look at its history to conclude that it is rather a monument to the audacity and skill of our public plunderers, to the cowardice of our politicians and to an enduring patience of our general public, which has long ceased to be a virtue. No people have ever been more shamelessly victimized than the American people have been in this pension business. Our deserving soldiers and sailors had been abundantly provided for, with far greater generosity than any other country could boast of, by the pension legislation that was enacted during and immediately after the war. Everybody would have been satisfied had not pension attorneys hungry for fees, and politicians hungry for votes, kept telling the veterans that they ought to have more. Still, legislation kept within bounds, and the pension roll began actually to decrease, as in the natural course of things it was bound to do, until, twelve years after the war, the "arrears-of-pensions act" was passed. This act, putting compara-

tively large sums of money within the reach of pensioners, excited the greed of many veterans, and served to establish the procuring of pensions in great quantities as a regular industry and one of the most profitable in the country. With their headquarters in Washington and their agencies in every State, these pension-attorney firms flooded the land with their circulars, approaching every veteran personally to persuade him that he could have a pension, whether he had sustained any injury in the war or whether he was able to make a living or not, and that they would help him to it. Tens if not hundreds of thousands of pensioners may therefore truthfully say that while they did not think of applying for pensions, they were urged upon them by the attorneys. Thus torrents of applications poured in, for each of which an attorney had his fee.

As the pension attorneys got richer, they became greedier, more daring and more powerful. They organized a manufactory of public opinion. Through organizations of veterans, and through newspapers established by them for the purpose, they assumed to speak in the name of the soldiers, and to demand of Congress more and more extravagant pension legislation to open to them new fields for booty. In Congress they found little if any resistance. There is no more brilliant illustration of the politicians' abject cowardice than the succession of pension laws asked for by soldiers at the instigation of the attorneys, and obsequiously granted by our Congressmen.

Thus we arrived where we are, not admired by other nations for our generosity, but laughed at for our folly and recklessness. The American people have permitted this preposterous debauch to go on until it not only swallowed up our Treasury surplus, but, however rich this country may be, it actually forces us to borrow money to

meet the current expenses of the Government. More than that. If by some unhappy foreign complication we should be forced to assume a warlike attitude, it would become a matter of grave consideration how much of that sort of luxury the country could afford to indulge in. From 1861 to 1893 we paid out in pensions no less than \$1,576,503,- 544.42, with probably as much again or more to come. In other words, the pensions, before we are through with them, will have cost us at least as much as the whole war debt amounted to, and perhaps a good deal more, for the pension sharks are by no means through yet with their demands. We shall therefore have to consider not only how much a war may cost us, but that a heavier expense, although spread over a longer time, will begin when the war is over. Thus it may be said without exaggeration that our way of showing our so-called gratitude for military services rendered in one great war, taken as a precedent, renders our financial capacity for carrying on another great war seriously questionable.

We have no space here to discuss at length the demoralization spread by our pension system among a large part of our population, by familiarizing it with a seductive sort of mendicancy in a guise of patriotism, and with the habit of looking to the Government for a living. Suffice it to say that nothing is more apt to undermine that popular character which is necessary for the life of democratic institutions. It is the highest time to stop in this mad career. Much of the damage done cannot be repaired. But effectual efforts can at least be set on foot to eliminate the fraudulent cases from the pension roll. We suggested already a year ago that to this end the public display of a list of local pensioners, with a statement of the disabilities, in every post-office in the country would be a great help. The proposition of the *Times* that a commission composed of old soldiers be charged with conducting an examination

of the whole pension roll seems to us commendable. Then a method should be devised to make the intervention of the pension attorney between the applicant and the Pension Office unnecessary, and thus to disarm the principal agency of mischief. All such plans will, of course, find the greed of the pension attorney and the cowardice of the politician in their way. But it may dawn at last upon the politician that his cowardice is stupid. For while an earnest effort to reform the abuses of the pension system may cost him, on the one hand, a few votes of interested persons, it will, on the other hand, win him the favor and support of a much greater number of thoughtful and patriotic men. The average American is certainly willing that every deserving soldier who suffered in the war shall have his full share of honor and of the Nation's bounty; but he is not willing that the people should be plundered by the fraudulent practices of greedy pretenders and speculators, and he will be grateful to the public man who aids in delivering the country of this pest.

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TO EDWARD M. SHEPARD

POCANTICO HILLS, Oct. 6, 1894.

Many thanks for your letter received this morning. I am rejoiced to hear that you are determined to go ahead and that this rare opportunity will not be lost. You can now show the Democrats what their party ought to be in point of candidates as well as of principles. Would you not think it wise to put forth, together with your ticket, a platform embracing mainly these five points: honest government and pure elections, a sound currency, tariff reform, civil service reform and divorce of municipal affairs from party politics? A short and simple document of this kind, expressed in ringing language, might prove a great rallying cry for the party of the future.

I have received an interesting letter from Mr. Henry A. Richmond of Buffalo, informing me that there is a "very strong feeling against Hill and in favor of a third ticket in that city." "The Democratic business men," he says, "are all right; I do not find one in favor of Hill." I judge from his letter that he has written also to you.

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"SOLITUDE," Oct. 7, 1894.

I forgot to suggest that if you accompany the independent nominations with a platform, there ought to be something against the secret A. P. A.

I enclose an article on Hill which will appear in the next number of *Harper's Weekly*.

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"SOLITUDE," Oct. 10, 1894.

The work you have done is grand. And it could not have been done in a style worthier of the object. Platform and candidate are perfect. The organization you have started ought to become *the Democracy* of New York and of the whole country.

You have already accomplished much in giving this movement so excellent a send-off. And most of this is owing to your own true and intrepid spirit. You are rendering a great and most necessary service to the cause of good government as well as to your party, and I am proud to call myself, Your friend.

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#### HILL AND HILLISM<sup>x</sup>

As a private citizen not engaged in active politics, but taking a warm interest in the public welfare, I am here

<sup>x</sup> A speech at Cooper Union, N. Y. City, Oct. 29, 1894, in support of Everett P. Wheeler, the Reform Democratic candidate for governor.

to tell you why I think that David B. Hill should not be elected governor, and that the movement which has put forward Everett P. Wheeler as its standard-bearer deserves support. This being no time for sweet circumlocution, I shall speak to you in plain language and endeavor to call things by their right names. Let me begin with a chapter of contemporaneous history which, although well known, needs constant repetition.

There is in this municipality a great struggle going on which is to decide whether the city of New York shall be owned by the inhabitants thereof or by Tammany Hall. It has long been popularly believed that Tammany Hall is a nest of rapacious freebooters. But recent disclosures of corruption, of blackmail, of robbery, of vice and crime planted and protected for revenue, of terrorism, of cruel oppression practiced upon the poor, the weak and the helpless, have gone far beyond popular expectation. I know Tammany Hall disclaims responsibility for some of these atrocities. But they were inspired by the Tammany spirit; they found in the Tammany "pull" their encouragement and assurance of impunity; they filled Tammany pockets; they helped to keep Tammany in power, and they are properly charged to the Tammany system of government. I have seen something of the world, and affirm that in no civilized country, and hardly in any uncivilized, is there a government which, in foulness of corruption, in insatiable rapacity, in criminal practices, in cruel oppression of the lowly, equals Tammany rule.

The good citizens of New York concluded at last that it was time to make an end of this. They organized a City Club, Good Government clubs, a German-American Reform Union and various other bodies, and from day to day the call grew louder for a union of all honest men without distinction of party—all against Tammany. The Tammany chiefs became alarmed.

They saw a day of judgment coming. Their head chief, Dick Croker, took to his heels. He gathered up the princely fortune he had saved from his revenues as king of New York and retired as a Tammany "sage," complacently conscious of having secured his harvest in season. But the other Tammany chiefs were not so comfortably settled. They had to brave the coming storm. How could they avoid defeat at the municipal election? They found themselves put to their wits, and tried various devices. They sang the song of harmony as sweetly as any sucking dove. They would forswear all selfish designs. They would nominate a high-toned citizen for mayor. They would even endorse a ticket nominated by reform Democrats. They would do anything to make people forget the Tiger's teeth and claws until after election. But it was all in vain.

In their extremity they remembered that in their kind of politics the shortest way from one point to another is a crooked line. The salvation they could not expect to win directly in New York city they might secure by a flank march via Albany. They bethought themselves of their lifelong friend, their trusty confederate, David B. Hill. If they could only make Hill governor again, they need not trouble themselves about a defeat in a mayor's election. As a leading Tammany man said in a reported interview: "Tammany can afford to give up the mayoralty for a couple of years. It would give up a great deal more if it could thereby prevent the election of a Republican governor and legislature." Of course, with Hill in the governor's chair there would be no removals of Tammany heads of departments; no anti-Tammany laws would escape his veto. And with a legislature to match there would be no annoying investigations. Tammany, substantially remaining in possession of all its power, save the mayoralty, would laugh at the

impotent wrath of the anti-Tammany mayor, and after two years of fostering care by friend Hill turn up as good as new and get back all it had before. Such was the calculation, and it was excellent. The Tammany mind is eminently practical.

But would friend Hill be willing to accept the nomination for the governorship? Hardly. Comfortably ensconced for several years in the Senate, he would not like to take unnecessary risks. If asked beforehand, he would refuse. Tammany therefore resolved to nominate without asking, and the game succeeded. It is universally known, and not contradicted, that the stampede in the Democratic State convention, which thrust the nomination upon Hill, was planned and managed by Tammany, and that Hill had been nominated and virtually accepted and found himself harnessed to the Tammany cart ere he had time to rub his eyes. That so sly a fox should be caught by surprise may seem ludicrous. But it is more than a joke. It is the revenge of fate; it is the sin of the evil-doer coming home to roost; it is the devil claiming his own. So often had Hill ridden into place and power on the backs of Tammany and the State machine that Tammany and its allies have a right to jump upon his back and say: "Now we will ride you for our salvation! We have done your work; now you will do ours!" All this is perfectly fit and proper. Hill and Tammany are bound together by natural ties. They are of one flesh and blood. Their principles are the same, their methods the same, their aims the same and they know, as Benjamin Franklin once said, that they will have to hang together, or they will hang separately. As Tammany has always fought Hill's battles, so Hill now fights the battles of Tammany.

Can any sane man doubt it? What does it mean when the Tammany Mayor Gilroy never grows tired of protesting: "The State ticket is paramount! Never mind the

city"? What does it mean when Mr. Straus—altogether too good a man to be seen in such company—relinquished his candidacy because the city ticket was openly sacrificed to Hill? What does it mean that the shouts for Hill in Tammany meetings are so much louder than those for Grant? It means that the battle against Tammany is really fought in the contest for the governorship. It means that every vote for Hill is a vote for protecting Tammany Hall against any legislation unfavorable to its interests. It means that every vote for Hill is a vote for shielding the Tammany chiefs of the municipal departments from any effective interference by the reform mayor. It means that every vote for Hill is a vote for stripping the reform mayor of the power necessary to clean out the Augean stables of Tammany corruption. It means that every vote for Hill is a vote for enabling Tammany to preserve the substance of its power for a resumption of its nefarious business when the storm of indignant excitement will have blown over. It means that every vote for Hill is a vote for defrauding this patriotic uprising of the good citizens of New York of its most valuable fruit. It means, in one word, that every vote for Hill is a vote for Tammany Hall, and all that it implies.

That a Tammany man should vote for Hill with zest is natural. That an unreasoning, bigoted partisan, or a person ignorant of his record, should vote for him, I can understand. But when I hear professed anti-Tammany Democrats, men who have preached political morality and reform, men who have with burning words held up Hill's villainies to public scorn, men who have denounced him for demoralizing and disgracing his party, men who have called upon their fellow-Democrats to organize against the scandals of his leadership, and who stood at the very head of the organization so formed—when I hear such men appeal to that very organization, at this solemn

crisis, to support him for the governorship—thus seeking to unsettle the righteous public sentiment they themselves have labored to call forth, and thus putting in wanton jeopardy everything that has been gained and all we are striving for—when I hear this, then, I must confess, I stand appalled and perplexed. I am far from throwing suspicion upon the motives of any one incurring so fearful a responsibility. But I inquire anxiously into the reasons they can possibly have for such amazing conduct. Permit me to pass in review all that these new converts to Hill may have to say for him. It is with the utmost reluctance that I descend to the discussion of personalities in politics. But in this case where the person forms so important a part of the political issue, I must be pardoned for regarding it as a commanding duty to tear off the mask of the most audacious pretender among living public men.

In the first place it is said that David B. Hill has shown himself an able man. Yes; and how able!

How ably, after he had once risen to political prominence, did he manage to attach to himself the mercenary elements of his party and form out of them the worst political machine this State has ever seen!

How ably he used this machine to undermine Mr. Cleveland in the Democratic organization of this State!

How ably he strove to belittle the tariff issue brought forward by Mr. Cleveland until that issue was generally accepted!

How ably he contrived, when Mr. Cleveland in 1888 was a second time a candidate for the Presidency, to get for himself in this State, as a candidate for governor, a plurality of many thousands, while Mr. Cleveland was sacrificed!

How ably he used his power as governor to nullify the civil service law and to keep in the ballot-reform law openings for corrupt practices!

How ably he took \$15,000 out of a public contract, and, therefore, out of the people's pockets, for his campaign expenses!

How ably he instigated and directed the crime of abstracting an election return, falsifying an election and stealing the Senate!

How ably he championed the crime, advocated the elevation of the criminal to the highest tribunal of the State "as an act of simple justice" and set down our foremost lawyers, who had some respect for the honor of the judicial ermine, as a "brainless set of namby-pambys"!

How ably he led his party, after having insulted the people of the State with such a nomination, into a humiliation and defeat by more than a hundred thousand votes!

How ably he got up his famous snap convention, thus stealing for himself the Democratic delegation of the State and falsifying the public sentiment of its people!

How ably he managed, at Mr. Cleveland's second election in 1892, to make the Cleveland vote fall behind the ordinary party strength in almost all the counties in which Hill's personal influence was especially strong!

How ably he afterwards claimed for himself the honors of the campaign!

How ably he labored as a member of the Senate to baffle the Democratic Administration in every public measure in which it took a special interest!

How ably he coupled with his vote for the repeal of the silver-purchase law a speech enabling him to slide easily down on the free-coinage side of the fence!

How ably he managed to defeat in the Senate the nominations for the Federal Supreme bench of some of the best jurists of his own State and robbed New York of the honor of a seat on the highest Federal tribunal!

How ably he fought day in and day out to keep the

McKinley tariff on the statute book as the law of the land under the pretext of demanding an amendment to the Wilson tariff bill which he knew would not be adopted!

How ably is he now playing himself off as the champion of the self-same tariff act which he struggled to the last by hook or crook to defeat, and which he was the only Democrat in the Senate to vote against!

Able! I should say so. There is no abler genius of mischief in the Democratic ranks. There is no abler traitor to Democratic principles and policies, no abler demoralizer of Democratic virtue, no abler enemy of the Democratic Administration. There are few rogues in politics whom David B. Hill cannot easily beat at their trade. And he is still able to pull the wool over the eyes of lots of credulous citizens.

I leave it to you to think out what will become of the country and of your party, if such ability is to rule their destinies!

It is said that of late David B. Hill has much "broadened." To be sure he has. He is broad enough to be for good money and for the free coinage of silver at the same time. He is broad enough to fight bitterly against the tariff bill and then to extol it as a beneficent Democratic measure. If he goes on "broadening," he will soon be broad enough to be on every side of every public question, always with the keen eye of the statesman firmly fixed upon the interests of David B. Hill.

And he is broadly generous too. He even went so far at one time in the Senate as to defend the hated Cleveland—when he thought he could thereby most effectually kill the tariff bill. And he was hot for killing the tariff bill because he thought he could thereby most effectually kill Mr. Cleveland.

He is, indeed, generous to us all. He tells us that if he had had his way he would have admitted the delegates

of the State Democracy and of the Brooklyn reform Democrats to the late State convention. I should not wonder, for, being sure of an immense machine majority in that convention anyhow, which would have made the reformers absolutely powerless and at the same time harmless, the spider could generously invite the fly into his net. And now he is so generous as to permit all his opponents to vote for him. What more can you ask for?

It is said that he is courageous. No more courageous man in his circumstances than he. Only think of it: After all he has done, he still has the courage to call himself a Democrat! He still has the courage to show his face among decent people and actually to ask for the suffrages of patriotic and self-respecting men. Human intrepidity can hardly rise higher.

It is said—Mr. Coudert says so—that David B. Hill “represents in this contest everything we have fought for these last ten years.” I do not know whom Mr. Coudert means by “we.” For his own sake I hope he does not include himself. If he means by “we” such men as Dick Croker and Bill Sheehan and Barney Martin and Paddy Divver, and that ilk of patriots, then I agree. What *they* have fought for these last ten years could indeed find no more brilliant representative than Dave Hill. To represent political methods which resulted in the building up of the most corrupt and despotic machine this State has ever known, and in such audacious frauds as the famous snap convention; to represent a political morality which flowered in the falsification of an election and a theft of the Senate majority, and in an attempt to seat a criminal on the highest State tribunal; to represent a Democratic partisanship which consists in systematic treachery to Democratic principles and measures, and in malignant attempts to break down a Democratic Administration—all this to further the most selfish and devouring

of personal ambitions—to represent such things David B. Hill, of all others, is your man. But to say that David B. Hill truly represents what the *Democratic party* has fought for these last ten years, is far worse than anything the bitterest enemies of the Democratic party can say against it. The Democratic party may be able to endure much obloquy. But as soon as the people generally believe that, good Heavens! what will become of the Democracy then? And David B. Hill's election now would go very far to make the people believe it.

Look the situation squarely in the face. There is an anti-Democratic current sweeping over the land. We all know it. Democratic defeats crowd one another. What is the trouble? No doubt the hard times have something to do with it. But in spite of the hard times the Democracy would have a good fighting chance did it stand before the country with a character commanding respect and confidence. Why does it not? Because of its professed principles and its leading measure? No. If the choice between the McKinley tariff and the Wilson tariff were, purely on their merits, submitted to a popular vote, I am confident the McKinley tariff would be voted down by a decisive majority. Even thousands of Republicans would vote against it. What, then, is the trouble? It is corrupt and treacherous leadership. It is your Tammany, your Hills, your Gormans, your Murphys, your Brices, your Smiths, that have disgusted decent men and made them doubtful whether the Democratic party is capable of conducting the Government honestly and for the general good. This is the trouble.

What, then, would David B. Hill's defeat in this election signify? He himself tries to frighten Democratic children with the pretense that it would mean the adoption of the apportionment amendment to the State constitution, and the disfranchisement of Democrats. Nonsense.

I shall vote, and so will you, against that amendment, and with entire consistency we can put him and it into the same grave.

He pretends also that his defeat will mean a victory of the American Protective Association. Nonsense again. That proscriptive secret society is a waning power already, and we shall all coöperate to put it into the same grave as a good third. He further pretends that a defeat of the regular Democratic organization in New York State this year will necessarily draw after it defeat in the Presidential election two years hence. More nonsense. It is history that several times the party defeated in New York one year was victorious in the National field one or two years afterwards.

This is Hill's cry, and it is Tammany's cry likewise. Being one and the same, they have an equal right to it. They cannot be expected to remember that the numerical strength of a party always depends in the long run upon its moral strength. It is, nevertheless, an overruling truth. And in order to recover the necessary moral strength, the Democratic party needs not more Tammany and more Hill, but a good deal less of them. To make the Democratic ship swim again, the party must throw its Jonahs overboard. It must bury them in the waves, out of sight, and, if that be possible, out of memory. This is what Hill's defeat will mean.

Now let us see what his victory would signify. Listen to me a moment, Democrats, who constantly affirm their zeal for reform, clean politics and good government, but now tell us that the good of the Democratic party requires Hill's election. Have you considered what the consequences would be if you succeeded in seducing a sufficient number of anti-Tammany and anti-Hill Democrats to give him a majority? As to our municipal struggle, do you really mean merely to hit Tammany without hurting

it? Or to hurt it only a little, and at the same time to furnish the surgeon who will surely set it upon its legs again, and restore its power for mischief? And this at the very moment when by thorough action that hideous nest of corruption and despotism may be stamped out! Have you considered what an awful responsibility you take in trying to deprive the present great uprising of good citizenship of its ultimate and most valuable fruit, to frustrate this rare opportunity and to discredit non-partisan reform movements for years to come? Have you considered what curses will follow you, curses of the betrayed and the robbed and the oppressed, if you succeed?

But more. Only recently the rascally and tyrannical methods of the Democratic State machine excited you to righteous indignation. You declared that the Democratic party could not live under it; you declared it incompatible with your character as gentlemen to submit to it. You protested; you got up the anti-snapper movement; you organized the State Democracy—all against the machine. Well, who is the State machine? David B. Hill. And if you make him governor again—what then? Why, the machine will be stronger, and, after having victoriously passed through such a crisis, more arbitrary and despotic than ever. And will you then organize other anti-machine movements? Oh, no; for after this year's pro-Hill performance no self-respecting man will again trust the sincerity of your leadership. You will be what David B. Hill wishes his Democratic opponents to be: impotent and despised.

But still more. You call yourselves Cleveland Democrats and supporters of his patriotic purposes. Consider what you are now about to do for him and for the aims he represents. You elect Hill and you give him a prestige of personal strength and success such as he never had before, and as is enjoyed at present by no other Democrat.

It has been said that the election to the governorship of New York this year will be the sure stepping-stone to the nomination for the Presidency two years hence. Whether this be so in fact or not, it will certainly be believed by the crowd of those who are always inclined to turn their faces towards the rising sun; and their number is legion in every party. Hill's election now against unusual odds would make him the most unprincipled and most dangerous politician brought forth by New York politics since the days of Aaron Burr, the most powerful personal force in the Democratic organization. He would, by all the pushing ambitions in the Democratic camp in Congress as well as outside of it, be looked upon as the man of the future, and Cleveland as the man of the past. They would court the coming man's favor and go to him for orders. From that moment on Mr. Cleveland will, in the pursuit of his principles and policies, find himself confronted by an insidious power which, added to the opposition he has already to meet, may be strong enough to turn the second half of his Administration into a slow funeral of laudable endeavors. This is what, by electing Hill, you will do for our National politics; but, pray, call yourselves Cleveland Democrats no longer.

We are told that Mr. Cleveland himself may support Hill. I trust not. I should greatly deplore it if President Cleveland were weak enough to consider it his duty, as head of the party, to support every tainted character regularly nominated. But it would not alter the situation. If Mr. Cleveland asked me personally to deliver him bound hand and foot into the hands of his worst enemy, I would answer: "I will not do it!" As a true friend I would consider it my duty to defend him against himself.

This is not all. When last year the moral sense of the people rose in revolt against the nomination of Maynard for the court of appeals, we heard it commonly said that

the proper place for such a criminal was the penitentiary and not the judicial bench. You said so yourselves. And in your righteous wrath you buried Maynard under a majority of over 100,000 votes. But let me ask you, if Maynard, the tool, deserved such a crushing condemnation, what does Hill deserve, who, as the principal, employed the tool in the execution of the crime instigated by himself? Will you virtuous men of last year make that principal this year governor of the State? If you find it in your consciences to do this, then you must admit that you have grievously wronged Maynard and owe him apology and reparation. You are in duty bound to go to him and say: "Worthy sir, we have done you injustice. Pardon us, for we repent. What we called a crime we have since discovered to have been a commendable deed. We have expressed our appreciation of it by rewarding its instigator with the highest office in the State. And you, in bravely helping him to perform the meritorious act of abstracting an election return, falsifying an election and stealing the Senate majority, deserved honor instead of punishment. We come to put a civic crown upon your head, and shall be happy to carry you at the earliest opportunity in triumph to a seat in our highest tribunal, that you may sit as a judge over us, to support and strengthen by your decisions, if you can, the patriotic efforts of our great and virtuous governor!" When this interesting ceremony takes place, will Mr. Ellery Anderson marshal the procession, and will Mr. Coudert pronounce the eulogy? For my part, if I did such a thing as support Hill after having condemned Maynard, I would feel as if I could no longer look straight into the eyes of my children. I certainly should not wish my sons to follow my example. Do you feel differently, my anti-Maynard, pro-Hill friends?

And now I ask you to open your eyes and look, as

sensible, self-respecting and patriotic men, at the miserable plight of your party. What has brought it to this? What a wicked fraud it is, this vaunted political smartness of the Hill school, which pretends to strengthen a party by organizing machines that would rather fit a band of marauders than an association of honest men, and must inevitably provoke the indignation of the public conscience; which will steal a Senate one year only to lose a whole legislature the next; which seeks party victory with political sharpers at its head, and runs the good aims of the party, and with it the party itself, into certain ruin and disgrace!

What a contemptible humbug it is, this so-called statesmanship which equivocates and shifts and dodges and squirms about every principle and public policy, and schemes and plots and intrigues for no higher object than personal advancement and power and plunder!

What a farcical spectacle it is, this so-called heroic campaign, Hill himself, the Great Mogul of the machine, with the brand of fate already upon his forehead, a sick devil in the monk's cowl, rushing from place to place, praising the tariff act he voted against, fawning upon Cleveland, whom he has been constantly stabbing in the back, whining about his self-sacrifice in taking the nomination, peddling around his canting promise as to what a good boy he will be, with the impudent assumption that, if he is defeated, the party will die!

And what a calamitous weakness it is, this so-called party loyalty of respectable men, which, when the party is led into iniquity and dishonor, indulges itself in highly moral protests; but then, when the test comes, supports, "for the good of the party," the very leader in iniquity, and thus serves to nurse and encourage and propagate the very wickedness protested against!

Gentlemen of the Reform Organization of the Demo-

cratic party, I turn to you with a feeling of relief and hope. It is a joy to meet once more with men who dare to look the truth squarely in the face, and to call their souls their own. Your clearness of mind amid so much mental confusion, your firmness amid so much wavering, your courage amid so much pusillanimity, entitle you to the respect of friend and foe. You have manfully declined to kneel before the idol of a party organization serving bad ends. You have scorned to stultify and disgrace yourselves by honoring to-day what you denounced as a crime yesterday. You have justly repelled the leadership of the evil genius of the party nominated by Tammany Hall for its purposes. You have done more. You have shown the Democratic party in its distress the way of salvation. You have proclaimed the principle that, if it is to be the party of tariff reform, it must be led by tariff reformers, and that if it is to be the party of good government, it must be led by honest men.

Your acts have been as good as your words. Your platform is the model Democratic platform, indeed the model platform of the day. And your standard-bearer, Everett P. Wheeler, is by his principles and his public and private virtues the model candidate of whom any party might be proud.

I invite the Democrats of this State and of the whole country to look at this. What would the position of your party be to-day, what its power and its prestige, if it had constantly stood true to such a platform with such leaders at its head? It would be irresistible in the confidence of the people. Well, what has not been may be. Before us is a great opportunity. Now is the time, in this State at least, to crush the powers of evil and to clear the field for a power of good. Boldly plant your flag as the flag of true Democracy. Around it will rally not

only hosts of true Democrats, but, after this election, thousands of Republicans too, who are impatient with the tendencies and abuses of their own party, but were kept in it because Tammany and Hillism disgusted and repelled them. An organization like this, with such principles and such men, will solve their doubts. It will be a gathering of new forces.

It is objected that this will not be the regular organization of the State. The answer is that the true Democracy must not rest until it becomes the regular Democracy. It is objected also that this will involve Democratic defeat. The answer is that great reforms are never accomplished by those whom the thought of defeat can frighten from their purpose. Besides, there will, in all likelihood, be Democratic defeat anyhow. The question is only what kind of defeat. The worst defeat of Democratic principles, Democratic morals and Democratic prospects would be David B. Hill's election. This, however, I am glad to say, is hardly to be apprehended. But the defeat of a bad Democratic leader may be turned into a triumph of good Democratic principles if emphasized by Democratic votes. And here is the great duty the true Democrats of New York have to perform. Every vote for Hill is a vote for corruption and machine politics and for the demoralization and decay of the Democratic party. Every vote for Everett P. Wheeler is a vote for fidelity to the principles of good government and for party purification and rejuvenation.

May the citizens of New York when they go to the ballot-box not forget the true saying which has passed into a proverb: He serves his party most who serves his country best.

TO W. S. BISSELL<sup>1</sup>

POCANTICO HILLS, Nov. 28, 1894.

I have just read the civil service part of your official report and cannot refrain from thanking you for it. In whatever detail of official policy our opinions may differ—this is unquestionably the weightiest and bravest utterance that has ever come from the Post-Office Department and cannot fail to do great good. It will be an especial pleasure to me to avail myself of an appropriate opportunity for giving public expression to these sentiments.

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THE VENEZUELAN QUESTION<sup>2</sup>

MR. PRESIDENT:—As an honorary member of the Chamber of Commerce, I am thankful for the privilege of seconding the resolution offered by the Committee.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Postmaster-General.

<sup>2</sup> Speech before the New York Chamber of Commerce, Jan. 2, 1896.

<sup>3</sup> *Resolved*, That the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, being profoundly impressed with the gravity of the situation which threatens the peace, now and happily so long existing between Great Britain and the United States, appeals to the common-sense and the common interests of the people of both countries to avert the calamity of war by a resort to arbitration or other friendly negotiation, which has so often been found to be a sufficient and satisfactory mode of settling international disputes, and to which both Governments stand committed by profession, precedent and the humanitarian spirit of the age.

*Resolved*, That the President of the Chamber of Commerce appoint a Special Committee of fifteen members, of whom the President shall be one, to consider the expediency of an effort to be made on its part, in conjunction with similar organizations, in the interest of international peace and good understanding, toward the submission of the whole Venezuela Boundary dispute for investigation to a Joint Commission, to be composed of the members of the Commission already appointed by the President and an equal number of British subjects, and to be presided over by some man of eminent character and ability, to be agreed upon by the Governments of Great Britain and the United States; the Commission so constituted to be not a court of arbitration, but a Commission of Inquiry or Advisory Council,

I yield to no one in American feeling or pride; and, as an American, I maintain that international peace, kept in justice and honor, is an American principle and an American interest. As to the President's recent message on the Venezuela case, opinions differ. But I am sure that all good citizens, whether they approve or disapprove of it, and while they would faithfully stand by their country in time of need, sincerely and heartily wish that the pending controversy between the United States and Great Britain be brought to a peaceable issue.

I am well aware of the strange teachings put forth among us by some persons, that a war, from time to time, would by no means be a misfortune, but rather a healthy exercise to stir up our patriotism, and to keep us from becoming effeminate. Indeed, there are some of them busily looking round for somebody to fight as the crazed Malay runs amuck looking for somebody to kill. The idea that the stalwart and hard-working American people, engaged in subduing to civilization an immense continent, need foreign wars to preserve their manhood from dropping into effeminacy, or that their love of country will flag unless stimulated by hatred of somebody else, or that they must have bloodshed and devastation as an outdoor exercise in the place of other sports—such an idea is as preposterous as it is disgraceful and abominable.

It is also said that there are some American citizens of Irish origin, who wish the United States to get into a war with England, because they believe such a war would

and as such to report the results of its investigations and its opinions to the Governments concerned for their decision.

*Resolved further,* That if the Special Committee of this Chamber find it expedient that such an effort be made, it shall have power to enter, in the name of this Chamber of Commerce, into correspondence with other commercial organizations and other organizations of public-spirited citizens to enlist their coöperation, and to do such other things as it may deem useful and proper to further the object in view.

serve to relieve Ireland of the British connection. We all value the willingness of the Irish-born American citizens to fight for their adopted country if need be; and nobody will deny that their hearty love for their native land is, as such, entirely natural and entitled to respect. But as American citizens, having sworn exclusive allegiance to the United States, not one of them should ever forget that this Republic has a right to expect of all its adopted citizens, as to their attitude toward public affairs, especially questions of peace or war, the loyal and complete subordination of the interests of their native countries to the interests of the United States.

There are also corrupt politicians eager to plunder the public under a cheap guise of patriotism and unscrupulous speculators looking for gambling and pilfering opportunities in their country's trouble, and wishing for war as the piratical wrecker on his rocky shore wishes for fogs or hurricanes. They deserve the detestation of every decent man.

But aside from these classes it may safely be assumed that all seriously minded American citizens earnestly hope for a continuance of the long existing friendly relations between this country and Great Britain. General Sherman, whose memory is dear to us all, is reported to have said, in his vigorous way: "You want to know what war is? War is hell." And nobody who has seen war as he had, and as some of us have, will question the truthfulness of this characteristic saying. True, war sometimes develops noble emotions and heroic qualities in individuals or in a people; but war is hell for all that. If our boasted civilization and Christianity are to mean anything, they should mean this: No war is justifiable unless its cause or object stands in just proportion to its cost in blood, in destruction, in human misery, in waste, in political corruption, in social demoralization, in relapse of civili-

zation; and even then it is justifiable only when every expedient of statesmanship to avert it has been thoroughly exhausted.

I shall not discuss now whether those who honestly think that our present difference with Great Britain would, as to cause or object, justify war, or those who think the contrary, are right. I expect them both to coöperate in an earnest endeavor to encourage those expedients of statesmanship by which war may be averted in either case. Confronting a grave emergency, we must, as practical men, look at the situation, not as it might have been or ought to be, but as it is. For several years our Government has been seeking to bring a boundary dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana to a friendly settlement but without success. Last summer, the President, through the Secretary of State, in a despatch reviewing the case at length, and containing an elaborate disquisition on the Monroe doctrine, asked the British Government whether it "would consent or decline to submit the Venezuela question in its entirety to impartial arbitration," calling for "a definite decision." Lord Salisbury, after some delay, replied, in a despatch also discussing the Monroe doctrine from his point of view, that the Venezuela question might be in part submitted to arbitration, but he refused so to submit it in its entirety as asked for. Thereupon President Cleveland sent a message to Congress recommending appropriations for a commission to be appointed by the Executive, which commission "shall make the necessary investigation" of the boundary dispute, and report to our Government; and when such report is made and accepted, it will, in the President's opinion, be the duty of the United States to resist, by every means, the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands, or the exercise of any governmental jurisdiction over any territory, which, after investigation, we have determined of

right belongs to Venezuela." And Congress, by unanimously voting the appropriation asked for, without qualification, virtually made the position taken by the President its own.

This correspondence and this message, by their tone as well as their substance, have essentially changed the situation. It is no longer a mere question of boundary, or of the status of the Monroe doctrine, but after a demand and a call for a definite decision, and a definite refusal of the thing demanded, and in answer to this something that may be understood as a threat of war, it has assumed the most ticklish form of an international difference—the form of a question of honor. Questions of fact, of law, of interest, of substantial justice and right it may sometimes be difficult to determine; but there are rules of evidence, of legal construction, of equity and precedents to aid us. A question of honor is often inaccessible to these aids, for it is a matter of sentiment. Affairs of honor have caused as many follies as affairs of love. It is a strange fact, that while the mediæval conception of honor which regarded the duel as the only adequate settlement of a question of that nature, has yielded to more enlightened and more moral views in several highly civilized countries, nations are in such cases still apt to rush to arms as the only means of satisfaction.

It is generally said, in Great Britain as well as here, that there will be no war. The belief is born of the wish. It is so general because almost everybody feels that such a war would be a disaster not only calamitous but also absurd and shameful to both nations. From the bottom of my heart I trust the prediction will prove true. But the prediction itself, with the popular sentiment prompting it, will not be alone sufficient to make it true. Bloody wars have happened in spite of an earnest popular desire for peace on both sides, especially when points of honor

inflamed the controversy. It may be in vain to cry "Peace! Peace!" on both sides of the ocean, if we continue to flaunt the red flag in one another's faces.

The Commission just appointed by the President, indeed, consists of eminent, patriotic and wise men. They will, no doubt, conduct their inquiry with conscientious care and fairness. So we think here. But we have to admit that after all it is a one-sided contrivance, and as such lacks an important element of authority. Suppose the report of the Commission goes against the British contention. Suppose then we say to Great Britain: "*Our* investigation shows this, and *we* decide accordingly. Take this, or fight!" How then? It is quite possible that a vast majority of the British people care very little about the strip of territory in dispute, and would have been satisfied to let the whole of it go to arbitration. It is not impossible even that Lord Salisbury himself, in view of the threatening complications in Europe and other parts of the world, and of the manifold interests involved, might at last rather let it be so submitted than have a long quarrel about it. But it may well be doubted whether any statesman at the head of the British or any other great Government would think that he could afford to yield what he otherwise would be disposed to yield, under a threat of war. Similar circumstances would produce similar effects with us. The fact is, therefore, that however peaceable the popular temper may be on both sides of the water, the critical moment will come at the time when the Commission reports, and, if that Commission remains one-sided as it is now, the crisis may become more exciting and dangerous than ever.

But in the meantime there will be something calling for the most earnest attention of the business world on both sides of the Atlantic. While that critical period is impending there will be—who knows how long—a dark

cloud of uncertainty hanging over both nations, an uncertainty liable to be fitfully aggravated on occasion, or even without occasion, by speculative manufacturers of rumors. Every business calculation will be like taking a gambler's chance. The spirit of enterprise will be depressed by vague anxiety as to the future, by the apprehension—paralysis, and I need not tell you as experienced business men what all this means as to that confidence which is necessary to set in motion the rich man's money and the poor man's labor, and thus to develop general prosperity. It is of the highest importance, therefore, that this uncertainty be removed, or at least lessened as much and as soon as possible; and the peace sentiment prevailing here as well as in England, of which the friendly message from the Chamber of Commerce in Edinburgh is so cheering an evidence, may perhaps be practically set to work for the accomplishment of that end.

A thought occurred to me when studying President Cleveland's Venezuela message, which, indeed, may well have occurred, at least in general outline, to many others at the same time, because it seems so natural. I am glad to notice that something in the same line was suggested by an English journal. The President has appointed an American Commission to inquire into British claims as to the Venezuela boundary. As I have already pointed out, the findings of that Commission will, owing to its one-sided origin, lack an essential element of the moral authority required to command general credit. This authority would be supplied if an equal number of eminent Englishmen, designated by the British Government, were joined to the Commission to coöperate in the examination of the whole case, and if the two parties, to prevent dead-locks between them, agreed upon some distinguished person outside to preside over and direct their deliberations and to have the casting vote—the

joint commission to be not a court of arbitration, and as such to pronounce a final and binding decision of the whole case—the thing which Lord Salisbury objected to—but an advisory council, to report the results of its inquiry into the whole case, together with its opinions, findings and recommendations to the two Governments for their free acceptance or rejection.

It may be said that such an arrangement would not entirely remove the uncertainty as to the final outcome. I believe, however, that it would at least very greatly lessen that uncertainty. I think it probable that the findings and recommendations of a commission so constituted would have high moral authority, and carry very great weight with both governments. They would be likely to furnish, if not a complete and conclusive decision, at least a basis for a friendly agreement. The very appointment of such a joint commission by the two Governments would be apt at once to remove the point of honor, the most dangerous element, from the controversy, and thus go very far to relieve the apprehension of disastrous possibilities which usually has so unsettling and depressing an effect.

I do not know, of course, whether such a plan would be accepted by either Government. I think, however, that each of them could assent to it without the slightest derogation to its dignity, and that if either of them received it, upon proper presentation, even with an informal manifestation of favor, the way would easily be opened to a mutual understanding concerning it. At any rate, it seems to me worth the while of a public spirited and patriotic body like this, and of other friends of peace here or abroad, to consider its expediency, and at the close of my remarks I shall move a tentative resolution to that effect, in addition to the one now pending.

I repeat, I am for peace—not, indeed, peace at any price,

but peace with honor. Let us understand, however, what the honor of this great American Republic consists in. We are a very powerful people—even without an Army or Navy immediately ready for action, we are, in some respects, the most powerful people on earth. We enjoy peculiar advantages of inestimable value. We are not only richer than any European nation in men, in wealth and in resources yet undeveloped, but we are the only nation that has a free hand, having no dangerous neighbors and no outlying and exposed possessions to take care of. We are, in our continental position, substantially unassailable. A hostile Navy may destroy what commercial fleet we have, blockade our ports, and even bombard our seaboard towns. This would be painful enough, but it would only be scratching our edges. It would not touch a vital point. No foreign Power or possible combination could attack us on land without being overwhelmed on our own soil by immensely superior numbers. We are the best fitted, not, perhaps, for a war of quick decision, but for a long war. Better than any other nation we can, if need be, live on our own fat. We enjoy the advantage of not having spent our resources during long periods of peace on armaments of tremendous cost without immediate use for them, but we would have those resources unimpaired in time of war to be used during the conflict. Substantially unassailable in our continental fastness, and bringing our vast resources into play with the patriotic spirit and the inventive genius and energy of our people, we would, on sea as well as on land, for offensive as well as defensive warfare, be stronger the second year of a war than the first, and stronger the third than the second, and so on. Owing to this superiority of our staying power, a war with the United States would be to any foreign nation practically a war without end. No foreign Power or possible combination in the old world can,

therefore, considering in addition to all this the precarious relations of every one of them with other Powers and its various exposed interests, have the slightest inclination to get into a war with the United States, and none of them will, unless we force it to do so. They will, on the contrary, carefully avoid such a quarrel as long as they can, and we may be confident that without firing a gun, and even without having many guns ready for firing, we shall always see our rights respected and our demands, if they are just and proper—may be, after some diplomatic sparring—at last fully complied with.

What is the rule of honor to be observed by a Power so strong and so advantageously situated as this Republic is? Of course, I do not expect it meekly to pocket real insults if they should be offered to it. But surely, it should not, as our boyish jingoes wish it to do, swagger about among the nations of the world, with a chip on its shoulder, and shaking its fist in everybody's face. Of course, it should not tamely submit to real encroachments upon its rights. But, surely, it should not, whenever its own notions of right or interest collide with the notions of others, fall into hysterics and act as if it really feared for its own security and its very independence. As a true gentleman, conscious of his strength and his dignity, it should be slow to take offense. In its dealings with other nations it should have scrupulous regard, not only for their rights, but also for their self-respect. With all its latent resources for war, it should be the great peace Power of the world. It should never forget what a proud privilege and what an inestimable blessing it is not to need and not to have big armies or navies to support. It should seek to influence mankind, not by heavy artillery, but by good example and wise counsel. It should see its highest glory, not in battles won, but in wars prevented. It should be so invariably just and fair, so trustworthy,

so good tempered, so conciliatory that other nations would instinctively turn to it as their mutual friend and the natural adjuster of their differences, thus making it the greatest preserver of the world's peace.

This is not a mere idealistic fancy. It is the natural position of this great Republic among the nations of the earth. It is its noblest vocation, and it will be a glorious day for the United States when the good sense and the self-respect of the American people see in this their "manifest destiny." It all rests upon peace. Is not this peace with honor? There has, of late, been much loose speech about "Americanism." Is not this good Americanism? It is surely to-day the Americanism of those who love their country most. And I fervently hope that it will be and ever remain the Americanism of our children and children's children.

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#### TO WINSLOW WARREN

POCANTICO HILLS, N. Y., April 21, 1896.

I agree with all you say, and I have expressed the same sentiments in a series of articles in *Harper's Weekly* in the course of the last six months, as well as in private conversation with sound-money Republicans and Democrats. There ought to have been an independent movement long ago, and it is perhaps not too late for it yet. But to have the desired effect, it should be headed, not by the old set of political independents, but by a union of sound-money business men, Republicans and Democrats, going before the country with the declaration that they will not support any candidate for the Presidency who is not known to be absolutely sound on the money question, and that if neither party presents such a candidate, they will strike out for themselves. I have preached this to all with whom I had any conversation on the subject.

But I have not been able to find any Republican business men willing to take this position. There were a few Democrats, but not enough. This is my experience. And I am afraid it is yours.

I have thus become convinced that a movement started now by independents whose standing before the country is mainly political, would at present lack that support which would be necessary to make it impressive. If you have in Boston a sufficient number of prominent business men, Republicans and Democrats, to start the bolt, it should certainly be done. I do not see any signs of a chance in New York. The outlook here is generally most dismal. I fear no independent movement can be initiated with any strength until the results of the two Conventions demonstrate its absolute necessity. I should be glad to hear more from you on the possibilities in Boston.

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#### INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION<sup>1</sup>

I have been honored with the request that I should address you on the desirableness of arbitration as a method of settling international disputes. To show that arbitration is preferable to war, should be among civilized people as superfluous as to show that to refer disputes between individuals or associations to courts of justice is better than to refer them to single combat or to street fights—in one word, that the ways of civilization are preferable to those of barbarism. Neither is there any doubt as to the practicability of international arbitration. What seemed an idealistic dream in Hugo Grotius's time, is now largely an established practice; no longer an uncertain experiment, but an acknowledged success. In this century not less than eighty controversies between

<sup>1</sup> Address delivered before the Arbitration Conference, Washington, D. C., April 22, 1896.

civilized Powers have been composed by arbitration. And more than that. Every international dispute settled by arbitration has *stayed* settled, while during the same period some of the results of great wars have *not* stayed settled, and others are unceasingly drawn in question, being subject to the shifting preponderance of power. And such wars have cost rivers of blood, countless treasure and immeasurable misery, while arbitration has cost comparatively nothing. Thus history teaches the indisputable lesson that arbitration is not only the most humane and economical method of settling international differences, but also the most, if not the only, certain method to furnish enduring results.

As to the part war has played and may still have to play in the history of mankind, I do not judge as a blind sentimentalist. I readily admit that, by the side of horrible devastations, barbarous cruelty, great and beneficent things have been accomplished by means of war in forming nations and in spreading and establishing the rule or influence of the capable and progressive. I will not inquire how much of this work still remains to be done and what place war may have in it. But surely, among the civilized nations of to-day—and these we are considering—the existing conditions of intercourse largely preclude war as an agency for salutary objects. The steamship, the railroad, the telegraph, the postal union and other international arrangements facilitating transportation and the circulation of intelligence, have broken down many of the barriers which formerly enabled nations to lead separate lives, and have made them in those things which constitute the agencies of well-being and of progressive civilization in a very high degree dependent upon each other. And this development of common life-interests and mutual furtherance, mental as well as material, still goes on in continuous growth. Thus a war

between civilized nations means *now* a rupture of arteries of common life-blood, a stoppage of the agencies of common well-being and advancement, a waste of energies serviceable to common interests—in one word, a general disaster, infinitely more serious than it did in times gone by; and it is, consequently, now an infinitely more heinous crime against humanity, unless not only the ends it is to serve fully justify the sacrifices it entails, but unless also all expedients suggested by the genius of peace have been exhausted to avert the armed conflict.

Of those pacific expedients, when ordinary diplomatic negotiation does not avail, arbitration has proved itself most effective. And it is the object of the movement in which we are engaged to make the resort to arbitration, in case of international difficulty, still more easy, more regular, more normal, more habitual and thereby to render the resort to war more unnatural and more difficult than heretofore.

In this movement the Republic of the United States is the natural leader, and I can conceive for it no nobler or more beneficent mission. The naturalness of this leadership is owing to its peculiar position among the nations of the earth. Look at the powers of the old world; how each of them is uneasy watching the other; how conflicting interests or ambitions are constantly exciting new anxieties; how they are all armed to the teeth and nervously increase their armaments, lest a hostile neighbor overmatch them; how they are piling expense upon expense and tax upon tax to augment their instruments of destruction; how, as has been said, every workingman toiling for his daily bread, has to carry a full-armed soldier or sailor on his back, and how, in spite of those bristling armaments, their sleep is unceasingly troubled by dreams of interests threatened, of marches stolen upon them, of combinations hatched against them

and of the danger of some accident breaking the precarious peace and settling those gigantic and exhausting preparations in motion for the work of ravage and ruin.

And then look at this Republic, stronger than any nation in Europe in the number, intelligence, vigor and patriotism of its people, and in the unparalleled abundance of its barely broached resources; resting with full security in its magnificent domain; standing safely aloof from the feuds of the old world; substantially unassailable in its great continental stronghold; no dangerous neighbors threatening its borders; no outlying and exposed possessions to make it anxious; the only great power in the world seeing no need of keeping up vast standing armaments on land or sea to maintain its peace or to protect its integrity; its free institutions making its people the sole master of its destinies; and its best political traditions pointing to a general policy of peace and good-will among men. What nation is there better fitted to be the champion of this cause of peace and good-will than this, so strong although unarmed, and so entirely exempt from any imputation of the motive of fear or of selfish advantage? Truly, this Republic, with its power and its opportunities is the pet of destiny.

As an American citizen, I cannot contemplate this noble peace mission of my country without a thrill of pride. And I must confess it touches me like an attack upon the dignity of this Republic when I hear Americans repudiate that peace mission upon the ground of supposed interests of the United States requiring for their protection or furtherance preparation for warlike action and the incitement of a fighting spirit among our people. To judge from the utterances of some men having the public ear, we are constantly threatened by the evil designs of rival or secretly hostile Powers that are eagerly watching every chance to humiliate our self-esteem, to

insult our flag, to balk our policies, to harass our commerce and even to threaten our very independence; and putting us in imminent danger of discomfiture of all sorts, unless we stand with sword in hand in sleepless watch and cover the seas with warships and picket the islands of every ocean with garrisoned outposts, and surround ourselves far and near with impregnable fortresses. What a poor idea those indulging in such talk have of the true position of their country among the nations of the world.

A little calm reflection will convince every unprejudiced mind that there is not a single Power, nor even an imaginable combination of Powers, on the face of the globe that can wish—I might almost say, that can afford—a serious quarrel with the United States. There are very simple reasons for this. A war in our days is not a mere matter of military skill, nor even—as it would certainly not be in our case—a mere matter of preparation for the first onset. It is a matter of material resources, of reserves, of staying-power. Now, considering that in all these respects our means are substantially inexhaustible, and that the patriotic spirit and the extraordinary ingenuity of our people would greatly aid their development in the progress of a conflict; considering that, however grievous the injuries, a strong hostile navy might inflict upon us at the beginning of a war, it could not touch a vital point, as on land we would be immensely superior to any army that could be brought upon our shores; considering that thus a war with the United States, as a test of endurance, would, so far, as our staying-power is concerned, be a war of indefinite duration; considering all these things, I am justified in saying that no European Power can engage in such a conflict with us without presenting to its rivals in the old world the most tempting opportunity for hostile action. And no European Power will do this, unless

forced by extreme necessity. For the same reason no European Power will, even if it were so inclined, insist upon doing anything injurious to our interests that might lead to a war with the United States. We may therefore depend upon it with absolute assurance that, whether we are armed or not, no European Power will seek a quarrel with us; that, on the contrary, they will avoid such a quarrel with the utmost care; that we cannot have a war with any of them, unless we wantonly and persistently seek such a war; and that they will respect our rights and comply with all our demands, if just and proper, in the way of friendly agreement.

If anybody doubts this, let him look at a recent occurrence. The alarmists about the hostility to us of foreign Powers usually have Great Britain in their minds. I am very sure President Cleveland, when he wrote his Venezuela message, did not mean to provoke a war with Great Britain. But the language of that message might have been construed as such a provocation by anybody inclined to do so. Had Great Britain wished a quarrel with us, here was a tempting opportunity. Everybody knew that we had but a small Navy, an insignificant standing Army and no coast defenses; that in fact we were entirely unprepared for a conflict. The public opinion of Europe, too, was against us. What did the British Government do? It did not avail itself of that opportunity. It did not resent the language of the message.

On the contrary, the Queen's speech from the throne gracefully turned that message into an "expression of willingness" on the part of the United States to coöperate with Great Britain in the adjustment of the Venezuela boundary dispute.

It has been said that the conciliatory mildness of this turn was owing to the impression produced in England by the German Emperor's congratulatory despatch to the

president of the South African Republic. If the two things were so connected, it would prove what I have said, that even the strongest European Government will be deterred from a quarrel with the United States by the opportunities which such a quarrel would open to its rivals. If the two things were not so connected it would prove that even the strongest European Power will go to very great lengths in the way of conciliation to remain on friendly terms with this Republic.

In the face of these indisputable facts, we hear the hysterical cries of the alarmists who scent behind every rock or bush a foreign foe standing with dagger in hand ready to spring upon us, and to rob us of our valuables, if not to kill us outright—or at least making faces at us and insulting the Stars and Stripes. Is not this constant and eager looking for danger or insult, where neither exists, very like that melancholy form of insanity called persecution mania, which is so extremely distressing to the sufferers and their friends? We may heartily commiserate the unfortunate victims of so dreadful an affliction; but surely the American people should not take such morbid hallucinations as a reason for giving up that inestimable blessing of not being burdened with large armaments, and for embarking upon a policy of warlike preparation and bellicose bluster.

It is a little less absurd in sound, but not in sense, when people say that instead of trusting in our position as the great peace Power we must at least have plenty of warships to “show our flag” everywhere, and to impress foreign nations with our strength to the end of protecting and developing our maritime commerce. Granting that we should have a sufficient naval force to do our share of police work on the seas, would a large armament be required on account of our maritime trade? Let us see. Fifty years ago, as the official statistics of “the value of

foreign trade carried in American and in foreign vessels" show, nearly 82 per cent. of that trade was carried on in American vessels. Between 1847 and 1861, that percentage fell to 65. Then the civil war came, at the close of which American bottoms carried only 28 per cent. of that trade; and now we carry less than 12 per cent. During the period when this maritime trade rose to its highest development, we had no naval force to be in any degree compared with those of the great European Powers. Nor did we need any for the protection of our maritime commerce, for no foreign Power molested that commerce. In fact, since the war of 1812, it has not been molested by anybody so as to require armed protection except during the civil war by Confederate cruisers. The harassment ceased again when the civil war ended, but our merchant shipping on the high seas continued to decline.

That decline was evidently not owing to the superiority of other nations in naval armament. It was coincident with the development of ocean transportation by iron steamships instead of wooden sailing ships. The wooden sailing ships we had in plenty, but of iron steamships we have only few. It appears, therefore, that whatever we may need a large war fleet for, it is certainly not for the development of our maritime commerce. To raise that commerce to its old superiority again, we want *not more warships, but more merchant vessels*. To obtain these we need a policy enabling American capital and enterprise to compete in that business with foreign nations. And to make such a policy fruitful, we need above all things peace. And we shall have that peace so long as we abstain from driving some foreign Power against its own inclination into a war with the United States.

Can there be any motive other than the absurd ones mentioned, to induce us to provoke such a war? I have heard it said that a war might be desirable to enliven

business again. Would not that be as wise and moral as a proposition to burn down our cities for the purpose of giving the masons and carpenters something to do? Nay, we are even told that there are persons who would have a foreign war on any pretext, no matter with whom, to the end of bringing on a certain change in our monetary policy. But the thought of plotting in cold blood to break the peace of the country and to send thousands of our youths to slaughter and to desolate thousands of American homes for an object of internal policy, whatever it may be, is so abominable, so ghastly, so appalling, that I dismiss it as impossible of belief.

I say this not as a so-called Anglo-maniac bowing down before everything English. While I admire the magnificent qualities and achievements of that great nation, I am not blind to its faults. I suppose Englishmen candidly expressing their sentiments speak in a similar strain of us. But I believe that an arbitration agreement between just these two countries would not only be of immense importance to themselves, but also serve as an example to invite imitation in wider circles. In this respect I do not think that the so-called blood-relationship of the two nations, which would make such an arbitration agreement between them appear more natural, furnishes the strongest reason for it. It is indeed true that the ties binding the two peoples sentimentally together would give to a war between them an especially wicked and heinous aspect. But were their arbitration agreement placed mainly on this ground, it would lose much of its important significance for the world at large.

In truth, however, the common ancestry, the common origin of institutions and laws, the common traditions, the common literature and so on, have not prevented conflicts between the Americans and English before, and they would not alone be sufficient to prevent them in the

future. Such conflicts may, indeed, be regarded as family feuds; but family feuds are apt to be the bitterest of all. In point of fact, there is by no means such a community or accord of interest or feeling between the two nations as to preclude hot rivalries and jealousies on many fields which might now and then bring forth an exciting clash. We hear it even said now in this country that Great Britain is not the Power with whom to have a permanent peace arrangement, because she is so high-handed in her dealings with other nations. I should not wonder if the same thing were said in England about the United States. This of course is not an argument against an arbitration agreement, but rather for it. Such an arrangement between nations of such temper is especially called for to prevent that temper from running away with calm reason. Between perfect angels from heaven an arbitration treaty would be superfluous.

The institution of a regulated and permanent system of arbitration between the United States and Great Britain would therefore not be a mere sentimental cooing between loving cousins, nor a mere stage show gotten up for the amusement of the public, but a very serious contrivance intended for very serious business. It will set to mankind the example of two very great nations, the greatest rivals in the world, neither of them a mere theorist or sentimental dreamer, both intensely practical, self-willed and hard-headed, deliberately agreeing to abstain from the barbarous ways of bygone times in adjusting the questions of conflicting interest or ambition that may arise between them, and to resort instead in all cases of difficulty to the peaceable and civilized methods suggested by the enlightenment, the moral sense and the humane spirit of our age. If these two nations prove that this *can* be done, will not the conclusion gradually force itself upon other civilized nations that by others too it *ought*

to be done, and finally that it *must* be done? This is the service to be rendered, not only to ourselves, but to mankind.

While the practicability of international arbitration by tribunals established in each case has been triumphantly proved, there is some difference of opinion as to whether a permanent tribunal is possible, whether it can be so organized as to be fit for the adjustment of *all* disputes that might come before it and whether there would be any power behind it to enforce its adjudications in case one party or the other refused to comply. Such doubts should not disturb our purpose. Similar doubts had to be overcome at every step of the progress from the ancient wager of battle to the present organization of courts of justice. I am sanguine enough to believe that as soon as the two Governments have once resolved that a fixed system of international arbitration *shall* be established between them, the same ingenuity which has been exerted in discovering difficulties will then be exerted in removing them, and most of them will be found not to exist. The end to be reached in good faith determined upon, a workable machinery will soon be devised, be it a permanent arbitration tribunal, or the adoption of an organic rule for the appointment of a special tribunal for each case. We may trust to experience to develop the best system.

Neither am I troubled by the objection that there are some international disputes which in their very nature cannot be submitted to arbitration, especially those involving questions of national honor. When the habit of such submission is once well established, it will doubtless be found that most of the questions now thought unfit for it are entirely capable of composition by methods of reason and equity. And as to so-called questions of honor, it is time for modern civilization to leave behind it those mediæval notions according to which personal honor

found its best protection in the dueling pistol, and national honor could be vindicated only by slaughter and devastation. Moreover, was not the great Alabama case, which involved points very closely akin to questions of honor, settled by international arbitration, and does not this magnificent achievement form one of the most glorious pages of the common history of America and England? Truly, the two nations that accomplished this need not be afraid of unadjustable questions of honor in the future.

Indeed, there will be no recognized power behind a Court of Arbitration, like an international sheriff or other executionary force, to compel the acceptance of its decisions by an unwilling party. In this extreme case there would be, as the worst possible result, what there would have been without arbitration—war. But in how many of the fourscore cases of international arbitration we have witnessed in this century has such an enforcing power been needed? In not a single one. In every instance the same spirit which moved the contending parties to accept arbitration, moved them to accept the verdict. Why, then, borrow trouble where experience has shown that there is no danger of mischief? The most trustworthy compelling power will always be the sense of honor of the parties concerned and their respect for the enlightened judgment of civilized mankind which will watch the proceedings.

We may therefore confidently expect that a permanent system of arbitration will prove as feasible as it is desirable. Nor is there any reason to doubt that its general purpose is intelligently and warmly favored by the best public sentiment both in England and in the United States. The memorial of 233 members of the British House of Commons which, in 1887, was presented to the President and the Congress of the United States, expressing the wish that all future differences between the two countries

be submitted to arbitration, was, in 1890, echoed by a unanimous vote of our Congress requesting the President to open negotiations in this sense with all countries with which we had diplomatic relations. Again this sentiment broke forth in England as well as here on the occasion of the Venezuela excitement, in demonstrations of the highest respectability. Indeed, the popular desire as well as the argument seem to be all on one side. I have heard of only one objection that makes the slightest pretense to statesmanship, and it need only be stated to cover its supporters with confusion. It is that we are a young and aspiring people, and that a binding arbitration treaty would hamper us in our freedom of action.

Let the light be turned upon this. What is it that an arbitration treaty contemplates? That in all cases of dispute between this and a certain other country there shall be an impartial tribunal regularly appointed to decide upon principles of international law, of equity, of reason, what this and what the other country may be justly entitled to. And this arrangement is to be shunned as hampering our freedom of action?

What will you think of a man who tells you that he feels himself intolerably hampered in his freedom of action by the ten commandments or by the criminal code? What respect and confidence can a nation claim for its character that rejects a trustworthy and well-regulated method of ascertaining and establishing right and justice, avowedly to preserve its freedom of action? Shame upon those who would have this great Republic play so disreputable a part! I protest that the American people are an honorable people. Wherever its interests or ambitions may lead this great Nation, I am sure it will always preserve that self-respect which will prompt it rather to court the searchlight of truth and justice than by skulking on dark and devious paths seek to evade it.

Therefore, I doubt not that the patriotic citizens assembled here to promote the establishment of a permanent system of international arbitration may be confident of having the warm sympathy of the American people behind them when they knock at the door of the President of the United States, and say to him: "In the name of all good Americans we commend this cause to your care. If carried to a successful issue it will hold up this Republic to its noblest ideals. It will illuminate with fresh luster the close of this great century. It will write the name of the American people foremost upon the roll of the champions of the world's peace and of true civilization."

I know, however, from personal experience, of some otherwise honorable and sensible men who wish for a war on sentimental—aye, on high moral ground. One of them, whom I much esteem, confessed to me that he longed for a war, if not with England, then with Spain or some other Power, as he said, "to lift the American people out of their materialism and to awaken once more that heroic spirit which moved young Cushing to risk his life in blowing up the Confederate steamer *Albemarle*." This, when I heard it, fairly took my breath away. And yet, we must admit, such fanciful confusion of ideas is not without charm to some of our high-spirited young men. But what a mocking delusion it is! To lift a people out of materialism by war! Has not war always excited the spirit of reckless and unscrupulous speculation, not only while it was going on, but also afterwards, by the economic disorders accompanying and outlasting it? Has it not always stimulated the rapid and often dishonest accumulation of riches on one side, while spreading and intensifying want and misery on the other? Has it not thus always had a tendency to plunge a people still deeper into materialism? Has not every great war left a dark streak of demoralization behind? Has it not thus always

proved dangerous to the purity of republican governments? Is not this our own experience? And as to awakening the heroic spirit—does it not, while stirring noble impulses in some, excite the base passions in others? And do not the young Cushings among us find opportunities for heroism in the life of peace too? Would it be wise in the economy of the universe to bring on a war, with its blood-shed and devastation, its distress and mourning, merely for the purpose of accommodating our young braves with chances for blowing up ships? The old Roman poet tells us that it is sweet and glorious to die for one's country. It is noble, indeed. But to die on the battlefield is not the highest achievement of heroism. To live for a good cause honestly, earnestly, unselfishly, laboriously, is at least as noble and heroic as to die for it, and usually far more difficult.

I have seen war; I have seen it with its glories and its horrors; with its noble emotions and its bestialities; with its exaltations and triumphs and its unspeakable miseries and baneful corruptions; and I say to you, I feel my blood tingle with indignation when I hear the flippant talk of war as if it were only a holiday pastime or an athletic sport. We are often told that there are things worse than war. Yes, but not many. He deserves the curse of mankind who in the exercise of power forgets that war should be only the very last resort even in contending for a just and beneficent end, after all the resources of peaceful methods are thoroughly exhausted. As an American, proud of his country and anxious that this Republic should prove itself equal to the most glorious of its opportunities, I cannot but denounce as a wretched fatuity that so-called patriotism which will not remember that we are the envy of the whole world for the priceless privilege of being exempt from the oppressive burden of warlike preparations; which, when it sees other nations

groaning under that load, tauntingly asks, "Why do you not disarm?" and then insists that the American people too shall put the incubus of heavy armament on their backs; and which would drag this Republic down from its high degree of the championship of peace among nations and degrade it to the vulgar level of the bully ready and eager for a fight.

We hear much of the necessity of an elaborate system of coast fortifications to protect our seaports from assault. How far such a system may be desirable, I will not here discuss. But I am confident our strongest, most effective, most trustworthy and infinitely the cheapest coast defense will consist in "Fort Justice," "Fort Good Sense," "Fort Self-respect," "Fort Good-will" and if international differences really do arise, "Fort Arbitration."

Let no one accuse me of resorting to the clap-trap of the stump speech in discussing this grave subject. I mean exactly what I say, and am solemnly in earnest. This Republic can have no other armament as effective as the weapons of peace. Its security, its influence, its happiness and its glory will be the greater the less it thinks of war. Its moral authority will be far more potent than the heavy squadrons and the big guns of others. And this authority will, in its intercourse with foreign nations, be best maintained by that justice which is the duty of all; by that generous regard not only for the rights, but also the self-respect of others, which is the distinguishing mark of the true gentleman; and by that patient forbearance which is the most gracious virtue of the strong.

For all these reasons it appears to me this Republic is the natural champion of the great peace measure, for the furtherance of which we are met. The permanent establishment of a general court of arbitration to be composed of representative jurists of the principal States

and to take cognizance of all international disputes that cannot be settled by ordinary diplomatic negotiation, is no doubt the ideal to be aimed at. If this cannot be reached at once the conclusion of an arbitration treaty between the United States and Great Britain may be regarded as a great step in that direction.

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#### HONEST MONEY AND HONESTY<sup>1</sup>

FELLOW-CITIZENS:—I have come from the East to the West to speak to you for honest money. I do not imagine myself to be in an “enemy’s country.” There is to me no enemy’s country within the boundaries of this Republic. Wherever I am among Americans I am among fellow-citizens and friends, bound together by common interests and a common patriotism. In this spirit I shall discuss the question of the day. I shall not deal in financial philosophy, but in hard and dry facts.

There are sporadic discontents in the country, partly genuine, partly produced by artificial agitation. They may be specified thus: There are farmers who complain of the low prices of agricultural products; laboring men complaining of a lack of remunerative employment; men in all sorts of pursuits complaining of a general business stagnation and of a scarcity of money. In some parts of the country, especially the South and West, there are many people complaining of a want of capital and a too high rate of interest. The cry for more money is the favorite cry. These are the principal and the most definite complaints. Beyond them, however, an impression has been spread by agitators that an organized conspiracy of moneyed men, mainly great bankers, in

<sup>1</sup> Speech delivered at Central Music Hall, Chicago, Sept. 5, 1896, under the auspices of the American Honest Money League.

America and in Europe, backed by the monarchs and aristocracies of the old world, is seeking the general establishment of the gold standard of value to monopolize or "corner" the world's money to the general detriment.

All this has found definite expression in the following declaration of the Chicago platform:

We declare that the act of 1873, demonetizing silver without the knowledge or approval of the American people, has resulted in the appreciation of gold and a corresponding fall in the prices of commodities produced by the people; a heavy increase in the burden of taxation and of all debts, public and private; the enrichment of the money-lending class at home and abroad, prostration of industry and impoverishment of the people.

Mark well that all these evil consequences are ascribed to the demonetization of silver in the United States alone—not to its demonetization anywhere else. This is to justify the presentation, as a sufficient remedy, of the free coinage of silver in the United States alone, "without waiting for the aid or consent of any other nation." This platform is amplified by free-coinage orators, who tell us that the act of 1873, called "the crime of 1873," has surreptitiously "wiped out" one-half of the people's money, namely, silver; that in consequence the remaining half of our metallic money, namely, gold, as a basis of the whole financial structure, has to do the same business that formerly was done by gold and silver together; that thereby gold has risen to about double its former purchasing power, the gold dollar being virtually a 200-cent dollar; that the man who produces things for sale is thus being robbed of half the price, while debts payable on the gold basis have become twice as heavy, and that this fall of prices and increase of burdens are enriching the money changers and oppressing the people.

Are these complaints well founded? Look at facts which nobody disputes. That there has been a considerable fall in the prices of many articles since 1873 is certainly true. But was this fall caused by the so-called demonetization of silver through the act of 1873? Now, not to speak of other periods of our history, such as the period from 1846 to 1851, everybody knows that there was a considerable fall of prices, not only as to agricultural products—cotton, for instance, dropped from \$1.00 a pound in 1864 to 17 cents in 1871—but in many kinds of industrial products, before 1873. What happened before 1873 cannot have been caused by what happened in 1873. This is clear. The shrinkage after 1873 may, therefore, have been caused by something else.

Another thing is equally clear. Whenever a change in the prices of commodities is caused by a change in supply or demand, or both, then it may affect different articles differently. Thus wheat may rise in price, the supply being proportionately short, while at the same time cotton may decline in price, the supply being proportionately abundant. But when a change of prices takes place in consequence of a great change in the purchasing power of the money of the country, especially when that change is sudden, then the effect must be equal, or at least approximately so, as to all articles that are bought or sold with that money. If by the so-called demonetization of silver in 1873 the gold dollar, or the dollar on the gold basis, became a 200-cent dollar at all, then it became a 200-cent dollar at once and for everything. It could not possibly be at the same time a 200-cent dollar for wheat and a 120-cent dollar for coal, and a 150-cent dollar for cotton, and a 100-cent dollar for corn or for shovels. I challenge any one to gainsay this.

Now for the facts. The act of 1873 in question became a law on the 12th of February. What was the effect? Wheat,

rye, oats and corn rose above the price of 1872, while cotton declined. In 1874 wheat dropped a little; corn made a jump upward; cotton declined; oats and rye rose. In 1875 there was a general decline. In 1876 there was a rise in wheat and a decline in corn, oats, rye and cotton. In 1877 there was another rise in wheat carrying the price above that of 1870 and up to that of 1871, years preceding the act of 1873. Evidently so far the 200-cent dollar had not made its mark at all. But I will admit the possible plea, that, as they say, the act of 1873 having been passed in secret, people did not know anything about it, and prices remained measurably steady, in ignorance of what dreadful things had happened. If so, then it would appear that, if the knowing ones had only kept still about it, the gold dollar would have modestly remained a 100-cent dollar, and nobody would have been hurt. But, seriously speaking, it may be said that when the act of 1873 was passed we were still using exclusively paper money; that neither gold nor silver was in circulation, and that therefore the demonetization would not be felt. Very well. But then in 1879 specie payments were resumed. Metallic money circulated again. And, more than that, the cry about "the crime of 1873" resounded in Congress and in the country. Then at last the 200-cent gold dollar had its opportunity. Prices could no longer plead ignorance. What happened? In 1880 wheat rose above the price of 1879, likewise corn, cotton and oats. In 1881 wheat rose again, also corn, oats and cotton. In 1882 wheat and cotton declined, while corn and oats rose. The reports here given are those of the New York market. They may vary somewhat from the reports of farm prices, but they present the rises and declines of prices with substantial correctness.

These facts prove conclusively to every sane mind that for nine years after the act of 1873—six years before

and three years after the resumption of specie payments—the prices of the agricultural staples mentioned, being in most instances considerably above 1860, show absolutely no trace of any such effect as would have been produced upon them had a great and sudden change in the purchasing power of the money of the country taken place; that it would be childish to pretend that but for the act of 1873 those prices would be 100, or 50, or 25, or 10 per cent. higher, and that, therefore, all this talk about the gold dollar having become a 200-cent dollar, or a 150-cent dollar, or 125-cent dollar, is—pardon the expression—arrant nonsense. Since 1882 the price of wheat has, indeed, very much declined, although in 1891 it reached once more in New York \$1.09, while corn sold in 1891 2, 3 and 4 cents higher than in 1879. But if the act of 1873, which, had it really enhanced the purchasing power of the dollar, would have done so promptly and uniformly, produced no such effect for nine years after its enactment, it would be absurd to say that it produces it twenty years after its enactment. Is not this clear?

If, however, there be somebody believing that in spite of these facts the demonetization of silver by the act of 1873 must in some mysterious way have done something to depress prices, I meet him with the affirmation that the silver dollar was practically demonetized long before 1873. To judge from the speeches of our free-coinage orators the American people must before 1873 have fairly wallowed in silver dollars. What is the fact? President Jefferson stopped the coinage of silver dollars in 1806. From 1783 to 1878, aside from fractional currency—which since 1853 was only limited legal tender—only about 8,000,000 of silver dollars were coined. They were so scarce that you would hardly ever see one except in a curiosity shop as a rare coin.

There was constant trouble with the legal ratio between

gold and silver, which could not be so fixed as to keep the two metals together in circulation. First one of them would be driven out of the country and then the other. Meanwhile, over \$1,000,000,000 of gold coin was coined, and since 1853 gold was substantially the only full legal-tender money in actual circulation. And those were exceptionally prosperous times. Then the civil war came and swept all our metallic money out of sight. Paper money took its place, and in that condition we were in 1873, when the famous act of 1873 was passed. What, then, was in reality that law that has since been so fiercely denounced as "the crime of 1873"? To judge by the declamations of the free-coinage orators, it must have been a law annihilating at one fell swoop one-half of the money circulating among the people. Did it do that? Why, it was simply an act revising our coinage laws and providing among other things that certain silver coins should be struck to be legal-tender in the payment of debts only to a small amount. The standard silver dollar, that had practically been out of use since President Jefferson in 1806 had stopped its coinage, was simply not mentioned in the enumeration. That is all. The act of 1873, therefore, did not create a new state of things, but simply recognized a state of things which had existed for many and many years. It did thereby not only not destroy half the money of the country, but not a single dollar of it.

But, I hear myself asked, if this is so, why was this act of 1873 passed secretly, surreptitiously, stealthily? For silver orators have been persistently dinging into the popular ear for many years, until millions believed it, the story that the silver dollar was "assassinated" through the law of 1873 by some dark, corrupt plot. This fable has been so often and so authoritatively disproved that I am unwilling to take it up again in detail. Senator Sherman did

that recently in a most conclusive manner. I will only add that I was a member of the Senate at the time and know whereof I affirm; and I emphatically pronounce all the stories about the act of 1873 being passed surreptitiously; about Senators and Members being somehow hypnotized, so that they did not know what they were doing; about some Englishman being on the ground with much money to promote the demonetization of silver, and so on, as wholly and unqualifiedly false. I wish to be scrupulously courteous to my opponents. But as a conscientious student of contemporaneous history, I am bound to say that in the forty years during which I have been an attentive observer of public affairs, I have never witnessed nor heard of such unscrupulous, shameless, persistent, audacious, cumulative, gigantic lying as has been and is now being done with regard to the act of 1873, its origin, its nature and its consequences.

How did it happen that the act of 1873 did not attract more popular attention at the time? Simply because the dropping of the obsolete silver dollar from the coinage was regarded by everybody taking an interest in such matters as the mere recording of an accomplished fact, as a matter of course, just as much so as a law would have been providing that the old flintlock should no longer be used in the army. And how did it happen that a few years afterward such an uproar arose about it? The reason for that, too, was very simple. In 1873 the market value of silver, although already yielding, was still high. The silver in the silver dollar was worth \$1.02. The silver-mine owner did not care to take \$1.02 to the mint and get only \$1.00 back for it. He was then enthusiastic for gold. But a few years later silver had declined in market value considerably, and when the silver miner might have taken 90 cents' worth of silver to the mint and got for it \$1.00, he was enthusiastic for silver, and he grew

more and more enthusiastic the more silver declined in the market and the more profit free coinage would have given him. The silver-mine owner is no doubt a great and good man, but he is not the most disinterested of philanthropists. He knows on which side his bread is buttered. Finding the act of 1873 in his way, he discovered that act to have been a heinous crime, not against the mining millionaires, but against the common people. Another class of persons joined in the cry, namely, those who had worked for an inflation of our irredeemable paper money, who had opposed the resumption of specie payments and now favored the silver dollar, because the silver in it was worth in the market less than a gold dollar, and its coinage would therefore furnish what they called "cheap money." And then began that campaign of falsehood which in shamelessness of imposture has, within my knowledge, never had its equal.

Now mark what followed. Cowed by the uproarious outcry which was started by the silver miners and taken up by the "cheap money" men, Congress passed two laws, one in 1878, the other in 1890, in pursuance of which over 429,000,000 of silver dollars were added to our currency, more than fifty times as many dollars as had ever been coined before, besides a large addition to our subsidiary silver coins. Our paper money was largely increased, so that while in 1873, the year in which the American people were said to have been robbed of half their money—while in 1873, I say, we had \$774,000,000 of money in the United States, we had \$2,217,000,000 in 1895—nearly three times as much; and while in 1873 the circulation was \$18.04 per capita, it was \$22.96 per capita in 1895. Fifty times as many silver dollars, and many times more money of all kinds than this country had ever had in its most prosperous days—and yet, the price of silver in the market kept on falling, and the prices of

many commodities, agricultural staples included, continued in their declining tendency.

Now analyze this case. Upon what ground do the silver advocates assert that the so-called demonetization of silver depressed prices? According to their own reasoning, because there has not been sufficient money to sustain prices. Sustain what prices? Those prevailing before 1873. But there is now three times as much money as there was in 1873, and a much higher per capita circulation. Well, what becomes of their argument? Some of the silver philosophers have invented a more mysterious phrase—that prices have gone down because by the act of 1873 the “money of ultimate redemption” had been curtailed—only gold being available for this purpose. But according to the treasury statistics we had in 1873 only \$25,000,000 of coin, including subsidiary silver, in the country, and now we have much over \$600,000,000 of gold alone, or more than twenty-four times as much “money of ultimate redemption” as in 1873. And yet prices are low. The man whom such facts do not convince that the decline of prices cannot have been caused by any effect produced upon our currency by the act of 1873 must have a skull so thick that a trip hammer would not drive a sound conclusion through it.

But what is it, then, that has caused the decline of prices? I appeal to your common-sense. Do you think that when one man, aided by machinery, does as much productive work as formerly ten or more did, and when our modern means of transportation carry the product from the producer to the consumer with five times the speed, at one-fifth the cost, and when in the transmission of intelligence time is quite and cost almost annihilated, do you think that then the product of human labor should not in due proportion become cheaper? If it did not, then modern civilization would, in one of its most important

and beneficent functions, be a flat failure. For what is the inventive genius of the age that devotes itself to practical objects engaged in; what else than in devising and developing means and methods by which the things required by mankind for the sustenance and comfort of life be made better and more easily attainable; that is, cheaper?

The farmer in the United States welcomed the agricultural machinery which helps him in planting, raising and harvesting his crop. He welcomed the railroad, the steamboat, the low freights, the telegraph, which shortened the distance between his farm and the market, and the banking arrangements required for moving and selling his product. But as nearly all our farmers had the same encouragement, so it followed quite naturally that the wheat crop of this country increased from an annual average of 312,000,000 bushels between 1870 and 1880 to an annual average of 475,000,000 bushels between 1890 and 1895. But also foreign countries had the encouraging benefit. New wheat fields were opened in Russia and the Argentine Republic and elsewhere; and, according to Bradstreet's (a very competent authority), the wheat product of the world grew from 1889 to 1894 no less than 429,000,000 bushels, while the world's consumption is estimated to increase only 12,000,000 to 16,000,000 bushels annually. When the increase of the world's supply thus gains upon the increase of the world's demands is it a wonder that in the world's market, which rules the price for all exporting countries, prices should have declined? Is not this an infinitely more rational explanation of the decline in prices than to ascribe that decline to the so-called demonetization law of 1873, which practically demonetized nothing, but was actually followed by an increase of our currency, nearly trebling its volume, and making the per capita far, far higher than it ever had

been before, and higher than it is in any other country except one? You might as well ascribe our civil war to the great comet of 1811.

Permit me here a word on what, in my humble opinion, is the true source of the discontent so far as it is entertained by honest men. The new economic conditions somewhat suddenly created in our time by the vast improvements in the means and methods of production and transportation have surprised, puzzled and perplexed the minds of many well-meaning people. They became alarmed at the naturally and necessarily following decline of the prices of agricultural as well as industrial products and at the general tendency of profits toward a minimum. Some of them found it very hard to adapt their ways of thinking and doing to the new state of things. They disliked to see in all the change a natural evolution of permanent effect. They easily yielded to the impression that there must be something wrong at the bottom of it all, some conspiracy of wealth, some hocus-pocus with the money of the country, just as once every cattle disease was ascribed to witchcraft, and as even in this century in some places the appearance of cholera was attributed to a conspiracy of the Jews to poison the wells. Honest people in that state of mind fell an easy prey to the equally honest financial quack as well as to the dishonest demagogue. Thus they were readily persuaded that the so-called demonetization of silver was the true cause of their troubles, and that the free coinage of silver would be the true remedy, while thorough inquiry and calm reasoning would have convinced them that the true cause is the progress of civilization in production and transportation, and that the true remedy can be found only in the adaptation of our schemes of husbandry and our business methods to that progress. This is proved by actual experience. There are a great many prosperous farmers

to-day in spite of low prices. They are farming farmers. There are others who do not prosper. They are largely the political farmers. The reason is this: The successful farming farmers have been studying the most economical methods of production, the most profitable varieties of farm products and the changing opportunities offered by the market, while the political farmers have studied *Coin's Financial School* and the question how free coinage would give them double prices for what they would have raised if their financial studies had not absorbed so much of their time and attention.

Candid reflection will convince them that the remedy urged by the free-coinage men, being based upon a false diagnosis, will not only not cure but immensely aggravate the trouble complained of. It is a case of jumping from the frying-pan into the fire. The Bryan remedy demands a radical change of the basis of our monetary system. What is that system? The currency of the United States consists of gold coin, silver coin and five different kinds of paper money, these all redeemable in gold or in some roundabout way sustained by gold. Besides, there is the national bank currency, redeemable by the banks in greenbacks, the greenbacks then being redeemable in gold. It is true, nominally, various descriptions of our paper money, the greenbacks and the Treasury notes, are redeemable in "coin," meaning, literally, gold or silver, at the discretion of the Government, but practically they have always been held to be redeemable in gold if the holder presenting them for redemption so desired. And this construction has been substantially confirmed by the law of 1890. That law directed the purchase of 4,500,000 ounces of silver a month and the issue of Treasury notes therefor, such Treasury notes to be redeemable in gold or silver coin; and in connection therewith the law declared it to be "the established policy of the United States to

maintain the two metals at a parity with each other, upon the present legal ratio, or such ratio as may be provided by law."

Fix your minds upon these words. We wish the United States to be regarded as an honest and honorable nation. If so, then this declaration made through its Government must be regarded as an honest declaration. This declaration could honestly have but one meaning, namely, this: The Government said,

Here, I issue paper money to be redeemable in gold or silver coin at my discretion, but lest anybody be disturbed by doubt as to the mercantile value of one of these metals, I hereby solemnly declare it to be my established policy to maintain these two metals at a parity, that is, equal to the more valuable of the two. You can therefore take my paper money with full confidence in my honor and integrity.

I repeat, if ours is an honest and honorable Government, the declaration could not possibly have any other meaning. I therefore affirm and maintain that it constituted a clear and solemn pledge on the part of the United States to keep the silver dollar in its purchasing power as good as the gold dollar, and to do all things that might be necessary to that end. Whoever denies this meaning of the declaration pronounces the United States a cheat, a "confidence" concern, issuing promises to pay, under false pretenses.

How is the Government of the United States to make good that pledge? It would be an easy task, indeed, if the silver contained in the silver dollar were in the market, as merchandise, worth as much as the gold contained in the gold dollar. But, for reasons which I shall mention hereafter, the market value of silver has fallen about 50 per cent., so that the silver contained in the silver dollar can be bought in the market, as merchandise, for little more than 50 cents in gold. What is the problem con-

fronting the Government now? Some financial philosophers of the fiat persuasion say that when the Government put its stamp upon the silver dollar, and made it a legal-tender, it created in it a value as good as that of the gold dollar, and its duty is fulfilled, once and forever. Is this true?

Soon after the beginning of our civil war the Government issued the greenback. The greenback dollar was a bit of paper on which was printed the promise of the Government to pay the holder one dollar—meaning one dollar in gold coin, for nobody thought of anything else. It bore the Government stamp and was made a legal-tender for public and private dues, except duties on imports. At first, when there were but few greenbacks out, and it was hoped that the war would speedily be ended and the Government would soon be in condition to redeem the greenback, that greenback passed at par with gold, in spite of its not being receivable for duties on imports. But as the war continued and the quantity of greenbacks grew larger and larger, the public confidence as to the Government soon becoming able to redeem them was shaken, and the greenback, in spite of the Government stamp and its legal-tender qualities, fell in purchasing power compared with gold. Gold rose to a premium as against the greenback and went out of circulation. This gold premium rose and rose as the quantity of greenbacks out increased, and at the same time the period when the Government would be able to redeem them seemed farther removed.

But the civil war came to a happy ending, the issuing of greenbacks was stopped, the redemption act was passed, the Government gathered gold and the greenback rose to par with gold again. The stamp of the Government and the legal-tender quality had neither saved it from depreciation nor secured its return to par with gold. What

caused the depreciation was the prospect of an indefinite increase of the greenback promises to pay and the uncertainty as to the ability of the Government to meet its obligations. What caused the subsequent rise of the greenbacks to par with gold was the limiting of the greenback issues to a manageable quantity, the preparation made by the Government for redemption and the returned public confidence that the Government was able as well as willing to redeem its promises.

What is now the status of the silver dollar in this respect? The greenback dollar is an evidence of indebtedness on the part of the Government to the amount of just \$1.00—the bit of paper out of which the greenback is made being worth nothing. Under the pledge of the Government to keep the silver dollar to all intents and purposes on a parity with the gold dollar, the silver dollar is virtually an evidence of indebtedness on the part of the United States to an amount equal to the difference between the mercantile value of the metal in the silver dollar and in the gold dollar, that is to say, to the amount of 50 cents if the metal in the silver dollar can be bought at 50 cents. Notwithstanding this difference, the silver dollar will, like the greenback, pass in mercantile transactions as the equivalent of the gold dollar as long as there is public confidence in the ability and willingness of the Government to fulfil its pledge to "maintain the two metals at a parity." To fulfil this pledge it is necessary so to limit the circulation of silver dollars and of paper representing silver, for which the Government is responsible, and to keep so large a reserve of gold on hand, as to leave no reasonable doubt of the ability of the Government to meet its obligations.

We know from experience that when, as in 1893, such doubt arose, gold was withdrawn from the Treasury in large quantities, and the gold dollar was on the point

of rising to a premium—that is to say, the parity of the two metals was being disturbed. It could be, as it was, maintained only by stopping the increase of the silver circulation and by replenishing the gold reserve by means of bond sales. Had the Government neglected to take these necessary steps, had it permitted the parity of the two metals to be disturbed, it would have been false to its manifest duty, a duty which President Cleveland faithfully, courageously fulfilled. There stands, then, the National pledge to keep the purchasing power of the silver dollar within the United States equal to that of the gold dollar. Every Government policy disregarding that pledge or making its fulfilment impossible is a policy of downright repudiation, dishonoring the Republic.

What, then, is the policy of the Bryan democracy? It is expressed in its platform: "We demand the free and unlimited coinage of both silver and gold at the present legal ratio of 16 to 1, without waiting for the aid or consent of any other nation." And, secondly, "We are opposed to the issue of interest-bearing bonds of the United States in times of peace." What does the free coinage of silver mean? It means that any one, here or abroad, who has any silver of any kind may take it to the mints of the United States to be coined into dollars without charge, and that the silver dollars so coined shall be returned to him and shall be a legal-tender for all debts, public or private. And what does the ratio of 16 to 1 mean? It means that under the law sixteen ounces of silver shall be held to be worth one ounce of gold. But are sixteen ounces of silver to-day worth one ounce of gold in the markets of the world? Why, there is not a sane person in the United States or anywhere else who would to-day give one ounce of gold for sixteen ounces of silver, knowing that he can get more than thirty-one ounces of silver for one ounce of gold. What, then, would free silver coinage

mean if suddenly introduced to-day? It would mean that any one, American or foreigner, could at pleasure expand our silver currency and thereby increase our public obligation by taking to our mints silver bullion worth about 50 cents and getting back a silver dollar worth about twice as much in its debt-paying power.

This would, no doubt, be a profitable arrangement for those who have silver to take to the mint. Who are they? To judge from the talk of silver orators you might think that, if only free coinage were once established, every farmer would have his private silver mine in his back yard and every laborer a magic source of silver supply in his kitchen. Such delusions would soon vanish. It would turn out that the men who would have large quantities of silver bullion to be doubled in value are the rich mine owners, the silver kings, who belong to the heaviest capitalists in the country, and the bullion dealers, the great brokers, the big money-changers, here as well as in England and on the European continent—in short, what Populists usually call the “money power.” How large the rush of silver to our mints and the consequent addition to our silver coinage would be, I will not here conjecture. It is, indeed, certain that the inducement of any great profit would very soon disappear. But in any event there will be an indeterminable, indefinite expansion of our silver circulation in prospect, and I maintain that this indefinite prospect of expansion would utterly destroy the parity of the two metals.

It is true some of the free-coinage men reason “that free coinage would increase the demand so as to restore the old price.” Let us see. The act of 1873, as has been shown, did not curtail existing demand, for there had been no such demand in this country for many years. The demonetization of silver in the old world did curtail the demand, but it was far from being the only cause of the

fall in the price of silver. The price of silver began to decline in the market, at first slightly, two years before the demonetization took place. The cause was, then, the increase of supply. Between 1866 and 1870 the average annual production of silver in the world was 43,051,583 fine ounces. Between 1871 and 1875 it was 63,317,014 fine ounces, and it went on increasing until in 1895 it was 174,796,875 fine ounces, four times as much as the annual average had been thirty years before. And the rise in production would have been still greater had not the fall in price made the mining of some low-grade ores unprofitable.

Now I ask any sensible person whether against such an increase of production any product in the world could have maintained its price, even if the demand had remained the same. What, then, would the effect of free coinage in the United States be on the price of silver? It would probably produce at first an upward tendency. But as soon as the price goes up, silver production, greatly facilitated by constantly progressive reduction of its cost, will jump up too, and once more depress the price. We had a striking illustration of this after the passage of the law of 1890, which provided for the purchase of 54,000,000 ounces annually. At first the price of silver rose sharply, but soon it began to fall again, and fell lower than ever. Why? Because the production of silver rose from 124,000,-000 ounces in 1890 to 137,000,000 in 1891, to 153,000,000 in 1892, and to 165,000,000 in 1893. Can there be any doubt that, if free coinage caused any considerable rise in price, that price would be speedily pressed down again by an increased output of the mines? Why is it that such an enormous quantity of silver is produced at the present low price? Because at that low price silver mining on a large scale is still profitable. If it were not there would be none of it. It is therefore certain that free coinage

would not raise the price of silver to anything near the old figure, and that an ounce of gold would continue to buy far more than sixteen ounces of silver.

How, then, could under such circumstances the parity of the two metals be maintained with an indefinite increase of the silver circulation? It would be impossible, unless the gold reserve behind all our obligations were also indefinitely augmented? And how could that reserve be augmented? As it may appear, only by loans effected through the issue of bonds of the United States. But here the Bryan democracy steps in with its platform declaring, "We are opposed to the issuing of interest-bearing bonds of the United States in times of peace." Thus by making the increase of the silver circulation indefinite and at the same time stopping the only source from which the gold reserve can be replenished, the Bryan democracy will render the maintenance of the parity of the two metals utterly impossible. This is a clear repudiation of the solemn pledge contained in the law of 1890, with more acts of repudiation to follow.

Consider now what the immediate consequences would be if Mr. Bryan were elected President, with a Congress to match. Mr. Bryan would of course be anxious to have his free-coinage law enacted, but that could not be, even if he called an extra session of Congress, until some time in April or May, five or six months after the day of election. But as soon as on the 4th of November the results of the election were announced everybody would know that the parity of gold and silver would not be maintained. Even Mr. Cleveland would not be able to maintain it till the expiration of his term, for nobody would then buy bonds for gold, expecting them to be paid back in silver. Neither would the banks of the country, as they have recently done, come forward again to supply the Treasury with gold, for they would have to expect that the greenbacks they would

get for the gold would be redeemed in silver. And here permit me a word, by the way, about those banks. Some of the silver papers said that the banks in coming voluntarily to the rescue of the Government acted not from patriotism but from interest. If so, then let us thank God that we have financial institutions that consider it their interest to keep the Government solvent. Woe to the country if a majority of the people should find it in their interest to make the Government bankrupt! Well, even after Mr. Bryan's election the banks might be patriotic or prudent enough to come again to the rescue of the Government with their gold, did they not know that it would be absolutely useless. And why would it be useless? Because, it having been made certain by Mr. Bryan's election that the parity of gold and silver would not be maintained, there would be a rush upon the Treasury for the gold in it by persons holding greenbacks entitled to redemption, and the gold reserve would be exhausted in a twinkling.

Gold will instantly disappear from circulation to be hoarded or exported. Why will it disappear? Because every sensible person when making a payment will prefer to make it in the less valuable silver dollar and hold the more valuable gold dollar back for more profitable use. Gold will, therefore, quickly rise to a premium, and we shall be on the silver basis long before a free-coinage law can be enacted. What does it mean to be on the silver basis? The word "coin," wherever it appears in the law, will no longer mean gold, as it was so far understood, but silver alone. The greenback or Treasury note redeemable in "coin" will no longer be redeemable in gold, as heretofore, but only in silver. The United States bond, payable in coin—no matter whether gold was paid for it or whether it had been sold for the very purpose of buying gold for the Treasury—will be paid principal and interest in silver—

repudiation as flagrant as the world ever witnessed. Our daily transactions in buying and selling, in paying and receiving wages, will no longer be carried on upon the basis of the gold dollar worth 100 cents, but of the silver dollar worth 50 cents or thereabout—for the Government will no longer hold up the silver dollar to the value of the gold dollar. That is what the silver basis means. You can study in Mexico how it works.

Now, who will get that Treasury gold when, after Bryan's supposed election, the rush for it is made! Not the farmer, not the laboring man, not those whom the Populists usually call the people. They have no green-backs ready to present for redemption, and if they had they would hardly be quick enough about it. No, that Treasury gold will be promptly gotten hold of by the big bankers, by Wall Street men and by other persons called by the Populists the "money power," to be by them used as they think most profitable.

The quantity of gold vanishing from circulation will amount to about \$600,000,000, the disappearance of which will make a tremendous hole in the volume of our currency. Nearly one-third of it will be gone, and what remains will be reduced nearly one-half in purchasing power. But, says the silver man, there will be free silver coinage to fill the gap promptly with coined silver or silver certificates. Oh, no, my fellow-sufferers. The disappearance of gold will happen promptly after the election of Mr. Bryan, and there will not possibly be any free coinage of silver for at least six months, and it will require a great many more months to fill a gap of \$600,000,000.

What will happen meanwhile? The St. Louis *Globe-Democrat* reports Mr. Bryan to have said some time ago: "I think it [meaning the victory of the free-coinage movement] will cause a panic. But the country is in a deplorable condition, and it will take extreme measures

to restore it to a condition of prosperity." Whereupon the St. Louis paper pointedly remarks: "Evidently Mr. Bryan has heard of the doctor who always threw his patient into fits before administering any curative medicine." Just so.

How, then, would Mr. Bryan's "fit" work? The sudden disappearance of our gold from circulation would produce the most stringent contraction of the currency on record. Business men who owe money and at the same time have money due them will be forced to collect that money by every means at their disposal. Nobody will be inclined to lend out any money except upon extraordinary security. The banks will naturally consider it their duty to keep themselves strong, and therefore to call in loans and to restrict their discounts and advances to business men with the utmost caution. Business establishments, manufactories, mercantile houses, unable to get the money for meeting their obligations, will by the hundreds succumb to their embarrassments and tumble down like a row of bricks. Others will cautiously restrict their operations to the narrowest possible limit, and wage-earners by the thousands will lose their employment and be turned into the street.

No class of society will be spared the destructive consequences. Every frightened creditor, pressed by his own creditors, and apprehensive of a growing loss by every day's delay, will eagerly pounce upon his debtors.

The prompt settlement of every account will be peremptorily demanded. Our farmers who have mortgages on their property, and who have been told that free coinage will make things exceedingly easy for them, will have some unexpected experiences. Every mortgage debt that is due will be quickly called in. The mortgagor who tries to have his bond extended will find an unwilling ear. He who seeks to borrow money in order to replace the old

mortgage with a new one will be told that this is no time for loans, except, perhaps, upon exorbitant conditions. The mortgagor may find, too, that his bond is payable in gold coin, and he will have to buy the gold at the premium then ruling. Foreclosures will be the order of the day. The mortgagor who seeks shelter under the law's delay will at any rate further burden his property with the cost of legal proceedings. Everywhere anxiety, embarrassment, sacrifice, loss and distress, even before Mr. Bryan could ascend the Presidential chair.

Still there are some who under these circumstances will do a lively and prosperous business: the sheriff, the usurer and the moneyed man who has ready means to buy real estate or other goods for a song at forced sales. That part of the "money power" will lustily thrive on the misfortunes of the people.

But more. We are largely in debt to Europe—not as if Europe had forced us to borrow—but because we solicited Europe to lend us. Our merchants and bankers owe unsettled balances or accounts, and large amounts of our securities are held there—National, State and municipal bonds, bonds and stock of our railroads, street railways and industrial corporations, and even mortgages on city property or farms, placed there by loan companies. The European holders of such securities will be seriously alarmed at the prospects here, and our securities will promptly and indiscriminately be thrown upon the market for what they will bring. A violent decline of prices will be the consequence, of course, here as well as abroad. This will, indeed, in the first place affect those who deal in such securities. People who have borrowed money on their holdings will have to sacrifice them, because they cannot raise the money to protect them. There will, therefore, be a general and ruinous crash in the stock and bond market.

Our silver friends may say that this will not trouble them, and that the more the money-changers of Wall Street come to grief the better. Indeed if it were only the money-changers of Wall Street that suffered we might easily console ourselves. But the bonds of the United States, and of states and municipalities, and the bonds and stocks of our railroads, of street railways and of industrial corporations, are also held largely in this country, not merely by big capitalists, but by people of small means, farmers, wage-earners, who have invested their savings in them; and by savings banks, life insurance companies and trust funds, in which many millions of poor people are interested. Is their loss also a matter of indifference?

Again, our silver friends may say that if Europeans do not "trust silver," and in their fright throw away our securities at a heavy sacrifice, we can pick up those securities at a splendid bargain; that some of them will, after all, become good, and rise to high figures again, and that thus we shall make a heavy profit on them. This is true. But who will make that profit? Not the farmer, not the laborer in the workshop, not the toiling masses. No, it will be he whom our silver friends love to denounce as the great gold-bug, the rich operator, the very incarnation of the "money power." That class of men will make those profits and be more powerful than before. The catastrophe in Wall Street, caused by the election of Mr. Bryan, and the ruining of some Wall Street men, would not mean the destruction of what the Populist understands by Wall Street; it would mean some big fish swallowing some little fish, the big fish growing still bigger by the operation. It would not weaken, but more strongly concentrate the so-called "money power."

How can I foretell these things with so much assurance? Because they have already cast their shadows before. Do

you remember the crisis of 1893 when the silver basis was in sight?

And now again the mere apprehension of a possibility of Mr. Bryan's election and of the consequent slipping of our country upon the silver basis has already caused untold millions of our securities to be thrown upon the market in Europe as well as here. Scores of business orders are already recalled, a large number of manufacturing establishments have already stopped or restricted their operations, enterprise is already discouraged and nearly paralyzed. Many works of public utility by industrial or railroad companies have already been ordered off, thousands of workingmen are already thrown out of employment, gold is already being hoarded, capital is already being sent out of the country to be invested in Europe for safety. And why, all this? Not, as the silver men foolishly pretend, because the existing gold standard has made money scarce, for capital is lying idle in heaps, scores upon scores of millions, fairly yearning for safe employment. No; ask those concerned why all this happens, and with one voice they will tell you it is because they apprehend serious danger to every dollar ventured out through the change of our standard of value in prospect through the debasement of our currency threatened by the free-silver-coinage movement. And if these are the effects of a mere apprehension of a possibility, what would be the effect of the event itself? There is scarcely an imaginable limit to the destruction certain to be wrought by the business disturbance that Mr. Bryan's mere election would cause, even before his inauguration. After five or six months of such a deadly crisis, Mr. Bryan's extra session of Congress would begin and give us free coinage. Then as Mr. Bryan solemnly promised us in his great New York oration, free coinage will give us bimetallism, bimetallism will give us an abundance of money and all will be right.

Bimetallism? What is bimetallism? It is a monetary system in which the two metals circulate together for all the purposes of money on a parity with each other upon a fixed legal ratio, which in our case is 16 to 1. Evidently, to have bimetallism gold must be on hand as well as silver. As I have shown, between Mr. Bryan's supposed election and his extra session of Congress our gold will have run away from circulation. Part of it has been privately hoarded, and another, by far the larger part, has gone to Europe, where it finds profitable employment. Thus it turns out that Mr. Bryan's election will have served to possess the American and still more the European "money powers" of most of the gold which he needs here for his bimetallism. This is one of the troubles which the really sincere European bimetallists foresaw when they almost pathetically implored their less sincere American brothers not to think of the free coinage of silver in the United States alone, because it would drive almost all the gold to Europe and attract silver to America, which would make bimetallism impossible in Europe as well as here.

How will Mr. Bryan get the gold back from the "money power"? Evidently he must offer an inducement. What inducement? To be sure, the mints will be open to gold as well as silver. But who will offer gold bullion to have it coined into dollars for circulation when he can have silver dollars with the same legal-tender power at half the price? Only an idiot would do that. Of course gold will be offered only when the silver dollar is up again to the gold standard. There is the rub. But here Mr. Bryan steps in with a theory which is a curiosity in statesmanship. He said in his New York speech: "Any purchaser who stands ready to take the entire supply of any article at a certain price can prevent that article from falling below that price. So the Government can fix a

price for gold and silver by creating a demand greater than the supply." And again: "When a mint price is thus established it regulates the bullion price, because any person desiring coin may have the bullion converted into coin at that price, and any person desiring bullion can secure it by melting that coin."

What? Is this to mean that under free coinage the Government will purchase silver bullion and pay a certain fixed price for it? If so, then Mr. Bryan, the great free-coinage apostle, does not know what free coinage is. Let us remind him. It means that the owner of silver bullion may take it to the mint and have it coined and returned to him in coined pieces, so many silver dollars for so much weight of pure silver. It does not mean that the Government "stands ready to purchase the entire supply of silver at a certain price." The Government does not purchase a single ounce of it. It merely receives the bullion, stamps it and returns it. And as to fixing a price, as soon as the Government stops holding up the silver dollar to the gold standard, as it would with Mr. Bryan's election, the silver dollar, measured by its purchasing power, will be worth not a cent more than the market value of the silver contained in it. If the market value of that quantity is 50 cents in gold, and you present at the mint 50 cents' worth of bullion, you get back, not a gold dollar, but a silver dollar worth just 50 cents in gold. You might, instead of taking your bullion to the mint, sell it in the market for just the same amount of money. Indeed, bullion owners, unless they have some special reason for taking their bullion to the mint, will take it to the market and sell it there, as they very extensively do in all countries in which there is free silver coinage. Why should they not? Because if they have their bullion coined they get legal-tender dollars for it. If they sell it in the market they get there legal-tender

dollars likewise. It will, therefore, be a mere question of special convenience whether they take it to the mint or to the market. And in the market, according to all human reason and experience, its price will, temporary fluctuations notwithstanding, remain on the whole very near to the figure of the cost at which it can in large quantities be produced. Mr. Bryan's strange imaginings have, therefore, proved only that when he speaks of Government purchases of silver, and fixing prices and creating a demand greater than the supply, he simply does not know what free coinage is.

The theory that free silver coinage will make and keep the silver dollar equal in value to the gold dollar rests upon absolutely nothing but Mr. Bryan's incessantly expressed personal belief. Fixed belief is a happy state of the mind. One of the strongest cases of belief I ever met with was a man who inflexibly believed that he was the Pope of Rome and could, if he would, fetch down the moon. He was under treatment by a specialist for mental peculiarities.

Every sensible person, I trust, will now admit that free silver coinage in the United States alone will make bimetallism—the equal use of both gold and silver as money—utterly impossible, here as well as abroad. It will confirm Europe in gold monometallism and condemn us to silver monometallism—the exclusive use of silver as money, and of paper based upon silver. No doubt this is what the silver men are really aiming at.

Let us now consider how it will affect the various interests of the people. The first blessing we are promised will flow from free coinage is a general rise of prices. This means that the silver dollar will buy less than the gold dollar did, and this for the reason that it is no longer worth as much as the gold dollar. Evidently the promise of bimetallism, of silver rising to its old price on the one

hand, and the promise of higher prices owing to a less valuable silver dollar on the other hand, do not go together. The one or the other is a fraud. Of course the fraud is the promise of bimetallism. The rise of prices owing to the debasement of the dollar will begin at once as soon as gold departs, and we slip on the silver basis. Bread will be dearer; milk, coffee, sugar, tea, meat and vegetables will be dearer; clothes, shoes and hats will be dearer; rents, furniture, coal, kerosene—in short, every article the price of which can be raised by the seller.

High prices are a two-edged sword—handy to the seller but unpleasant to the buyer. They press, of course, hardest upon those who are compelled to buy most in proportion to their income or their earnings. And who are they? The poor people. What a rich family spends upon the actual necessities of life, the indispensable food, clothing and shelter, is very little compared with its income. Most of its expenditures are for things that are not necessities, and may be classed as luxuries, the purchasing of which may be suspended or postponed without hardship. But the poor family, the wage-earner's family, is obliged to spend a very large part of its income from day to day upon food, clothing, shelter, heat and light, that cannot be temporarily dispensed with without hardship. From a rise in the prices of necessities of life the poor people, therefore, suffer by far the most.

Here I touch one of the most insidious deceptions with which our free-coinage apostles seek to hoodwink the people. They speak of a class of "consumers" as if they were only a lot of rich people sitting in their fine houses and doing nothing but consume; and of a class of "producers," consisting of all the people engaged in work, especially manual work, doing nothing but produce. And they speak of high prices as if their effect were mainly to make those lazy, rich consumers pay more for

the things which the producers make and sell to them. This picture is an insidious lie. The number of people not engaged in any directly or indirectly productive work is, thank heaven, in this country, still very small. And not only they are consumers, but everybody is. Nay, more than that, the poorest laborer is, in proportion to his means, a much heavier consumer than the richest millionaire. And as to the blessing of high prices, they are a grinding hardship, not to the rich, but to the poor consumers, unless their earnings rise in full proportion to the rise in prices. Neither are rising prices a sign of rising business prosperity, except when the rise of prices springs from increasing consumption. It certainly is not when it is caused by a debasement of the purchasing power of the current money.

Make the practical application. Some time ago I read among the published utterances of various persons on the silver question the following from a street car conductor: "I am for Bryan and free silver," said he. "If he is elected, money will be plenty and circulate more, and then we'll get some of it." The poor fellow! Let us suppose, then, Mr. Bryan elected. We are happily on the silver basis. The dollar buys its 50 cents' worth of goods or thereabout. The wages of our street car conductor are, say, \$2.00 a day. His wife, poor woman, goes to the grocer and finds that everything she used to buy for 10 cents now costs 20. She plaintively remonstrates. "I cannot help that," says the grocer. "You pay me in silver, 50 cents on the dollar. I have to use this money in buying my stock, and need twice as many dollars as I did before. So my customers must pay twice as much or I must close my store." There is nothing more to be said. It is the same thing when she goes to the butcher, the baker, the shoemaker and so on. Our street car conductor finds that while he and his family could with

strict economy live on \$2.00 a day, they are fearfully pinched when the \$2.00 buys only as much as formerly \$1.00. He consults with his friends, and a committee of them apply to the president of the street railway for higher wages. "Higher wages?" says he. "I have been thinking that a reduction of wages will be necessary. For all our supplies and material we have now to pay \$2.00 where we formerly paid \$1.00. But we get only our 5 cents fare, which is really now  $2\frac{1}{2}$  cents. And, besides, our bonds are payable, principal and interest, in gold, and we have to buy that gold at the rate of \$2.00 in silver for one gold dollar. How are we to make both ends meet? I really do not know whether we can continue to pay you even \$2.00 a day." The committeemen growl and speak of striking. "Strike?" says the president. "Why, the streets are full of laboring men thrown out of work by the closing of shops since we are on the silver basis. There are thousands of them, men with families, who will jump at the chance of earning even less than \$2.00 a day." The committee look at one another. They know that it is all true. The beauty of higher prices on the silver basis begins to dawn upon them, and they withdraw, wiser but much sadder men; and the conductor's care-burdened wife asks him whether it was really a smart thing to vote for Bryan and plenty of money.

The same will happen to the hundreds of thousands of employees of the railroads in the United States. There is hardly one of those railroads that will not be prevented either by law or by other powerful influences from raising its passenger fares or freight rates to meet the depreciation of the money they receive, and 60 per cent. of their bonded indebtedness is contracted to be paid, principal and interest, in gold. Bankruptcy will stare them in the face, and even those of them that may manage to escape it, will hardly be able to make good to their employees

the damage they suffer through the depreciation of their wages through the silver dollar.

How stands the case of the wage-earners whose product can be raised in price proportionate to the debasement of the dollar? As the dollar falls in value the manufacturer or the merchant marks up his goods. The workingman or the clerk, finding himself hard pressed by the rise in price of the necessities of life, applies for a corresponding increase of wages. The head of the factory or the mercantile establishment admits that some increase is called for. "But," says he, "you are not the only person in trouble. The value of our money is fluctuating. We hardly know what it is to-day. We surely do not know what it will be next week. Profits are excessively close anyhow. We make a sale or a purchase to-day and think it is at a profit. To-morrow we may find that it was at a loss. We hardly venture to make a contract to be filled at a future time, because we can make no safe calculations. We can increase your wages a little, but not much. For that you will have to wait until things get more settled. Besides, this free silver coinage has thrown all business into dreadful confusion, and there are plenty of people out of employment who would do your work for less than you get now." And so the wage-earner has to be satisfied with a little increase of pay, and wait for more while the advanced prices of necessities prey upon him.

Is this mere conjecture? It is the experience of every country that has been cursed by a rise of prices through money of fluctuating value. I defy any one to show me in the whole history of the world a single exception. Did we not during our civil war witness it with our own eyes? In 1862, when our irredeemable paper currency had begun to depreciate, the average wages of labor rose only 3 per cent., while the average price rose 18; in 1863, when wages had risen  $10\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., average prices were 49 per cent.

higher; in 1864 wages had risen  $25\frac{3}{4}$  per cent., and prices  $90\frac{1}{2}$ ; in 1865 wages had advanced 43 per cent., and prices 117 above what wages and prices had been in gold in 1861. In other words, the laboring man's wages had lost in purchasing power more than 30 cents in every dollar. Every country laboring under similar conditions tells the same story. What reason in the world is there to assume that this universal rule will not operate in the case of free coinage?

And what have the apostles of free silver coinage to say to this? Hear Mr. Bryan himself in his famous New York oration: "While a gold standard raises the purchasing power of the dollar, it also makes it more difficult to obtain possession of the dollar—employment is less permanent, loss of work more probable, and reemployment less certain." Is that all? Yes, all. Does not Mr. Bryan know that under what was practically the gold standard we had in the fifties one of the most active and prosperous periods this country had ever seen? Does he not know that more recently, at the time of the return to specie payments, we had under the gold standard years of signal prosperity with all hands at work? And does he wish to learn what has been the trouble since and what is the trouble now? Let him ask the employers of labor, and with almost one voice they will tell him that not the existing gold standard, but the growing danger of its overthrow, that the growing aggressiveness of the free-coinage movement, filling the minds of men with anxious apprehensions as to dark future uncertainties, has served to paralyze that spirit of enterprise which sets the laboring men to work. Let him study the history of the crisis of 1893. Not the gold standard, but distrust of silver, destroyed the confidence that employs labor. This is the truth, and Mr. Bryan will in vain try to deny it.

I must confess, of all the deceptive appeals resorted to

by the silver orators, that addressed to the wage-earners seems to me the most heartless and damnable. And of all the instances of reckless credulity we witness, that of wage-earners who actually permit themselves to be persuaded that free silver coinage will be a blessing to them is the most incomprehensible and the saddest. There is something pathetic in their delusion. Of all things, human labor is the one that has during the last fifty years in this country largely and almost steadily risen in price. Average wages have nearly doubled since 1840 and have risen more than 60 per cent. since 1860. The steady rise has been owing partly to organization, in greater part to the larger average productiveness of human labor in connection with machinery—in one word, to the progress of civilization. As civilization has served to multiply and cheapen labor's products, it has at the same time served to enhance labor's earnings. It has thus secured to the laboring man, especially in this Republic, a double advantage—a greater number of dollars by way of wages, and for every dollar more of the things which the laboring man has to buy for the necessities and enjoyments of himself and his family.

This is one of the greatest achievements of our age, at which every true friend of humanity will heartily rejoice, but which more than all others the workingman himself should appreciate. That the workingmen should be called upon, by the exercise of their right as voters, to aid in despoiling themselves of this combined blessing, looks like a satanic mockery. And when we see pretended labor leaders join the silver mine millionaires, the silver politicians and the nebulous silver philosophers in an effort to seduce the workingmen into an act of self-destruction so supremely foolish, there is good reason for warning these of treason in their camp. If there is anybody in the wide world who should fight to the last gasp for a money of

true value, that does not lie to him, and who should curse and spurn as his worst enemy the demagogue seeking to beguile him with deceitful currency juggles, it is the man who earns his bread by the sweat of his brow. This is emphatically the wage-earner's battle. Alas for him if he should desert his own cause!

The free-coinage men profess especial solicitude for those whom they call "the debtor class." Who are the debtor class? Our silver friends speak as if as a rule the rich people were creditors and the poor were debtors. Is this correct? In my household I am the debtor to the cook and the chambermaid and the washerwoman two or three weeks in the month, and they are my creditors. Nor are they likely to be debtors to anybody else, while I may be, for they have little if any credit, while I, perhaps, have some. I am, therefore, the only debtor in my house. The relations between the large employer of labor and the employees are substantially the same. Ordinarily the employer, the rich man, is apt to be the only debtor among them. The employees are, as a rule, only creditors, and as they lay up savings, they are apt to become creditors in a larger sense. They deposit their money in savings banks or invest it in building associations, in mutual benefit societies, in loan companies or in life insurance policies, and become capitalists in a small way. The amount deposited by the people of small means in the savings banks of the United States is at present something over \$1,800,000,000, that invested in building associations about \$800,000,000, in mutual benefit societies \$365,000,000, and in life insurance many hundred millions more.

The number of such creditors belonging to what our silver friends often call "the toiling masses" is therefore very large. Together with their dependents it may, for aught we know, amount to fifteen or twenty millions. Who are the debtors of these creditors? The savings

banks had, according to the reports of 1894, loaned out about one-half of the money deposited with them on real estate mortgages, and invested the other half in United States bonds, state, county and municipal bonds, and railroad and other bonds and stocks. The investments of the life insurance companies were about proportionately the same. The investments in real estate mortgages are always preferably in large amounts, on property belonging to comparatively wealthy persons, or to business corporations. Thus the debtors to these creditors belonging to the toiling masses are the United States, states and municipalities, railroad and other corporations, and persons very much richer than the creditors. Here we have, then, rich debtors owing to many millions of poor creditors thousands of millions of dollars.

The silver orators pretend that they have the toiling masses greatly at heart and that free coinage is to be introduced mainly for their benefit. How do they take care of the toiling masses in this case? By bringing us down upon the silver basis they simply cut down the thousands of millions of invested savings of poor people to about 50 cents on the dollar. And for whose benefit is this done? For the benefit of the debtors of these poor people who will gain about 50 cents on the dollar. And who are they? Aside from the United States, and the states and municipalities, those debtors are railroad and other corporations and more or less rich men, whom our silver friends profess to abhor very much as belonging to the "money power." Thus will the silver standard bleed the poor creditor for the benefit of the rich debtor. May not the toiling masses pray heaven to deliver them of the free coinage friends?

And what have these friends to say in their own defense? I will again let Mr. Bryan's New York oration speak. He says, first with regard to the insurance companies: "Since

the total premiums received exceed the total losses paid, a rising standard must be of more benefit to the companies than to the policyholders." How wise! And that the companies may not have this benefit, he proposes by the silver standard to strip the policies of the policyholders of nearly half their value! But does not Mr. Bryan know that most of these companies are mutual insurances, and that what benefits or injures the companies therefore benefits or injures the policyholders?

As to the savings bank depositors he says: "Under a gold standard there is increasing danger that the savings bank depositors will lose their deposits because of the inability of the banks to collect their assets." And to avert this danger, Mr. Bryan advises a policy which would, by the introduction of the silver standard, at once cut down the value of those assets to 50 cents on the dollar. He further says: "If the gold standard is to continue indefinitely the depositors in savings banks may be compelled to withdraw their deposits in order to pay living expenses." Indeed!

It is a remarkable fact that since 1873, the year of the great crime, until 1895, during the period when we had to suffer all the calamities of the gold standard, the deposits in savings banks have, instead of being withdrawn for living expenses, increased, positively increased, much over \$1,000,000,000. And they would have increased still more had not some depositors withdrawn their deposits, not for living expenses, but to send them to Europe for safety, out of the way of Mr. Bryan and other friends of the toiling masses. They will, no doubt, bring that money back as soon as Mr. Bryan is beaten.

Let us go on. Almost every man in active business is a debtor and a creditor at the same time—every merchant, every manufacturer—a creditor to his customers and a debtor to those from whom he buys. Let Mr. Bryan bring on his panic, and hundreds, if not thousands of them,

although ever so solvent, under ordinary circumstances, will break, because they cannot pay what they owe, being unable to collect what is due them.

Every bank, while being a creditor to its borrowers, is a debtor to its depositors. I say this with great deference to Mr. Bryan, for he has made a profound discovery in economic science. He says in his New York speech: "It is sometimes asserted by our opponents that a bank belongs to the debtor class, but this is not true of any solvent bank. Every statement published by a solvent bank shows that the assets exceed the liabilities." According to Mr. Bryan, then, one must be a bankrupt in order to be a debtor. We always thought that he is a debtor who owes, whether he can pay or not, and that he is a bankrupt who owes more than he has the means to pay. But the new Bryanese doctrine changes all this. The man who owes, but can pay his debts, is not a debtor, and therefore owes nothing. This will be welcome news to many of his supporters.

But although Mr. Bryan is anxious to exclude the banks from his favorite class of debtors, he is not without solicitude for their welfare. He is evidently haunted by the singular idea that the gold dollar will indefinitely go on appreciating, and that prices will indefinitely go on falling, and that we shall never touch bottom. He reasons that if the gold standard be maintained and prices continue falling, "the bank is apt to lose more of bad debts than it can gain by the increase of the purchasing power of its capital and surplus." And to avert this trouble, which the bankers themselves almost unanimously refuse to see, Mr. Bryan proposes to make short work of them by a policy which will result in the establishment of the silver standard and make all the debts due to the banks payable in 50-cent dollars.

If he had the slightest conception of the nature of the

banking business and of its history, and especially of its recent experiences, he would know that the banks are not imperiled by the maintenance of the existing standard, but have been and will be imperiled by the danger of a debasement of that standard, for the very simple reason that such a danger causes a feeling of insecurity among depositors, a great many of whom will be anxious to withdraw their deposits and to get hold of their money before it depreciates, thus bringing on the greatest danger to a bank—a depositors' run. This is substantially what threatened in 1893, when a grave doubt arose in the public mind whether the Government would be able to maintain the gold standard. We were then within a hair's breadth of a very widespread bankruptcy of the banks, and only the wisest management and the utmost efforts of the clearing-houses prevented it. Nothing will be more apt to bring on such a catastrophe than Mr. Bryan's election; and he will then have the satisfaction of welcoming a goodly number of insolvent banks in the fold of the bankrupts whom he considers the only debtors worthy of the name.

Among the farmers of the West and South there seems to be an impression that the embarrassment of the banks will be of small concern to them. I would advise them well to consider how much the sale of their staple products depends upon the ability of the banks to advance the money for moving the crops. They would do well to remember 1893, when, owing to the crisis of that year, the banking machinery did not work, when the large grain storehouses were suddenly obliged to sell out, and grain prices dropped like lead in water. Do the farmers want to have that experience repeated in a tenfold aggravated form? Then they have only to do that which always disturbs the functions of the banking system more disastrously than anything else—threaten with debasement the existing standard of value. Mr. Bryan's election

would do that work so thoroughly that the paralyzing effects would keenly be felt on every farm in the land.

But we are told that the Bryan panic cannot last forever; that finally the business of the country will adjust itself to the silver basis; that then unrest will cease and that confidence and prosperity will return. No, the unrest will not cease. For with the establishment of the silver basis will come the disappointment of those who brought it on.

It will be found that whoever wants silver dollars must either sell something for them or work for them or borrow them, or get them by begging, or steal them; that whoever wants to borrow them must give satisfactory security, just as it was with gold dollars before, and that everybody will want more silver dollars than he wanted gold dollars to do the same business, because they will buy less. It will be found that the silver standard will not lower the rate of interest, but raise it, for the lender will make provisions for a further depreciation of the silver money. It will be found that the West and South, in spite of the bombastic speeches now made, will need Eastern or European capital for the more rapid development of their resources just as much as before; that, while capital is lying idle in heaps, the South and West cannot get it as before, because the free-coinage business will have ruined their credit and frightened capital away by a sense of insecurity. It will be found that if the South and West in their eager desire to get that capital would gladly make gold contracts for it, they will, according to the Chicago platform, be prevented from that, too, by a Bryanese law prohibiting gold contracts, as Mr. Bryan himself expresses it, "in the interest of public policy," and that thus the South and West will be stripped of the only means to get the capital they so sorely need. It will, in short, be found that the disastrous consequences of the free-coinage policy

will fall upon no part of the country with such crushing weight as upon the South and West.

Well, and the upshot of it all? Those who now cry out that there must be more and cheaper money, because there is not gold enough, will then cry out that there must be more and cheaper money because there is not silver enough. And then it will be argued that, inasmuch as there must be more money, more money, more money, just as well as we can make 50 cents' worth of silver a dollar, we can make a worthless bit of paper a dollar, and, that, after all, the regular unadulterated fiat dollar without redemption is the true money of the people, the only money that costs nothing, the coinage of which will be truly free, independent and unlimited, the only money that can be made in indefinite quantities until everybody has enough. Madness? Yes. But there are logic and method in this madness. The difference between making 50 cents' worth of silver a dollar and making a bit of paper a dollar is not a difference in kind, but only in degree. After Bryan, Tillman.

However, the ultimate result is not at all uncertain. After a period of infinite confusion, disaster, humiliation, suffering and misery the American people will at last regain sanity of mind, and arrive again at some very simple conclusions: That if you call a peck a bushel, you will have more bushels, but not more grain; if you call a foot a yard, you will have more yards, but not more cloth; if you call a square rod an acre, you will have more acres, but not more land; and if you call 50 cents, or 1 cent, or a bit of paper, a dollar, you will have more dollars, but not more wealth—indeed, a great deal less chance for wealth, for you will have far less credit, because far less honesty. We shall then have learned again that the wit of man cannot, although insanity tries very hard, invent an economic system under which everything you have to sell

will be dear, and everything you have to buy will be cheap. And, having got hold of these very simple truths, the American people will then in sackcloth and ashes repent of this insane free-coinage debauch. They will then recognize how wise the great civilized nations of Europe were in adopting the only money in our days capable of being the money of the world's commerce as their own money.

We shall then be sufficiently cured of prejudice to observe that under that monetary system those nations have on the whole prospered, notwithstanding serious evils and drawbacks under which we do not labor, and that the rate of interest is lowest where the gold standard has existed longest. We shall then understand that it is a good thing to have the necessities of life in plenty and cheap; to have wages rising and payable in money that does not deceive; to have capital inspired with confidence in the value of money, and, therefore, easier to go out in investment or enterprise. We shall then readily acknowledge how foolish we were from the very beginning of our silver experiments in throwing away our gold for silver, by which we lost confidence, credit and prosperity. Chastened by adversity, we shall then no longer be tempted to repeat such nonsense; but with laborious and painful effort we shall work our way back to that money standard which will insure stability and confidence at home and enable us to trade with the nations of the world on equal terms.

And at what price will this ultimate result be gained in the case of Mr. Bryan's election? At the price of the most violent and destructive crisis on record, such a crisis as can only be brought on by a sudden subversion of the standard of values and of the whole basis of credit. At the price of indefinite business paralysis and distress. At the price of the ruthless spoliation of the savings ac-

cumulated by the toiling masses. At the price of robbing our war veterans of half the value of their pensions. At the price of greatly increasing the number of unemployed by discouraging enterprise, and of curtailing the value of wages of those remaining at work. At the price of the respect of the world for our intelligence and practical sense. And worse, far worse than all this, at the price of something that has never been forfeited since this Republic was born—at the price of the greatest good a nation can possess, and for the preservation of which it should shed its last drop of blood—at the price of our National honor. For this Nation, so rich and powerful, would stand before the world as a wanton, reckless repudiator, as nothing better than a fraudulent bankrupt. This will be the cost of the experiment. Are you willing to pay this price?

It is not my habit to boast of a warm heart for the poor and suffering. But my sympathy is no less sincere because I do not carry my love and solicitude for the common people constantly at my tongue's end. If there be those who are satisfied with everything that exists, I am not one of them. There are few, if any, who abhor that which may properly be called plutocracy, or detest the arrogance of wealth more heartily than I do. I know, also, that the industrial developments of our time have brought hardship to some classes of people which only the more sagacious, active and energetic among them have been able to counterbalance profitably with its benefits. There are laws and practices which, had I the power, I would promptly change, in the interest of common justice and equity. But because I am so minded, I must oppose to the utmost a policy which, I am convinced, will immeasurably aggravate existing evils. I also know full well that a large majority of those who support free coinage are honest and well-meaning citizens, wishing to do right. But because I know this my blood stirs with indignation

when I see the unscrupulous efforts made to goad them on to their destruction. I have witnessed in my long life ten Presidential campaigns, but never one in which the appeals to prejudice, passion and cupidity were so reckless and the speculation upon assumed popular ignorance or rascality so audacious and wicked. Some of the silver orators actually speak as if they believed the American people to be born fools or knaves, or both.

Look at this. To frighten the innocent with the terror of the unknown, a dreadful picture is painted of the "money power" of Wall Street, and worse still, the money power of England, as able, ready and eager to "corner" the gold of the world, and thus to impoverish and enslave the people. Well, if the money power were able and eager to corner the gold of the world, would free silver coinage in the United States prevent it? I have shown that by driving our gold straight into the jaws of the money power, free silver coinage would help that money power in cornering gold. According to the silver authorities there are in the world about \$4,000,000,000 of silver and about \$4,000,000,000 of gold in circulation. But the silver dollars are the only 50-cent dollars. Now if the money power, with the help of free silver coinage, corners all the gold, it will be able to buy up all the silver and have nearly \$2,000,000,000 in gold over. Will it not?

You may say that the money power cannot get hold of the silver, because the silver, in the shape of coin or of paper based upon it, will be in general use as money. But is not, under the gold standard, the gold, in the shape of coin or paper based upon it, in the same general use as money? And if for this reason silver cannot be cornered, will it not for the same reason be impossible to corner gold? This may sound like a huge joke, and so it is. But does it not show that if those terrible things could be done at all, they could be done with silver just as well as

with gold? And if it were more difficult with bimetallism —have I not conclusively shown that free silver coinage here would make bimetallism utterly impossible, if it were ever so feasible otherwise?

But Mr. Bryan has in this line a bugbear all his own. In his New York speech, that great deliverance of his statesmanship, he said: "A gold standard encourages the hoarding of money, because money is rising; it also discourages enterprise and paralyzes industry." This is unique. According to Mr. Bryan, the "gold-bug" will, under the gold standard, hoard his money, and sit on it, because gold is rising in value; and so long as gold does not stop rising, the gold-bug will not stop sitting on it. Why does Mr. Bryan consider the "gold-bug" so stupid? Suppose Mr. Bryan were correct in saying that gold money is rising in value, why should not then the "gold-bug," instead of sitting on his gold, lend it out on safe, rock-ribbed security at several per cent. more! He would be sure, under the gold standard, of getting his money back in unimpaired value. Can he not thus safely increase his gain? Does not Mr. Bryan think the gold-bug will be smart enough to see that? Does not Mr. Bryan know that good money is hoarded only when, if let out, it is in danger of returning in the shape of less valuable money, and that then money is scarce? Does he not know that gold goes out freely and encouragingly into the business of the country when the owner is assured, as the gold standard would assure him, that it will come back in a money equally valuable, and that then money is apt to be plenty? If Mr. Bryan does not know that, every intelligent grocery clerk can tell him.

Mr. Bryan is certainly a remarkable man, being still so young. I wonder how he found time to accumulate so enormous a store of misinformation, and to develop so mature an incapacity for understanding this subject. I

say this in all seriousness, compelled by my respect for the exalted office to which Mr. Bryan aspires. Considering that for years the discussion of these questions has been his only business, and that he has remained so entirely unacquainted with the most rudimentary of economic principles and with the most conspicuous of business experience, we must conclude that he not only does not know, but is unable to learn. Imagine such ignorance coupled with such assurance clothed with great power! Imagine him, as President of the United States, parading such childish absurdities in his messages! It would make us the laughing-stock of the world, and every self-respecting American would hang his head in shame.

But more. Resorting to that cheapest of all hackneyed tricks of demagogery, the excitement of American feeling against England in particular and Europe in general, they tell us that, like a "conquered race," we are paying "tribute" to the foreigner. What has Europe done to "subjugate" us? Nothing, absolutely nothing, but lend us money. She did not force her money upon us, but lent it when we asked for it and we were glad to receive it. She lent us money when we needed it to maintain the Union and were in dire distress. She lent us money when we wished it to develop the resources of our new country, and now what does Europe ask for? Nothing but what we promised to pay when we took what she lent. Where is the tribute? It is said that Europe largely profited on the loans. On the war bonds, yes, and, having been helped in need, we did not grudge it. But as for the rest, is it not true also that untold millions of European money have been sunk in American enterprises that failed? Tribute indeed! This word can be prompted only by that mean spirit which cajoles the lender as a friend when his money is asked for, and treats him as an enemy and

outlaw when he asks for his dues. Is this the spirit of the American people?

They seek to excite the people of the West against the East, because, as Mr. Bryan said in the Chicago Convention, the East injuriously interferes with the business of the West. Aye, the East has interfered with Western business, but how? In helping to build Western railroads, to dig Western canals, to set up Western telegraphs, to establish Western factories, to build up Western towns, to move Western crops, to allay Western distress caused by fire, flood or drought. Has this served to enrich the East? Yes, and so it has enriched the West. Their wealth and greatness have been mutually built up by the harmonious coöperation of their brawn and brain and money, just as the blood of the East and the West mingled on the common battlefields of the Republic. And now comes this young man, as if we had not suffered enough from sectional strife, and talks of "enemy's country!"

They seek to excite what they call "the poor" against what they call "the rich"—in this land of great opportunities for all, where, now as ever, so many of the poor of yesterday are among the rich of to-day, and so many of the rich of to-day may be among the poor of to-morrow. Their candidate for the Presidency presented a characteristic spectacle when some time ago he was kindly shown over the farm of the governor of New York, who is himself an example of the poor country boy risen by able and honest effort to affluence and distinction; and when that candidate then straightway in a public speech drew invidious comparisons between the elegant houses on the Hudson and the poor cabins in the West—teaching not the true American lesson of success won by honest industry, thrift and enterprise, but the lesson that those who have succeeded less should hate and fight those who

have succeeded more—a lesson utterly un-American, unpatriotic and abominable!

They tell the farmer—most cruel deception!—that he must and will be made independent of the world abroad, while year after year from \$500,000,000 to \$700,000,000 worth of our agricultural products must seek the foreign market to find purchasers, and while nothing will hurt the farmer more than a serious impairment of the great home market by a business crisis.

They proclaim themselves the special champions of the toiling masses, while their policy would rob the laboring man of half of his savings, and grievously curtail the value of his wages. Am I asked, if the silver standard will relatively reduce wages, why so many employers of labor are opposed to it? The reason is obvious, because, aside from all considerations of sentiment, the prudent employers of labor know that they would lose vastly more through the disastrous disturbance of business sure to be caused by a free-coinage victory than they could possibly gain by the cheapening of labor. And would not the toiling masses suffer most from that disturbance of business? He is a traitor to the laboring man who tells him that he can profit by the ruin of his employer.

They pretend to be enemies of plutocracy, and advocate a policy which, if I were a selfish, unscrupulous money shark, I should welcome as my finest opportunity. Am I asked, if a free coinage victory would play into the hands of the money power, why the bankers and capitalists are generally against it? The answer is simple. No doubt there are those among the rich of the country who will not scruple at any means to increase their wealth, who will crush their competitors with a rude and lawless hand, and take any advantage of the embarrassment of the unfortunate. They are the men who will thrive most in general ruin. But the vast majority of our bankers and business

potentates are honorable men, who are proud of their good name, who treat honestly and fairly those with whom they deal; who do not see their interest in the ruin of their customers, and who know that their own prosperity is safest in the prosperity of all. Therefore they are against free coinage. It is not these, but the worst element of the "money power," that free coinage will serve. The real pitiless bloodsuckers in the West and South are their own village usurers, their own sharpers around the courthouses, not the legitimate banker or Eastern capitalist.

The agitators denounce the gold standard as the device of monarchs and aristocrats, while the history of the world teaches that from time immemorial it was a favorite trick of unscrupulous despots to fleece their subjects by debasing the coin of the realm, and that those who out of the monetary confusion evolved fixed standards of values and money that would not cheat have always been ranked among the most meritorious benefactors of mankind, and especially of the poor and weak.

They seek to inflame the vanity of the American people by telling them that we are great and strong enough to maintain any monetary system we like, and to keep up the value of our money without regard to all the world abroad—while our own history teaches us that a century ago the American people were strong enough to shake off the yoke of Great Britain, but not strong enough to save their continental money from declining in value to nothing; that in recent times the American people were strong enough to subdue a gigantic rebellion, but not strong enough to keep an indefinite issue of greenbacks at par, and that this Republic may be able to conquer the world, but it will not be able to make twice two five, or to make itself richer by watering its currency.

They speak of the silver dollar as the money of the Constitution, while they must know that there is not one

single word in the Constitution which, honestly interpreted, could justify such a claim.

They invoke for their cause the names of Jefferson and Jackson, while every reader of history knows that Jefferson and Jackson would have stood aghast at their wild scheme of creating by law a false value, and would have kicked out of their presence as a public nuisance any one seriously advocating it.

Such things the free coinage agitators tell the American people, assuming them to be without intelligence. Far worse are the appeals they address to them, assuming them to be without moral sense.

They have been teaching the people that because the prices of wheat and other things have fallen about one-half since the so-called demonetization year, 1873,—I have shown why those prices have fallen,—it is not equitable that debtors should be held to pay more than half the amount of their debts in gold, that they should be released in correspondence with the decline of prices, and that it would therefore be right to reduce by free silver coinage the value of the debt-paying money by one-half.

If this were right as a general principle, how would it apply to our debts? Of our Government bonds, there are very few that do not bear date long after 1873. Many of them were sold for the express purpose of bringing gold into the Treasury. Our corporation bonds, are, as a rule, also quite young. But all these obligations are a mere trifle compared with the immense sums of debt contracted in the daily transactions of business. The average life of a real estate mortgage is only five years. But probably nine-tenths of all our debts are those between firm and firm or between man and man in the form of notes, bills of exchange, wage bills and open accounts, the amount of which is incalculable. How old are these? From one hour to six months. How would the principle apply to

them? Would there be any equity, or any shadow, or pretense, or quibble of equity in scaling them down 50 per cent. by a sudden drop from the gold to the silver basis?

Subject the principle itself to a simple test. When I contract a debt I owe what it is mutually understood that I am to pay. Our whole business life and social fabric, all human intercourse, rests upon the binding force of such understandings. Unless it be expressly understood, has the debtor the slightest right or reason to demand that the creditor shall be satisfied with a less amount in payment if wheat or cotton or something else had meanwhile declined in price? If so, would not the creditor also have the right to demand that the debtor should pay more in proportion if wheat or cotton or something else meanwhile had risen in price? If neither of them had thought of proposing or of accepting so adventurous a contract, how can such claims be justified if based upon a mere secret mental reservation or an arbitrary after-thought? Is it not monstrous that such an assumption should be taken as a warrant for the reduction at one sweep of all debts by a debasement of the standard of value?

You recognize such a principle and carry it into general practice, and there will be the end of all confidence between man and man, the cessation of all credit and trust, the utter subversion of the moral rules governing human intercourse, an unbridled reign of fraudulent pretense and unscrupulous greed—in one word, the overthrow of civilized life.

And yet he who has watched the free coinage agitation knows that just this appeal to debtors is one of its main allurements. Listen to their speeches, read their literature, and you meet ever recurring, now in soft-spoken circumlocution, now in sly suggestion, now in the language

of brazen cynicism, the promise that free coinage will enable the debtor to get rid of his obligations by paying only a part of them. It is a scheme of wanton repudiation of private as well as public debts, not as if we could not pay them in full, but because we would prefer not to pay in full—the practice resorted to by the fraudulent bankrupt—and this sanctioned by law, as a part of our National policy.

Fellow-citizens, think this out. It is a grave matter; a matter of vital import to the existence of this Nation. The father who teaches such moral principles to his children educates them for fraud, dishonor and the penitentiary. The public men who teach such moral principles to the people educate the people for the contempt and abhorrence of mankind. The nation that accepts such moral principles cannot live. It will rot to death in the loathsome stew of its own corruption. If the nation accepting such moral principles be this Republic, it will deal a blow to the credit of democratic institutions from which the cause of free government will not recover for centuries.

But thank God! The American people will never accept such moral principles. The American people will, before election day arrives, have fully discovered what all this means. They will indignantly repel the unspeakable insult offered to them by the politicians who have dared to ask for the votes of honest men upon the offer of such a bait. They will know how to resent the deep disgrace inflicted upon the Nation, in the eyes of the whole world, by those Americans who exhibited their own belief that the American people were capable of taking such a bait.

Mr. Bryan has a taste for Scriptural illustration. He will remember how Christ was taken up on a high mountain, and promised all the glories of the world if he would fall down and worship the devil. He will also remember

what Christ answered. So the tempter now takes the American people up the mountain and says, "I will take from you half of your debts if you will worship me." But then brave old Uncle Sam rises up in all his dignity, manly pride and honest wrath, and speaks in thunder tones: "Get thee behind me, Satan. For it is written that thou shalt worship only the God of truth, honor and righteousness, and Him alone shalt thou serve."

This will be the voice of the American people on the third of November. And the Stars and Stripes will continue to wave undefiled, honorable and honored among the banners of mankind.

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FROM PRESIDENT CLEVELAND

EXECUTIVE MANSION,  
WASHINGTON, Nov. 6, 1896.

Your note of yesterday gratified me exceedingly, and I cannot refrain from letting you know this, and at the same time thanking you for your efforts in the cause of national honor and sound finance.

The manner in which the best Democrats turned away from mere partisanship to serve their country last Tuesday makes me feel that there is much patriotism abroad in the land—even among zealous politicians.

The path of official duty has sometimes been very rough, though scarcely ever hard to see.

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TO MARCUS A. HANNA

16 EAST 64TH ST., NEW YORK, Nov. 12, 1896.

Yesterday I learned from Mr. Isaac N. Seligman, to my utter dismay, that he had spoken to you of the desirability of my being in Mr. McKinley's Cabinet. I hasten to say to you—although I hope it is hardly necessary to do so—

that this was not only without my knowledge, but that, had I had the least suspicion of Mr. Seligman's intention to do so, I should have put in a peremptory veto. The fact is, I not only do not entertain any such desire, but, on the contrary, were my opinion asked about it, I would distinctly advise against anything of the kind. I think it would be a public misfortune if any prominent sound-money Democrat or Independent, by accepting any place liable to be looked upon as a reward for services rendered, gave the public the slightest reason for thinking that the motives impelling those classes of citizens to support Mr. McKinley for the Presidency had been other than personally disinterested and purely patriotic. Moreover, I think that to compose a Cabinet of heterogeneous elements is as a matter of policy very questionable. Experience speaks rather against it. What might properly be done in case of an entire realignment of political parties, I will not say. But such is not our present situation.

I trust you will permit me to speak to you confidentially about the manner in which, in my humble opinion, Mr. McKinley might show his appreciation of the services rendered by his allies in the late election. It strikes me that he might do so by giving friendly consideration to their views when shaping the policy of his Administration, and, secondly, by retaining in office, or by reappointing, a number of especially efficient and meritorious officers now in the National service, as Mr. Cleveland did in the case of the postmaster of New York City. This would be in the line of the principles of civil service reform which have always found in Mr. McKinley a faithful and efficient defender in Congress. I am sure such action would be very highly appreciated by the enlightened opinion of the country and greatly strengthen him in public confidence.

Pardon this intrusion and believe me,

Very sincerely yours.

WILLIAM STEINWAY<sup>1</sup>

Honored friends and mourners, mourners are we all. I can say but a few words to you, but they come from a troubled heart. It is a great sorrow that gathers us about this coffin. We stand here bowed by a sense of loss that touches this city, the Nation, the world, not in a general way, but one that goes straight to the heart of each individual personally. Whoever knew him cannot but have the feeling that in this dead man he has lost a brother. Certain it is that to many who watched his fruitful career from afar off, it has had a great meaning.

As a simple workman William Steinway began his life's activity. Through unwearying labor, honest, daring, many-sided, thoughtful, he climbed round by round till the name of the great master-manufacturer resounded through all the civilized nations of the earth, and the noblest societies of art and the mightiest princes of the world decorated him with their distinguished honors. But with all the greatness of his success he remained always the simple, honest, restless workman—the true, the ideal knight of labor in the broadest, noblest sense. As a patron of art and of the uplifting pleasures art satisfies, he was a power. Who can measure the gratitude our country owes to him for his furtherance of the true love of art and the ennobled æsthetic taste which it was his searching constant care to serve by securing the best of talent, by holding out help to struggling genius, and by exciting our living interest in such things? He was a pattern of American citizenship, the embodiment of unselfish, efficient public spirit. With what force of word and deed has he come forward when the life of the Republic needed a defense, or the honor of the Government or the

<sup>1</sup> Remarks at his funeral in Liederkranz Hall, New York City, Dec. 2, 1896.

credit of the Nation was to be maintained! How ready, disinterested, self-sacrificing and effective was he always in giving his service, so often called for by public interests.

He was a pattern of German-American citizenship—blending in himself the best traits of American character with the best of the German—a great American in enterprise and affection for this Republic, all a German in soul and true reverence for the old fatherland, the patriotic American with a German heart. He was a pattern of the master-manufacturer on whose heart the weal of his workmen lay as on a father's and who found in their contentment his happiness and pride.

And—what is in our day of special significance—he was a pattern as a rich man. I wish I could call the millionaires of the land to this bier and say to them, "Those among you who lament that at times poverty looks with mutterings on riches, learn from this dead man." His millions were never begrudged him. The dark glance of envy never fell upon him. Covetousness itself passed him by disarmed and reconciled. Yes, every one would have rejoiced to see him still richer, for every one knew that everything he got contributed to the welfare of all. No one fulfilled better than he the duties of wealth. There was no puffed-up pride of possession, no extravagant prank of display. Simple as ever remained his being, modest his mode of life. But he knew one luxury and he practiced it; that was the luxury of the liberal hand—a princely luxury, that few of the world's greatest have indulged in more richly than he.

I speak here not only of the gifts of large sums, of which the world knows, but of those much greater amounts that he spent quietly for his fellow-man and of which the world knows nothing. And it was not money alone that he gave. It was the hearty joy of the genuine benefactor, with which he bade the worthy welcome, and often antici-

pated their wants. It was the bright cheerfulness of the willing giver who could conceive no abuse of his generosity, who spared neither time nor pains, who let no business claims deter or disturb him, and who comforted and considered, thought and labored till the necessary aid was secured. How incredibly far that went, how great the number of those who looked upon Steinway as a kindly, never-failing support, how his labor of charity accumulated, sometimes till the whole capacity of an ordinary man would have been exhausted, that only his closest friends ever knew; and they hardly knew it at all. I have seen many men in my day, never a bigger heart. It is hard over this coffin so to speak the truth that it shall not seem exaggerated. Is it too much to say that in this man every human being has lost a brother?

He was the millionaire whom no one begrudged his riches. Nothing could reward more beautifully his good works than to have his noble example acknowledged by the rich of our day and to have the great lesson of his life understood and taken to heart in its full worth.

And what a friend and comrade he was. His inexhaustible sympathy, his loyal devotion, his childlike enthusiasm for the good and the beautiful, his joy in others' joy, his bubbling humor, his sunny cheerfulness—who that was near him has not been made happy and better by these qualities of his? He is a happy man who finds his happiness in the fortunes of others. So was he in truth one of the happiest of men.

And now, plucked away in the fulness of his energy, powers and strivings, he lies here before us dumb and still—in this hall in which he so loved to mingle with his friends, in which his voice so often rang out, in which he spent so many merry hours himself and made so merry for others. And here stand his children and relatives, bowed low by the blow of fate. Is it a comfort to them

that their grief is shared? Truly, this consolation flows out to them in the richest streams, for hundreds and thousands are united in this common sorrow as one great family. The memory of this true nobleman will be green and blossoming in all our hearts, and his name will live in our imperishable reverence and affection.

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FROM THOMAS F. BAYARD

83 EATON SQUARE, S. W.,  
LONDON, Sunday the 13th of Dec., 1896.

My dear Carl Schurz: I have just read and handed to my wife and daughter to read, your beautiful and impressive eulogy of William Steinway—so full of just discrimination, honorable alike to the dead man and to the living orator. Nearly twenty-five years ago I crossed the Atlantic in company with Mr. Steinway who attracted me by his strong intelligence and even more by his simple and robust integrity. I remember well his speaking of the award of prizes in the French Exposition, and his fine scorn of the proposals (scarcely veiled) which had been made to him by the officials of the Second Empire to *purchase* certificates of the excellence of his pianos.

Well might you summon to his bier the rich men of the United States and point to his life as a lesson for the wise use of wealth. Never was a better illustration of the spirit of responsibility, for a recognition of *the trust* that must accompany the possession of wealth in order to make its possessor safe, or its possession a blessing to the community from which it was gathered, and never, my dear General, was there a time in history nor a country where such a sermon as yours and such a character and life as William Steinway's were more needed than *now* and in the United States. I trust the seeds he has planted and you have watered will bear a good harvest.

I write this note in obedience to a warm impulse, and my mind goes back to the days when we sat together in the Senate and when you stepped out of the ranks of party and struck the

shield of corruption and abuses, and, single-handed, defied the serried ranks of political power and party passion.

Then you gained my admiration, my confidence and respect and you have never lost them. And it is the vibration of such feelings that causes this note.

On the incoming of the McKinley Administration I shall pack up and return home, and when I am settled there in my plain homestead overlooking the blue Delaware, perhaps I may induce you to pass some days with me, and, if you like it, I will tell you what I can of this great and civilized Kingdom, and of what I here tried to do to create a clear and friendly understanding between its people and my own countrymen.

Of course there are discordant voices, and no man can escape the missiles of folly, ignorance and hatred; but, despite them all, I think I shall leave the path of honorable success unobstructed to those envoys who are to come after me.

I hope your health is good and that those you love are well established in life. And I am with sincerity, long tested,

Your friend,

T. F. BAYARD.

The Hon. CARL SCHURZ,  
NEW YORK.

#### THE GERMAN MOTHERTONGUE<sup>1</sup>

MY FRIENDS:—The toast to the German mothertongue ought to be responded to in music. This the Liederkranz has done so often and with so much feeling—and again only the other day—that it might be better were the chorus now to stand in my place, for to-day we celebrate more especially the German mothertongue as it speaks to us in song. There may indeed be other languages which on account of the resonance of their vowels and the

<sup>1</sup> A response to a toast at a banquet in celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of a choral society, the Deutscher Liederkranz, of New York City, Jan. 9, 1897.

Translated by Miss Schurz.

softness of their consonants are better adapted to singing, but in no other language do people sing as much as in German and no other nation has given us so great a treasure of melodies that the people sing, songs of such deep feeling and of such virile force. Together with the mother-tongue, the German *Leid* sprang from the German heart and it has made its way around the world. Whatever may resist German intellect and German enterprise—nothing can withstand German song.

We must be forgiven if, when speaking of our German mothertongue, we become a little sentimental, for that is not a sign of weakness. You may remember Heine's lines about the "sentimental oaks." The German mother-tongue is a treasure for every thoughtful person who possesses it, the value of which is to him much more than a mere matter of sentiment. We Germans like to hear honesty spoken of as one of the prominent traits of the German national character; and I, for my part, am particularly pleased when the better elements of the American people rely upon the support of German-Americans when questions about honest government and honest money arise. Pardon me for referring to such questions here; I do so only because honesty is also one of the principal characteristics of the German mothertongue.

Other languages, particularly the Romance, are distinguished for the refined and graceful elegance of their melodious diction. In these languages it is easy to say things that sound very pretty and that mean very little. In German that is more difficult. I would not imply that I consider it admirable, where a sign announces "German spoken here," for one to be as rude as one pleases—I mean rather that an insincere or stupid thought expressed in German really sounds so. And if you say anything clever or graceful in German, you cannot make it sound any more clever than it really is. In other words,

the German mothertongue is not the language of vain display. Moreover, like a great organ it commands the whole range of musical expression, of force, of grandeur, of lofty enthusiasm, of passion, of delicate feeling. What is there in any other language that can excel the vigor of the German Bible, the powerful, sonorous sublimity of Schiller's dramas, the captivating word-music of Heine's lyrics?

It would be superfluous here to speak of the literature which has grown up in the German language and includes every field of intellectual activity, for its imposing scope has been recognized by the whole civilized world. But it is not only *German* literature which the mothertongue has to give us.

There is no language in the world which offers so many difficulties to the translator as the German, and none in which all the idioms and poetic meters of other languages can be so exactly rendered and which has so rich and complete a collection of translations. Homer, Dante, Hafiz, Shakespeare, Aristotle, Bacon, Thucydides, Tacitus, Macaulay, Victor Hugo, Walter Scott, Tolstoy—the poetry, philosophy, science, history, fiction of all times and of all nations have naturally found a home in the German language, through the translations which are worthy of the originals by their fidelity, their strength and beauty. Indeed, the German language opens up to us more than any other the wealth of the literature of the whole world.

We possess, in truth, a treasure which we cannot prize highly enough, especially we who have made a new home in a new world speaking another language. It is sometimes expected of our compatriots in America that they shall not only learn English, but that they shall entirely cast aside the old mothertongue. That is very unwise advice. Nobody will dispute that the German-American

must learn English. He owes it to his new country and he owes it to himself. But it is more than folly to say that he ought, therefore, to give up the German language. As American citizens we must become Americanized; that is absolutely necessary. I have always been in favor of a sensible Americanization, but this need not mean a complete abandonment of all that is German. It means that we should adopt the best traits of American character and join them to the best traits of German character. By so doing we shall make the most valuable contribution to the American nation, to American civilization. As Americans we ought to acquire the language of the country, but we must not lose our German mothertongue.

The idea that the preservation of the German language together with the English may hinder the development of our American patriotism is as silly as it would be to say that it makes us less patriotic to be able to sing *Hail, Columbia* in two languages. There are thousands of Americans who study German without becoming less patriotic; it only makes them more cultured and more accomplished. They learn German with laborious effort, for German is very difficult. We German-Americans have brought this treasure over the ocean with us. We need not study German—we need only not to forget it. Our children will have without trouble what others can acquire only with great difficulty, if we are but sensible and conscientious enough to cultivate and to foster it in our families. That may not suffice to give our children as thorough a knowledge of the language as is desirable, but it will immensely facilitate the acquisition of what is lacking.

I am not preaching as one of whom it might be said: "Follow his words but not his deeds." I flatter myself that I am as dutiful an American as any one, and I have tried to learn English and so have my children. But in my family circle only German is spoken, much German is

read and our family correspondence is carried on only in German. I may therefore be permitted to express myself strongly on this point. And so I say to you when I see how German-American parents neglect to secure for their children the possession of the mothertongue, often from mere indolence, how they wantonly cast aside the precious gift—then my German heart and my American common-sense rise up in indignant protest. Parents who neglect to give their children an opportunity to learn the German language without effort are sinning against their sacred obligation to preserve the mothertongue. All the more do I honor a German-American society in which the German language is valued and cherished as it is here; it is doing an incalculable service to our contemporaries as well as to coming generations.

May the Liederkranz, in the unnumbered years that we all hope are still in store for it, remain as faithful to this noble duty as it has been in the half-century just elapsed—for the mothertongue is the bond which holds and binds its members together. The German mothertongue, the dear, strong, noble, tender, sacred mothertongue—may it live everlastingly here and all the world over!

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TO THOMAS F. BAYARD

NEW YORK, Jan. 12, 1897.

My dear friend Bayard: What pleasant surprises your letters were! Not as if I had thought that you had forgotten me—for I knew you had not—but I did not expect to see you moved to such an expression of feeling by the little tribute I had paid to my departed friend. He was indeed a man of rare goodness, and his example well deserved to be held up to the contemplation of modern society.

I need not tell you that I have followed your course in

England with the liveliest interest, sympathy and gratification. It seems to be admitted on all hands that you are the most popular representative this Republic has ever had at the Court of St. James, and only our boyish jingoes who "want a war" and some old demagogues who will be without political capital when they lose all opportunities for twisting the British lion's tail, refuse to recognize the good you have done by fostering the feeling of cordiality between the two nations. The Arbitration Treaty, which has just been signed, crowns the beneficent efforts that have been made in that direction. All mankind must be congratulated upon this great achievement. It is an onward stride of human civilization which will ever stand first in rank among the glories of the closing nineteenth century.

Our political condition is dangerously muddled. I say *dangerously*, because the reaction that may be provoked by the excesses of narrow-minded Republican partisanship which are now threatening, may throw the country into the hands, not of a Democratic party led by Cleveland, but of a motley crowd of ignorant and fanatical visionaries and of reckless political speculators. The best hope of the country will be in the sound-money Democrats, provided they courageously maintain their identity and push forward their organization.

Yes, after your return to your home we ought to have some days of quiet communion, as you suggest; and I trust we shall have them. We shall have much to say to one another.

Many thanks for your cordial letters and the reprint of my little speech.

Commend me to Mrs. Bayard and to your children and believe me,

Ever your friend,

C. SCHURZ.

## TO SIMON WOLF

NEW YORK, Feb. 13, 1897.<sup>1</sup>

Your letter in regard to Poesche<sup>2</sup> is in my hands. I need hardly tell you that I esteem Poesche very highly, that my friendly feelings toward him are of the warmest kind and that I should like to be able to serve him. But it is my unalterable rule to give no recommendations for official positions. Even should this rule allow any exceptions, which is not the case, such exceptions would be quite impossible just now, as those who have supported McKinley, not as his party associates, but as independents, should consider it a point of honor to ask no favors of the Administration either for themselves or their friends. I must therefore strictly adhere to my rule not to meddle with appointments to office—unless the Administration were to ask my opinion in some special case—which is hardly probable. I am therefore quite unable to help in trying to reinstate Poesche, and I cannot tell you how very much I regret this, for I believe that he has suffered very harsh treatment. Please explain to him—should you consider it necessary—the condition of things, and assure him that it is by no means lack of sincere friendship which prevents me from helping him in this matter.

## TO PRESIDENT MCKINLEY

NEW YORK, March 4, 1897.

Permit me to address to you a few words in the name of the National Civil Service Reform League whose president I am.

It seems to us very important that the United States

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the German.

<sup>2</sup> Who had lost his position in the Treasury Department and desired to be reinstated.

Civil Service Commission should be regarded and treated as an essentially non-partisan body, and that it should, therefore, not be subject to sweeping changes as to its composition with every change of Administration. If you should deem it wise not to keep all the present members of the Commission but to give the Commission a Republican majority, yet we would respectfully ask you to consider whether in that case the public interest will not be best served by making the one change required for that purpose, and thus preserve the substantial continuity of the Commission. We are strongly of the opinion that the largest possible preservation of that continuity would be most in harmony with the spirit of the reformed civil service system, and hope that it will commend itself to your good judgment. Should you deem it proper not to make any change in the Commission at all, we would, for the reason mentioned, be all the more gratified and hail your decision as a precedent of very great value.

I beg leave to add that if the organization over which I have the honor to preside, or myself personally, can in any way ever be of service to you in the line of the principles we represent, we shall always be gladly at your disposal.

Accept my warmest wishes for the success of your Administration as well as for your personal prosperity, and believe me,

Very sincerely yours.

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FROM PRESIDENT MCKINLEY

EXECUTIVE MANSION,  
WASHINGTON, March 16, 1897.

I have received your kind letter of the tenth [fourth] instant in behalf of the Civil Service Reform League whose interests you have so long and ably represented, and can assure you

that even in the limited time now at my disposal, I have given consideration to the ideas which you advocate.

In the near future I shall hope, with the assistance and coöperation of yourself and others interested in necessary reforms in this branch of the Government, to develop some practical plan of progress which will be satisfactory to the friends of good government in all parts of the country.

In due time I shall take pleasure in considering the ideas in detail presented by the gentlemen who have made a special study of this subject. Allow me at this time to thank you very heartily for the promise of prompt and continued co-operation on the part of the strong and progressive organization over whose deliberations you have the honor to preside.

Thanking you sincerely for your good wishes for the success of the new Administration, and trusting that your expectations may be fully realized, I am,

Very truly yours.

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GROVER CLEVELAND'S SECOND ADMINISTRATION<sup>1</sup>

The election of Grover Cleveland to the Presidency in 1892 was one of the most extraordinary events in our political history. During his first Administration he had estranged many of the leading politicians of his party. He had gone far enough in the line of civil service reform to alarm and disgust the believers in the doctrine that "to the victors belong the spoils"; and a large majority of the Democratic leaders and workers held to that belief. He had affirmed, meaning it, that "public office is a public trust," and that the interests of the country are paramount to those of any party—doctrines, profession of which is regarded by the thorough-paced partisan of our

<sup>1</sup> *McClure's Magazine*, May, 1897. Hearty thanks are given to *McClure's Magazine* for generous consent to the reprint of this article and those on "Can the South Solve the Negro Question?" and on "George William Curtis."

days as a pharisaical assumption of superior virtue. He had, indeed, not repelled the advice of the party magnates on matters of public policy, but he had not diligently sought it, nor had he followed it when it ran counter to his own judgment. Most of the Democratic leaders, as well as of the party workers of less degree, had, therefore, concluded that he was not the kind of President they liked. Then, near the close of his first Administration, he had, in a very impressive manner, advanced the tariff question as the principal issue between the two great political parties—this also against the wish of some prominent Democrats, who predicted party defeat as a consequence.

In spite of all this his renomination for the Presidency in 1888 was a party necessity, and, therefore, a matter of course; for even the most discontented Democratic politicians had to admit that they could not refuse Mr. Cleveland a renomination without virtually disowning the first and only Administration the Democratic party could call its own since 1861, which would have been fatal. But, no matter for what reason, he was defeated in the election. Had he not been above the common run of party leaders, his position would then have been weak indeed. The party had paid off its debt to him by the renomination; and the prestige of a public man is usually greatly impaired by defeat.

Nor did he, during the four years of his retirement, do any of the things which, under such circumstances, the ordinary politician would have thought useful to repair his fortunes. He quietly practiced law. He did not pose as the central figure of public occasions to attract the public eye. He did nothing to regain the favor of those who manage party caucuses and conventions. In his own State he permitted the regular organization of his party to pass wholly into the hands of his enemies. He not only did not shape his utterances according to the

temporary currents of party sentiment, but while an apparently irresistible "craze" for the free coinage of silver was sweeping over most of the Democratic States, he continued to manifest his opposition to free coinage in language almost defiant in its positiveness.

According to the notions commonly current among politicians, such a man was an impossible candidate. But in spite of it all, his name resounded all over the country as that of the favorite of the Democratic masses. It was a truly spontaneous movement. There was no concerted agitation, no machine work behind it. On the contrary, those given to political machine methods mostly worked against him. But in vain. At the Democratic National Convention of 1892 a thing happened which was without precedent in our political history. Mr. Cleveland was nominated as a candidate for the Presidency, not merely without the support, but against the emphatic protest of the regular party delegation from his own State.

It is a significant fact that there was nothing in the political situation to give Mr. Cleveland any peculiar advantage. Indeed, the high tariff enacted under the Harrison Administration had provoked a violent reaction which resulted in a sweeping Democratic victory in the Congressional elections of 1890 and made a similar victory in the Presidential election of 1892 probable. This did not, in itself, tell in favor of his nomination. On the contrary, the probability of Democratic success in 1892 was rather apt to bring out every possible Democratic aspirant for the Presidency, to call into action their local followings, to organize a powerful "field" against Mr. Cleveland, and thus to facilitate the nomination of some person less objected to. It is equally significant that Mr. Cleveland won his unprecedented triumph without possessing what are commonly supposed to be the elements of popularity. He did not fascinate people by the charm

of extraordinary eloquence. He did not win their friendship by any magic of "personal magnetism." There was nothing romantic in his history to captivate the imagination. Least of all did he know the demagogue's art of being all things to all men. The real source of his strength lay in the impression made upon the popular mind, less by his abilities or by his opinions, than by his character as it had revealed itself in his utterances and acts. People saw in him a man conscientiously devoted to his duties, honest in his zeal to understand and to perform them without regard to personal advantage, and maintaining with dauntless courage what he thought right against friend and foe alike—a personality of exceptional strength and trustworthiness, commanding confidence. Thus the very qualities which made him an uncomfortable and distasteful person to party magnates and their henchmen, had endeared him to the popular heart. They overshadowed in the minds of many all differences of opinion about silver or the tariff. They carried his nomination and election triumphantly over the heads of the "practical politicians," and gave him even a large number of Republican votes—far more than enough to make up for the defection of Democratic malcontents.

As a vigorous pronouncement of public opinion in favor of a candidate who saw in his office not a party agency, but a public trust, and as a victory of moral forces over political machine principles and methods, the nomination and election of Mr. Cleveland were events of most encouraging significance. Had those moral forces proved equally potent in determining the character and temper of Congress, they would not only have secured during Mr. Cleveland's term of office harmonious coöperation between the different branches of the Government, but they would also have gone far to strengthen the power of honest and independent thought in party politics, to bring back

party organization to its legitimate functions, and generally to elevate the tone of our political life. But Mr. Cleveland had to encounter antagonisms of a singularly complex and dangerous nature.

Every intelligent man among those who voted to make him President had known precisely what to expect of him. Nobody had the slightest reason for thinking that he would favor free coinage or "do something for silver"; or that he would easily acquiesce in the squandering of public money; or that he would countenance any tariff reform not embodying the free admission of "raw materials" and a corresponding reduction of duties; or that he would conduct our foreign affairs in any other than a spirit of justice and peace according to the principles of international law; or that he would let the spoils hunters of his party have their way and abstain from extending the operation of the civil service rules. With a general and full and clear knowledge of all this the Democrats, reinforced by a large number of independent voters, elected him.

But no sooner had he ascended the Presidential chair than he encountered with regard to almost every article of his creed a decided, sometimes even bitter and insidious, opposition within his own party as represented in Congress. This opposition sprang partly from honest difference of opinion on public matters, such as the silver question, partly from interest, partly from personal feeling. Indeed, in the House of Representatives, which had been elected at the same time with him and under the same popular inspiration, and which had the advantage of the able and high-minded leadership of Mr. Wilson of West Virginia, the adverse current remained within bounds. Some of the policies the President stood for found there a fair party support. But the Democratic contingent in the Senate, a few faithful friends excepted, was largely con-

trolled by those party leaders who had long disliked Mr. Cleveland for the very qualities which gave him his popular prestige. In addition to the old grudge, they now resented his election over their heads. His success, owing to popular favor, had only served to embitter their hostility to him.

They found, of course, willing aid among the Republicans of both Houses. Many of these, indeed, carried on their legitimate party opposition against the Democratic President in a wholly honorable spirit. But there were not a few extreme Republican partisans who saw in Mr. Cleveland only the one Democrat who, since 1861, had been able to wrest the Presidency from Republican hands; whom, because of his peculiar standing in the popular confidence, they had most to fear, and whom it was, therefore, most desirable, by any available means, to destroy. This was considered "good party politics."

The President thus found himself confronted by an extraordinary combination of hostile forces, and this at a time when the general situation he had to deal with was peculiarly perplexing. The preceding Administration had left a Pandora box of trouble as its legacy behind it. Among Republicans it is the fashion to attribute all the financial disturbance happening under the Cleveland Administration to that Administration itself. No fair-minded student of recent events will accept this view. The first causes of that disturbance will be found in one of those periodical business prostrations characteristic of our times. The ten years preceding 1890 had been years of great prosperity. That prosperity had produced the usual effect of inciting recklessness in borrowing and lending, and of stimulating the spirit of venturesome enterprise. With the year 1890 the reaction set in. Cautious men began to sell securities and to restrict their credits. Values shrank and creditors became apprehensive. In

this country during the first six months of 1890 the mortgages of nearly two dozen railroad companies were foreclosed, and the Barings' collapse in England later in the year caused widespread consternation. Confidence here, as elsewhere, was grievously shaken, and business embarrassments rapidly increased.

There are two superstitions being cultivated in this country which the period of depression beginning in 1890 was well apt to put in their true light. One is that when business languishes we have only to enact a high tariff and everything will soon be in prosperous and happy motion again. The downward movement beginning in 1890 occurred while the McKinley tariff was in full operation. While it is not pretended that this downward movement was caused by that high tariff, it is very evident that the tariff did not prevent or stop it. The other superstition is that the sure remedy for hard times consists in an increase of the volume of current money. This remedy was applied in 1890 through the so-called Sherman act, by which the Government's currency was rapidly increased. But the business decline did not stop. On the contrary, it was seriously aggravated by adding to the other uncertainties of the day the portentous question whether, if the issues of Government paper money against silver purchases were continued, it would be possible to maintain its parity with gold.

This was the situation when Mr. Cleveland became President. To make his Administration responsible for that situation is a ludicrous absurdity. At the close of his first term, in 1889, he had turned over to his successor, Mr. Harrison, a cash balance in the Treasury of more than \$281,000,000, of which more than \$196,000,000 was gold. In 1891, after the second year of President Harrison's term, the cash balance had dropped to less than \$176,500,000, and the Treasury gold to less than \$118,000,000.

At the close of his Administration in 1893, President Harrison left to his successor, Mr. Cleveland, a cash balance of less than \$146,000,000, of which a little more than \$103,500,000 was gold—and this would have been considerably less than \$100,000,000, the traditional gold reserve held against the greenbacks, had not Mr. Foster, President Harrison's Secretary of the Treasury, obtained several millions of gold for greenbacks from New York bankers, to keep that reserve from falling below the regular mark. Thus President Harrison left to his successor, Mr. Cleveland, over \$134,000,000 less in cash assets, and \$93,000,000 less in gold, than he had in 1889 received from him. Indeed, Secretary Foster was so anxious lest the gold reserve sink below \$100,000,000 before the Republicans went out of power that he made preparations for a sale of Government bonds. This was the legacy left to Mr. Cleveland.

When his Presidential term began the financial crisis of 1893 was well under way. The condition of the Treasury continued to grow weaker. The appropriations made by Congress had been extravagantly lavish, and the McKinley tariff failed to furnish the necessary revenue. The period of deficits, in the place of the former surpluses, set in before that tariff was changed. The resources of the Treasury dwindled as its responsibilities increased. When the small excess of the gold holdings of the Treasury above \$100,000,000 threatened to disappear, the country was startled by an announcement, telegraphed from Washington as coming from the Treasury Department, which created the apprehension that when that excess was exhausted, the Treasury notes provided for in the Sherman act would no longer be redeemed in gold. This announcement started a panicky feeling in the business centers. President Cleveland promptly caused the public to be informed that the gold payments would be

maintained under all circumstances. The panic was checked, but a nervous disquietude remained which made the public mind morbidly susceptible to discouraging impressions. Soon the Treasury gold actually fell below \$100,000,000, and the charm of safety which in the popular imagination hung about that reserve was broken. Business failures rapidly multiplied. In May, banks began to break at a terrific rate, especially in the West. The closing of the mints in India to the free coinage of silver caused a sudden fall of twenty points in the price of that metal. No intelligent man could doubt that, if the monthly silver purchases and the issuing of paper money standing for silver continued, the disappearance of our stock of gold would go on at an accelerating pace, and the monetary system of the country would soon be on the silver basis—a catastrophe involving the ruin of our National credit and a most disastrous confusion to all our business interests. The repeal of the silver purchase law was therefore the first necessity.

It was expected that President Cleveland would call an extra session of Congress for this purpose, to meet at the earliest possible period. But he put off that extra session until August—thinking, perhaps, that the public mind was not yet prepared for the repeal of the Sherman act, or that Congress would be better prepared for it later.

When Congress met in August, 1893, Mr. Cleveland had, like many other Presidents before him, lost some of the honeymoon popularity, and even some more important elements of strength that he had possessed a few months before. His anxious desire to save the country from the dire consequences of the silver purchase law and to bring about the reformation of the tariff had seduced him into efforts to win the favor, or at least to avert the displeasure, of Members of Congress by way of meeting their wishes in making appointments to office. To use

the patronage of the Government for the purpose of influencing the action of Congress was against his principles as well as against his inclinations. There is no reason for doubting that he would have been glad to exterminate the spoils system, root and branch, at one blow, had he thought it possible to do so at that period without seriously endangering other great interests. He therefore adjourned his plans for extending the application of civil service reform principles to a later day.

But giving due credit to his general intentions, the correctness of his judgment of the situation may be questioned from a practical point of view. He was, after all, not capable of making the use of the patronage in this fashion a regular and in any sense successful policy. While doing some things which under less critical circumstances he would not have done, his care for the public interest compelled him to refuse to do other things without which he could not secure the active friendship of those who asked for them. In a large majority of cases you cannot satisfy the spoils-mongering politician unless you give him everything he demands. Deny him anything and he will be as dissatisfied as if he had received nothing. There are exceptions, but this is the rule. The result of Mr. Cleveland's concession to the old patronage abuse was that he pleased a few who, in turn, served him if they found it in their interest to do so, but not otherwise, and would have served him also without patronage if it accorded with their interests; that the old story of the bestowal of an office making ten enemies and one ingrate repeated itself in many cases; that the distribution of favors caused many bitter disappointments, jealousies and heartburnings; that his opponents made a great outcry about his attempts to buy votes in Congress with patronage—an outcry which was far greater than the facts warranted, but became a formidable weapon against

him; and that some of the things done—such as the hasty removals and appointments in the Consular service—created a painful sensation among those whose principles and views of policy were most in accord with his own. Such slips weakened him for the time in public estimation; and inasmuch as that public estimation was always the main source of his strength, everything calculated to shake it served to increase the power of his enemies.

It happens sometimes that men of a superior stamp deem it expedient in difficult situations to resort to the arts of management familiar to the small politician, thinking themselves able to play at that game as well as anybody else. But there have been only few of them who proved that they could do so with success, or even with impunity. Mr. Cleveland was not one of these few. He had far less skill in the craft of small politics than he himself may have believed. His nature lacked that gift. He was powerful as a leader of men in mass, on a great scale, by prevailing upon public opinion, or by stirring the popular moral sense. But he was awkward in dealing with mankind in detail, in manipulating individuals. Such men are apt rather to lose much than to gain anything by ventures below their natural sphere.

The President on the 7th of August, 1893, sent a message to the Congress assembled in extra session strongly urging the immediate repeal of the silver purchase act. The House of Representatives, under Mr. Wilson's leadership, responded with reasonable promptness. It passed the Wilson repeal bill on the 28th by a heavy majority, of which, however, the Republicans furnished the larger part. But in the Senate the struggle assumed a different character. There was a majority in that body in favor of repeal. But the minority was strong enough, owing to the rules of the Senate, which know no "previous question," to obstruct the vote indefinitely. The silver

Senators, mostly Democrats, with some Republicans, coalesced under the leadership of the Republican Senator Teller, a man full of the zeal of honest fanaticism. The silver men understood the greatness of the stake. So long as the silver purchase act was in force, they could hope that its operation would bring the country at last upon the silver basis even without the enactment of a free-coinage act. The repeal of the silver purchase law would extinguish that hope. Therefore they fought against it with desperate energy. The repeal force, mostly Republicans, with some Democrats, were led by the Democratic Senator Voorhees, the chairman of the Committee on Finance, at heart a silver man, but honestly enough in favor of this Administration measure for the occasion. But he did not master his subject, and his leadership was unskillful and spiritless. Moreover, there were among the Democrats, and even apparently on the President's side in this struggle, some whose lurking rancor against him inspired the wish that if the repeal must pass, it should at least pass in a form making it appear as somebody else's measure rather than his.

From the 28th of August, when Senator Voorhees reported the bill to the Senate, the debate went on week after week, until finally the time was occupied on the part of the coalition opposing repeal only by those unseemly maneuvers called filibustering. Meanwhile the business community, harassed by the wantonly prolonged uncertainty and the accumulating embarrassments and disasters caused by it, grew more impatient from day to day. A storm of popular indignation broke upon the Senate. Senators were pelted with telegraphic messages, letters and resolutions adopted by business men's associations and public meetings in which prompt action was vehemently demanded and the obstruction denounced as a hostile plot against the public welfare. It is more

than probable that the obstructionists would at last have yielded to this impetuous pressure of public sentiment, had not Senator Gorman encouraged them with the assurance that, if they held out, they would force the Administration to yield some concession favorable to "silver."

Indeed, from time to time rumors found their way into the newspapers that such a compromise was on the point of consummation, and toward the end of October the consent of almost all the Democratic Senators was actually obtained to a proposition that the silver purchase law should remain in force one year longer and then stop; that the silver purchased under that act and the seigniorage should be coined, and that all Government notes under \$10 should be withdrawn—a proposition full of mischief. The silver Democrats were propitiated by the argument that while the silver purchase law could hardly be permanently maintained under existing circumstances, this proposition would keep it in operation at least for a year longer and then compensate for it by other concessions. The Administration Democrats were falsely told that the Secretary of the Treasury himself favored it, and that this would be a "Democratic" measure upon which the whole party could be reunited; besides, it was "the only thing possible." Meanwhile President Cleveland, profoundly convinced that nothing but the complete and unconditional repeal of the silver purchase clause of the Sherman act would save the country from immediate peril, stood unmoved in his purpose. Neither the desperate efforts of the obstructionists in the Senate nor the intrigues of his personal enemies disheartened him; and when the proposition of compromise was brought before him, with an array of persuasive argument by his very friends, the table shook under his fist when he exclaimed: "I will never consent to it."

There was the end. The Senate voted the repeal as proposed by him without further delay. The thing which Senator Gorman had asserted could not be done, was done, because there was a man to see it done. It was a great victory. The public interest triumphed over everything, and that triumph was due to Grover Cleveland alone. The justice of history will never deny him this acknowledgment.

But while the repeal of the silver purchase act averted the most immediate peril, it could by no means stop the source of the evil. It removed one very serious cause of distrust, but it did not restore confidence. The struggle in the Senate had even increased public apprehension as to the resources, the recklessness, the desperate character of the silver movement. That movement has often been likened to the paper inflation "craze" of twenty years before. As to the ultimate ends the two are indeed alike. But the silver movement has in the mining interests of the far West a very strong and well-organized financial power behind it, which the paper inflation movement had not. By means of a well-supplied war chest it can sustain a systematic and incessant agitation, which the paper inflation movement could not. It is, therefore, much more able to take advantage of its local opportunities and to repair the effects of defeat. It dies much harder. Indeed, after the repeal of the silver purchase act it was felt to be still very much alive and capable of mischief. The anxieties it inspired were heightened by other circumstances. The revenues of the Government ran low. The apprehension that the Government would be obliged to draw upon the gold resources of the Treasury for current expenses caused many people, especially foreign investors in the United States, to anticipate this by drawing it out themselves for greenbacks, and to send it abroad. There was also not a little private hoarding of gold at home.

This created a constant drain on the gold reserve of the Treasury, and to replenish it loans by bond sales had soon to be resorted to.

Such bond sales, open to the public, were made in January and again in November, 1894, but not without some difficulty. They did not stop the drain. Bonds were sold for gold. That gold was put into the Treasury. The distrust continuing, greenbacks were again presented for redemption, and thus that gold drawn out of the Treasury. The greenbacks were paid out again by the Treasury for current expenses, and then they were again presented for redemption to draw out more gold. It seemed indeed like an "endless chain," as Mr. Cleveland called it. Early in 1895 the situation became very critical. On the 28th of January the President sent a message to Congress pointing out the dangers impending and asking for the passage of a law authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to sell three per cent. gold bonds running fifty years. Congress had repeatedly shown its unwillingness to adopt effective measures for the relief of the Treasury, and did so this time. The apprehensive temper of the business community grew into actual alarm. A regular run began upon the Treasury for the gold in it. On the 8th of February the gold holdings were reduced to \$41,300,000, and this amount consisted almost wholly, not of coin, but of bars. The Treasury was in a state of utter helplessness to meet the run, which threatened to spread as it went on. The Republic was within a hair's breadth of bankruptcy. Only the promptest help could ward off the catastrophe.

Then President Cleveland did a thing which exposed him to measureless obloquy and defamation, but saved the country from incalculable confusion, calamity and disgrace. The famous syndicate contract was made with New York bankers, who drew the foremost banking houses of Europe into coöperation. They sold to the Govern-

ment \$65,117,000 worth of gold for four per cent. bonds of the nominal value of \$62,317,500. The difference between these sums represented the premium on the bonds, making their price equal to 104.49, and the rate of interest three and three-quarters per cent. These bonds, authorized by the act of July 14, 1870, were payable in "coin." According to the talk of the silver men in Congress they *should* be paid in silver. According to the cowardly duplicities of the politicians in Congress who, although not silver men themselves, constantly bid for the silver vote, those bonds *might* be paid in silver. The syndicate was willing to run that chance; but it offered to take three per cent. instead of four per cent. bonds, if Congress would, within ten days, make them specifically payable in gold. President Cleveland communicated this offer, together with the whole contract, to the House of Representatives, strongly recommending that the terms of the offer be complied with, as more than \$16,000,000 would be saved in interest during the time the bonds had to run. It seems almost incredible, but the House deliberately threw away that saving because a large majority of the members were too much afraid of the word "gold" to accept it. But by far the most important provision of the contract was that by which the most powerful American and European banking houses bound themselves not only to bring at least one-half of the gold to be delivered from Europe, but also to "exert all financial influence and to make all legitimate efforts to protect the Treasury of the United States against the withdrawals of gold pending the complete performance of the contract."

When the conclusion of this contract became known, the panicky feeling subsided instantly. The run upon the Treasury ceased. Bankruptcy was averted. Every intelligent person knew that with the organized coöperation of such forces, which, having been secured once, could

be secured again, the Government would remain able to continue its gold payments and to maintain its credit intact. And when a year later the gold assets again dropped considerably below the one hundred million figure, the revived popular confidence made it easy to fill the gap by a popular loan, while formerly the popular loan had been a precarious operation.

But the silver men were furious beyond measure because another chance for precipitating the country upon the silver basis had been spoiled by President Cleveland's determined action. Ever since, the "bankers' syndicate" has been a favorite staple of their denunciatory rhetoric. According to them, that syndicate has robbed the Government, enslaved the people, obliterated our free institutions and done whatever else of iniquity the human imagination can conceive. Their vindictive vilification of Mr. Cleveland has gone even to the length of charging him with having put millions into his own pocket as his share of the profit from the syndicate transaction. The inventors of a calumny so silly as well as revolting did not feel what an insult they offered to the national character by expecting any one to believe it. To such a charge, leaving out of the question Mr. Cleveland's personal repute, a self-respecting American has but one answer: It is simply impossible that a President of the United States, whatever else may be said against him, should ever conceive the thought of deriving a corrupt pecuniary profit from any use of his official power. It will be a sad day for the Republic when this impossibility ceases to be taken for granted. The wretches who circulated that falsehood about Mr. Cleveland did, of course, not credit it themselves.

There were also men of standing in the Republican party who attacked the syndicate contract in that carping, caviling spirit characteristic of narrow-minded partisans,

criticizing its terms as if they had had a liberal assortment of first-class bankers at hand, ready for a pledge to protect the Treasury against the withdrawal of gold, and to expose themselves for months ahead to the chances of embarrassment by war or commercial perturbations—all for nothing; or as if the President should have jeopardized an arrangement absolutely necessary to save the country from the immediate danger of bankruptcy, disaster and disgrace, by haggling over a fraction of a per cent. while Congress was wantonly throwing away the opportunity of saving sixteen millions. Many of those who then displayed their partisan zeal by such pettiness may now be heartily ashamed of it. They may now gratefully remember that President Cleveland not only was ever watchful and prompt to defeat by his veto vicious legislation supported mainly by men of his own party, such as the bill for coining the seigniorage, but that in those days of supreme peril he remained undismayed by the ferocious assaults made upon his good name as well as his statesmanship, and stood firm as a rock against the powers of evil which menaced the welfare and the honor of the American people. Nor should it be forgotten when we at last come to the true cure of our financial ills—the withdrawal of our greenbacks and a liberal extension of banking facilities—that he time and again commended these measures to an unwilling Congress. The country has never had in the Presidential office a stronger bulwark of its credit and a more faithful champion of sound finance than Grover Cleveland.

Probably the greatest and most painful disappointment of his whole political career was the fate his tariff reform policy met with. His tariff message of 1887 gave to his party, which for a long time had been floundering about, as a mere opposition, in vagueness of purpose, a positive and definite policy, a cause and a battlecry. Although

temporarily repelled in the Presidential election of 1888, tariff reform achieved a signal triumph in the Congressional elections of 1890, and formed the most prominent issue in the Presidential election of 1892 which put the Democratic party in full possession of the National Government. The time for its realization seemed to have come.

Mr. Wilson of West Virginia, who possessed and deserved the full confidence of the President, was made chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means of the House of Representatives. Himself a man of superior ability, of statesmanlike breadth of view and of noble aspirations, he had, in framing and carrying through the tariff bill, to contend with the lack of those qualities in other men's minds. There were among the Democrats in Congress a good many who professed to be in favor of tariff reform and who fully recognized the pledge of their party to abolish or reduce tariff duties to that end, but who wished to spare the protection given to the industries carried on in their own districts or States. They would reform everything except the things in which they were themselves interested, politically or otherwise. This is one of the greatest difficulties the systematic reform of a high tariff has to encounter in a popular assembly. When the game of mutual concession and dicker once begins, there is no telling where it will end. The result is usually a legislative patchwork without any scientific symmetry or unity of purpose. Thus the tariff which issued from the deliberations of the House was by no means a faultless or consistent measure. Henry Clay would have considered it a tariff sufficiently protective to satisfy his views. But it embodied, at least in a measure, the rule of free raw material and an approximately corresponding reduction of the duties on manufactured articles. It was a long step toward the realization of the principles which Mr. Cleveland had advocated as the essence of tariff reform.

But when the bill went to the Senate it fell into the hands of those who were enemies both of tariff reform and of the President. The interference of special interests, which in the House of Representatives had served to demoralize the tariff reform forces to a dangerous degree, appeared in the Senate in a shape far more insidious as well as powerful. A combination formed by a number of Senators strong enough to defeat the tariff bill dictated to the Democrats of the Senate its conditions with the brutal peremptoriness of a band of brigands demanding ransom for a captive. Senator Gorman again was its directing spirit. Free coal and free iron were unceremoniously sacrificed, and the Sugar Trust had its own way in determining the duties in which it was interested. After months of secret intriguing and open bullying and dicker- ing and haggling, the bill was at last put on its passage, but all that was left of it, except free wool, was a mere caricature of a tariff reform measure.

When the bill was about to go to a conference committee of the two Houses, the President made a last effort to save his cherished cause from discomfiture and disgrace. In a letter addressed to Mr. Wilson, and through him to the House of Representatives, he called upon the Democrats in pathetic accents to remain true to their principles.

But it was all in vain. Mr. Wilson indeed made a gallant fight in the conference committee, but the Democratic majority of the House at the decisive moment failed to sustain him. The Senatorial combination carried the day, and the cause of tariff reform was treacherously slaughtered in the house of its friends.

The chagrin of the President was extreme. He gave vigorous expression to it in denouncing the perfidy of those who had "stolen and worn the livery of Democratic tariff reform in the service of Republican protection," and cast "the deadly blight of treason" upon their cause.

He could not put his name to such a measure, but, inasmuch as after all it would lighten many tariff burdens that rested heavily upon the people, he permitted it to become a law without his signature.

The fate Mr. Cleveland's tariff reform policy met in Congress marked two facts. One was that he had lost the leadership of the Democratic party; and the other, that the Democratic party was in process of fatal disintegration, owing to the want of unity of purpose and to the destruction of the only leadership that possessed any moral force. Henceforth it was at the mercy of the machine politicians and of such distracting influences as the silver movement. The effect produced upon the country by the performances of the Democrats in Congress was instantaneous. The independents who had aided the Democratic party in the elections of 1890 and 1892 turned away with disgust. The best part of the Democratic constituency were utterly disheartened. The question was seriously debated among its very friends, whether the Democratic party was at all capable of carrying on the Government. We receive the impression of burlesque, or of Mephistophelian irony, when we now read a speech delivered by Mr. Gorman in the Senate after he had well-nigh completed the disfigurement of the tariff bill. "Mr. President," said he, "we are nearing the end. After twenty years of progress, of positive growth, of constant development and of universal enlightenment, the Democratic party and the American people are within sight of the promised land. Emancipation is at hand. Years of arduous labor by unselfish and patriotic men cannot count for nothing. Fruition is as inevitable as fate. I repeat, it is near at hand. Now of all times the sun of Democracy is at the meridian." A few months after this triumphant utterance of the leader of the Senatorial plot, the Democrats suffered an overwhelming defeat in the

Congressional elections of 1894. Then Mr. Cleveland was confronted by a Congress opposed to him in both branches, and he had to do his work as President in complete political isolation. That work was, however, not without lasting effect.

In the conduct of our foreign affairs President Cleveland found, at the very beginning of his Administration, on his hands the treaty for the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands which had been concluded during the last days of President Harrison's term. Enough was known of the occurrences which had brought forth that treaty to justify Mr. Cleveland in promptly withdrawing it from the Senate for further inquiry and consideration. He despatched a special commissioner to Hawaii, who soon confirmed the report, beyond reasonable doubt, that the Hawaiian Queen had been dethroned and a change of government effected by a revolutionary movement set on foot by a small number of persons, largely Americans; that to the success of that movement officers of the United States and the forces under their command had actively contributed, and that the offer of the country for annexation to the United States had the support of only a very small minority of the Hawaiian people. There was but one honest conclusion, and President Cleveland pronounced it. This Republic, even if annexation were otherwise considered opportune, could not honorably take advantage for its own aggrandizement of a wrong committed by its own officers, and it was also in honor bound to redress the wrong done and to restore the *status quo ante* as much as circumstances permitted. A storm of denunciation burst forth from those who call it "patriotic" to augment the domain of the Republic by theft, and was echoed by the Republicans, who thought it their duty to find fault with a Democratic Administration. No end of senseless rant was indulged in about the "hauling down of

the American flag" from the Hawaiian state-house—as if any man of self-respect would deny that wherever the flag floats in dishonor, honor commands it to be hauled down.

The clamor increased when it became known that under the instructions of our State Department the American Minister in Hawaii had offered to the dethroned Queen to restore her to her royal dignity, of which she had been deprived by the wrongful use of the power of the United States, on condition that she issue a general amnesty. It was fortunate that she refused to do this, and thus gave our Government an opportunity to retreat from an engagement, the execution of which might have produced most unfortunate complications. To restore the *status quo ante* even to the extent of putting the Queen on her throne again by the employment of the same power of the United States by which she had been driven from it, would indeed have accorded with abstract justice. But in dealing with the actualities of this world we have sometimes to admit that there are wrongs which cannot be completely righted in perfect justice to all, because by such wrongs situations may have been created, the entire overturning of which would inflict new wrongs upon innocent persons without after all furnishing the complete redress of the old wrongs aimed at. Thus the restoration of the Hawaiian Queen would undoubtedly have brought about in that country a state of restlessness and insecurity most grievous to the innocent part of the population—not to speak of the clash of opinions and the distracting agitation it would have caused in the United States.

It was wise, therefore, to recognize the new government of Hawaii as the government *de facto*, and firmly to resist the annexation scheme. On the whole, the action of the Administration in this case produced excellent effects. In declining to profit from an illegitimate use of the power of the United States, and in endeavoring, as far as possible,

to redress a wrong done through it, Mr. Cleveland's Administration gave to the world a proof of our fairness, justice and good faith in dealing with weaker nations which could not fail greatly to raise the character of this Republic in the esteem and confidence of mankind. Nor did Mr. Cleveland render his country a less valuable service in saving it, by defeating the Hawaiian annexation scheme, from the first step in the direction of indiscriminate and reckless aggrandizement.

So uniformly judicious and discreet had Mr. Cleveland been in the conduct of our foreign relations; so solicitously had he guarded the honor and dignity of this Republic, not only by maintaining our own rights, but also by respecting the rights of others; so careful and conscientious in the observance of the principles of international law had been his course with regard to the insurrection in Cuba, notwithstanding the clamor of the professional "jingoes" and of hot-headed sympathizers, and notwithstanding, too, his own sympathy with the cause of the insurgents; so wisely and consistently pacific and so dignified had been his foreign policy throughout, that the people were struck with wonder and amazement when they read his famous Venezuela message on the 17th of December, 1895, in which he asked Congress to make an appropriation for a commission to investigate the boundary line in dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana; declared that if Great Britain refused to submit the whole matter to arbitration, the United States should by every means in their power enforce the finding of our own commission; substantially made the cause of Venezuela our own, and apparently countenanced, by inference at least, that construction of the Monroe Doctrine now so much in vogue, which maintains that the relations between any part of America and any foreign power are virtually the business of this Republic.

Without taking time for calm deliberation both Houses of Congress promptly voted the appropriation asked for. From many parts of the country came expressions of approval. The jingoes were jubilant, for they thought that the Administration had surrendered to them, and there was a threat of war in the air. A panicky feeling seized upon the business community both in England and in the United States. The prices of stocks and bonds dropped with a thump. The losses caused by the depreciation of securities were enormous. The revival of business in this country, of which there had been some promising symptoms, was instantly checked by a nervous sense of apprehension. Many of Mr. Cleveland's most steadfast friends were sorely puzzled. What could he mean? Did he try to catch popularity for himself and his party? But he was not a demagogue. Did he wish to provoke a war? But he had always been a man of peace. The truth most probably is that, the United States having for many years acted in this matter as the friend of Venezuela, he felt a certain responsibility as to the outcome; that he was irritated by the constant advance of British territorial claims at the expense of Venezuela, and apprehensive of a new forward attempt; that he thought it time to stop further encroachment and bring the question to a final issue; and that he knew of no better means to this end than a vigorous demonstration on the part of this Republic involving the possibility of war.

Assuming that the objects President Cleveland had in view were right, it can hardly be denied that by prudent and at the same time energetic management they might have been reached without the risk of a collision with a friendly power, without exciting dangerous passions among our population, without a disastrous disturbance of the business of the country—and thus without a grievous break in Mr. Cleveland's otherwise so dignified and states-

manlike foreign policy. At the same time it must be admitted that the means he employed did accomplish his purpose. As soon as a danger of war appeared on the horizon, public sentiment in England pronounced itself so generally and so emphatically for the preservation of peace with the United States that Lord Salisbury could yield important points in the Venezuela boundary dispute and thus clear the way for a satisfactory arrangement without weakening his position before the British people. In this country, too, the bellicose flurry was speedily subdued by telling demonstrations of our love of peace and goodwill among nations, which warmly responded to the feeling manifested by English public opinion. And then came, borne along on the wave of international fraternalism, that great achievement which alone would suffice to make an Administration memorable for all time—the general arbitration treaty between the United States and Great Britain—not only a guaranty of peace between the two nations but an example for all mankind to follow, an epoch in the advance of civilization. The active negotiations for this treaty belong wholly to Mr. Cleveland's Administration. They were begun under Secretary Gresham, and carried to a successful issue with extraordinary ability by Secretary Olney. The efforts made in the Senate to prevent the confirmation of the treaty while Mr. Cleveland was President—efforts attributed by the opinion of the country to a combination of partisan jealousy and personal rancor—succeeded in postponing the final consummation, but ignominiously failed in taking from Mr. Cleveland's Administration the glory of the achievement. That treaty will forever stand as a monumental milestone in history, bearing in large characters the names of Cleveland, Gresham and Olney. Nor will any amendments intended to emasculate the treaty defeat its purpose. The very fact that the executive heads of the

two countries once concluded it will henceforth put upon any refusal to submit to arbitration any difference between them a burden of odium too heavy for any civilized nation to bear. This victory of peace is won.

There is another great victory with which Mr. Cleveland's name is nobly identified. He was a civil service reformer, not as a theorist, but as a practical administrator. He knew from practical experience that public office, to be treated as a public trust, must cease to be party spoil, and that a department of the public service, to be a business department, must cease to be a patronage department. He knew also that offices would not cease to be treated as party spoil so long as they were filled by partisan favor, and that public departments would not cease to be patronage departments so long as they had patronage to bestow. He had learned this as Mayor of Buffalo and as Governor of New York, and he found in the competitive merit system the simple, honest, practical remedy. When he became President the first time in 1885, he would have wiped out the spoils system at once, had he not feared by breaking too brusquely with long-established political habits, to alienate his party. He resolved therefore slowly to extend the civil service rules already in operation while humoring the Democratic politicians by conceding to them as much as he thought necessary. Such concessions, once begun, are apt to lead on beyond the original intention, and so it happened that at the end of his first term he had dissatisfied the reformers without satisfying the party politicians. Still, when he went out of office in 1889, he had added 12,000 places to those under the civil service rules.

It has already been mentioned what considerations induced him at the beginning of his second Administration to humor the politicians of his party again and to postpone what blows he meant to strike for his cherished

reform. The first three years he added only this and that branch of the service to the classified list, and established rules covering a part of the consular service. But on the 6th of May, 1896, he issued an order which marked an epoch. It not only added at one stroke of the pen over 40,000 places to those already classified, making the total nearly 90,000, but it established the general principle that it is the natural and normal status of persons serving under the Executive Departments of the National Government to be under the civil service rules—in other words, that it shall no longer require a special edict to put them there, but that they shall be considered and treated as being there unless excepted by special edict.

This order was the most effective blow the spoils system had ever received. It completed the work of civil service reform as to the subordinate places under the heads of Government offices, leaving in their old condition virtually only the officers to be appointed with the consent of the Senate, and the minor postmasters. These, it is to be hoped, will in the same spirit be dealt with by Mr. Cleveland's successors. But of him it may justly be said that while he has not done for the reform of the civil service all that could and should be done, he has done far more than all his predecessors together, and he will ever stand preëminent among the champions of that great cause.

But he was a reformer of the Government service in more than one sense. No man in the Presidential chair has ever battled with more devotion, energy and fearlessness for economy and rectitude in the administration of the people's business; not one has carried on the struggle against the prevailing wantonness of public expenditure and against corrupt jobs more bravely, more persistently and with more unceasing watchfulness; and not one has, in doing this, defied the prejudices of large classes of people, the powerful resentment of favored

interests and the vindictive hatred of greedy schemers with more self-sacrificing fortitude than he. The spectacle of the President of the United States, in the small hours of the night, poring over the details of bills granting public money for rivers and harbors, or for pensions, or for public buildings, and what not, to satisfy himself whether the people's interests were well guarded, and then, whenever he detected fraud, or wastefulness, writing his veto messages with an indefatigable and unflinching sense of duty—that spectacle has not seldom been held up to disdain and ridicule by unprincipled or light-headed persons. But the more thoughtfully the patriotic citizen contemplates it, the more worthy will he find that President of the admiration, confidence and gratitude of the people.

No thinking man denies that corruption and profligacy, the tendency to make the Government an agency for private support and the loose methods of doing the Government's business which minister to such evil practices are among the gravest dangers besetting democratic institutions. The more highly should we value among our officers of state that courage of conscience which fears nothing, and that devotion to duty which shuns no drudgery to protect the purity of the Government and the character and interests of the Nation. Indeed, there was something of civic heroism in the figure of President Cleveland as during the expiring days of his term he sat in the political solitude of the White House, to the last moment plodding in the accustomed way, elaborately writing out his enlightened and cogent objections to an illiberal immigration bill, in spite of the clamor in favor of it; studying appropriations and casting them aside if extravagant, and vetoing grants of pension if unwarranted by fact or equity—although he well knew that in most cases Congress would pass such acts of legislation over

his head without a moment's consideration—thus doing his duty for duty's sake. It would be going too far to say that, as a reward, every honest man was his friend; but surely every rascal was by instinct his enemy. And all good citizens have reason to wish that every one of his successors may, irrespective of political opinions, possess that conscience and moral force which were President Cleveland's distinguishing qualities.

It is said that his Administration was a failure. True, he failed in holding his party together. But who would have succeeded? He felt himself a party man because he believed in the "old" Democratic policies which aimed at economical, simple and honest government of, for and by the people. He sought to elevate his party again to the level of its original principles. It was his ambition to do the country good service in the name of that Democracy. It was his fate—a fate with something of the tragic in it—that his very endeavors to revive the best of the old Democracy served only to reveal the moral decay and the political disruption of the Democracy of his day, and to consign him to an isolation paralleled in our history only by that of John Quincy Adams. There could be no more whimsical irony of fortune than that, after Mr. Cleveland had led his party to victory over the McKinley tariff, not only the specific fruits of that victory were made repugnant to him by the treachery of other Democratic leaders, but that the greater treason of the National Convention of his party, by threatening the country with immeasurable calamities, forced him to favor the election of Mr. McKinley himself as his successor in the Presidential office, and to find in Mr. McKinley's victory a popular vindication of his own financial principles.

As to the Democracy for which he had stood, it survived only in those represented by the Indianapolis convention of sound-money Democrats—the saving remnant, em-

bodying the hope—indeed the only hope—of a Democratic party resurrection.

But what does the true success of an Administration consist in? Not in the mere prosperity of a party organization, but in the public good accomplished and in the public evil prevented. Who, then, will deny that, had not Mr. Cleveland stood like a tower of strength between his country and bankruptcy, we should have been forced on the silver basis and into the disgrace of repudiation? Would not, without his prompt interposition, the annexation of Hawaii have launched us upon a career of indiscriminate aggrandizement and wild adventure imperiling our peace and the character of our institutions? Has he not been a bulwark against countless jobs and acts of special legislation and of reckless extravagance, not only by his vetoes, but by merely being seen at his post? And as to the good accomplished, how many Administrations do we find in our annals that have left behind them a prouder record of achievement than the maintenance of the money standard and the credit of the country against immense difficulties, the splendid advance in the reform of the civil service, and that signal triumph of the enlightened and humane spirit of our closing century—the general arbitration treaty with Great Britain? Whatever its mischances and failures may have been—with such successes the second Cleveland Administration can confidently appeal to the judgment of history. Nobody pretends that Mr. Cleveland is the ideal human being or the ideal statesman; but it is safe to say that the greatness of his name will constantly grow in the historic retrospect, and that his figure will continue to stand strong and eminent in the front rank of American Presidents long after the small politicians who sought to thwart or belittle him have been buried under the drift sands of time.

CIVIL SERVICE REFORM AND THE "BLACK ACT"<sup>1</sup>

GOVERNOR:—We appear here with the respectful request that you will not permit the bill now before you, known as the civil service bill, to become a law.

As citizens living under a constitutional government we are all in duty bound to uphold the fundamental law of the State. The higher the officer of the State, the more weighty becomes the obligation he assumes when taking this oath: "I do solemnly swear that I will support the Constitution of the United States and the constitution of the State of New York, according to the best of my ability."

The constitution of the State of New York contains this clause: "Appointments and promotions in the civil service of the State, and of all the civil divisions thereof, including cities and villages, shall be made according to merit and fitness, to be ascertained, so far as practicable, by examination, which, so far as practicable, shall be competitive." The true intent and meaning of this provision is that the civil service system existing by law in this State should stand under the safeguard of a constitutional mandate—not, indeed, as to every detail of its mechanism, but at least as to its fundamental principles and essential features. This is no mere surmise. It is a view repeatedly and emphatically confirmed by judicial decisions. Permit me to quote one of them as a specimen:

The rule as to open competitive examinations, and the manner of its operation and effect, were well known to the people of the State when the constitution was submitted to

<sup>1</sup> An address on behalf of the Civil Service Reform Association of New York, at a hearing given at the executive chamber, Albany, May 6, 1897, on the pending bill to amend the civil service laws of the State, commonly known as the "Black Act."

the popular vote. It had been in operation in the Federal service and in this and other States for ten years. That the people intended to embody the result of that experience in the fundamental law of the State is beyond question, and in construing the power of the legislature over the manner of examinations we must give due and proper effect to that purpose and intent. [Supreme Court, case of Keymer.]

There are several other decisions to the same effect. They are, no doubt, well known to you.

The competitive examinations prescribed by the constitution are, therefore, beyond question, in every essential point such as were provided for by the civil service law at the time when the constitution was adopted—that is to say, in point of fact, what true competitive examinations were universally understood to be wherever a civil service system like ours was in practice.

What is that competitive examination? It is an examination in which every citizen conforming to certain requirements as to age, health and moral character has a right to appear, and in which he has a perfectly equal chance with every other candidate—whether rich or poor, whether the son of a hod-carrier or of a millionaire, whether Republican or Democrat or non-partisan, whether Christian, Jew or Gentile—and which gives those who pass the tests of merit and fitness most successfully the best title to appointment—an examination, in one word, which puts all citizens, irrespective of wealth, of social or political influence, of party affiliation or of religious belief, upon a perfectly equal footing, giving the best man the best chance. You will admit, Governor, that a more democratic system of appointment to office could not be conceived.

It will be observed that the necessary effect of this competitive system is to confine the discretion of the

appointing power within narrow limits. This is not a mere incidental effect, but it was the original design.

It has a plausible sound when we are told that the head of a public department knows best what kind of men he needs for the work to be done. In private business, where political pressure is unknown, this rule indeed holds good. But we, you and I, and many of those here present, who have the experience of public life, know but too well that, even if the head of a public department does possess that knowledge, he will, so long as he is exposed to political pressure, not be left free to act upon it. We know but too well that this independent and enlightened discretion of the appointing officer to be freely exercised for the good of the service is a myth.

Permit me to tell you why I speak of this with so much assurance. I am not a mere theorist in this matter. During the forty years I have been more or less actively connected with public life, I have witnessed and taken part in a great many things. I have served my apprenticeship as a practical politician. I started under what is currently called the spoils system, when the distribution of offices as rewards for political or personal service was the recognized rule, and the present civil service reform was not yet thought of. I swam with the current for a considerable period, until I saw where that current would carry us. My ideas about the evils flowing from the spoils system are, therefore, not merely evolved from my inner consciousness. They have been the product of personal observation, aye, of personal participation. I saw those evils with my own eyes; I touched them with my own hands.

As to the point here in question, I not merely believe, *I know* that the plea for the discretion of the heads of public departments in making appointments is clap-trap of the most deceptive sort. I know that heads of depart-

ments who cared more for party politics than for the good of the service used that discretion recklessly for political or personal ends without much regard to the public good. I know that heads of departments who cared more for the public good than for party politics must have had in them the stuff that martyrs are made of, in order to resist, in the exercise of their discretionary appointing-power, that political pressure which sought to extort from them appointments obnoxious to their sense of duty, and that such martyrs never have been plenty. I know that the incompetent and dishonest persons that infested the service generally got their places by such pressure. I know that no man, however able and worthy, could get a place without the favor or influence of some powerful person, save in very exceptional cases. I know that when I was a Department chief myself, all sorts of incompetent or disreputable persons were pressed upon me for appointment with a force and persistency extremely difficult to withstand. I know that I could not remove a clerk for undutiful conduct, aye, not even for habitual drunkenness, without having a lot of Congressmen on my hands protesting against the removal, and going sometimes so far as to threaten me with obstructing the appropriations for my Department if I insisted. I know that when there were not places enough to go around, the most unjust removals were urged to make room, or the creation of new berths was imperiously demanded, and that thus the public pay-rolls were overloaded with salaries that were mere wanton waste.

I know, further, that when I took charge of the Interior Department I saw but one way to shut off that dangerous, mischievous, demoralizing pressure, to stop that incessant and exhausting struggle against dictatorial influences which constantly sought to force my discretionary power into doing things which my sense of duty to the public

forbade me to do, and to save my time and working strength for the public business to which I was commissioned to devote myself. And what was that way? It was to institute of my own motion, without being bound to do so by law, a system of competitive examinations for that Department, to determine the appointments I had to make. I thus voluntarily stripped myself of my own discretionary power, and I did it for my own protection as well as for the good of the service. For when after that act Members of Congress or other political potentates came to me to unload upon my Department their favorites or hangers-on, I said to them: "Welcome, gentlemen. Send on your men. They will be examined by an impartial commission, and the man who comes out best will get the place."

And what did my bureau chiefs say whose positions corresponded to the heads of departments in our State government, and in our great municipalities? Did they insist that they knew best what kind of men they wanted to do their work, and that therefore they must have a controlling influence upon the appointments? Did they claim that if my examining commission judged of the "merits" of the candidates, they must themselves be permitted to judge of their "fitness"? Oh, no! They were dutiful and experienced men. They knew that just so long as they were supposed to have any discretionary influence upon appointments, they would be exposed to a pressure extremely difficult, and to them dangerous, to resist. They, therefore, did not only not remonstrate against my order, but they warmly thanked me for it as an act that would protect them in their endeavor to serve the Government to the best of their ability, and that would inspire the service with a new moral spirit. And so it did. It is true, in the camp of the spoils-seekers there was much and extremely profane swearing. I was de-

nounced as a theorist, a visionary, a pharisee, a dude, a foreign monarchist, a Chinese and even much worse. In spite of it all the protecting bulwark surrounding the Department remained intact. We got from the competitive system a most excellent set of public servants. And every man and woman in the Department was stimulated in his or her work by the inspiring consciousness that every one of them had his chance according to merit, and that no longer the aristocratic rule of personal favor or political influence prevailed in the Department, but the rule of justice equal to all. And all this would have been impossible but for the competitive system, the most essential feature of which is that the examinations be conducted not by the appointing-power, nor under its specific direction or influence, but in every individual case with entire, absolute independence of it.

Now, these things I know—not from the talk of dreamers, or as philosophical deductions from abstract principles, but from my own observation and experience of hard actual facts as a man of affairs—as a practical politician, if you please—I know them, because I was there, and I had eyes to see, and ears to hear and a mind to understand. And, Governor, a great many of these things you know, too. For, although your experience may not have been as long as mine, it was certainly large enough to bring many of them to your notice. You know especially that what I said of the *aristocratic* character of the rule of favor and influence is true to the letter; that in the same measure as a public officer has the discretionary power of appointment, he is exposed to fierce pressure for public places by men of political or other influence; that this influence is exercised very frequently, if not in most cases, for reasons of a personal or political nature, without due regard to the public interest; that this pressure of influence is difficult to resist; that even strong

men in power will yield to it sometimes, and that weaker men succumb to it habitually; that every appointment made in obedience to such pressure means that somebody got an office owing to the favor, personal or political, of some influential person; that wherever an office is bestowed by favor, persons of superior merit and fitness who may aspire to it are thereby wrongfully deprived of their chance. And you will certainly not deny that distributing offices by favor is an essentially aristocratic practice. I am therefore right in speaking of the spoils system as the rule of an aristocracy of influence.

Opponents of the competitive merit system are fond of pretending that it removes the offices from the reach of the people. But are not under the spoils system the offices open only to those of the people who have the aristocracy of influence at their backs? Can it be said that the offices are open to the people if they are open only to the favored few? Here is an object lesson. A few days ago District-Attorney Olcott in New York City appointed seven subpoena servers and one messenger after a non-competitive examination. All these appointments were made on the recommendation of the Republican county committee. Were these places open to the people? No—only to such of the people who had the influence of the county committee at their backs. I maintain that an honest competitive system breaks the aristocracy of influence *distinctly for the benefit of the people—to secure justice to the people.* Only when public places are to be reached by free and open competitive tests accessible to all, and are conducted with honest impartiality—that is, when the element of personal or political favor or influence is entirely excluded from selection for office, when the favor of the millionaire and of the party chief combined weigh nothing against a simple demonstration of merit—only then will the poor man, the man

without influential backing, the man who depends entirely upon his own worth, be sure to have his fair and equal chance. Only then will public office be truly open to the people. Only then will our public service be administered upon principles truly democratic.

If the lowly, the laboring men, the men without influence, understood this competitive system—as some day, I trust, they will understand it—they would be aware that this alone opens to them and their children the road to public employment consistently with their self-respect and dignity as men, and that, without it, they will never be able to attain office unless becoming the political slave of somebody. They would be aware that every place withdrawn from honest competition and put within the discretion of the appointing-power is, as a rule, put beyond their reach, because it can be attained only by persons having the favor and influence of the powerful behind them. And knowing this, they would jealously watch every place removed from the honest competitive rule as a place stolen from them; and they would hold to stern account every political party seeking to transfer offices from competitive examinations conducted by independent examiners to the discretion of the appointing officer, and thus to expose it to political pressure and arbitrary favor; for they will have a right to denounce that party as seeking to rob the poor, the lowly, the men without backing, and their children, of their equal chance, and as playing directly into the hands of the aristocracy of influence.

Now, sir, apply what I have said to our present civil service law and to the change proposed in it by the bill before you. The existing law is based upon the right principle—that is to say, it provides for competitive examinations open to all, the examinations to be conducted by civil service boards, which are indeed appointed

and act under general rules ordered and approved by the governor or by the mayors of the different municipalities respectively, but are not subject to direction or influence on the part of the appointing officers as to the management of the specific examinations and the ratings to be made. Being thus independent of the appointing-power, the examinations have the essential prerequisite of impartiality and freedom from influence. This system, therefore, gives everybody an equal chance without favor and is essentially democratic.

I am aware that—mostly, if not wholly by the enemies of the system—complaints are made as to its working, charging that the examinations are too scholastic and not practical enough, that they do not sufficiently test character, and so on. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, the law or its execution were actually defective and called for amendment. To what end should such amendment be directed? Surely, if we mean to keep good faith with the people and with our own consciences, we shall exert our whole ingenuity to remedy the alleged defects by means in entire harmony with the constitutional mandate. We shall, above all things, avoid every device, aye, we shall as honest men spurn every thought of a scheme, that would strike at the fundamental principle, the essential requisite of the competitive system contemplated by the constitution—the principle that the management of the examinations and the making of the ratings shall in no wise be under the control or influence of the appointing officers.

What, then, does the bill before you provide? Under the constitution appointments shall be made “according to merit and fitness to be ascertained, so far as practicable, by competitive examinations.” So far during the fourteen years that the competitive system has been in practice in this country, and during the many more years that it

has been in practice elsewhere, the two words "merit" and "fitness" have been used by everybody who has had anything to do with civil service legislation, as meaning substantially the same thing—as one of those tautologies so frequent in our legal vocabulary. Nobody has ever thought of making, as applied to the civil service, any distinction between them. But now, all of a sudden, the authors of this bill have made the startling discovery that the two words mean essentially different things—so different, indeed, that a candidate for office should not be examined as to his "fitness" by the same board that examines him as to his "merit." This strikes me as if, when a candidate for a place were required to be "hale and hearty," one physician should examine him as to whether he was "hearty," and the other as to whether he was "hale."

I hold in my hand a report of questions actually asked in civil service examinations conducted by the civil service board in New York City. Of these, I will give you an example:

#### WEIGHMASTER—FIRE DEPARTMENT

(1.) Do you consider it the duty of a weighmaster in a city department personally to supervise all weighing of coal delivered to that department? Give the reasons for your answer.

(2.) In your opinion should all coal so delivered be weighed or would the weighing of samples be sufficient? Give the reasons for your answer.

(3.) What, in your opinion, would be a proper system of checks in order to prevent any collusion between the weighmaster and dealer?

(4.) To what points, in particular, would your attention be directed in order to prevent dishonest delivery?

(5.) If you were called on to superintend the issuing of stores from the general store-room for the use of the depart-

ment, state what vouchers you would think essential, and what system of records you would keep, in order that the accounts might be in proper form?

(6.) Given, the necessary character, ability and acquaintance with the duties of the position of weighmaster, what do you consider the most important qualification for that position?

(7.) What simple way is there of testing the accuracy of a beam balance?

Will you kindly ask yourself whether these questions should come under the head of "merit" or of "fitness," and why, if "merit," they should be asked by one board, and if "fitness" by another? And so you may go through this whole record, which I beg leave to commend to your study, and you will find that, as soon as this novel distinction is practically tested, it turns out to be a mere piece of hair-splitting pettifoggery.

But this hair-splitting has been resorted to for a purpose. So far "merit and fitness" have been tested together in one competitive examination, by boards independent of the appointing officers, which independent boards ascertained the results, made the ratings and certified the candidates rated highest on a scale of one hundred for appointment. This method, honestly executed, gave every person, however lowly or uninfluentia, a fair chance, for there was no arbitrary favoritism or political influence in the proceeding. But now, under this bill, only what is called "merit" shall be examined into by civil service commissions independent of the appointing officers, and however successfully the examined candidate stands the test, he shall at best receive only a rating 50 in 100—that is to say, he shall be considered only half qualified for appointment, the other half of qualification to be rated by another authority that is to examine him for what is called "fitness." And who is that other authority? The appointing officer himself.

Thus the essential principle, that to secure the examination of candidates for office against the interference of arbitrary favoritism or political influence, they must be independent of the discretion of the appointing officers—the principle evidently contemplated by the constitutional mandate—is completely nullified. Is it not? Is there anything in this bill affording the slightest guaranty of impartiality in conducting the examinations or making the ratings on the part of the appointing officer? Let us see. The bill provides:

Sec. 2. The fitness of the applicants shall be determined by examination, to be conducted by the person or persons holding the power of appointment or promotion, or by some person or board designated by the person holding such power of appointment, and the rating on such examination for fitness shall not exceed in any case 50 per cent. The rating upon the examination for fitness shall be added by the person or persons holding the power of appointment or promotion to the rating given each applicant, respectively, by the civil service commissioners or examining Board, as provided in section one of this act.

Think of this! The appointing officer may conduct these examinations just as he pleases, in secret or in public, orally or in writing, personally or through whomsoever he may designate—a party district committee, or a consistory of divines, or even the barkeeper of the nearest saloon, for there is nothing to prevent it. Whatever he may do, he need not leave any record of it. Our civil service commissioners have to keep the examination papers on file. They may be looked into, and if any mistake has been made it can be discovered and corrected; if any injustice has been done it can be redressed. But the appointing officer under this bill is relieved of such surveillance. This examination into fitness may be

wholly oral and leave no trace behind it except the verdict. And that verdict, absolutely unrestrained as it is, and utterly arbitrary and unjust as it may be, is to stand unimpeachable, and is to weigh as much as the examination held by an independent and impartial board. And this is called an impartial machinery for competitive examination.

The consequences, if this bill becomes a law, are easily foreseen. No sooner will it be known that the appointing officers have the power to shape the examinations for "fitness" as they please, than the pressure of the aristocracy of influence will again be upon them in full force, cajoling, urging, bullying them into compliance with its behests. And how many of the appointing officers will be strong or virtuous enough to resist? We are told that, when we predict the return of the spoils abuses as the result of such a law, we are reasoning upon the assumption that the appointing officers will not do their duty. Why, sir, we do not reason upon any mere assumption at all! We reason upon the universal experience that whenever appointing officers had such discretionary power, they, in nine cases out of ten, were cajoled, urged, bullied into compliance with the pressure of influence. There is no assumption, no guesswork about it. We reason upon the basis of indisputable fact. There were examinations conducted under the control of the appointing officers in the Federal Departments for many, many years before the introduction of the competitive system. These examinations soon degenerated into the veriest farce. They never offered the slightest obstacle to the bestowal of place as spoil or favor. They may have served sometimes to turn away a candidate without backing; but they never served to keep out of place any one whom the appointing officer or the influence ruling him really desired to appoint.

Is it objected that the examinations for "fitness"

under this bill are to be competitive? Yes, competitive with a vengeance. Let us see how the machinery will work. The bill as amended provides that the civil service commission under the orders of the governor shall fix a minimum rate which, in the examination for "merit," the candidate must have reached in order to be admitted to the examination of "fitness." Suppose this minimum is fixed at 30 or 35. Now some scores or some hundreds of candidates who have reached that minimum trot around from one appointing officer to another to show themselves fit—in itself a wonderful arrangement, ludicrous enough to extort a smile from a mummy. What will the appointing officers do? I will not speak of a department chief who cares more for party politics than for the good of the service. The whole business of examining for "fitness" will be regarded only as good fun by him. No; let us take a departmental chief who does care for the interest of the service, and who is full of those good intentions with which the road to hell is paved. Here are some of those successful "merit" men who present to Mr. Commissioner letters from some millionaire, some railroad magnate who wishes to dump upon the public service certain poor relatives or useless hangers-on, and promises Mr. Commissioner a return of favors. Mr. Commissioner is pleased, and his virtue feels the flattering temptation. Other candidates are urgently recommended by a party committee, which informs him that the organization wants recognition, and reminds Mr. Commissioner of his party obligations. Still other candidates bring an order from the supreme party boss, who curtly demands places with good salaries for these men, and in a tone of command bids Mr. Commissioner not to be squeamish, but to hustle. Mr. Commissioner's virtue is knocked into unconsciousness, and he begins to arrange for the tests of "fitness."

Suppose, then, there are some other young men, sons of lowly parents, without the influence of millionaires or of party committees or bosses behind them. They have in the "merit" examination the highest rating, 50, while the favorites of influence stand only little above the minimum, say 35. Mr. Commissioner calls one of the poor boys without influence before him for examination into his "fitness." The department, let us say, is that of public works. Mr. Commissioner asks: "How many cubic feet are there in two rods square? Answer quickly." The poor candidate looks perplexed. "You can't answer?" says Mr. Commissioner. "Sorry; you seem to have lots of 'merit,' but no 'fitness' to speak of." Now comes the rating. "Merit," 50; "fitness," zero; total, 50. A candidate with the millionaires' or party committee's or bosses' influence appears. "How much is four times four?" asks Mr. Commissioner. "Sixteen," cheerily answers the candidate. "Excellent!" says Mr. Commissioner. "You have not much 'merit,' but 'fitness' plenty and to spare." Rating: For "merit," 35; for "fitness," 50; total, 85. The poor, uninfluential "merit" man walks sadly off, and the "fitness" man with strong backing gets the place.

You may say that this is a caricature and a farce; and, truly, so it looks. But is it a mere creation of fancy? What is there in this bill to prevent it from actually happening? Nothing—absolutely nothing. Will you say that such brazen things will not happen? Why, they actually have happened. There is now in the service of this State a gentleman who years ago, when in the Federal service examinations were conducted under the control of the appointing officers, was, as a favored candidate, actually asked the identical question: "How much is four times four?" And in addition: "What is the capital of this Union?" And having answered these

questions correctly, he got the place. Why should not this happen again? If Mr. Commissioner should be ashamed to do the thing himself, he can, under this bill, delegate the job to some district committeeman, or to the nearest barkeeper. They will do the business with zest.

Will you say that the Governor would stop such scandals by ordering proper rules for regular competitive tests to be made? Well, there are other tricks equally effective. If the appointing officers manage the examinations, they may simply furnish the favored candidates beforehand with the questions to be asked, and with the correct answers. You think such things will not be done? I tell you such things have been done. Some time ago the majority of the fire board of the City of New York in its original composition wanted a certain favored person to pass a competitive examination in order to get a certain place. They wished that the questions should be "practical," and, "knowing the work to be done," they furnished a set of questions to the city civil service commission to be propounded to the candidates. What happened? The civil service commission framed a different set of questions, although running in the same line. When the examination papers were taken up, it was found that the favored candidate had, in the place of the questions put by the civil service commission, written down the questions coming from the fire board, with the correct answers. The fraud was evident. It failed. Why did it fail? Because the examination was managed by an independent civil service commission. Had it been managed by the fire board, the appointing officers, the fraud would, of course, have succeeded, and the favored candidate would have got the place by a so-called competitive examination. And when that fraud had failed, the fire board caused to be put through the legislature a bill transferring all examinations for the fire depart-

ment to the fire board itself—that is, to the appointing officers, thus trying to get for that department, of course for crooked ends, substantially the same power which this bill is to give all the public departments of the State and of the municipalities. The bill of the fire board failed through the veto of the mayor after the close of the session. But, sir, is it a wonder that the board of fire underwriters, in the interest of the insurance companies and of the public, now solemnly protests against the much more general and more dangerous bill before you?

Thus it is vain to say that such things, or even things more outrageous, will not happen. I ask you once more, what is there in this bill to prevent them? Why, this measure is so loosely constructed that the merest tyro at fraud can drive a coach and four through all the pretence of competitive examinations. It furnishes such facilities that it *invites* such things to be done. Nay, go around among the spoils politicians of this State and you will hear them say that this bill is gotten up for the very purpose that such things *shall* be done, not as an exception but as a rule. There is absolutely no difference of opinion about the certain effects of this bill. Because it will surely bring back the abuses of the spoils system, the friends of an honest civil service oppose it. And why do the spoils politicians advocate it? Because it will bring back the spoils system with all its consequences. Its opponents protest against it and its friends advocate it—both for exactly the same reason, in perfect agreement as to its inevitable results.

However, let us give its authors as to their intentions the benefit of the doubt. If you think, sir, that the existing civil service system has defects which should be remedied, then I ask you, in all candor, do you see no other way to accomplish that object than this sure method

utterly to ruin and destroy the system? Must you needs burn down the whole house to make a chimney draw? What do you complain of? That the questions asked in the examinations are too scholastic? That no sufficient means are employed to ascertain character? That the interests and wishes of the several departments are not sufficiently regarded in the purview of the examinations? Why, sir, if these complaints were well founded, you as governor have the amplest power to rectify all this in the simplest way. The law gives you the power to approve or disapprove, aye, virtually to make the rules in accordance with the constitutional mandate, and to modify in a general sense the methods of proceeding of the civil service boards. And so have the mayors of the cities the power. All that is required is that you should sit down and, with such expert aid as you can abundantly command, go over the rules and over the records of the examinations. You can say: Here is a rule that seems to be too broad or too narrow, and I order it to be changed thus and so; or, I fail to find here proper methods for the ascertainment of character or of practical skill or experience, and I direct that such methods be adopted, or that the departments be consulted as to the line the examinations should follow. You, as governor, can do all this. You can do everything consistent with the fundamental principle of the constitutional mandate. There is absolutely no obstacle in your way—and we shall all be happy to aid you in making the system more effective and beneficial.

Now, since you can do all this by a simple exercise of your executive power, why, in the name of common-sense, why this bill? Why this unheard of and ridiculous pettifoggery about the difference between "merit" and "fitness"? Why this multiplication of examinations, this trotting around of hundreds or thousands of candidates

from "merit" to "fitness" tests, which would increase labor and cost beyond computation? Why this exposure of appointing officers to no end of pressure and temptation, exhausting their time and working-force, and corrupting their morals? Why this vast complicated machinery which, even if it were honestly used, would throw the civil service into inextricable and ridiculous confusion? Why all this, when for a real, honest improvement of the system you need only a conscientious use of the power you have as governor under the constitution and the law?

Sir, if this bill is really intended to improve the existing civil service system, it must be regarded as one of the most pitiable abortions ever brought forth by human ingenuity. But if it has been devised by its authors to subvert that system and to open again all the gates to the abuses of spoils politics, then we would have to admit it to be a success. In that case the only fault to be found with the authors would be that they did not have the courage openly to avow their purpose, but with craven hypocrisy hid that purpose behind a network of false pretenses.

May I be pardoned for inquiring who asked for this bill? I know, indeed, a host of good citizens who condemn it with indignation and alarm. Look over the list of names on the petition for this hearing. There you find the foremost representatives of the church, of education, of science, of commerce, of industry, of labor—all uniting in this condemnation. Every man in the public service who cares more for the public good than for party politics abhors it. Nay, not a few of the very members of the legislature, who voted for it under caucus dictation—a practice which may mark the temporary success of despotic leadership, but is the moral ruin of political parties—many of those very members of the legislature,

secretly or openly, protested against it. Thus we know what sort of people condemn this measure although many of them have not yet spoken. But may I again inquire, who asked for it? It would be of great interest to the people of the State, Governor, if you would make known a list of its sponsors.

We know some of the men who support it now—all on the ground that it will make all the thousands of offices of the State and its municipalities the prey of the spoils politicians again. One of them, Mr. Abraham Gruber, has elaborated his reasoning into a systematic philosophy of American politics, which teaches us this: The American people need the stimulant of party spoil in the shape of offices, to create in them that interest in public affairs without which democratic institutions would perish. If the spoils of office are withdrawn from our party contests by civil service reform, then another stimulant, namely, money, will take their place. The spoils of office are, therefore, necessary to prevent general bribery and corruption by money.

This is Mr. Gruber's philosophy of American politics, and, therefore, he is an ardent friend of this bill. Sir, have you considered what this means? It means that of all the nations which live under constitutional governments, none of which, except ourselves, has the spoils system, the American people are the only one so constitutionally mercenary, so hopelessly depraved, that they will not take any interest in their public affairs unless they are stimulated by the prospect of reward, either in the shape of office plunder or of bribe money. And this fact is to be officially recognized by our civil service legislation. Sir, can this be so? Have we indeed sunk so low? Is this really the character of our citizenship? Is this the outcome of a century of democratic government in this great and glorious Republic? If this were

so, then indeed we should have to despair of the capacity of man to govern himself. But I pronounce it a foul and atrocious calumny. Never was a more wanton, a deadlier insult thrown into the face of a high-minded and patriotic people. And every honest American heel should lift itself to kick the vile slanderer into the sea!

Yes, there are indeed some men among us, fortunately a small minority, who will take an interest in public affairs only for personal reward, and are patriots for revenue only. It would be much better for our public morals, as well as for the dignity and welfare of the American people, if those mercenary bands ceased to take *their* interest in our public affairs, and to disgust and crowd out and to rule better citizens than themselves. But I appeal to your instinct as a patriot, sir, should we feed that greed, should we gratify and stimulate that mercenary spirit by legislation like this?

For such reasons, Governor, we appear here to pray that you may refuse your signature to this bill. A few days after the fall of Richmond, in 1865, Abraham Lincoln pointed out to a friend the usual crowd of officehunters and their backers besieging his door, and he said: "Look at this. Now we have overcome the rebellion, but here you see something that may become more dangerous to this Republic than the rebellion itself." Had he lived, he would perhaps himself have led in the effort to avert a danger which his great mind so clearly foresaw. But that task has dropped upon the shoulders of another generation —the task of destroying the spoils system, which, according to Lincoln's utterance, appeared to him no less important than the task of destroying the slave-power, and which has proved hardly less difficult. But it is certainly no less hopeful.

With the faithful and unremitting effort the opponents of the spoils system succeeded in the enactment of laws

and the introduction of rules promising the complete accomplishment of their object in a future not very remote. The obstacles which the advancing reform had to overcome and the boisterous reactionary movement that has now set in vividly recall to my mind the changing fortune of the struggle against slavery. I remember the enthusiastic uprising of the anti-slavery sentiment after the pro-slavery attempt upon Kansas, the high hopes of immediate victory that was set upon the Frémont campaign of 1856, the thick gloom that followed Frémont's defeat, how the slave-power seemed to carry all before it under Buchanan's Administration, how even the highest judiciary of the Republic wrote one of the few dark pages of its history in fortifying slavery by the Dred Scott decision, how all seemed lost and how then those dismal days were speedily followed by the complete and final triumph of freedom.

With proud confidence in the sense of National honor, in the virtue and the wisdom of the American people, I venture to predict that as they wiped out the blot of slavery from the National escutcheon, so they will surely at last sweep away the barbarism and corruption of spoils politics. It is true, a violent and noisy effort is now in progress to wrest from the reform the ground it has conquered. The party in power, which has been most positive in its pledges to support and advance the reform, is urged by some of its members with furious cries to dis-honor itself by breaking its word; and timid leaders are frightened by the deafening clamor of a greedy minority as if it were the voice of the people. All this may appear very formidable to-day, but it will not prevent the ultimate consummation. The reform cause may, indeed, meet with temporary obstruction, as the anti-slavery movement did in Buchanan's time. Some men in conspicuous position may disgrace themselves and regret

their weakness forever after. This or that political party may prove faithless to its pledges, and invite the discipline of defeat. You may sign this bill and make it a law—although I think it can hardly be the ambition of a governor to figure as the Buchanan of New York in the history of the State. If it does become a law it may indeed cast a shadow upon the fame of New York. It may serve for a short while to interrupt and retard the onward march of reform. But the whole reactionary attempt of which this bill is a part cannot finally stop that onward march. The present attempt can only succeed in reviving old abuses and scandals, and in furnishing fresh object lessons which will teach the people all the more clearly that the completest and most rigorous enforcement of the reform is imperatively required for the honor as well as the welfare of the Republic. And that will all the more certainly come.

We are, therefore, very far from begging here for the life of the reform movement. That is well enough assured. We ask only that trouble which is altogether useless and unnecessarily disturbing, be avoided. We may add by way of friendly caution that the time is not far [off] when public men will be as sorry to have figured as the aiders and abettors of the barbarous and corrupt spoils system, as, in the North at least, other public men are sorry for having in the past made a record as aiders and abettors of slavery.

Humble private citizen as I am, it may appear in me a presumptuous fancy to imagine myself as occupying the seat of power now held by you. Pardon me for indulging myself in that dream for a moment, to consider what I would do in your place. I would—as I trust you do—keep steadily before my mind the solemnity of the oath I had sworn, “to support the constitution of the State according to the best of my ability.” I would ask myself

most conscientiously whether the scheme involved in this bill was really the best that my ability could devise to carry out the true intent of that constitution which I had taken a sacred oath to support. I would most scrupulously avoid doing or sanctioning anything that might prejudice or obstruct those among my people that are poor and lowly and without power and influence, in enjoying their full right to public position according to their merit, on a footing of perfect equality with others more favored. And as I valued the good name I wished to leave as an inheritance to my children, I would never, never put that name under a bill so full of mischief and indignity as this.

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## TO PRESIDENT McKINLEY

16 EAST 64TH ST., NEW YORK, June 4, 1897.

My dear Mr. President: Mr. McAneny, the secretary of the Civil Service Reform League, will present to you a memorial from a committee of that body which speaks for itself. The permission you kindly gave me at our very pleasant interview here to write to you whenever I thought I had anything pertinent to say, encourages me to add a few words.

The triumph of the Republican party at the last election seems to have had the effect of exciting in its spoils politicians the hope of upsetting what has been gained for the cause of civil service reform by a hard struggle of many years. This fact in itself cannot but be in the highest degree mortifying and humiliating to every conscientious Republican who remembers the solemn pledges of the platform of his party. You are no doubt aware of what has happened in this State. You will, I am sure, not think it unnatural that the class of citizens to which I belong should find it hard to see the victory to which they

have more or less contributed used by some of its beneficiaries to the end of undoing a great work to which we had devoted the best efforts of our lives, and to be, in addition, assailed with gross personal abuse for defending what the Republican party had solemnly promised to maintain and extend.

It is needless to say that I have the fullest confidence in your good faith, and this confidence inspires me with the hope that you will not take amiss a respectful suggestion which I venture to offer to your consideration. It seems to me that this whole reactionary effort might be checked by you with a few calm words to this effect: that you have always considered and do now consider the merit system a good thing in itself and in its effects a vast improvement upon former methods; that the Republican party has constantly declared itself to be of the same opinion; that it has solemnly pledged itself in its platform to maintain the reformed system and to extend it wherever practicable; that you as the official head of the party have confirmed that pledge and promise to make it good; that as a faithful chief magistrate and an honest man you feel yourself bound to redeem that promise in good faith; that no Republican ought to ask a President of his party to break his word to cease being an honest man and to disgrace the party itself by dishonoring its pledges; and that if any Republican asks you to do this thing, that is, to take any step backward and to refrain from extending the reformed civil service system wherever practicable, all you have to answer is that as a conscientious man, as a good Republican President, you cannot do it.

I am quite confident that such a simple and calm declaration coming from you would stop the whole hue and cry at once. And if they tried in Congress to force your hand by inserting in appropriation bills provisions exempting this or that class of employees from the civil service rules,

and you returned such bills without your approval on the ground that legislation of that kind does not belong in appropriation bills and is an improper interference with the Executive power, aside from the fact that it conflicts with the Republican platform, I have not the least doubt that the bills would at once be repassed without those provisions, and that such things would never be heard of again. On the whole, I am convinced that such steps on your part would instantly arrest the reactionary movement, save you from no end of trouble, and be received with enthusiastic applause by the whole country—an applause which would completely silence the noisy shouters and put them to shame. I need not tell you how the people admire and love courageous honesty.

Neither do I think that the investigation by the Senate Committee at present going on should be regarded as standing in the way of such a declaration. That investigation is, it appears, so conducted as to show that the civil service law and the rules have not been fairly and impartially executed. Assuming this to be shown, the remedy would not be the total or partial abolition of the law and the rules, but a fairer, more impartial and more efficient enforcement of them.

Will you pardon the freedom with which I have written to you? My heart is in the cause, and I feel I can serve it, as well as your Administration, in no better way than by speaking to you with entire candor and sincerity.

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#### ARMED OR UNARMED PEACE<sup>1</sup>

The address recently delivered before the Naval War College at Newport by our new Assistant Secretary of the

<sup>1</sup> From *Harper's Weekly* of June 19, 1897. Grateful acknowledgments are made to Harper & Brothers for generous permission to reprint this article.

Navy, Mr. Theodore Roosevelt, has deservedly attracted much attention. It was a very eloquent and forcible defence of the proposition that this Republic must have a great navy in order to be prepared for war, and that in being well prepared for war is the surest means of preserving peace. The building of a big navy was thus presented to us as essentially a peace measure.

Had this plea for the preservation of peace by the construction of a large number of war-ships come from a member of the Peace Society or from any one else known as an earnest advocate of the peaceable settlement of international disputes, it would stand on firmer ground than it does coming from Mr. Roosevelt. This is said in the kindest spirit and without the slightest desire to disparage his character or the eminent services he has in various ways rendered to the public. The fact is that Mr. Roosevelt has always with perfect frankness confessed himself to be what is currently called a jingo. But he stands foremost among the sincere and honest men of that class. He is not one of those who would urge his country into a war, and then try to get a contract or some cheap popularity by talking or writing bloody patriotism while others had to do the fighting. He would be prompt to seek the post of danger for himself. The story is told of him that some years ago, when there seemed to be a prospect of a conflict with Chile, Mr. Roosevelt wrote to the War Department asking for himself the privilege of being the first volunteer for active service. And it is probably doing him no injustice to say that when the Chilean trouble was amicably composed, he may have been a little disappointed by being thus deprived of the chance of fighting for his country. Aside from his patriotic impulses, Mr. Roosevelt is essentially a fighting man by temperament. Nobody relishes the "joy of the conflict" with greater zest than he does; and it is therefore

not surprising that a peace argument should have been an awkward and somewhat bewildering task to him.

Every attentive reader of Mr. Roosevelt's oration will be struck by the bellicose flavor pervading it. It is really a panegyric on war. With almost poetic enthusiasm he describes how war arouses noble emotions, stimulates patriotism, brings forth heroic examples and how "no triumph of peace is quite so great as the supreme triumphs of war." To be sure, he has also a word of recognition for the merits of peace, but it is rather of the conventional and perfunctory kind. Peace must be quite honorable to be entitled to respect, and Mr. Roosevelt seems to think that we must look sharp or peace will be as likely as not to become dishonorable and craven without our knowing it. On the whole he is inclined to believe that a long peace will have a tendency to make a people effeminate and unpatriotic, and that it will require an occasional spell of blood-letting and devastation to restore or keep up the necessary vigor, manliness, elevation of sentiment and patriotic devotion. Mr. Roosevelt in his combative ardor has probably not noticed the logical quandary into which he has reasoned himself. It is this: according to him a long peace has a tendency to make a people effeminate and unpatriotic, while war will invigorate a people and inspire patriotism. But he argues also that the building of a great fleet of war-ships will be a means not to bring on war, but to preserve peace. Ergo, the building of a great war-fleet will effect that which promotes effeminacy and languishing patriotism. Mr. Roosevelt, according to his own theory, will hardly accept this result as satisfactory to himself. His argument in favor of a big war-fleet as an instrumentality of peace comes thus to an untimely end.

In truth those among us who are really in favor of peaceable methods of adjusting international differences

are not in favor of building a great war-fleet, while almost all the zealous advocates of a great war-fleet belong to the jingo class, many of whom are not nearly as honest and unselfish as Mr. Roosevelt is, and would hesitate little to drive their country into a war with some foreign Power without necessity.

The reason why the true friends of peace are opposed to the building of a big navy is a very simple one. We do not need such a navy for the maintenance of peace between the United States and foreign nations. Since the War of 1812, when this Republic was so small and feeble that other Powers thought they could kick and cuff it with impunity, we have not had another foreign war save that with Mexico, which was a war of aggression and conquest on our part. With that exception we have lived at peace with the world. During that long period we never had a navy worth speaking of in comparison with those of the great naval Powers, except during our civil war, when we had our hands full at home. And yet, in spite of our having no navy, our rights were respected and our interests never lacked protection; and whenever we had any just cause of complaint we never found it difficult to obtain our dues by peaceable methods. In fact, we have been permitted to do some things which would not have been tolerated if done by other nations. Why? Not because the great Powers are particularly fond of us, but because there is not one of them that can venture upon a serious quarrel with us without exposing itself to the gravest peril in its relations with other Powers that might take advantage of its embarrassments. The very first axiom in the catechism of British statesmanship is that peace must be kept with the United States. And the reasons which make this self-evident to every British statesman have the same force with the other great Powers too. They may sometimes growl at us or try to

gain a little diplomatic advantage of us, but every one of them will go to the utmost verge of concession to avoid a serious embroilment with us. The jingo talk we hear so often about the dangers threatening us, and of the encroachments and insults we may expect at the hands of European Powers, is therefore the veriest balderdash. Not one of those Powers will venture to invade any rights or to deny any just claims of ours to the extent of risking a warlike conflict with this Republic, although we are unarmed. We can have no war with them unless we want war, and drive them into it by making it to them a matter of plain self-respect.

Thus we do not need a big war-fleet to preserve the peace or to protect our dignity or our just rights or interests. Those objects are accomplished by our geographical position, by the well-known abundance of our resources and by the ever-vigilant jealousies of other Powers among themselves. There is not the slightest reason for thinking, if we follow a rational and decent policy toward other nations, that in this respect the future will differ from the past. The American people are enjoying the inestimable privilege of being secure without being obliged to burden themselves with costly military and naval establishments. This privilege is the envy of all nations that groan under the load of arms which an abhorred necessity forces upon them. Are we so utterly lost to good sense as wantonly to throw away this priceless privilege and to take that abominable load upon our backs without any such necessity? That we should have a smart little navy enabling us to do our share of police duty on the seas nobody will deny. In this respect the new navy we have will very nearly meet all reasonable requirements, and its quality in officers, men and equipment may well be a matter of national solicitude and pride. But are we to spend untold hundreds of millions

in building one of the great war-fleets of the world, which, as experience shows, will be antiquated almost as soon as finished, without being obliged to do so? Are we to tax our already heavily taxed people for this purpose—not to preserve the peace, for that requires no big fleet—but to bring on a danger of wanton war by exciting a desire to use the costly new armaments before they are superseded by newer ones? It is amazing how eager some otherwise sensible Americans are to strip their country, without any necessity, of one of its proudest and most beneficent distinctions—an exceptional blessing which we cannot be too thankful for—that of enjoying an unarmed peace.

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TO JACOB H. GALLINGER<sup>1</sup>

BOLTON LANDING, N. Y., Aug. 16, 1897.

My attention has been called to the Exeter *News-Letter* of July 23d, containing a communication from you in which, together with several other gentlemen, I am personally attacked. Ordinarily I take no notice of such abuse as you have seen fit to bestow upon me. But since in this instance it is employed by way of argument against the civil service law, you must permit me a word in reply. Your communication pretends to be an answer to a crushing refutation by Mr. George McAneny, the secretary of the National Civil Service Reform League, of certain allegations made by yourself concerning the provisions and the working of the existing civil service law. I call it a crushing refutation, for it proved conclusively by the record, by indisputable facts and figures, that many of your allegations were untrue, while the rest were strikingly

<sup>1</sup> An open letter addressed to Senator Gallinger and published in the Exeter, N. H., *News-Letter* of Aug. 27, 1897.

irrelevant. Being thus exposed you have, as a last resort, sought refuge in an appeal to Republican party feeling against those who are supposed to be mainly active in the movement for civil service reform. You say, for instance:

When it is remembered that Carl Schurz, the president of the League of which George McAneny is secretary, once occupied a seat in the Senate, and is now in private life, a traitor to the Republican party and its principles, I am willing to have the people of New Hampshire (rather than McAneny, whoever he is) pass on the question of my intelligence and integrity.

Pardon me, Senator, for saying a word on my relations to "the Republican party and its principles." Last year when the Presidential contest had assumed the character of an issue between sound money and free-silver coinage, the chiefs of the Republican campaign committees, and at least one of the candidates on the Republican national ticket, applied to me, your "traitor to the Republican party and Republican principles," for help. I did take part in the campaign. The help I gave may have been very insignificant. You may never have heard of it. You were probably so much in demand and so hotly engaged in the thick of the fight, and your voice may have so powerfully resounded all over the field, drowning feebler noises, that my modest efforts escaped your notice. At any rate, whatever help I gave, whether much or little, went to the benefit of the Republican candidates. It was a free gift. There was not the slightest desire or expectation of reward. I may say, however, that the Republican campaign managers were profuse in warm—and no doubt, sincere—words of acknowledgment.

That now a Republican in the prominent position of a Senator should so fluently denounce me as "a traitor to the Republican party and to Republican principles" is, to say

the least, not polite. It is not good manners. I doubt even whether it is good politics.

You must, however, not understand me as if I were at all disturbed by the "names" you call me. I am accustomed to that sort of thing at the hands of a certain class of politicians, and bear it with ease. Neither should you think that I wish to claim any standing in the Republican party. My way of looking at things will probably never have your approval; but I may, perhaps, succeed in making it intelligible to you. I believe that a party organization is not an end in itself, but merely a means for the attainment of public ends. I, therefore, do not worship a political party as a divinity entitled to my devotion under all circumstances, but regard it simply as an organization of citizens standing together for public objects on which they agree. I believe, and have always believed, that whenever such agreement on essential points ceases, and whenever a citizen becomes conscientiously convinced that he will serve the public welfare best by making, either temporarily or permanently, a change of party relations, it is not only his moral right but his duty to make it. Moreover, I believe that any doctrine to the contrary is highly dangerous to the integrity of free institutions.

It was as an anti-slavery man that I joined the Republican party. Untold thousands of citizens who had been life-long Democrats did the same thing, following the same principles. Were they "traitors"? When the abolition of slavery was accomplished and incidental questions decided, that which had mainly attracted me as well as many others to the Republican party existed no longer. Other issues pressed to the foreground. Among them, the questions of honest, efficient and economical administration of the Government—including civil service reform—of sound currency, and of an honorable, and at the same time conservative and pacific foreign policy, seemed

to me most important. I have never favored high tariff protection. I regard that policy as, in the long run, economically as well as morally injurious—morally still more than economically. The more the Republican party became wedded to that policy, the less I agreed with it; and, therefore, when high protection became the main issue before the people, as in 1888 and 1892, I opposed it. When the question of public morals in government seemed to me the main issue before the country, as in 1884, I supported the candidate whose victory seemed to me to serve the public good best in that respect. When the main issue was between honest money and free-silver coinage, as in 1896, I put my dislike for tariff protection aside and helped the party supporting the cause of sound money.

If there were a political party standing for all the objects of high importance I have mentioned, I should stand faithfully by that party so long as it faithfully served those public ends. But in the absence of such a national organization, I and others of the same way of thinking must do the best we can to serve the public ends we have in view. And when I say "we," I mean a very large and constantly increasing number of citizens who care more for the public good than for any political organization and who, therefore, have helped now one party and then another as in their honest opinion the public interest demanded. You say that such citizens are "traitors" to their party. But are they not faithful to their convictions of duty to the public good, and is not this fidelity, in the moral aspect, worth more than mere fidelity to an organization?

From your point of view you may find all this very foolish. You may call it "Sunday-school politics" or whatever you like. But if those independent citizens are conscientious in their opinions and their conduct, you have to respect them all the more as they follow their course,

being well aware that it ordinarily excludes them from the so-called rewards of political activity. And the "practical politician" of your stamp does respect them in spite of himself; for, whenever an important election approaches, the practical politician in dulcet tones appeals to "the high-minded citizens who put country above party" for support. After the election you may abuse them, because you are not able to command them; but you will appeal to them in the same sweet way anew when their aid is again needed. Now, if you call the conduct of such men "treason," all I can say is, in the language of Patrick Henry, that you are at liberty to "make the most of it." You can hardly be expected to appreciate the significance of the smile with which such revilings are received by those for whom they are intended.

Of the gentlemen who serve as the officers of the Civil Service Reform League—not one of whom, pardon me for saying, would shun comparison with you, either intellectually, or morally, or socially, or politically—you say that "none of them has ever voted the Republican ticket as a matter of political principle." You are mistaken in a twofold sense. The Civil Service Reform League is a non-partisan organization. There are men in it who have always been Democrats, others that have always been and now are Republicans, and still others who are Independents, but most of them have voted the Republican ticket more frequently than the Democratic. Why did they do so? Take the last election. They voted for McKinley and Hobart because the Republican party had declared itself emphatically for honest money and for civil service reform. Was not that "voting the Republican ticket as a matter of political principle?" What else could it be? It was certainly not voting the Republican ticket as a matter of personal interest; for not one of these Independents expected or desired any

office or other political favor as a reward for his vote. They all knew perfectly well that immediately after your party had accepted and been benefited by their help, Republican politicians like yourself would turn around and call them "traitors," and "renegades," and "political hermaphrodites" and what not. Even such a prospect could not deter them from voting as they did. If this was not voting "as a matter of political principle"—voting to the end of promoting not their personal interests, but the public good—what in the world was it? Would you say that he votes "as a matter of political principle" who steadily votes his party ticket, no matter whether he approves of the principles and policies of the party or not—perhaps merely to get an office? That this is really your conception of "political principle" can hardly be doubted by any fairminded reader of your letter.

Why do you seek to defame the character of the officers of the Civil Service Reform League? Your purpose is evident. You wish your constituency to understand that the civil service law has been framed and is now mainly supported only by enemies of the Republican party, by "worshippers of Grover Cleveland," by "traitors," "renegades," "political hermaphrodites"—in one word, by persons utterly unworthy of respect, and that, therefore, this law, "modeled," as you say, "after India, China and Great Britain," should not only not be supported, but should speedily be thrown overboard.

I ask you, Senator, are you not insulting your New Hampshire constituents by speculating upon their supposed ignorance? Have you so mean an opinion of their intelligence and education as to believe that they have never read the Republican platform? That platform, solemnly adopted last year by the National Convention of the Republican party as the proclamation of its faith, speaks thus:

The civil service law was placed on the statute book by the Republican party, which has always sustained it, and we renew our repeated declarations that it shall be thoroughly and honestly enforced, and extended, wherever practicable.

Here, then, Senator, you are confronted by the Republican platform testifying the fact that the civil service law was put on the statute book, not by your "traitors," "renegades" and "hermaphrodites," but by the Republican party itself; that the Republican party, evidently proud of the achievement, wishes the whole American people to understand this, and that it solemnly promises to enforce that law "thoroughly and honestly," and even more, to "extend it wherever practicable." Nor can it be unknown to you that upon this platform Mr. William McKinley was nominated as the Republican candidate for the Presidency; that he made the pledge of the party his own, and emphatically declared that there would be "no backward step"; and that after having become President, Mr. McKinley, as an honest gentleman, promptly proceeded to do some things clearly manifesting his determination to be true to the pledge of the party and his own. Why are you so silent about all this, Senator, in your letters to your constituents? Are you treating them fairly?

You profess to be a faithful Republican, a strict party man; at least you are not sparing in opprobrious epithets when assailing those who are not. A really good and strict and faithful party man regards the party platform as his political gospel. You cannot object to being judged by your own standard. Do you think he deserves the name of a good and strict and faithful party man who only wears the party name and votes the party tickets, but scorns the party's principles and pledges? Does it not appear to you that persons who do that call themselves true party men under false pretenses, and lay

themselves open to the charge that they vote the party ticket for selfish purposes, and not "as a matter of political principle"?

Or will you pretend that the party pledge concerning the civil service law is not binding, while other pledges are? Why should it be so? The civil service pledge was not a mere accidental, heedless utterance. It has been reiterated with the utmost positiveness in every Republican platform since the enactment of the civil service law—the reiteration being no less regular and emphatic than that with which the protective tariff was endorsed. Upon what ground, then, would you call one pledge less sacred and binding than the other? On the binding force of the civil service pledge you may take lessons from President McKinley.

I know you assert that in some respects the civil service law does not work well. For the sake of argument I will for a moment forget that your allegations have been conclusively shown to be groundless or irrelevant, but assume that they had some foundation in fact—that in the execution of the law really some mistakes had been made and some inconvenience to the service been caused. What would under such circumstances be the course of a true Republican, a faithful party man? Would he not consider it his duty to exert to the utmost his ingenuity and influence to the end of correcting those mistakes and inconveniences in a manner harmonious with the spirit and intent of the civil service law, so that the solemn pledge of the party promising an honest and thorough enforcement of the law might be faithfully redeemed? Would he, instead, think for a moment of acting as you do? Would he denounce the law as an outlandish contrivance "modeled after India, China and Great Britain"? Would he endeavor to create the false impression that it had been enacted, not by the Republican party, but by a dis-

reputable set of "traitors," "renegades" and "political hermaphrodites"? Would he urge his party to do a disgraceful thing by abolishing a law it had promised honestly and thoroughly to enforce and even, wherever practicable, to extend? Would he seek to induce a Republican President to become a dishonest man by breaking his plighted word? And just this, Senator, is what you are doing.

Is that your conception of good Republicanism? Do you call that supporting your President in the discharge of his sacred duty? You seem to pose as a man who votes the Republican ticket "as a matter of political principle." What would you have to say if some party man more faithful than yourself to that which after all gives to a party its true value—its principles and pledges and good faith—arraigned you as a "traitor," a "renegade," a "political hermaphrodite" and all that, on account of your repudiation of one of the essential parts of the Republican platform and your opposition to President McKinley's faithful endeavor to carry it out?

Here, Senator, I will leave you to your reflections, with the assurance that, if you wish to continue this conversation, I shall with pleasure be at your service.

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FROM CHARLES STUART SMITH

PAUL SMITH'S, N. Y., Aug. 28, 1897.

I am unable to refrain from thanking you for your exquisite dissection of poor Gallinger. It is the most polite and gentleman-like flaying of a selfish and ignorant politician that I have seen or known of since the days of Junius. You have again added a most valuable contribution to public education upon the most important topic of the day. Civil service is the keynote and the one remedy for all our political ills, and you are now the high-priest of this religion. I hope that [George

William] Curtis from his home "over the river" still is permitted to know what good things are going on, here below.

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#### MURDER AS A POLITICAL AGENCY<sup>1</sup>

The assassination of Canovas del Castillo has, as is usual under such circumstances, caused lively speculation as to what the political consequences of that tragic event may be. Will it improve the chances of the Carlists in Spain? Will it strengthen the Republican movement in that kingdom? Will it bring about a change in the policy of the Spanish Government with regard to Cuba? The probability is that nothing will happen that would not have been brought about by other causes—causes of a general nature far more potential than the disappearance of a single individual from the political stage. It is remarkable how little the course of history has been affected by sudden removal of men of power who at the time seemed to hold in their hands the destinies of their countries or even of the world. The dagger that killed Cæsar did not prevent the development of imperialism in Rome. The Roman Republic was ripe for it, and it came. The violent deaths of various Roman emperors utterly failed to change the character of the Roman Empire. As to similar occurrences in more modern times, the murder of William the Silent did not prevent the deliverance of the Netherlands from the Spanish yoke. It has been said that the assassination of Henry IV. of France precipitated the religious conflicts which followed it, desolating a part of continental Europe, and that had he lived longer those conflicts might have been entirely prevented; but a thorough study of the history of that period authorizes

<sup>1</sup> From *Harper's Weekly* of Aug. 28, 1897. Grateful acknowledgments are made to Harper & Brothers for generous permission to reprint this article.

the opinion that those calamities would have ultimately come had Henry IV. not been murdered. The stabbing or strangling to death of Russian czars resulted only in changes of persons. The dynamite bomb which killed Alexander II. left Russia substantially in the same condition in which it had found it. Neither can it be said that the assassinations of Republican Presidents in the United States and in France produced any effects of lasting consequence. That of Abraham Lincoln certainly did not save the Southern Confederacy from collapse, and those of Garfield and of Carnot brought about virtually only the substitution of one chief magistrate for another.

Without underrating the influence exercised by great men upon the course of events, and leaving aside speculations as to what possibly might have happened had the bloody deeds in question been committed at different periods or under different circumstances, and taking into consideration only the facts as they are recorded, it may be said that the murders of political potentates, for the accomplishment of whatever ends they may have been designed, were, as a rule, mere ineffectual atrocities. In some cases the evident purpose for which those acts of violence were intended served to make them intelligible. The tyrannicide who imagined the deliverance of his countrymen from usurpation or oppression, and the religious fanatic who schemed to help or avenge his church can be understood. Their motives had a simple and logical application to an actual state of things, and they aimed at the accomplishment of immediate and definite results. In some historic cases the character and the motives of the perpetrators distinguished their acts so much from common crime, that the criminal nature of the deeds was almost wholly overlooked in popular judgment. But of late years we are startled by a class of assassinations which can be explained only upon theories

so complicated and so wholly unnatural that we seem to stand in the presence of an insolvable psychological puzzle.

When we speak of the "anarchist" we mean to designate by that name a human being who is in a general way the enemy of all that exists, and who seeks to overthrow it by any means, however criminal and atrocious, but who has never been able to give an account in the slightest degree intelligible of the kind of society he thinks of putting in the place of that which he wants to destroy. We hear, indeed, some wild talk about the establishment of a social order, or disorder, without government and without laws and courts of justice, in which everybody can do what he or she pleases, and that when everybody can do what he or she pleases, everybody will do right, and have enough of the good things of the world, and be happy. But all this is so absolutely inconceivable to the human imagination, not to speak of human reason, that only insane people can be supposed to entertain it. The means by which the establishment of this social condition is to be accomplished are equally inexplicable as to their adaptation to the ulterior purpose. We have to draw our conclusions from things which have actually happened. A dynamite bomb is dropped by an anarchist into a church, or a theater or a public procession. A number of people, most of them entirely unknown to the anarchist, are killed or maimed by the explosion. The anarchist and his accomplices are caught, tried and executed as murderers. Another anarchist kills the chief of the State, or the Minister, under whose Government the trial and the executions have taken place. This anarchist, when caught, explains his crime by saying that he had to avenge the death of his executed, or, as he calls it, murdered friends. He leaves the inference that, if he is executed, one of his friends will in turn avenge his execution in the same way.

Now, what can all this mean? The anarchist who kills a President or Minister, on the pretense of avenging the execution of another anarchist murderer, may possibly imagine that if this process goes on with some regularity public officers will become afraid to hurt anarchists, and that the anarchists may then drop dynamite bombs wherever and whenever they please with impunity. This kind of reasoning is built upon the fantastic assumption that there is no courage left in human society except that of the anarchists. Still, however absurd the premise, there is a semblance of logic in it. But it does not explain the reason for their throwing dynamite bombs into churches and theaters, among promiscuous gatherings of inoffensive people, to kill anybody that may be about. The only thing approximating an explanation that has been said is that the plan of the anarchists is to throw society, by these seemingly causeless murders, into a condition of abject terror, and thereby to create a general state of the intensest bewilderment and confusion, in which, everybody else having completely lost his head, the anarchists are the only people who have kept their five senses together and know what they want, and that then they can step in and regulate things according to their notions. The idea that by this sort of terrorism human society, as at present organized, could be moved to abdicate all its functions, and to deliver itself into the hands of an organization of murderers, is so absolutely preposterous that its serious conception can be attributed only to an utterly deranged state of mind.

There may be some persons sincerely cherishing such amazing fancies, and willing to live and die for them; but among the more active element of the anarchists characters of a very different kind have been discovered—persons too lazy to do any honest work, who found that they could get along without it by devoting themselves to the

destruction of all existing institutions, and some others, too, who, as judicial proceedings in France showed a few years ago, made their living as footpads, or burglars, or forgers and what not, thus punishing society for their own benefit in detail before reforming it in bulk. Such anarchists certainly never felt themselves as Brutuses and Cassiuses seeing in accumulated wealth and in every sort of power a Cæsar to stab, or as philosophers and prophets only a century or two ahead of their time. They are simply common criminals of the worst kind. But they form an essential part of the militant force of anarchism.

That the anarchists cannot attain any of the ulterior objects attributed to them is a matter of course. But their existence nevertheless imposes a serious problem upon society. It is to defend itself against a secret combination of crazy people and criminals—that is, to punish and so far as possible to prevent the atrocities which form their trade, without trenching upon the legitimate and necessary rights and liberties of the citizen. In this country the danger of an encroachment upon those rights and liberties by such methods of repression and prevention, although not altogether absent, is far less threatening than in European states, the Governments of which have a tendency to aggrandize the police power, and are prone to avail themselves of any apparent or real public danger, or any panicky feeling among the people, to this end at the expense of free institutions. While the crimes of the anarchists are apt to produce such panicky feelings on account of the prominence of their victims, there is really no reason to apprehend that they may not be prevented and punished by the same appliances which are sufficient for the breaking up and punishment of bands of brigands or counterfeiters of money. To extirpate their so-called doctrines those measures are

certainly the worst which would make the law-abiding citizen fear for his own rights.

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TO JACOB H. GALLINGER<sup>1</sup>

You have chosen to continue our public conversation, and so be it. Your reply to my "open letter" strikingly presents the spectacle of the defendant after conviction making faces at the prosecuting attorney. But that will hardly change the judgment already pronounced by an intelligent public opinion. I might therefore dismiss your cry of distress without another word, did it not convey some valuable lessons.

Being a writer whose genius shines most brilliantly in quotations, you have sought to show that my public course has greatly displeased some politicians, and that they have spoken of it with marked acerbity. This is an old story, and I am only surprised at the meagerness of your display. I could have furnished you an abundance of more amusing material from my own collections. It is true, with others I have helped in defeating aspirants to high place, in baffling political speculators and in holding political parties after election to their preëlection pledges—an "obtrusive" practice which just now seems to be quite troublesome to statesmen like yourself. For this I have had to endure not only the candid criticism of fairminded party-men, which I always respect, but also an unusual measure of that general vilification to which the defeated candidate, the thwarted spoils-monger and the enraged party fanatic resort when ingenuous argument fails. But when you analyze the whole farrago you will find it to consist of endless variations of one theme,—that I have claimed the right, and hold myself in duty bound,

<sup>1</sup> An open letter published in the Exeter, N. H., *News-Letter* of Oct. 1, 1897.

to oppose, without regard to mere party interest, any policy or any candidate whose victory would, in my honest opinion, have been injurious to the public welfare.

For this course I had reasons that enable me to bear those revilings with cheerful equanimity. The wrongs which during my long observation of public affairs I have seen done or condoned for the sake of party, and the crushing of individual conviction and the deadening of conscience through the tyranny of party organization that I have witnessed have deeply impressed me with the belief that it is high time the American people should remember and most earnestly take to heart the solemn warning in Washington's Farewell Address against an excessive party spirit as a very serious danger to our free institutions. A symptom of that party spirit we beheld in a feature of last year's election campaign, the appalling significance of which every thinking American should well consider. In the spring of 1896, Democratic conventions in many States most emphatically and unequivocally condemned free-silver coinage as a heresy fraught with incalculable disaster to the country. No sooner had, a few weeks later, the Democratic National Convention espoused that heresy, than the Democratic party organizations in the same States endorsed the very doctrine they had so loudly condemned and men of otherwise respectable character supported this amazing self-stultification, because they would rather risk the ruin of the Republic than forfeit their party regularity. Nor is this submissiveness confined to the Democratic side. This very day we see the Republican party in several States under the despotic control of mutual assurance companies of spoils politicians called machines, and under the tyranny of bosses of most unsavory repute, respected only for their iniquitous power —while the rank and file, and even men of high standing, trembling lest they lose their party regularity, submit to

the dictatorship of the most selfish and unscrupulous elements in politics, which they know to be subversive to public morals and hurtful to the public interest. And there is no prospect of improvement—nay, it is certain that the evil will grow and spread so long as Washington's admonition is unheeded and the rank and file of our parties accept the doctrine that the obligation to party is superior to any other. Where will this end?

Under such circumstances I am willing to be decorated with all the vituperation your industry can collect, for maintaining and following the principle that the duty of the citizen to the public weal is absolutely paramount to any duty he may owe to a party organization.

I do not, of course, indulge in any hope of making you appreciate that principle. But it may at least be useful to point out the absurdities in which your doctrine of "party treason" involves you. With characteristic confusion of ideas you accuse me of having "espoused all shades of political opinion." Do not flatter yourself that I would defend myself against any of your charges. I merely wish to show by this example how completely in a partisan mind like yours fidelity to party organization has taken the place of fidelity to political principles and public ends. I have always been an anti-slavery man; for a sound currency; for civil service reform; against high tariff protection; for honest and economical government; and for a foreign policy honorably pacific and conservative. Has anybody ever heard me say a word for slavery, or for fiat money or free silver, or for a high protective tariff, or in commendation of extravagance or of apology for corruption, or for needless war or wild foreign adventure? Where then is this "espousing of all shades of political opinion"? But you might say that while I have been true to my principles and aims, I have supported now one party and then another. But why? Because, as I

honestly believed, fidelity to my principles and aims demanded it. For instance, had I been "faithful" to the Republican party, I should have been "faithless" to my convictions as to the tariff. Had I been "faithful" to the Democratic party, I should have been "faithless" to my convictions as to the currency. (And here let me remark, by the way, that what you say in your letter of the *constant* high tariff policy of the Republican party betrays gross ignorance. You need only to read the Republican platforms since 1860 to find that the *high tariff for protection* is a Republican policy of comparatively recent date.)

Evidently we do not think alike. Your highest boast is that you have "never voted any other than the straight party ticket." To your mind obedience to the party organization in "voting the straight ticket" under all circumstances is a full discharge of the duties of citizenship and the sum of political virtue. When you have "voted the straight ticket" you feel yourself free to repudiate the party's principles and to dishonor its pledges, just as if a citizen after having paid his taxes to the State may think himself licensed to break its laws. To disobey the party organization by not voting the straight ticket is to you "treason" to be abhorred and branded with ignominy. But if this duty of allegiance to party organization is so sacred on the side of one party, it is equally sacred on the other, for the relation of the individual to the party is the same. Now, Senator, what are you doing, when, as a stump orator or political manager before an election, you seek to draw voters from the other side to yours? What were you aiming at last year when, brimful of enthusiasm for the gold plank in the Republican platform, you made those brilliant speeches of which the historians of the campaign are so strangely silent? The countless Democrats you converted, did you not seduce

them from their sacred party allegiance? Did you not persuade them to commit "treason" to their party and thus to do a dishonorable thing? And as to the sound-money Democrats, without whose aid Mr. McKinley's election would have been, if not impossible, at least extremely doubtful, should they not, instead of being welcomed as patriotic auxiliaries, have been repelled with disgust as a lot of ignoble renegades, utterly unmindful of the sacred duty "never to vote any other than the straight ticket of their party," and disgracefully given to "espousing all shades of political opinions"?

Fortunately for the country there are thoughtful Republicans as well as Democrats in constantly increasing multitude, who perceive not only the glaring absurdity of such doctrines but also the mischief of them; who recognize that political parties, to remain instrumentalities of public usefulness, must be confined to their legitimate functions, and that the enjoyment of the spoils is not the most valuable of the fruits of party victory; who are becoming more and more alarmed at the excessive party spirit so solemnly condemned by Washington, and at the demoralizing tyranny of party organization with its multiplying machines and bosses, as one of the greatest dangers to free institutions; and who see in the spoils system, for the full restoration of which politicians of your kind are so arduously working, one of the most baneful agencies ministering to the growing evil. Your "open letter" may well serve as a warning example of the moral effects of your own teachings upon yourself.

It is pleasant to notice that in three columns of personal diatribe you have at least ten lines about the real subject of our controversy. You are compelled actually to admit that the civil service law is not the creature of a set of "traitors" and "political hermaphrodites," but that the Republican party claims it as its offspring, and has

solemnly pledged itself in its platform to enforce that law "honestly and thoroughly." To the charge that you are repudiating this long-standing and important part of the Republican creed, and that you are urging the Republican party to break its pledge, you have only this defense:

In regard to civil service reform I will say that as the Republican party gave to the country the civil service law, that party is its best interpreter. . . . At best the interpretation of the present civil service law is not a fundamental political tenet, but simply a question of opinion. If you will read carefully the plank in the last Republican platform you will observe that it demands that "it [the civil service law] shall be thoroughly and honestly enforced." That is the very issue I have raised. I have contended and still contend that Grover Cleveland did not honestly enforce the law, but prostituted it to partisan ends.

Not a "fundamental political tenet" but a mere "matter of opinion"? Let us see. The Republican platform must be quoted to you again to make you fully appreciate it: "The civil service law was placed on the statute book by the Republican party, which has always sustained it, and we renew our repeated declarations that it shall be thoroughly and honestly enforced and extended wherever practicable." Have you ever known any platform pledge of greater clearness and force? It is not, as most platform declarations are, a more or less vague expression of sentiment or general intention. It is exceptionally definite, specific and unequivocal, more so than any protective tariff plank ever was. There cannot be the shadow of a doubt as to what the civil service law is; for it stands on the statute book. There can be no question as to what the enforcement of the law means, for the records of two Republican and two Democratic Administrations show it. There can be no doubt as to

the significance of the pledge to "extend" the law. That pledge cannot possibly mean anything else than the widening of the operation of the law, "wherever practicable," beyond the limits within which it operated at the time the pledge was made. And it may be remarked, by the way, that under this pledge President McKinley, as a really faithful Republican, would not only have been bound, had President Cleveland's order of May 6, 1896, never been issued, to make substantially the same extensions provided for by that order, but that he is now bound to go even beyond them, "wherever practicable."

And in the face of all this you assert that the interpretation of the civil service law and of the Republican pledge concerning it is a mere matter of "opinion" and that the party itself is the best interpreter. Do you mean to say that the party itself may interpret the pledges upon which it asked for the people's votes, just as it may please? Is not this attributing to the political party the doctrine of the divine right of kings—the officers of the government being responsible only to the king, and the king being responsible only to himself or, as he expresses it, to his God? To this point you carry the doctrine of the divine right of party.

How President McKinley, as a faithful Republican and an upright gentleman, interprets the pledge, we all know. But how do you advise the Republican party to "interpret" its pledge? You pretend to great indignation at the wicked Grover Cleveland who, as you say, "did not honestly enforce the law but prostituted it to partisan ends." Of course, you wish your constituents to understand that *you* fairly yearn for a really "honest" enforcement of the law and that "partisan ends" are a horror to your patriotic soul. Do you not again presume upon the supposed ignorance of the people of New Hampshire? They need only open the *Congressional Record*

to find that on March 23, 1897, less than nine months after the Republican party reiterated its solemn pledge, you spoke in the Senate thus:

I do not believe that life is long enough for this Senate to investigate the civil service of this Government. There is a shorter and easier way, and *that is to get rid of the whole thing*. I have voted against it [the civil service law] in the other house of Congress, I have voted against it in the Senate whenever opportunity offered, and *what I desire is to cast my vote to blot out that statute*. I stand upon the simple proposition that it is an un-American law, and that every citizen of this Republic has an equal right with every other citizen of the Republic to seek employment under the Government of the United States [as if this equality of rights were not infinitely more secure under the system of competitive examinations equally open to all, than under the system of appointment by influence], and whenever I get an opportunity, whatever the proposition may be, *to vote to blot this law off the statute books, I shall so vote*: and I shall take my chance with the people whom I happen to represent in part in this Chamber without reference to how it may strike the aesthetic tastes of the people of Massachusetts.

Thus it appears that you recognize the pledge of the Republican party to enforce the civil service law "honestly and thoroughly," and to "extend it wherever practicable"; that you reserve to the Republican party the right to "interpret" this pledge; and that at the same time you urge the Republican party to redeem the pledge binding it to enforce the civil service law honestly and thoroughly, by blotting out the law altogether. It is a somewhat unpleasant question to ask, Senator, but it must be asked: Is this a position to be taken, or a game to be played, by an honest man? And I venture to suggest that it will not be a sufficient answer to this question to cry out that the person asking it is a "traitor" or a "renegade," or even, if you please, a common felon. Nor will it be suf-

ficient to affirm that you "have never voted any other than the straight party ticket."

The sad confusion of moral principle betrayed by the stand you thus have taken is put in a still stronger light by the glaringly untruthful statements concerning the administration of the civil service law which you have made to your constituents in your public correspondence with Mr. McAneny. I refer to this because it is characteristic of the utterly unscrupulous methods by which the war against the civil service law is being carried on. Of those statements I will recall only a few specimens to your memory.

You charged that "President Cleveland's last order, which swept into the classified service almost 50,000 employés, bears date of November 2, 1896," and that "there is every reason to believe that the order dated November 2d was actually not written until after the result of the election of November 3d was known to the country." By this charge you evidently intended to make your constituents believe that President Cleveland had slyly waited until the Government was certain to pass into Republican hands, and that *then* he had extended the operation of the civil service law to protect Democratic appointees. The truth is, and so it was shown to you, that the Executive order extending the civil service law was issued by President Cleveland on May 6, 1896, six months before the election and several weeks before either of the great political parties held its National Convention. It was also shown to you that the number of employés brought into the classified service by that order was not 50,000, but 31,372, and that at least 12,000 of these had been already subject to the examination system under separate departmental orders. Neither is it true, as you charge, that the classification of any of these employés by President Cleveland's order protected them against

removal. The first order effectually to stop arbitrary removals was issued, not by President Cleveland, but by President McKinley.

To make the civil service law ridiculous to your constituents you told them that applicants for appointments as compositors or pressmen in the Government Printing Office were required to hop on one foot a distance of twelve feet, as part of their examination, and that they had to answer the question whether they were immune to the diseases endemic or epidemic in the Southern States. It was conclusively shown to you that the first test was imposed not on compositors and pressmen in the Printing Office, but only on applicants for places requiring physical strength and endurance, and then in connection with the familiar test of heart action, as it is also used in the Army and Navy; and that an answer to the second question is demanded only of applicants for places in the marine hospital service and a few similar positions at Southern ports.

To make the civil service law seem useless and even harmful to the public interest, you told your constituents that "not one item of proof has been produced to show that the service is better now than it was prior to the enactment of the civil service law, and that on the contrary the proof is all the other way." You were confronted with the official testimony of two Presidents, one Republican and one Democratic, and of an array of heads of Departments and bureau chiefs, who had actual experience of its working, overwhelmingly proving the exceedingly beneficial effects of the law as to the increased efficiency of the service; and, in addition, with the striking fact, drawn from the records, that since 1883, when the civil service law was enacted, there has been an increase of 37 per cent. in the number, and of 43 per cent. in the salaries of the *unclassified* places, while in the number of

places originally classified there has been an actual decrease, with a corresponding decrease in the appropriations for their support; in other words, that in the branches of the service under the civil service law more work was done by fewer persons and for less money, while in the branches not under the civil service law the old needless multiplication of offices went on, with an increasing wastefulness of expenditure.

These are only a few specimens of your assertions which were shown to be untrue. I might largely extend the list. Now, what did you do, Senator, when you were thus brought face to face with crushing proofs of the untruthfulness of the allegations against the civil service law you had made? Then you remembered that the president of the Civil Service Reform League was a "traitor to the Republican party and its principles," and that the leading members of that League were generally "renegades" and "political hermaphrodites," and persons entitled to no credit. And when you had annihilated them to your heart's content you rose to the final averment: "I stand by every declaration heretofore made, the denials to the contrary notwithstanding." It may not have occurred to you, Senator, that this is a somewhat grave matter, concerning your character as a gentleman. He who makes a false statement in the first instance may be excused on the ground that it was a mere mistake, a slip of the tongue or a lapse of the mind—although it might be expected of a Senator of the United States that before speaking of a public matter so loudly and so repeatedly, he should at least inform himself of easily ascertainable facts. But when, after having been clearly shown the falsity of his allegations, he then deliberately repeats and reaffirms and "stands by" them, the case becomes more serious. Then he exposes himself to the application of a very short word which cannot be offered any one who

is not devoid of the instincts of a gentleman, without kindling a blush on his cheeks. If you have any sincere friends they cannot too soon point out to you this danger line. As the matter stands, every unprejudiced person examining the evidence before us will find himself forced to the conclusion that you have deliberately sought to mislead and deceive your constituents by telling them things which had been proved to you, and which you knew to be untrue. And I repeat, against this it will be of no avail to you to cry out about my being a "traitor to the Republican party," or that you have never bolted a Republican ticket.

I have treated you seriously, Senator, in connection with a serious subject; and here I might leave you, had not this controversy also a feature irresistibly appealing to a humorous fancy. With the grand austerity to which but few great men know how to rise, you address to me in the opening of your "reply" a sentence which is to show me my proper place. It merits repetition. "It were probably better," you say, "to suffer you [me] to lapse again into that political obscurity where your disloyalty to the Republican party precipitated you, than to gratify your yearning desire for notoriety by keeping you longer in public view, into whose presence [!] you have seized this opportunity of obtruding yourself." That after having been publicly called a "traitor," and all that, I should have "obtruded" myself by a word of explanation, may indeed be inexcusable. But, Senator, is it not cruel, on your part, to taunt me with my "obscurity"? Nature and fortune are sparing with their choicest gifts. On you they have lavished a rare combination of genius and success. The great and powerful of this world should at least be generous enough not to scoff at the feeble and insignificant. You are a genuine celebrity. Your noble defiance of President Harrison on account of a consulship, of which

your biographers tell us, and your valiant battles for post-offices and revenue places, have carried your fame into the remotest corners of New Hampshire. The fearless statesmanship of your attack on the "hopping test" in the Senate has made your colleagues and many other people prick up their ears with amused curiosity. The stranger in the Senate gallery, directory in hand, easily identifies you on the floor of the Chamber as the occupant of chair No. 7. Having been a member of the Senate myself, I know what such triumphs mean. No wonder you are proud. But do not let the pride of your greatness, however just, harden your heart against ordinary mortals. Everybody loves fame. You have it in abundance. Why do you blame me for coveting a little of it? Do not grudge me that passing gleam of notoriety which comes to me through the reflex of your renown, in having my name mentioned for a few days together with yours, in this public discussion.<sup>1</sup>

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## TO PRESIDENT MCKINLEY

NEW YORK CITY, Oct. 17, 1897.

I cannot refrain from expressing to you my thanks for what you have said to Mr. McAneny, whose report I have just received, of your determination to enforce your last civil service order. I never had any doubt as to what you would do as soon as the true state of the case came to your notice, and I am sure that decisive action now in the shape of the issuing of a general regulation, and of vigorous discipline administered to recalcitrant officers will at once and forever stop the newspaper clamor questioning the good faith of your order, and that no officer will again treat that order with contempt.

<sup>1</sup> A third letter to Senator Gallinger, dated Nov. 9, 1897, was published in the *News-Letter* of Nov. 12, 1897.

Permit me another suggestion. We are likely to have a fierce fight about the civil service law in Congress next winter. In my humble opinion a strong word in favor of the merit system in your annual message, and some outspoken statements to the same effect in the reports of the Secretaries, especially those of the three great patronage Departments, the Treasury, the Post-Office and the Interior, would be half the battle. Indeed a vigorous pronouncement by the united Administration would probably spike the artillery of the assailants, confirm the Republicans in the faith avowed by their platform and substantially put the matter beyond controversy for the rest of your term.

As you know, my dear Mr. President, we do not agree on all points; but I am all the more anxious to coöperate with you to the best of my ability as to those things on which we do agree, especially as to the cause of civil service reform which we have both so warmly at heart. You may always count not only upon my personal gratitude for every forward step undertaken by you, but also upon my earnest desire to secure the gratitude of others—of the whole country, if that were in my power. I therefore look forward with especial pleasure to the opportunities for presenting your order concerning removals, as a practically accomplished reform, when giving a review of the situation in my annual address at the meeting of the National Civil Service Reform League on December 16th, at Cincinnati.

I trust you have received the suggestions I took the liberty of submitting to you through Mr. McAneny, concerning the supposed interference of your Administration in our municipal election, in the spirit in which they were conceived; and I am exceedingly glad to learn that no such interference on your part is intended. New York municipal politics have always been an extremely danger-

ous field for any National Administration to venture upon. If Tammany should be successful, the public opinion of the country, as it has already pronounced itself, will doubtless award the responsibility to the Republican machine here; and you can certainly not desire to be involved in the disaster. Your true friends would greatly deplore it. Believe me when I say that this sentiment on my part is inspired not only by my regard for the public interest, but also by a very sincere feeling of friendship for you personally.

I hope you have not seen in my declination to go into the Ohio campaign any want of willingness on my part to please you. I was very sorry I found myself compelled to decline. Be assured that if anything could have induced me to set aside my engagements here and to go, the expression of a wish by you would have done so.

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DANIEL WEBSTER<sup>1</sup>

Of the generation of American statesmen that followed those of the Revolutionary period few will live as long in the memory of the people, and none as long in the literature of the country, as Daniel Webster. His figure rises above the level of his time like a monument of colossal proportions. He was a child of the war of Independence, born in 1782. His father, a Puritan of stern and sterling character, had, as a backwoods farmer in New Hampshire, been an Indian fighter while New England had an Indian frontier, a soldier in the French war and a captain in the Revolutionary army. His high standing among his neighbors made him a judge of the local court. Ambitious for his children, he strained his scanty means to the utmost

<sup>1</sup> From *Harper's Magazine*, Nov., 1897. Hearty thanks are given to Harper & Bros. for their generous consent to this reprint.

to give his son the best education within reach, first at Exeter Academy, then at Dartmouth College. From his earliest days Daniel was petted by good fortune. His seemingly delicate health, his genial nature and his promising looks put, in the family circle, everybody at his service, even at personal sacrifice; and such sacrifice by others he became gradually accustomed to expect, as a prince expects homage.

At the academy and the college he shone not by phenomenal precocity, but by rapid progress in the studies he liked—Latin, literature and history. He did not excel in the qualities of the genuine scholar—patient and thorough research and the eager pursuit of knowledge for its own sake; but he was a voracious reader, assimilating easily what he read by dint of a strong memory and of serious reflection, and soon developed the faculty of making the most of what he knew by clear, vigorous, affluent and impressive utterance. At an early age, too, he commanded attention by a singular charm of presence, to which his great dark eyes contributed not a little, and, notwithstanding his high animal spirits, by a striking dignity of carriage and demeanor—traits which gradually matured into that singularly imposing personality, the effect of which is described by his contemporaries in language almost extravagant, borrowing its similes from kings, cathedrals and mountain-peaks.

His conspicuous power of speech caused him, even during his college days, to be drawn upon for orations on the Fourth of July and other festive days. The same faculty, reënforced by his virtue of knowing what he knew, gave him, after he had gone through the usual course of law study, early successes at the bar, which soon carried him from the field of legal practice into political life. He inherited Federalism from his father, and naturally accepted it, because he was a conservative

by instinct and temperament. Existing things had a *prima facie* claim upon his respect and support because they existed. He followed his party with fidelity, sometimes at the expense of his reason and logic, but without the narrow-mindedness of a proscriptive partisan spirit. In the excited discussions which preceded and accompanied the war of 1812 he took an active part as a public speaker and a pamphleteer. Something happened then, at the very beginning of his public career, that revealed in strong light the elements of strength as well as those of weakness in his nature. In a speech on the Fourth of July, 1812, at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, he set forth in vigorous language his opposition to the war policy of the Administration; but with equal emphasis he also declared that the remedy lay not in lawless resistance, but only in "the exercise of the constitutional right of suffrage"—a proposition then by no means popular with the extreme Federalists of New England. A few weeks later he was appointed by a local mass convention of Federalists to write an address on the same subject, which became widely known as the "Rockingham Memorial." In it he set forth with signal force the complaints of his party, but, as to the remedy, he consented to give voice to the sense of the meeting by a thinly veiled threat of secession and a hint on the possibility of a dissolution of the Union. In the first case he expressed his own opinions as a statesman and a patriot; in the second he accepted the opinions of those around him as his own, and spoke with equal ability and vigor as the mouthpiece or attorney of others—a double character destined to reappear from time to time in his public life with puzzling effect.

New Hampshire sent him to Congress, where he took his seat in the House of Representatives in May, 1813. He soon won a place in the front rank of debaters, especially on questions of finance. But the two terms during

which he represented a New Hampshire constituency were a mere prelude to his great political career. In 1817 he left Congress to give himself to his legal practice, which gained much in distinction and lucrativeness by his removal to Boston. He rose rapidly to National eminence as a practitioner in the Federal as well as the State tribunals. It was there that he won peculiar luster through his memorable argument in the famous Dartmouth College case before the Federal Supreme Court, which fascinated John Marshall on the bench, and moved to tears the thronged audience in the courtroom. It left Webster with no superior and with few rivals at the American bar. It may be questioned whether he was a great lawyer in the highest sense. There were others whose knowledge was larger and more thorough, and whose legal opinion carried greater authority. But hardly any of these surpassed him in the faculty of seizing with instinctive sureness of grasp the vital point of a cause, of endowing mere statement with the power of demonstration, of marshaling facts and arguments in massive array for concentric attack on the decisive point, of moving the feelings together with the understanding by appeals of singular magic and also of so assimilating and using the work of others as if it had been his own. Adding to all this the charm of that imposing personality which made every word falling from his lips sound as if it were entitled to far more than ordinary respect, he could not fail to win brilliant successes. He was engaged in many of the most important and celebrated cases of his time—some then celebrated and still remembered because of the part he played in them.

In Boston Webster found a thoroughly congenial home. Its history and traditions, its wealth and commercial activity, the high character of its citizenship, the academic atmosphere created by its institutions of learning, the

refined tone of its social circles, the fame of its public men, made the Boston of that period, in the main attributes of civilized life, the foremost city in the United States. Boston society received Webster with open arms, and presently he became, in an almost unexampled measure, its idol. Together with the most distinguished personages of the State, among them the venerable John Adams, he was elected a member of the convention called to revise the State constitution, where, as the champion of conservative principles, he advocated and carried the proposition that the State senate should remain the representative of property. When, in 1820, the day arrived for the celebration of the two hundredth anniversary of the landing of the Pilgrims on Plymouth Rock, it was he whom the public voice designated as the orator of the day. The oration, with its historical picturesqueness, its richness of thought and reasoning, its broad sweep of contemplation and the noble and magnificent simplicity of its eloquence, was in itself an event. No literary production of the period in America achieved greater renown. From that time on Massachusetts loved to exhibit herself in his person on occasions of state, and, in preference to all others, Webster was her spokesman when she commemorated the great events of her history. As such he produced a series of addresses—at the laying of the corner-stone and, later, at the completion of the Bunker Hill monument, on the death of John Adams and of Thomas Jefferson and on other occasions—which his contemporaries acclaimed as ranking with the greatest oratorical achievements of antiquity.

Webster soon appeared in Congress again, first in 1823, in the House of Representatives, as the member from the Boston district, and a few years later in the Senate. Then began the most brilliant part of his political career. It was the period when the component elements of the

old political parties, the Federalists and the Republicans, became intermingled, when old party issues vanished, and when new questions, or rather old questions in new shapes and relations, caused new groupings of men to be formed. In the confusion of the political and personal conflicts which characterized the so-called "era of good feeling," and which immediately followed it, Webster became a supporter of the Administration of John Quincy Adams, and, as an old Federalist and conservative, was naturally attracted by that combination of political forces which subsequently organized itself as the Whig party.

In the House of Representatives he attracted the attention of the world abroad by a stinging philippic against the "Holy Alliance," in a eulogy on the Greek revolution and by a sober exposition of the Monroe doctrine in a speech on the famous Panama mission. But his most remarkable achievement was an argument against Henry Clay's "American system," tariff protection as a policy—the very policy which was destined to become the cornerstone of the Whig platform. Webster's free-trade speech—for so it may be called—summed up and amplified the views he had already expressed on previous occasions, in a presentation of fundamental principles so broad and clear, with a display of knowledge so rich and accurate and an analysis of facts and theories so keen and thorough, that it stands unsurpassed in our political literature, and may still serve as a text-book to students of economic science. But Clay's tariff was adopted nevertheless, and four years later Webster abandoned many of his own conclusions, on the ground that in the meantime New England, accepting protection as the established policy of the country, had invested much capital in manufacturing enterprises, the success of which depended upon the maintenance of the protective policy, and should therefore not be left in the lurch. For this reason he

became a protectionist. This plea appeared again and again in his high-tariff speeches which followed; but he never attempted to deny or shake the broad principles so strongly set forth in his great argument of 1824.

Webster reached the highest point of his power and fame when, in 1830, he gave voice, as no one else could, to the National consciousness of the American people. Before the war of 1812 the Union had been looked upon by many thoughtful and patriotic Americans as an experiment—a promising one, indeed, but of uncertain issue. Whether it would be able to endure the strain of divergent local interests, feelings and aspirations, and whether its component parts would continue in the desire permanently to remain together in one political structure, were still matters of doubt and speculation. The results of the war of 1812 did much to inspire the American heart with a glow of pride in the great common country, with confident anticipations of its high destinies and with an instinctive feeling that the greatness of the country and the splendors of its destinies depended altogether upon the permanency of the Union. The original theory that the Constitution of the United States was a mere compact of partnership between independent and sovereign commonwealths, to be dissolved at will, whatever historical foundation it may have had, yielded to an overruling sentiment of a common nationality.

This sentiment was affronted by the nullification movement in South Carolina, which, under the guise of resistance to the high tariff of 1828, sought to erect a bulwark for slavery through the enforcement of the doctrine that a State by its sovereign action could overrule a Federal law, and might, as a last resort, legally withdraw from the "Federal compact." Against this assumption Webster rose up in his might like Samson going forth against the Philistines. In his famous "Reply to Hayne" he struck

down the doctrine of the legality of State resistance and of secession with blows so crushing, and maintained the supremacy of the Federal authority in its sphere and the indissolubility of the Union with an eloquence so grand and triumphant, that as his words went over the land the National heart bounded with joy, and broke out in enthusiastic acclamations. At that moment Webster stood before the world as the first of living Americans. Nor was this the mere sensation of a day. His "Liberty and Union, one and inseparable, now and forever!" remained the watchword of American patriotism, and still reverberated thirty years later in the thunders of the civil war. That glorious epoch continues to hold the first place among the monuments of American oratory.

In the contest against the nullification movement in South Carolina, Webster firmly maintained, against Henry Clay's compromise policy, that, wherever the National authority was lawlessly set at defiance, peace should never be purchased by concession to the challengers, and that it was time to "test the strength of the Government." He therefore sturdily supported President Jackson's "force bill," although the Administration of that doughty warrior was otherwise most uncongenial to him. But when the compromise had actually been adopted, he dropped back into the party line behind Clay's leadership, which he thenceforth never again forsook. There was an element of indolence in his nature, which it needed strong impulses to overcome so as to set the vast machinery of his mind in full motion. Such an impulse was furnished again by Jackson's attack on the United States Bank, and by other somewhat autocratic financial measures. Webster opposed this policy in a series of speeches on currency and banking, which deserve very high rank in the literature of that branch of economics. They were not free from partisan bias in the specific

application of those fundamental principles of which Webster had such a masterly grasp; but, notwithstanding this, his deep insight into the nature and conditions of credit, and his thorough study and profound judgment of the functions of banking, made him an invaluable teacher of the science of public finance. Nobody has ever depicted the vices and dangers inherent in an unsound currency, and the necessity of grounding the monetary system upon a firm basis of value, with greater force and more convincing lucidity.

But in spite of the brilliancy and strength of his efforts in opposing Jackson's willful and erratic policies, Webster never became the real leader of the Whig party. Although he was greatly the superior of Clay in wealth of knowledge, in depth of thought, in statesmanlike breadth of view, in solidity of reasoning power and in argumentative eloquence, he fell far behind him in those attributes which in contests for general leadership are apt to turn the scale—the spirit of initiative, force of will, that sincere self-confidence which extorts confidence from others, bold self-assertion in doubtful situations and constant alertness in watching and directing the details of political movements. Clay, therefore, remained the general leader of the Whig party, while Webster, with New England at his back, stood now by his side, now behind him, as in feudal times a great duke, rich in treasure and lands and retainers, himself of royal blood, may have stood now behind, now by the side of his king.

Unhappily for himself, Webster was not satisfied with the theater of action on which his abilities fitted him for the greatest service, and on which he achieved his highest renown. At a comparatively early period of his career he ardently wished to be sent as Minister to England, and he bore a grudge to John Quincy Adams for his failure to gratify that desire. Ever since his "Reply

to Hayne" had made his name a household word in the country, an ungovernable longing possessed him to be President of the United States. The morbid craving commonly called "the Presidential fever" developed in him, as it became chronic, its most distressing forms, disordering his ambition, unsettling his judgment and warping his statesmanship. His imagination always saw the coveted prize within his grasp, which in reality it never was. He lacked the sort of popularity which, since the Administration of John Quincy Adams, seemed to be required for a Presidential candidacy. He travelled over the land, South and North and East and West, to manufacture it for himself, but in vain. The people looked at him with awe and listened to him with rapture and wonder, but as to the Presidency the fancy and favor of the politicians, as well as of the masses, obstinately ran to other men. So it was again and again. Clay, too, was unfortunate as a Presidential candidate. But he could have at least the nomination of his party so long as there appeared to be any hope for his election. Webster was denied even that. The vote for him in the party conventions was always distressingly small, usually confined to New England, or only a part of it. Yet he never ceased to hope against hope, and thus to invite more and more galling disappointments. To Henry Clay he could yield without humiliation; but when he saw his party prefer to himself, not once, but twice and three times, men of only military fame, without any political significance whatever, his mortification was so keen that, in the bitterness of his soul, he twice openly protested against the result. Worse than all this, he had to meet the fate—a fate not uncommon with chronic Presidential candidates—to see the most important and most questionable act of his last years attributed to his inordinate craving for the elusive prize.

The cause of this steady succession of failures may have been partly that the people found him too unlike themselves—too unfamiliar to the popular heart—and partly that the party managers shrunk from nominating him because they saw in him not only a giant, but a very vulnerable giant, who would not “wear well” as a candidate. They had, indeed, reason to fear the discussions to which in an excited canvass his private character would be subjected. Of his moral failings those relating to money were the most notorious and the most offensive to the moral sense of the plain people. In the course of his public life he became accustomed not only to the adulation but also to the material generosity of his followers. Great as his professional income was, his prodigality went far beyond his means, and the recklessness with which he borrowed and forgot to return betrayed an utter insensibility to pecuniary obligation. With the coolest nonchalance he spent the money of his friends and left to them his debts for payment. This habit increased as he grew older, and severely tested the endurance of his admirers. So grave a departure from the principles of common honesty could not fail to cast a dark shadow upon his character, and it is not strange that the cloud of distrust should have spread from his private to his public morals. The charge was made that he stood in the Senate advocating high tariff as the paid attorney of the manufacturers of New England. It was met by the answer that so great a man would not sell himself. This should have been enough. Nevertheless, his defenders were grievously embarrassed when the fact was pointed out that it was, after all, in great part the money of the rich manufacturers and bankers that stocked his farm, furnished his house, supplied his table and paid his bills. A man less great could hardly have long sustained himself in public life under such a burden of suspicion. That

Daniel Webster did sustain himself is a striking proof of the strength of his prestige. But his moral failings cost him the noblest fruit of great service—an unbounded public confidence.

Although disappointed in his own expectations, he vigorously supported General Harrison for the Presidency in the campaign of 1840, and in 1841 was made Secretary of State. He remained in that office until he had concluded the famous Ashburton treaty, under the Administration of President Tyler, who turned against the Whig policies. After his resignation he was again elected to the Senate. Then a fateful crisis in his career approached.

The annexation of Texas, the Mexican war and the acquisition of territory on our southern and western border brought the slavery question sharply into the foreground. Webster had always, when occasion called for a demonstration of sentiment, denounced slavery as a great moral and political evil, and although affirming that under the Constitution it could not be touched by the action of the General Government in the States in which it existed, declared himself against its extension. He had opposed the annexation of Texas, the war against Mexico and the enlargement of the Republic by conquest. But while he did not abandon his position concerning slavery, his tone in maintaining it grew gradually milder. The impression gained ground that as a standing candidate for the Presidency he became more and more anxious to conciliate Southern opinion.

Then the day came that tried men's souls. The slave-power had favored war and conquest, hoping that the newly acquired territory would furnish more slave States and more Senators in its interest. That hope was cruelly dashed when California presented herself for admission into the Union with a State constitution excluding slavery from her soil. To the slave-power this was a stunning

blow. It had fought for more slave States and conquered for more free States. The admission of California would hopelessly destroy the balance of power between freedom and slavery in the Senate. The country soon was ablaze with excitement. In the North the anti-slavery feeling ran high. The "fire-eaters" of the South, exasperated beyond measure by their disappointment, vociferously threatened to disrupt the Union. Henry Clay, true to his record, hoped to avert the danger by a compromise. He sought to reconcile the South to the inevitable admission of California by certain concessions to slavery, among them the ill-famed and ill-fated fugitive-slave law—a law offensive not only to anti-slavery sentiment, but also to the common impulses of humanity and to the pride of manhood.

Webster had to choose. The anti-slavery men of New England, and even many of his conservative friends, hoped and expected that he would again, as he had done in nullification times, proudly plant the Union flag in the face of a disunion threat, with a defiant refusal of concession to a rebellious spirit, and give voice to the moral sense of the North. But Webster chose otherwise. On the 7th of March, 1850, he spoke in the Senate. The whole country listened with bated breath. While denouncing secession and pleading for the Union in glowing periods, he spoke of slavery in regretful but almost apologetic accents, upbraided the abolitionists as mischievous marplots, earnestly advocated the compromise and commended that feature of it which was most odious to Northern sentiment—the fugitive-slave law.

From this "Seventh of March Speech"—by that name it has passed into history—Webster never recovered. It stood in too striking a contrast to the "Reply to Hayne." There was, indeed, still the same lucid comprehensiveness of statement. The heavy battalions of argument marched

with the same massive tread. But there was lacking that which had been the great inspiration of the "Reply to Hayne"—the triumphant consciousness of being right. The effect of the speech corresponded to its character. Southern men welcomed it as a sign of Northern submissiveness, but it did not go far enough to satisfy them. The impression it made upon the anti-slavery people of the North was painful in the extreme. They saw in it "the fall of an archangel." Many of them denounced it as the treacherous bid of a Presidential candidate for Southern favor. Their reproaches varied from the indignant murmur to the shrillest note of execration. Persons less interested or excited looked up at the colossal figure of the old hero of "Liberty and Union" with a sort of bewildered dismay, as if something unnatural and portentous had happened to him. Even many of his stanchest adherents among the conservative Whigs stood at first stunned and perplexed, needing some time to gather themselves up for his defense.

This was not surprising. Henry Clay could plan and advocate the compromise of 1850 without loss of character. Although a man of anti-slavery instincts, he was himself a slaveholder representing a slaveholding community—a compromise in his very being; and compromise had always been the vital feature of his statesmanship. But Webster could not apologize for slavery, and in its behalf approve compromise and concession in the face of disunion threats, without turning his back upon the most illustrious feat of his public life. Injustice may have been done to him by the assailants of his motives, but it can hardly be denied that the evidence of circumstances stood glaringly against him. He himself was ill at ease. The virulent epithets and sneers with which he thenceforth aspersed anti-slavery principles and anti-slavery men, contrasting strangely with the stately decorum he had

always cultivated in his public utterances, betrayed the bitterness of a troubled soul.

The 7th-of-March speech, and the series of addresses with which he sought to set right and fortify the position he had taken, helped greatly in inducing both political parties to accept the compromise of 1850, and also in checking, at least for the time being, the anti-slavery movement in the Northern States. But they could not kill that movement, nor could they prevent the coming of the final crisis. They did, however, render him acceptable to the slave-power when, after the death of General Taylor, President Fillmore made him Secretary of State. Once more he stirred the people's heart by a note addressed to the Chevalier Hülsemann, the Austrian chargé d' affaires, in which, defending the mission of a special agent to inquire into the state of the Hungarian insurrection, he proudly justified the conduct of the Government, pointed exultingly to the greatness of the Republic and vigorously vindicated the sympathies of the American people with every advance of free institutions the world over. The whole people applauded, and this was the last flash of popularity.

In 1852 his hope to attain the Whig nomination for the Presidency rose to the highest pitch, although his prospects were darker than ever. But he had reached the age of seventy; this was his last chance, and he clung to it with desperate eagerness. He firmly counted upon receiving in the Convention a large number of Southern votes; he received not one. His defeat could hardly have been more overwhelming. The nomination fell to General Scott. In the agony of his disappointment Webster advised his friends to vote for the Democratic candidate, Franklin Pierce. In 1848 he had declared General Taylor's nomination to be one "not fit to be made"; but, after all, he had supported it. Then he still

saw a possibility for himself ahead. In 1852, the last hope having vanished, he punished his party for having refused him what he thought his due by openly declaring for the opposition. The reasons he gave for this extreme step were neither tenable nor even plausible. It was a wail of utter despair.

His health had for some time been failing, and the shock which his defeat gave him aggravated his ailment. On the morning of October 24, 1852, he died. Henry Clay's death had preceded his by four months. The month following saw the final discomfiture of the Whig party. The very effort of its chiefs to hold it together and to preserve the Union by concessions to slavery disrupted it so thoroughly that it could never again rally. Its very name soon disappeared. Less than two years after Webster's death the whole policy of compromise broke down in total collapse. Massachusetts herself had risen against it, and in Webster's seat in the Senate sat Charles Sumner, the very embodiment of the uncompromising anti-slavery conscience. The "irrepressible conflict" between freedom and slavery rudely swept aside all other politics and filled the stage. The thunder-clouds of the coming civil war loomed darkly above the horizon.

In the turmoils that followed, all of Webster's work sank into temporary oblivion, except his greatest and best. The echoes of the "Reply to Hayne" awoke again. "Liberty and Union, one and inseparable, now and forever!" became not merely the watchword of a party, but the battlecry of armed hosts. "I still live," had been his last words on his death-bed. Indeed, he still lived in his noblest achievement, and thus he will long continue to live.

Over Webster's grave there was much heated dispute as to the place he would occupy in the history of his country. Many of those who had idolized him during

his life extolled him still more after his death as the demi-god whose greatness put all his motives and acts above criticism, and whose genius excused all human frailties. Others, still feeling the smart of the disappointment which that fatal 7th of March had given them, would see in him nothing but rare gifts and great opportunities prostituted by vulgar appetites and a selfish ambition. The present generation, remote from the struggles and passions of those days, will be more impartial in its judgment. Looking back upon the time in which he lived, it beholds his statuesque form towering with strange grandeur among his contemporaries—huge in his strength, and huge also in his weaknesses and faults; not, indeed, an originator of policies or measures, but a marvelous expounder of principles, laws and facts, who illuminated every topic of public concern he touched with the light of a sovereign intelligence and vast knowledge; who by overpowering argument riveted around the Union unbreakable bonds of Constitutional doctrine; who awakened to new life and animated with invincible vigor the National spirit; who left to his countrymen and to the world invaluable lessons of statesmanship, right and patriotism, in language of grand simplicity and prodigiously forceful clearness; and who might stand as its greatest man in the political history of America had he been a master-character as he was a master-mind.

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TO PRESIDENT MCKINLEY

NEW YORK, Dec. 24, 1897.

If the proceedings of the annual meeting of the National Civil Service Reform League [at Cincinnati, Dec. 16th and 17th] have come to your notice, you will have observed that your resistance to the urgency of the office-hunters

and their patrons, as well as your Executive order of July 27, 1897, received hearty praise, and that your Administration was spoken of throughout in a tone of commendation, with the confident hope that the things which are still causing anxiety will be adjusted in entire consonance with the principles of the merit system.

I am also glad to say that we found in Ohio much more active sympathy than we had expected. Before long there will be an organized civil service reform movement in Ohio, which will afford you energetic support, and give General Grosvenor and his associates something to think of.

Pardon me now for making a few suggestions which spring from the sincerest desire to continue that auspicious state of feeling. There are reports in the newspapers which represent you as considering the policy of fore-stalling the coming debate in Congress by making further exemptions of "confidential" or "fiduciary" positions from the competitive rule. About this, permit me a few observations.

There are many positions so designated—and if further exceptions are made, a great many more will be so designated—that do not in any essential respect differ from other ordinary clerkships. There is, besides, no reason in the world why the occupants of certain positions, filled upon competitive examinations, should not be held to give bonds. The two things go perfectly well together. There is no well regulated service in any civilized state in which executive officers such as collectors or postmasters are permitted to appoint any of their subordinates at their discretion. The higher places under them are simply filled by promotion from lower grades, as they always can be quite satisfactorily. And nothing is more certain than that, if in our service such discretion is permitted, the appointments will be dictated to the executive

officers by political or personal influence. This so-called "discretion" is a mere fiction. The service, therefore, gains nothing by allowing them such discretion. On the contrary, it loses in point of efficiency as well as of morals, because political influence usually cares little about the true interest of the service.

Another newspaper report has it that you are considering the abrogation of the one year limit for the reinstatement of persons who have been removed without sufficient cause. This matter was discussed during Mr. Cleveland's last term, when it was moved for the benefit of the railway mail clerks who had been dismissed just before the extension of the rules over the railway mail service went into effect at the beginning of General Harrison's Administration. There seemed then to be peculiar reasons for the abrogation of the one year rule, but the Civil Service Reform League opposed it most earnestly because the example of numerous reinstatements once set would serve as a precedent, and throw the service into no end of confusion. We are as earnestly opposed to the abrogation of that rule now for the same reasons.

I would submit to you also that if you make any of these concessions, each of which would be construed as a backward step, the end of appeasing the opponents of the present civil service system would not be reached. According to universal experience your regular spoils "hunter" or patronage monger would not be satisfied by any partial concession. He will continue his clamor until he gets *all* he wants; and if you give him anything he will construe this only as a sign of a yielding disposition on your part and become all the more urgent and unmanageable.

The only thing that will make him stop his importunity is the conviction that there is for him no hope of getting any concession at all. I beg leave to repeat, therefore,

what I wrote you some time ago: If your Secretaries boldly and positively say now what, after the experience they have had, they doubtless think, that without the merit system they cannot manage their Departments as efficiently and honestly as they wish to manage them, and that there ought to be no further exceptions at all—the battle will be won by that simple declaration; the pressure will cease, and the clamorers in Congress will not dare to pass any adverse legislation because the public opinion of the country would be overwhelmingly against them.

Your Secretaries thus have it entirely in their power to relieve you, as well as themselves, of all trouble by speaking out frankly and resolutely against further changes. Every appearance of indecision would encourage further attacks.

I am sorry to find in the newspapers as well as in my correspondence, increasing complaint about violations of your removal order, accompanied with very disagreeable reflections on the good faith of the order, which are based upon the supposition that these violations are permitted to go on with impunity. There are probably many cases of groundless or exaggerated complaints; but some, I fear, are not at all groundless, and I believe there is nothing so much calculated to endanger popular confidence in the honesty of the merit system as such violations of orders if they actually do pass with impunity. I do not like to advise harsh measures. But it really does seem as if these violations of your orders could be stopped, and that the shaken confidence could be restored, *only* by making conspicuous examples of some of the offenders, according to the rule which demands their dismissal from office. Their disloyalty to you, with which they bring discredit upon your Administration, certainly deserves it.

Will you permit me a remark upon a subject which

belongs to another chapter? The Republican party in this city and State is dividing into two hostile camps. If things continue to go on as they do now, it will be doomed to certain defeat. The boss rule of Mr. Platt is the dividing element. That boss rule will cease as soon as it appears that Mr. Platt does no longer control any of the Federal patronage. As soon as it ceases, the party can unite again upon a new basis for a strong and hopeful fight. So long as Mr. Platt keeps the influence which the Federal patronage gives him, disturbance will continue and surely bring on disaster. I say this as one who is interested in the Republican party, seeing in it a bulwark against Bryanism.

Pardon this long letter. I need not assure you that the suggestions I make are those of a sincere friend who wishes for you all that is good.—Faithfully yours.

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TO MRS. R. W. GILDER

16 EAST 64TH ST., Feb. 15, 1898.

I am very sorry I cannot attend your meeting in behalf of the establishment of a permanent orchestra in this city. But let me assure you that your efforts in that direction have my earnest sympathy.

The city of New York is becoming more and more the recognized center of civilization in America—not only as to the habits, tastes, endeavors and demands of its own society, but in the sense that people from all parts of the continent congregate here to find of the enjoyments of civilized life the best to be had on this side of the Atlantic.

That such a city should not have a permanent orchestra, which by constant practice and study together can train itself for the most perfect interpretation of the creations of musical genius, must certainly be regarded as an

anomaly. That New York ought to have such an orchestra—indeed, that in order to perform its function as the greatest center of civilization in America, it *must* have such an orchestra—seems to be self-evident. And why should it not? It has the musicians and it has the money. The only thing needed is that the public spirit of some of its wealthy citizens should be turned into that channel. And I confidently hope that the persuasive enthusiasm of the ladies who have taken this task in hand will soon succeed in accomplishing it.

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#### NATIONAL HONOR<sup>1</sup>

The honor of a person, in the general sense of the term, is his moral dignity. To offend or wound a person's honor means to deny or impeach his moral dignity so as to lower it in the estimation of others, and perhaps also in his own self-respect. To forfeit one's honor means to do something, or to permit something to be done, which is incompatible with one's moral dignity. This applies to nations as well as to individuals. What true honor consists in, what constitutes an offense to one's honor and how the offended honor can or should be vindicated or restored, are questions which in different places and at different times have received different answers, according to the different conventional conceptions of honor or the different states of civilization there and then prevailing.

Whatever divergences of opinion on these points may still exist in this country, no American capable of sober reflection can seriously hold the belief that considerations of National honor would require, or even that its moral

<sup>1</sup> From *Harper's Weekly* of March 19, 1898. Grateful acknowledgments are made to Harper & Brothers for generous permission to reprint this article.

dignity would permit, this great Republic to swagger about among the nations of the world with a chip on its shoulder, shaking its fist under everybody's nose, and telling the world on every possible occasion that we can "whip" any Power that might choose to resent this, and that we would be rather glad of an opportunity for doing so. A private individual taking such an attitude would certainly not be called a gentleman. He would be considered a vulgar bully. If a person of great physical strength, he would be feared by some, esteemed by nobody and heartily detested as a public nuisance by the whole decent part of the community. A nation playing such a rôle would deserve and meet with the same judgment in the family of civilized nations, and at the same time it would cultivate within itself those forces of evil which are always developed by a perversion of the sense of honor, and the consequent loss of true moral dignity and of genuine self-respect.

Neither would any American having the honor of his country sincerely at heart find it compatible with the true moral dignity of this great Republic that the American people should always be nervously on the lookout for something to offend or affront it, and eager to construe as a grievous injury or a deadly insult anything in the slightest degree capable of an unpleasant interpretation, in order to avenge it. He would remember the common experience of private life that the honor of the "hero" of many so-called "affairs of honor," the ever-ready duellist, is apt to be not the genuine article, and that few things are more derogatory to the character of a gentleman than a propensity to pick unnecessary quarrels—that is, quarrels which might honorably be avoided. There is one duty which strong men and strong nations that are imbued with a strong sense of honor will never forget. It is that the strong should scrupulously abstain from abusing their

strength when dealing with the weak. Strong men and strong nations, conscious of their moral dignity, will be slow to take offense. They will, of course, not permit themselves to be injured, or insulted, or trifled with, or balked by anybody at will, or to any length; but they will be especially solicitous to exhaust all peaceable means for the enforcement of their just demands, or for the amicable composition of differences, before their superiority of brute strength is brought into play. They can afford and they should use the greater forbearance as it cannot be charged either to weakness or timidity.

A true sense of National honor will move the American people to keep this well in mind at the present moment. It is not intended to inquire here what our grievance against Spain may be. Let us assume it to be very grave. What will then be the situation? This Republic is very strong. Spain is, in comparison, very weak. We have a population of nearly 75,000,000. Spain has 18,000,000. We are immensely rich in ready means and still undeveloped resources. Spain is poor, with a heavy debt and impaired credit. Although Spain might annoy us much with her fleet at the beginning of hostilities, in case of war, there is no doubt of our ability to defeat her thoroughly in a contest, the final result of which depends upon material staying-power and the tenacity of the popular spirit. Nobody questions this. Our manifest superiority is so great that there would be little glory in our triumph. Neither are we in the situation of a people whose reputation as to courage, bravery or patriotism is still to be established. All this is so well-known and so universally acknowledged that no forbearance on our part can ever by any possibility be misinterpreted as a lack of power or of pluck—or that, in fact, it can appear as anything else than the considerate self-control of conscious strength. “But,” we are told, “the ‘dons’ are insolent. Unless

we give them a sound beating, they will say that the Americans are afraid of them!" Well, what of it if they were foolish enough to say or even to think so? Would anybody else believe it? Would it in any manner diminish the power of this Republic or lower its moral dignity, its National honor, in the estimation of other nations or in its own? No; if this Republic, conscious of its superior strength, seeks to obtain what it considers just and proper, with that generous forbearance which is the finest privilege of the strong when dealing with the weak, and avoids war with sedulous solicitude, until all honest efforts to preserve peace have been exhausted in vain, and thinks of it then only as an extreme exigency and a most unwelcome one, it will serve the National honor, the moral dignity of the Nation, infinitely better than by the most grandiloquent bluster or by any unnecessary demonstration that we are strong enough to "whip" anybody whenever we like.

For a just appreciation of the requirements of National honor in the premises it may be useful to look also at the Spanish side of the question. Spain, as the weaker party, will be much more open to the imputation of timidity if she yields on any dubious point. Her proverbial pride may render it therefore especially painful to her to abandon any position she once has held. The impulse to vindicate what she conceives to be her national honor by fighting at any cost to the last extremity for what she had once claimed as her right, or against what she had once denounced as a wrong or an indignity, may therefore be especially potent with her, even though she might herself feel that she could not justly maintain her contentions. But if she were conscious of that, would her national honor demand that she should at least try to uphold those contentions at the cost of more bloody and destructive war? Whatever may be thought of the character of Spanish rule, nobody will say that the Spanish nation

needs further proof of its courage or national spirit. Of those qualities at least the tremendous sacrifice of blood and treasure with which Spain has struggled to keep her grasp upon Cuba has given new and ample demonstration. In that respect, therefore, her national honor would not be jeopardized by submission to any fair demands, if such were made upon her on our part.

Neither would her national honor, in any sense, suffer by the abandonment of Cuba as soon as she has to admit that her rule over the inhabitants of that island can no longer be maintained. There has been a rumor that the proud Spaniard, when the loss of Cuba becomes certain, will then, for national honor's sake, provoke a war with the United States, so as to preserve at least the appearance of succumbing only to the superior strength of one of the great Powers of the world. No misconception of national honor could be more grotesque than the fancy that the moral dignity of a nation can better be saved by punishing one's self with an absolutely useless demonstration of willingness to shed more blood and to squander more wealth and to create more misery, than by a wise and decorous acceptance of the inevitable. It is a monstrous notion, which can have sprung only from some very much overheated brain; but it fairly illustrates the strange confusion of ideas in which national honor figures as something that stands above the dictates of common-sense, as well as of common morality.

We have had much of this wild sort of talk in this country, and we may have more. But there is good reason for hoping that it will not run away with the self-respect of the American people. We may well be proud of the self-contained dignity with which so far President McKinley and his Ministers have conducted our foreign affairs amid the excitements of the day; proud of the well-nigh unanimous applause which the calm attitude of those

in power has elicited from the citizenship of the country; and proud of the fact that a bill to put the Republic in a state of defense could pass both houses of Congress without hot appeals to warlike passions. This gives us a taste of that sense of National honor which draws its inspiration not from hysterical spasms, but from sober wisdom; not from the brutal wantonness of superior strength, but from the noble resolve to be all the more just and generous, because strong.

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TO PRESIDENT McKINLEY

[NEW YORK.] April 8, 1898.

Accept my sincere thanks for the cordial reception which, as your secretary, Mr. Porter, informs me, you have given to my letter of April 1st.

Permit me now to send you a report of the meeting of the Chamber of Commerce of New York in which a resolution drawn by me was adopted commending your peace policy. It faithfully represents the feelings of the best part of the community.

Unless I am much mistaken, the war fever stirred up by the "yellow journals" is on the point of receding. Owing partly to the indiscreet and impudent utterances of the Cuban Junta, partly to the immediate imminence of war, many people who but yesterday talked fluently about "liberating Cuba at any cost," begin to open their eyes to the dreadful and thankless impossibility we shall impose upon this Republic if by warlike action we make it answerable for the future peace and orderly conduct of the people of that island. If availing yourself at the last moment of the last chance, you succeed in saving the Republic from so terrible and hopeless an estrangement, the American people will never cease to be grateful to you. I think you can frankly and boldly take the people

into your confidence by a solemn word of warning with the assurance that a large majority of the thinking men will at once be on your side, and the rest will soon come to their senses.

Permit me another word. It would very grievously hurt this Republic in the opinion of mankind, which after all is of high importance to all of us, if the suspicion were permitted to grow up that the ultimate annexation of Cuba was a secret motive of our action. In my humble opinion, such an impression cannot be too carefully guarded against.

Pardon another suggestion. I fear some of your friends in Congress are doing you a bad service by representing the coming war, if it should come, as a political party matter. There has been some very reckless talk of this kind the effect of which is bad, and which does you great injustice.

Believe me, dear Mr. President, faithfully and anxiously yours.

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FROM THOMAS F. BAYARD

HOT SPRINGS, VA., April 8, 1898.

My dear Carl Schurz: You and I took our seats in the Senate in March, 1869, so that well-nigh thirty years have passed with all the chances and changes of life in this growing and active country, and I want to say another word of respect, admiration and sympathy for the part you have here borne and happily are now taking in the interests of good government and the higher civilization of the country of which we are both citizens. The impelling cause of these lines is the present crisis in our international affairs and the wise and just counsel you are giving to our countrymen in relation to the true status of our relations to Spain, and the unhappy island which is the cause and theater of so much that is inexpressibly horrible and sorrowful.

I will not attempt in this note to comment upon the unprecedented and distressful state of affairs, but only wish to touch your hand once more and thank you for what you have written and said and are yet to write and say to the American people in relation to the dangers that beset them and the real peril to free institutions that clouds our immediate future.

I came here a week ago to try the medicinal virtues of the baths, etc., but I fancy our gray-bearded Father Time is smiling at the efforts (so futile) to escape the results of his long companionship.

In a week I shall be back at my home in Delaware, and it would be a real joy to me to see you on my porch overlooking the blue Delaware and smoking the pipe of peace. It is an easy ride from New York, after business hours, to arrive at Wilmington, where I will meet you, and where a hearty welcome awaits you.

Dear Schurz, I remember so well thirty years ago, when you stepped out "solitary and alone" and struck the shield of organized and corrupt power in the Senate of the United States, and my heart has been with you from that day to this.

Sincerely and affectionately yours.

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#### ABOUT PATRIOTISM \*

The dictionaries define "patriotism" as "love of one's country," and "patriot" as "one who loves and faithfully serves his country." These definitions are generally accepted as correct, and they should be well kept in mind, especially at a time of warlike excitement when the word "patriotism" is on every lip, and an appeal to "patriotism," from whomsoever it may come and by whatever motive it may be prompted, is sure to draw popular applause. It should be constantly remembered that to

\* From *Harper's Weekly* of April 16, 1898. Grateful acknowledgments are made to Harper & Brothers for generous permission to reprint this article.

"serve one's country faithfully" means not only to profess love for it, or to have a sentimental attachment to it, but to consider with conscientious care what is best for its welfare and its honor, and then to do one's duty to it according to that understanding, honestly, with courageous devotion and in a spirit of self-sacrifice.

We are apt to admire as the highest exhibition of patriotism the voluntary sacrifice of one's life in battle for one's country. Inasmuch as life may ordinarily be assumed the possession we should be least inclined to part with, and as the deliberate sacrifice of it is justly thought to require a high degree of devotion and courage, the popular appreciation of the spirit which prompts such an offering is certainly well merited. But the peculiar luster in which this kind of patriotism appears, and which seizes upon the popular imagination, easily makes us depreciate another kind, which, although less brilliant, may be no less heroic, no less self-sacrificing and sometimes even far more useful to the common good. The glory surrounding warlike achievement and the homage lavished upon the martial hero are apt to make especially the young and ardent forget that while sometimes the interests of a country may be furthered and its honor protected by means of war, of all the means by which such objects can be accomplished, war is the most cruel, barbarous and abominable, and should be resorted to only in the last extremity, when there is no more hope of any other means succeeding. The man who in times of popular excitement boldly and unflinchingly resists hot-tempered clamor for an unnecessary war, and thus exposes himself to the opprobrious imputation of a lack of patriotism or of courage, to the end of saving his country from a great calamity, is, as to "loving and faithfully serving his country," at least as good a patriot as the hero of the most daring feat of arms, and a far

better one than those who, with an ostentatious pretense of superior patriotism, cry for war before it is needed, especially if then they let others do the fighting.

As there is nothing more dangerous to the well-being of a monarchy than a prince incessantly thirsting for martial glory, so there is no delusion more dangerous to the peace, the prosperity, the honor and the liberties of a free people than the one that a needless or wanton clamoring for war on every occasion of foreign embroilment is a sign of patriotic spirit. True patriotism in time of peace demands that we should vigilantly and actively endeavor to obtain the enactment of wise laws; the appointment of able and honest public servants; the redress of wrongs and the reform of abuses; the expulsion from public place of drones and rogues; the restraint of lawlessness and violence; the preservation of security and good order; and, finally, the maintenance of an honorable name among the nations of the world by dealing with them on principles of fairness and magnanimity, preferring at all times, in the adjustment of difficulties, peaceable means to the savage arbitrament of war, and resorting to this only when we can conscientiously affirm that no peaceable expedient has been left untried, and when we are sure that our reasons for war can, without fear of an adverse judgment, be submitted to the opinion of civilized mankind.

True patriotism is incompatible with any selfish motive that does not accord with the public interest. The journalist or the public agitator generally who, while knowing that just demands might still be satisfied by peaceable negotiation, clamors for war and stirs up popular passion to increase his popularity or profit, is not only not a patriot, but a public enemy—just as much as if he openly and persistently urged the lawless element among us to robbery, murder and arson, to share in the spoil. We all respect our Army and our Navy—their character

and their calling. They are to be the right arm of patriotism in times of conflict. Patriotism wishes them not only to be able to fight, but also to like fighting when fighting is necessary. But the same patriotism forbids them to clamor for a fight so long as fighting is not necessary. If officers of the Army or the Navy should ever use their influence to bring on a war while peace might honorably be maintained, to furnish them opportunity for showing how brave and skilful they are, and to increase their chances of promotion, they would be just as unpatriotic—aye, just as criminal—as the members of a fire department would be who try to set a tenement house ablaze for the purpose of exhibiting their skill in handling an engine or their courage in scaling ladders, and of thus earning praise and advancement. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a wantonness of spirit more reckless, more wicked, more repugnant to true patriotism, than the use of whatever influence one may possess to bring on war, with all its horrors and miseries, so long as the possibility of preserving an honorable peace has not utterly vanished.

If, in spite of all efforts to avert it, war does come, the duties of patriotism are the same for all, of whatever shade of opinion—for those who did not approve of the cause of the quarrel as much as for those who did. Patriotism then demands that we should all unite with the same faithful devotion in doing the best we can to make the shortest possible work of the struggle, and to secure a speedy issue honorable and advantageous to our country. It demands that we should carefully abstain from endangering the operations of our armies or navies by giving information to the enemy, and that, among other things, we should sternly curb that spirit of journalistic “enterprise” which, for instance, now is so busy advertising to the whole world the military and naval plans of our Government. It demands that we should always be

willing to deny ourselves any opportunity for private advantage that may injuriously interfere with the public policy.

It demands that, while vigorously pushing the war, we should neglect no chance for an honorable peace, and that in making such a peace we should never tarnish the good name of our country by an unnecessary humiliation of the defeated enemy. It demands that while the war is going on we should strive to the utmost of our power to mitigate its horrors, to alleviate its miseries, and, last but not least, to counteract those agencies of demoralization and corruption which, while the excited public mind is turned to one single object, are apt to grow and flourish in extraordinary measure. And here we touch a chapter the importance of which the patriot who has the working of free institutions at heart will certainly not fail to appreciate.

It is in time of war, when the rush of events frequently makes the needs of the Government especially pressing, that the tribe of unscrupulous speculators bent upon cheating and robbing the public find most fruitful opportunities. They will always be seen and heard among the noisiest of "patriots," in whose opinion no preparation is large enough, no action too quick and no measure too far-reaching. In the name of "patriotism" they will insist that all those safeguards in the government machinery which are to prevent fraud and theft be swept away as antiquated "red-tapeism" that obstructs the necessary vigor and promptness of action. In the name of "patriotism" they will seek to foist into places of trust and responsibility patriots of their own stripe to help them in their rascally game. In the name of "patriotism" they will strive to discredit and break down public men who have remained sufficiently cool to guard the public interest, as "not patriotic enough." And this tribe of sharks and

harpies will be lustily aided by the disreputable politicians who discover in the general disturbance a new chance for themselves, and who expect the loudest kind of war patriotism to lift them into popular favor and public place, trusting that everything will be forgiven to the "patriot" who is most vociferous in denouncing the enemy and most fiercely proclaiming that the war must not cease until the last fighting foe has bitten the dust. This is the class of "patriots" well fitted by old Dr. Samuel Johnson's robust saying, that "patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel." And those who "love their country and mean to serve it faithfully" must not forget that true patriotism, while in time of war it has to fight the foreign enemy abroad, has to fight with equal vigilance and vigor false patriotism at home. For unless it do so with effect, the range and power of corrupt and degrading influences in our political life will be fearfully enlarged, and the progress of honest, safe and orderly methods of government may be set back for an indefinite period.

Can true patriotism possibly be eager to rush our country into war while there is a chance for honorable peace?

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TO THOMAS F. BAYARD

NEW YORK, April 24, 1898.

Dear Bayard: I cannot thank you enough for the cordial greeting you have sent me. Every word of it has done my heart good, and I need not tell you that it is all most sincerely reciprocated. I should have responded to it more promptly had I not thought it best to wait until I could be reasonably sure that my letter would find you at your home in Wilmington again.

If I can find the time for making you a visit I shall certainly do so. In fact, I long for it. But I am sorry

to say that it is very doubtful whether my engagements here will permit me to do so in the near future. However, I shall try to make it possible, and then I shall advise you without ceremony.

I must confess to you that I am profoundly distressed about the present unhappy state of affairs. The impulses of the great mass of our people are no doubt generous and noble. But the reckless passions and ambitions of unruly spirits have acquired a sway which bodes ill to the country. Now that the war has actually begun we, of course, wish energy and wisdom to the Government and success to our arms. But who knows where it will lead us—in what complications and adventures it may entangle us, and how great the demoralization will be that this war will bring upon us!

One thing may, indeed, be hoped for. When Spain disappears from this hemisphere, the jingo-spirit will hardly find another “enemy” to excite the popular mind with; for the present attitude of Great Britain will no longer permit the American demagogue to seek popularity by twisting the British lion’s tail.

I thank you again, dear Bayard, for that cordial grasp of the hand. Present my best regards to Mrs. Bayard and believe me, faithfully yours.

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TO PRESIDENT MCKINLEY

May 9, 1898.

Notwithstanding the brilliant victories of our arms, upon which I heartily congratulate you, it is and will remain of great importance to this Republic that it should have the confidence and good will of foreign nations. The manner in which we plunged into this war has created much distrust and ill feeling on the continent of Europe.

But that in effect may be retrieved if we remain true to our promise that this is to be a war of deliverance and not one of greedy ambition, conquest, self-aggrandizement.

But if, as the newspapers foreshadow, the Administration takes advantage of the war to press the annexation of Hawaii now—that annexation having been violently dis-countenanced by the public opinion of the country before the war began—it is certain that the confidence of the world in the unselfishness of our policy will be destroyed. It will be in vain to say that for the purposes of the war we must have a naval station in Hawaii, for the world knows that we own Pearl Harbor, which we can use as a naval station without annexing Hawaii. The annexation of Hawaii under such circumstances would therefore merely be an acquisition of territory by means of this war. From that time on it would be useless to protest that this is not a war of selfish ambition and conquest.

I hope and trust that a rapid succession of victories will shorten the conflict and bring on an early peace. But, in any event, we may be involved in dangerous complications which may render the good opinion of the world of very high importance to us. And I beg your kind pardon for suggesting that it would, in my humble judgment, be a hazardous policy to risk the loss of that good opinion and to give new reason for distrust, by taking at this critical period a step which, if it is to be taken at all, can safely wait.

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THE '48ERS<sup>1</sup>

MY FRIENDS:—Allow me to express my sincere thanks for the honor you do us old "Forty-eighters" by your warm welcome this evening.

<sup>1</sup> Speech at a semi-centennial banquet in Arion Hall, New York City, May 14, 1898, in honor of the old '48ers.

Translated by Miss Schurz.

I have often asked myself which of the memories of my somewhat eventful life I should most wish to preserve and which I could most readily spare, and I have always come to the conclusion that the recollections of the period of 1848 are among my dearest and most precious. I would not give them up at any price.

It has become the fashion in certain quarters in Germany to scoff at the year '48 as the "mad year." That is such a foolish, yes, such an almost childish, view, of which only those are capable who cannot or will not grasp great historic facts in their true significance. It was in 1848 that the ruling German Powers so completely broke the bonds of absolutism that a return to the old form of government was made impossible. All the constitutional development they have had they owe to that period.

In 1848, for the first time, a sense of German national unity was felt and consciously developed with a life-giving force.

I was born on the left bank of the Rhine, and I distinctly remember how strong French traditions and French sympathies were among the people there in the days of my boyhood. Many of them were not sure that they did not prefer to be French rather than Prussian. The year '48 forever completely put an end to such an unsettled state of mind and in its place awakened in every heart the mighty longing for national unity which grew to be an irresistible moral impulse, until at last came the great consummation.

To us youths, however, the period of '48 was something even more than that. I have always been glad that I took part in such a movement in my early youth. Whoever has had a similar experience knows what it means to have been one of a numerous body who dedicated themselves to a cause, which to them was a noble and sacred one; who, with the boundless devotion of youth and with

the idealism that is free from all thought of self or of personal interest, were ready for any sacrifice. That was the spirit of the youth of 1848. Whoever was young then will cherish the memory as a proud and dear one. I always vividly remember a tragic incident of those days. In September, 1848, I took part in a congress of students which met in Eisenach at the foot of the Wartburg. I was sent there as a delegate from the University of Bonn. The other German universities were also represented. There were present, among others, nine or ten young men, delegates of the University of Vienna, who belonged to the Academic Legion of that city. This legion played a prominent part in the revolutionary developments of the time and seemed, for a short period, to exert a decisive influence on the Austrian Government. In their headquarters, the aula of the university, the leaders of the legion received deputations bringing petitions for the redress of grievances and for the introduction of reforms, as if the armed students were, indeed, the reigning power. Then came the reaction. It had grown strong by the union of the Court party and the Army with the nationalities hostile to Germany. A violent end seemed to threaten the revolutionary movement and at the time of our student congress at Eisenach the catastrophe was rapidly approaching.

The delegates of the Vienna universities appeared at our Congress clad in the picturesque uniform of the Academic Legion; they were handsome, chivalrous youths and general favorites, owing to their winning, genial manners. We were still in the midst of our student festivities and full of youthful exuberance of spirits when our Austrian friends suddenly announced, with agitated mien, that they were obliged to return to Vienna without delay. To our question, "Why?" they answered that they had received letters from headquarters warning them

that the final crisis was impending, that the cause of freedom required the presence of all her champions. In great haste they left us. I still see before me the scene of our parting. When, with a last hand-clasp, we called out, "Auf Wiedersehen!" one of them answered with a questioning inflection: "Auf Wiedersehen? we go to battle from here—look at the lists of the fallen, perhaps you will there find our names!" It was the "Morituri salutamus" spoken in the first freshness of youth. Soon after came the terrible October fights in Vienna in which the blood of the Academic Legion flowed in streams.

Such was the spirit of a great part of the German youth of 1848. But we are asked: Were there not many fantastic vagaries indulged in? Were there not many wild blunders made and much attempted that was foolish and unattainable? Certainly. But many of the things that were then aspired to have since been realized and others should and will be realized in the course of time. The so-called "Forty-eighters" were striving principally for the realization of two great ideals: national unity and representative government. The great union of Germany has been achieved and it may be confidently predicted that the continuance of the united German Empire will be all the more firmly assured the more popular and free the form of its government. The more arbitrary the supreme power, the more dangerous will anti-nationalism become. The more popular the administration of state affairs the more patriotic will be the people and the more patriotic the people the stronger and safer the Empire. The fact that the German nation now represents a free and proud people united by a feeling of patriotism in which it rejoices, and not merely an alliance of princes, is the surest guarantee of its permanence. May the powers that be in Germany always keep in mind this fact.

The youth inspired by the spirit of '48 fought honestly

for these great aims, these high ideals; he was ready to give his life for them, and whatever his mistakes or his foolhardiness the German people have every reason to be proud of him instead of scoffing at the "mad year." It is to be wished that in the youth of to-day a living spark of that same self-sacrificing idealism might be kindled and that this spark might never be choked and extinguished by a puerile ambition for personal aggrandizement.

Surely no one will deny that those German representatives of the movement of '48 who have sought and found a new home in America have always been good and conscientious citizens of their new fatherland. The intellectual freshness and vivacity which they brought with them greatly stimulated at the time the political and social life of the Germans in America, and when, with the movement of secession, danger threatened the new fatherland, the German '48ers, each in his way, were among the first who, with self-sacrificing devotion, rushed to the defense of the Union and liberty. Most of them have proved that the revolutionary agitators of 1848 could become reliable and conservative citizens under a free government. I believe that public opinion will on the whole give them a good character—and if it does not we will give it to ourselves.

Now we have dwindled to a very small band and again we find ourselves facing a crisis which makes special demands on the patriotism of the citizens of this Republic. You, Mr. Chairman, have already pointed out that there is a great difference of opinion as to the cause and the expediency of the present war, but that now, since the war has actually begun, we must all, man for man, stand together in the defense of our common country. Gentlemen, not only is this quite self-evident, but I go even further in saying that the man who now most eagerly advocates peace must, under the circumstances, recom-

mend the most energetic conduct of the war, as only by a speedy and decisive victory of the United States can peace be soon restored.

Mature reflection and a serious consideration of all the aspects of the problem have made me a fast friend of peace—not peace at any price, but peace as long as it is compatible with the honor and safety of the Nation. It is my conviction that few things are so dangerous to the ethical basis of democratic government as a protracted state of war. Under prevailing conditions the policy to be pursued by the true advocate of peace should be as follows: for peace as long as it can be maintained; after the outbreak of hostilities, for the most vigorous management of the war in order to put an end to the state of war as quickly as possible with a decisive victory. Again for peace as soon as the first chance of peace presents itself. Every patriotic citizen will, therefore, wish most speedy and decisive success to the arms of the Republic. He will support every demand of the Government with the most self-sacrificing devotion in order to regain the "desired peace," as President McKinley calls it in his last message. He will oppose every attempt to degrade a war which was heralded to all the world as a war for humanity to an ordinary war of conquest, an attempt which, if successful, will dishonor the flag and bring new wars and untold disaster upon the American people. Let us hope that the United States may be spared the heavy responsibility which would devolve upon them if this war should kindle a far-reaching conflagration, a danger which is all the more threatening the longer the war lasts. Let us hope that the great American Republic, among whose most loyal citizens we old '48ers count ourselves, may honorably emerge from this crisis with her democratic institutions unimpaired, with her promise honestly fulfilled that her victorious arms shall not serve

the lust of conquest, but shall be unselfishly used only in the name of humanity, of civilization and liberty—thus winning anew the confidence and respect of the world.

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## TO PRESIDENT MCKINLEY

NEW YORK, June 1, 1898.

My last letter having remained unanswered, I must conclude that you have thought it best not to respond to the suggestion therein submitted to you. Profoundly convinced as I am of the great importance of having the good opinion of foreign nations on our side in this war, and anxious to do all I can to that end wherever I may have opportunity—although as you may conclude from the enclosed clipping it is uphill work—will you bear with me if I return to the charge and pray you to read all I wish to say on this subject, although it may try your patience? I am now preparing a letter, instead of the interview mentioned in my last, which I intend to send over to Germany for publication in a few days.

It can hardly be denied that in our case a strict and outspoken adherence to our original declaration as to the object of the war will be for us the only honorable and thus also the most advantageous policy. If we turn this war, which was heralded to the world as a war of humanity, in any sense into a war of conquest, we shall forever forfeit the confidence of mankind, and we shall be met with general distrust in our international relations under circumstances which will make that distrust especially troublesome and dangerous.

If, on the other hand, we keep our word, annex none of the Spanish colonies we may occupy, make Cuba, and, as the case may be, Porto Rico independent, and dispose of the Philippines—assuming that we get control of them and find it impossible to return them to Spain—to some Power

that is not likely to excite especial jealousy, such as Holland or Belgium, we shall not only command the esteem and confidence of mankind in a much higher degree than ever before; we shall not only be able to get coaling-stations and naval depots wherever we may want them, but we shall qualify ourselves for that position which is most congenial to our democratic institutions; which we can maintain without extravagant armaments; which will not involve us in any burdensome political responsibilities, and which in the commercial point of view will, particularly in case of war among foreign nations, be infinitely more profitable than any other possibly can be—I mean the position of the *great neutral Power of the world.*

The policy I am advocating is, therefore, not a merely idealistic one. It suits this Republic best morally as well as materially. It is best calculated to preserve our free institutions intact, and it will give us eventually by far the greatest expansion of trade at the smallest risk, while other nations are fighting for such expansion. Such conflicts on a large scale we may witness before long. Let us hope that they will not come before we are out of this war and that this Republic may have the privilege of witnessing them from the vantage ground of the strong neutral. Occupying that ground we shall not need alliances in order to profit from the opening of new avenues of commerce. Of course, the idea of an "Anglo-American understanding" appeals strongly to my sympathy. But I would much rather see this Republic maintain the attitude of an independent and powerful neutral than depend upon any alliance for the safety of its possessions, however magnificent these may appear.

We cannot, in my humble opinion, follow a policy of annexing outlying territories without forfeiting these advantages, without becoming involved in foreign quarrels,

without losing the free hand and the immense benefits of the neutral position, and without endangering the moral vitality of our Republic. Nothing will, it seems to me, be more apt to keep us in the right way than the constantly and emphatically reiterated declaration by our Government that this is a war of humanity and that it will not be permitted to fall from the high level of the original purpose.

It might be objected that you cannot predict or fore-stall what Congress may do when the time comes for making peace. I think you can. If during the war you constantly keep before the popular conscience, as well as before the world abroad, the original declaration that this is a war for the independence of Cuba and not for conquest—*it being an incontestable fact that if the war had been announced as a war of conquest the American people would most certainly not have consented to it*—you will form and lead public opinion, you will neutralize the wild talk about “imperial policies” now going on, and you will by the irresistible moral force of simple honesty and good faith effectually determine the action of Congress beforehand. And I am sure public sentiment will be overwhelmingly on your side.

Last week I journeyed to St. Louis and back. At St. Louis and on the way I saw quite a number of respectable persons, conversations with whom convinced me that the war, while it has a certain surface popularity, is beneath that surface as unpopular in the West as it is in New York. At St. Louis I met Colonel Leighton, the president of the National Sound-Money League, who told me that he had recently made an extensive journey with Mr. Stuyvesant Fish, the president of the Illinois Central Railroad; that they had visited several cities, especially Southern, and talked with a great many people, and that, while all were loyally supporting the Government, they

had not met a single person who did not privately curse this war.

Now, I venture this prophecy: We may expect our Navy some time to annihilate the Spanish fleet in the West Indies. The Powers will then probably exercise a strong pressure on Spain to induce her to make an end of it by offering us the independence of Cuba and perhaps some war indemnity. Spain is not unlikely to do this. If then, the Administration, instead of treating upon that basis, prolongs the war for the purpose of securing some territorial conquest, the Democrats will no doubt be clever enough to take advantage of the peace sentiment of the country, and, Bryanism and all that notwithstanding, they will overwhelm the Republicans at the polls on the issue of "Free Cuba and peace" as against "More war for conquest."

To this prediction I will add another. The longer you hesitate to make an end of the imperialistic noise by keeping before the public by constant and emphatic assertion the original announcement that this is a war for the independence of Cuba, which cannot honorably be turned into a war of conquest, the more difficult you will find it to do the right thing for the country and to guide and save the Republican party when the opportunity for peace comes.

Pardon me for intruding so much upon your attention. This is so grave a crisis that my anxiety for the future of the Republic would not suffer me to be silent.

Let me congratulate you upon the appointment of Mr. Oscar Straus. It is a fine thing.

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TO PRESIDENT MCKINLEY

BOLTON LANDING, July 29, 1898.

I read in a newspaper that you would like to hear from your friends about what they think of conditions of peace to be imposed on Spain. I beg leave to respond.

According to the resolution adopted by Congress, this was to be a war of liberation, of disinterested benevolence, and not a war of conquest. This resolution, involving a solemn promise, makes the question of the peace conditions not a mere question of interest, but emphatically a question of honor. It seems to be generally admitted that, accordingly, we cannot annex Cuba.

But if we annex Porto Rico, or the Philippines, will not that make the war a war of conquest, contrary to our declaration and pledge? In the case of Porto Rico we have not even the pretext of a popular insurrection against Spanish rule. If we annex that island it will be palpable, flagrant conquest by arms, annexation by force, not only unjustified, but undisguised. And what did you say in your annual message? That annexation by force cannot be thought of; that it would be, according to the American code of morals, a *criminal* act of aggression.

I maintain, therefore, that as an honorable nation, we are peremptorily precluded from annexing any of the Spanish islands. We can "liberate" them, we may make other disposition of them, but we cannot, under existing circumstances, take any of them for ourselves without breaking our word, without violating the principle so forcibly stated by yourself in your message, and without putting a stain of disgrace upon the American name.

I believe also that a peace strictly in accordance with our original declaration and the pledge it involved will ultimately bring us the greatest material advantage. If we really needed a coaling-station, then we could have it without annexing a whole island with a large population, just as Great Britain holds Gibraltar without owning Spain.

Permit me to enclose an article on this subject I recently published in the *Independent*. I have a much stronger one, insisting mainly on the point of honor, in the September number of the *Century*.

## TO RICHARD WATSON GILDER

BOLTON LANDING, Aug. 8, 1898.

Your letter of August 3d with enclosure did not reach me till yesterday. I return the address with my signature, as I earnestly desire the maintenance of a true and lasting friendship between the American and the British nations. I mean such a friendship as is represented by James Bryce on the British side.

I distrust that kind of British friendship which would hurry us into an imperialistic policy and thus make us dependent upon British aid, obliging us in turn to give American aid in promotion of British policies; and which by a most unscrupulous manipulation of the news service seeks to stir up ill feeling between this country and other nations.

I wish I could attach this to my signature. But if that cannot properly be done, I shall find some occasion for expressing my sentiments to that effect.

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OUR FUTURE FOREIGN POLICY<sup>1</sup>

The future foreign policy of the United States will be largely determined by the peace soon to be concluded with Spain. Although a preliminary protocol has been signed, I shall discuss the matter as if it were an open one, which it really will be so long as the Senate has not ratified the treaty.

If our Government insists upon Spain altogether withdrawing her power from this hemisphere, or even from all of her colonies, there will hardly be much dissent

<sup>1</sup> Address at Saratoga, N. Y., Aug. 19, 1898, before a National Conference held under the auspices of the Civic Federation, for the purpose of considering our future attitude toward Cuba, Porto Rico, etc.

among us. The serious differences of opinion begin with the question whether those colonies or any of them shall be annexed to the United States, or whether they shall be made independent, to govern themselves, or whether other arrangements shall be made to provide for their future.

The question whether any of them shall be annexed to the United States presents itself under three different aspects: (1) as a question of morals, of honor; (2) as a question of institutional policy; and (3) as a question of commercial interests.

As to the question of morals, of honor, we have to remember that President McKinley in his annual message in December last, in discussing various methods of solving the Cuban difficulty, made the following emphatic declaration: "I speak not of forcible annexation, for that cannot be thought of. That by our code of morals would be criminal aggression." It will not be denied that although speaking of Cuban affairs, the President thus stated a principle of general application. It would be absurd to say that to annex Cuba by means of force would be "criminal aggression," but that it would be something quite justifiable to annex Porto Rico or the Philippine Islands by the same means.

We have also to remember that the war with Spain was virtually initiated by a resolution adopted by Congress, April 19th, which declared that the people of Cuba should be free and independent, that, moved by a sense of duty, the United States demanded the withdrawal of the Spanish forces from Cuba, that the President should use the Army and Navy and Militia "to the extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect"—that is, to liberate Cuba—and that such liberation and the pacification of Cuba accomplished, the United States, emphatically disclaiming any disposition or intention to

annex Cuba, would leave the government of that island to the people thereof.

This resolution was adopted to justify our war with Spain before the public opinion of mankind. All the world was to understand that only a sense of duty put arms in our hands; that we were impelled by a high purpose of noble disinterestedness; that this was to be a war of liberation and humanity, not of conquest or self-aggrandizement. This we solemnly proclaimed. In proclaiming it we asked the world to believe what we said. It is quite evident that if this proclamation had been open to the construction that, while we would not annex Cuba, we would annex whatever else might come conveniently our way, it would have met with general derision and contempt. Our own people would have indignantly protested against the mockery; and when some foreign papers charged us with hypocrisy, and predicted that this war of liberation and humanity would turn out to be a land-grabbing scheme, we grew very angry and loudly repelled the vile imputation.

It may be somewhat old-fashioned, but I still believe that a nation, no less than an individual man, is in honor bound to keep its word; that it can neither preserve its self-respect nor safe standards of morality among its own people, nor the esteem and confidence of mankind, unless it does, and that the maintenance of perfect good faith will finally turn out to be the best investment—that honesty is and will remain the best policy. And now I ask the advocates of annexation among us, whether if this Republic under any pretext annexes any of the Spanish colonies, it does not really turn this solemnly advertised war of liberation and humanity into a war of self-aggrandizement! I ask them what they will have to say when our detractors repeat against us their charges of hypocrisy and selfish motives! I ask them who will

trust us again when we appear once more before mankind with fine words about our unselfish devotion to human freedom and humanity! I ask them whether as patriotic men they really think it will become or profit this great American Republic to stand before mankind as a nation whose most solemn professions cannot be trusted!

If these questions cannot be satisfactorily answered, this might be the end of the discussion. But in these days of ours it is, perhaps, well to go on proving that honesty is really the best policy. What shall we do with these Spanish colonies if we annex them? They will either have to become States of this Union, on an equal footing with the other States, or they will have to be governed as subject provinces. These are questions which concern not only our commercial interests, but which touch the working and perhaps even the very existence of our democratic institutions.

There may be men who have ceased to care much about those democratic institutions, and who confess themselves tired when we talk about the government of the people, by the people and for the people, preferring that a debate like this should be confined to matters commercial. I trust we do not belong to that class. At any rate, I think that those democratic institutions are worth preserving. I believe that it is our greatest responsibility and our highest mission to transmit those institutions unimpaired to our children, and to maintain and develop them for the esteem and emulation of mankind in their greatest possible perfection and beneficence. I believe, therefore, that at this hour the most important question before us is, not how we can acquire the largest territory or make the most money, but how the annexation of the Spanish colonies would affect the character of our Government.

Are those colonies or any of them such that we could

with safety make States of our Union of them not only to govern themselves as to their home concerns, but also to help govern the whole Union by participating in the making of its laws and in the election of its Presidents?

All those islands are situated in the tropics. They are more or less densely peopled. Their population consists in Cuba and Porto Rico of Spanish creoles and of people of negro blood, with some native Spaniards and a slight sprinkling of North Americans, English, Germans and French; in the Philippines of a large mass of more or less barbarous Asiatics, descendants of Spaniards, mixtures of Asiatic and Spanish blood, a number of natives of Spain and a very few persons of northern races.

Now I challenge the advocates of annexation to show me a single instance of a tropical country in which people of that kind have shown themselves able to carry on democratic government in a manner fitting it for statehood in our Union. Show me a single one! The best governed of such countries is no doubt the northernmost, Mexico, under the firm hand of Porfirio Diaz. But his government is a hardly disguised military dictatorship which in this country would not be tolerated a week. That he has maintained it so long in Mexico speaks volumes for his ability and energy. He being an enlightened despot, his government is probably the best Mexico can get. But what will become of Mexico when Porfirio Diaz dies, is not easily foretold.

Our annexationists tell us, that such difficulties will soon disappear—that, if we keep the Spanish colonies, a stream of Anglo-Saxon immigration will at once pour into them and entirely transform the character and habits of the population.

I challenge them to show me a single tropical country into which a stream of Anglo-Saxon, or more broadly speaking, of Germanic immigration has poured so as to

give its population at large an Anglo-Saxon or Germanic character! Opportunity has not been lacking. India, long under British rule, shows in a population of 300,000,000 hardly more than 200,000 Englishmen, many of whom are in the employ of the Government, and very few of permanent residence. The Hawaiian Islands, having of tropical climates probably the best, and having invited American immigration for many years, have, in a population of over 100,000, hardly more than 3000 Americans. It is true, some persons of Germanic blood will go to the tropics—some merchants and their employees to found or run mercantile establishments; some planters to work their lands with men belonging to other races; some speculators in mines or railroads; some professional men and some mechanics and small tradesmen—most of them hoping to make money quickly, and then to go home again. But the number of such people is comparatively very small. They may improve economic and social conditions somewhat in and around the places where they go, but they will not change the general character and the political capabilities of the population at large in any essential degree.

In order to bring about important changes in that respect by immigration, it must be immigration in mass; and people of Germanic blood will not immigrate in mass to the tropics. The bulk of the population, that is, the decisive element in democratic government, consists everywhere of the laboring people; and all efforts to get men of Germanic blood to become the bulk, or even a large part, of the laboring force of any tropical country, have utterly failed. It is not only the low rate of wages prevailing there that repels them, but the climatic conditions which cannot be changed. I do not mean here particular diseases, like the yellow-fever, which may be combated, but the generally enervating effect of the

tropical climate. Hence the Anglo-Saxon has indeed been able to establish more or less arbitrary governments in the tropics, but he has never been able to found democracies there. I challenge the annexationists to deny this.

We shall, therefore, have to take those populations substantially as they are. What will happen? As to the Philippines, I suppose no sane American thinks of taking them into the Union as States to help govern us. But look at Porto Rico. It has a population of 900,000 souls, about one-half of them colored people, about 140,000 natives of Spain and a little over 12,000 Frenchmen, Germans and Englishmen, with a few Americans, whose number may, indeed, be somewhat increased. If admitted as a State, Porto Rico would have two Senators and five Representatives in Congress, and seven votes in the Electoral College. "Not much of a force," you will say. Apparently not, but a good deal of force when political parties run close, and when the passage of an important law, the determination of the general policy of the Government or even the election of a President may depend, as they often have done, on a few votes. And such votes are then to come from a population which in language, in traditions, habits and customs, in political, social and even moral notions are utterly unlike our people and can, under the tropical sun at least, never be assimilated. It will be a good deal of a force when party politicians begin to bargain and traffic with them to win their support.

Nor will those seven Porto Rico votes be the only ones we shall have to reckon with. Looking at the map you will find that the islands of San Domingo, with Hayti, and Cuba, are situated directly between Porto Rico and the United States. We shall be told that this is a dangerous, indeed, an intolerable, state of things, and that we

must have those islands; and having shaken off all mawkish sentimentality as to the keeping of faith and as to the "criminality," according to President McKinley, of "forcible annexation," we shall just take Santo Domingo and the negro republic of Hayti. As to Cuba, our promise will not stand in the way of superior reasons for making that island a part of our Union. One of those reasons has already found expression. Not long ago I read in a newspaper—and you can hear the same kind of talk from many people—that if the Cubans, having had their chance, show themselves incapable of governing themselves, we must of course annex that island and make a couple of States of it. In other words, if the Cubans are hopelessly incapable of orderly self-government, we must permit them to help govern our own country.

Well, these annexations accomplished, we shall have another lot of over 2,000,000 Spanish-Americans and negroes, who will probably send six or eight Senators and something like twelve to fifteen Representatives into Congress and command over twenty votes in the Electoral College, together with Porto Rico about thirty. That will be a political force five times as great in the Senate and nearly as great in the Electoral College as that of the State of New York—a force, if sticking together, strong enough frequently to hold the balance of power and to dictate its terms to the traders of our political parties.

But we shall hardly stop there. Being once fairly started in the career of aggrandizement regardless of consequences, our imperialists will find an open ear when they tell us that our control of the Nicaragua canal cannot possibly be safe unless that canal be bordered on both sides by United States territory, and that therefore we must have the whole country down to that canal and a good piece beyond. That would bring us another lot of about 13,000,000 of Spanish-Americans mixed with

Indian blood, and perhaps some twenty Senators and fifty or sixty Representatives, with seventy to eighty votes in the Electoral College, and with them a flood of Spanish-American politics, notoriously the most disorderly, tricky and corrupt politics on the face of the earth. What thinking American who has the future of the Republic at heart will not stand appalled at such a prospect?

You may say that this is mere conjecture and that such things will not happen. Do not deceive yourselves. Some Members of Congress voted for the annexation of Hawaii, hoping that would be the last step. What are they told now? "What good will Hawaii do us if we are not to go beyond?" I tell you, there is but one thing that will be sure to prevent the things I have spoken of from happening. It is that we carefully abstain from starting on the road towards them. It is not yet too late. If we once fairly begin to slide down on that inclined plane, what brakes will be strong enough to stop us before we have reached bottom? And reaching bottom means the moral ruin of the Anglo-Saxon republic. If we are to stop, we must stop before annexing Porto Rico. If we annex that island, we shall be on the slope.

There are multitudes of Americans who say now that if they had known what a sorry lot the Cubans are, we would never have gone to war in their behalf. However that may be, the same Americans should at least not permit those same Cubans to take part in governing us. And the Porto Ricans are of exactly the same stuff. But we are told that they wish to be annexed. What does it mean, if they do? They come to us and, virtually, say: "We like your Union and wish to enter it. Let us help you govern your country." If we are wise, and have a patriotic regard for the welfare and dignity of our Republic we shall answer: "Very kind, thank you. Govern yourselves first. If you are not fit to govern yourselves, you

are certainly not fit to take part in governing us." Will this be uncharitable? Charity begins at home. To perpetuate our institutions is our first duty. It would be criminal to disregard it.

It may be answered that we might prevent such evil results by not admitting any of the Spanish colonies as States, by governing them as subject provinces. That we *can* do this as far as the power of Congress to make all needful regulations concerning the territory of the United States is concerned, I do not question. But I affirm that we cannot permanently govern by arbitrary power millions of people as subject populations without doing ruthless violence to the spirit of our Constitution and to all the fundamental principles of democratic government. Nor would such a repudiation of the government of, by and for the people fail to produce a crop of demoralization and corruption beyond what this country has ever seen, even in the palmiest days of the carpet-bag governments in the South after our civil war.

We hear already of the formation of numerous syndicates with much money behind them, to exploit the resources of our new acquisitions, and also of their anxiety to have United States officers appointed who will favor their operations; and also of influential politicians being largely interested in these syndicates. And all these forces are to work together in far-away countries, remote from home observation, among more or less ignorant people for whose rights and interests Anglo-Saxon respect is not always the most scrupulous; and those populations long accustomed to the grossest corruption. The United States offices there will be simply like colossal Indian agencies, with opportunities and temptations infinitely greater than any Indian agent in this country ever dreamed of. Can anybody doubt what the effect upon our public morals will be?

These are not all the troubles the possession of those islands would bring us. We have now race problems on our hands in this country, the solution of which is exceedingly problematical. We have still to atone for our long toleration of slavery. The ills we thus have we must bear as best we can. But would it not be sinful folly to add to them tenfold by the incorporation in our body-politic of millions of persons belonging partly to races far less good-natured, tractable and orderly than the negro is?

And can we permit ourselves to forget the fact that in tropical regions there is always a strong tendency, under the plea of necessity, to use for the exploitation of the resources of those countries people of colored races, black or yellow, often under systems of contract labor which in various ways are akin to temporary slavery—at any rate entirely incompatible with our principles as to the freedom and dignity of labor and hostile to its interests? Have we not an example of this in the presence of the more than 40,000 Chinese and Japanese laborers in Hawaii, which imposes upon us a problem of most perplexing nature?

But this is not all. Who will deny that if we expand territorially, especially in the Far East, we shall at once become involved in the quarrels and jealousies of the old-world nations that are competing there for colonial acquisition with constant danger of armed collision?

And shall we not be exposed to such chances infinitely more than ever before, when our interests, our pride, our ambitions and jealousies are engaged in complicated enterprises far away? And are not such chances especially fraught with danger in a democracy, in which public sentiment, when nervously excited, does sometimes run away with sober judgment and may precipitate great conflicts which calm and patient reason, acting only on full and trustworthy information, would avoid?

It is, therefore, by no means idle talk when I say that when we are once plunged into the vortex of the competition of the old-world Powers for colonial expansion, especially in the Far East, the danger of war—not excluding unnecessary or foolish war—will be constantly near us. And what does that signify? Perpetual unrest and the maintenance of big naval and military armaments imposing immense burdens upon the people—heavier here in proportion than anywhere else, owing to our habitual administrative wastefulness—not to forget a pension-roll without calculable limit—all this producing militarism of the most prodigal kind.

Finally I come to the question of commercial interest. Our annexationists talk as if our commerce and our industries were in terrible distress for outlets; as if we were in imminent danger of suffocation for want of air, and as if nothing but territorial conquest could open markets for our surplus agricultural and industrial products. And this at a time when the bureau of Foreign Commerce of our State Department reports as follows:

The United States is no longer the “granary of the world” merely. Its sales of manufactured goods have continued to extend with a facility and promptitude of results which have excited the serious concern of countries that, for generations, had not only controlled their home markets, but had practically monopolized certain lines of trade in other lands. When we consider that this result has been reached with comparative ease, in spite of added impediments to United States exports, in the form of discriminations of various kinds, and notwithstanding that organized effort to reach foreign markets for our manufacturers is as yet in its infancy, the ability of the United States to compete successfully with the most advanced industrial nations in any part of the world, as well as with those nations in their home markets, can no longer be seriously questioned.

This statement, which is amply borne out by statistics, shows that we have made wonderful progress in selling goods abroad, not only without possessing colonies and without owning the respective markets, but competing with nations which do possess colonies and do own the markets we invaded. It seems, therefore, that the possession of colonies on our part is not necessary to open markets for our goods, and that, on the other hand, the possession of colonies by other nations does not altogether protect their markets from the invasion of our goods. I take it we owe our remarkable success to the fact that in various branches of industry we produce better goods at a proportionately lower price than others do. Evidently, if we adhere to that practice, there is hope that it alone will save us from the suffocation so much dreaded.

However, the report I have quoted also advocates the opening of further markets for our commerce. I fully agree. We cannot have too many. But can such markets be opened only by annexing to the United States the countries in which they are situated? Must we govern, and even permit to help govern us, the populations with which we wish to trade? Is there, even aside from our producing better goods at a proportionately lower price, no other means to give increased facilities to our commerce?

Suppose that, true to our plighted faith, we abstain from annexing any of the conquered islands. What will there be in the way of our opening those islands to the fullest freedom of commerce and of industrial enterprise? Suppose Cuba and Porto Rico are made independent republics, made so virtually by our action in their behalf, will it not be perfectly feasible to bring about such arrangements with them as will give our commercial and industrial enterprise all possible freedom for trading in their ports, for building up mercantile establishments and

factories in their cities, for constructing railroads, for developing mines and for cultivating plantations within their boundaries, and incidentally also for exercising all the civilizing influences that can profitably be brought to bear upon the native population? And as to the Philippines, will it not be possible to make similar arrangements there—whether all those islands be taken out of the hands of Spain or only a part, and whether what is so taken be, upon agreement of the parties concerned, intrusted to the governmental control of such a state as Holland or Belgium, neither of which is large enough to excite the jealousy of any of the great Powers, or whether other provisions be made for their future? If American diplomacy, having, after our successful war, the decisive voice in regard to those islands, is not skillful enough to bring about such results in the final settlement, it would certainly not be skillful enough to handle the more thorny problems which it would surely have to deal with in case all those islands should pass into our full possession. And as to coaling-stations and naval depots, can we not have as many as we need without owning large and populous countries behind them? Must Great Britain own Spain in order to hold Gibraltar?

This, then, is, in my humble opinion, the way of safety as well as of advantage: Let the thought of annexing those islands and their population to the United States either as States or as subject provinces be abandoned. Let Cuba and Porto Rico be occupied by our military forces under able and discreet commanders, until they are thoroughly pacified and until the people thereof, with such aid on the part of the United States as may be necessary, will have formed effective civil governments and an armed force of their own for the maintenance of public order and security. Let then, in accordance with the explicit promise given in the resolution of Congress, the control

of those islands be turned over to the people thereof; and let this final settlement include agreements with them securing to American citizens on the islands the fullest protection in the right of owning property and of carrying on all kinds of business, and, if you please, of establishing and maintaining churches and educational institutions and whatever other agencies of civilization there may be.

In this way we shall do our full duty to them without disregard of the superior duty which we owe to our own Republic. We shall have delivered them from Spanish misrule and given them a chance to govern themselves. The governments they then receive will indeed not be ideal governments. They will be Spanish-American governments, somewhat tempered and mitigated, perhaps, by the influence which American enterprise may carry there. But those governments will, at any rate, be their own, and if they become disorderly and corrupt, they will at least not infect with that disorder and corruption this Republic of ours. There are people who think that the annexation to the United States of such countries as Porto Rico and Cuba, and whatever else, is as simple a transaction as the acquisition by a rich farmer of a few more acres to enlarge his farm. Those who think so overlook the momentous fact that if we annex those islands, we shall not only have them, but in a very important sense they will have us too. The policy I recommend of making with them the suggested agreements concerning the rights of American citizens in them, and then letting them carry on governments of their own, would offer us all that is to us really desirable in them, without their having us too.

The problem of the future of the Philippines is no doubt much more complicated, and I should hesitate to form an opinion upon several phases of it without more definite

information as to local conditions. But as to the main point that concerns the United States, I say that the same principle should be adhered to as in the case of Cuba and Porto Rico—that is, we should obtain, by means of agreement, the greatest possible facilities for commerce and civilizing influences with the least political responsibilities and entanglements; in other words, we should not annex, but secure the opening to our activities of the territories concerned.

Holding fast to this principle we shall gain commercial opportunities of so great a value that they will more than compensate for the cost of the war; we shall have won high prestige by a remarkable display of National strength, valor and spirit, as well as magnanimity, and we shall have done our full duty to the cause for which we took up arms—and all this without breaking our plighted faith; without giving the world any reason to say that we have become hypocrites by turning a professed war of liberation and humanity into a war of conquest; without committing that act of “criminal aggression” which President McKinley denounced as violating the American code of morality; without becoming faithless to the grave responsibility and the high mission of the American people to preserve intact the principles of free government; without endangering the working of our democratic institutions by introducing into our Union hopelessly incongruous elements and the contamination of Spanish-American and Spanish-Asiatic politics.

Thus we shall deserve and possess the increased confidence of mankind, and enhance the credit of republican government by showing how an intelligent democracy can, unseduced by vulgar ambition, remain true to itself. Thus we shall render a noble service to civilization, of which the American people will be the greatest beneficiary.

As to the future foreign policy of the United States

beyond the problems immediately devolved upon us by the Spanish war, I think the following general maxims are eminently worthy of respect:

Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs, that honesty is always the best policy. Harmony, and a liberal intercourse with all nations, are recommended by policy, humanity and interest.

These are precepts laid down in Washington's Farewell Address, a document which, I grieve to say, is in our days sometimes spoken of with supercilious flippancy as a bundle of old-fogyish notions—although while following its teachings the American people have won the greatness, power, prosperity and happiness they now enjoy. I am probably not wrong in believing that the statesmen of this generation are not much wiser than George Washington was; I fear even that some of the loudest of them are not as wise. To my mind Washington's greatest achievement consisted not in the battle of Trenton, nor in the campaign of Yorktown, but rather in the fact that as the first Constitutional head of this Republic he conducted his high office with such wisdom, rectitude and patriotism that if any one of his successors is ever in doubt as to the motives which should inspire him, the principles upon which he should act, or the general policy he should follow, he can always turn to the acts and the teachings of the first President, and be sure to find there the safest guide. This Nation can never be too thankful for the exceptional blessing a benign fortune bestowed upon it in erecting at the very threshold of its career so noble a

standard of public virtue and statesmanship; and it will be an evil day for the American people when they cease to appreciate the inestimable value of the treasure they possess in George Washington's counsel and example.

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#### THOUGHTS ON AMERICAN IMPERIALISM<sup>1</sup>

The settlement of the results of the war with Spain imposes upon the American people the momentous duty of determining whether they will continue the traditional policy under which they have achieved their present prosperity, greatness and power, or whether they will adopt a new course, the issue of which is, to say the least, highly problematical, and which, if once entered upon, can, according to all human foresight, never be retraced. Under such circumstances they should be specially careful not to permit themselves to be influenced in their decision by high-sounding phrases of indefinite meaning, by vague generalities or by seductive catchwords appealing to unreasoning pride and reckless ambition. More than ever true patriotism now demands the exercise of the soberest possible discernment.

We are told that as we have grown very rich and very powerful the principles of policy embodied in Washington's Farewell Address have become obsolete; that we have "new responsibilities," "new duties" and a peculiar "mission." When we ask what these new responsibilities and duties require this Republic to do, the answer is that it should meddle more than heretofore with the concerns of the outside world for the purpose of "furthering the progress of civilization"; that it must adopt an

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"imperial policy" and make a beginning by keeping as American possessions the island colonies conquered from Spain. This last proposition has at least the merit of definiteness, and it behooves the American people carefully to examine it in the light of "responsibility," "duty" and "mission."

I am far from denying that this Republic, as one of the great Powers of the world, has its responsibilities. But what is it responsible for? Is it to be held, or to hold itself, responsible for the correction of all wrongs done by strong nations to weak ones, or by powerful oppressors to helpless populations? Is it, in other words, responsible for the general dispensation of righteousness throughout the world? Neither do I deny that this Republic has a "mission"; and I am willing to accept, what we are frequently told, that this mission consists in "furthering the progress of civilization." But does this mean that wherever obstacles to the progress of civilization appear, this Republic should at once step in to remove those obstacles by means of force, if friendly persuasion do not avail? Every sober-minded person will admit that under so tremendous a task any earthly power, however great, would soon break down. Moreover, those are not wrong who maintain that the nation which would assume the office of a general dispenser of justice and righteousness in the world, according to its own judgment, should be held to prove itself as a model of justice and righteousness in its own home concerns as well as in its dealings with others.

When we are asked whether a nation should, in this respect, do nothing for the outside world because it cannot do all, or because it is not perfect itself, the answer is that to be true to its responsibility and its duty, a nation should conscientiously seek to ascertain for itself how it can make its conduct most useful, morally as well as materially, to its own members as well as generally to

mankind, and then devote its energies to the task of reaching the highest possible degree of that usefulness.

The peculiar responsibility resting upon the American people cannot be more strikingly and impressively defined than it was by Abraham Lincoln in his famous Gettysburg speech:

Our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. . . .

It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion; . . . that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom; and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.

In other words, it is the first and highest duty of the American people, involving their first and gravest responsibility, so to conduct their foreign as well as their domestic concerns that the problem of democratic government on a large scale be successfully solved in this Republic, not only for the benefit of the inhabitants of this country alone, but for the benefit of mankind. If the American people fail in this, they will fail in discharging their gravest responsibility and in fulfilling their highest mission, whatever else they may accomplish.

I do not mean to say that a due regard to that responsibility and fidelity to that mission would preclude any other effort to further the cause of popular government and of civilization outside of our own limits. But it can hardly be questioned that whenever such efforts are made in a manner apt to undermine democratic government at home, such efforts must, as to the true responsibility and mission of the American people, be regarded as dangerous;

for they may not only injure the American people themselves, but also weaken the faith of mankind in the worth of democratic institutions, and thus impair their moral influence among men. To be just to their highest responsibility and duty, the American people should therefore avoid as much as possible everything, however splendid it may appear, and however flattering it may be to their ambition, that may be apt to make their democratic government at home less honest, less just, less beneficent and thereby less respectable and less attractive in the eyes of the world. One of the most prolific agencies of evil in this respect is war, for whatever reason it may be undertaken.

I shall certainly not deny that in the history of the world wars have sometimes done great service to civilization and to human freedom. There have been necessary wars, and there may be more. Our war for the Union may be called one of them. It is hardly denied now, even in the South, that the results of that war have in many respects been of immense benefit to the country. But it will just as little be denied that the civil war developed a degree of social as well as political demoralization which, if the conflict had gone on much longer, would have made the Republic a sink of corruption. It is true that we have since recovered from some of the evil practices bred by the war, and are thus enjoying all its good results without being permanently troubled by all of its bad effects. But while we have to some extent—by no means altogether—recovered during thirty-three years of peace from the mischief done by four years of war, how would it be if, instead of a long period of peace intervening, wars had multiplied during that time, continually withdrawing the attention of the citizens from their home concerns by the exciting reports of campaigns and battles, thus continually paralyzing that vigilance which is “the price of

liberty," and giving no end of opportunity to the political jobber and the demagogue? In this way wars are far more dangerous to democracies than to monarchies, for the reason that by the agencies of public demoralization democracies are far more mischievously attacked in the vital conditions of their being.

How far such mischief will be wrought by our war with Spain will depend upon its duration, upon the extent to which it withdraws popular attention from our home concerns, and upon its results as to the future policy of the United States. However justifiable and even praiseworthy this war may appear to us, it is useless to deny that the mere fact of the great American Republic having gone to war without absolutely evident and generally accepted necessity, has hurt the prestige of democratic government in an important respect. Critical observation of the goings on in the United States and in the French Republic has of late years seriously shaken what there was of popular belief that republican government was necessarily the most honest and economical and the wisest imaginable government. But mankind still did believe—especially judging from the fact that the United States, with all their wealth and strength, did not find it necessary to keep up any large armament—that republican government was by its natural tendency a guaranty of peace. That this belief, too, has been, justly or unjustly, shaken by our war with Spain must be considered as a serious hurt to the prestige of republican government generally.

This hurt may be very much aggravated, or it may be greatly lessened, as the American people make this or that use of their victory over Spain. Aside from the question whether the war was necessary even for the avowed purpose of it, the attitude assumed by the United States as to the object to be accomplished by the war was entitled

to the respect of mankind. The American people were greatly incensed at the cruel oppression suffered by the Cuban people at the hands of Spain. The Congress of the United States resolved "that the people of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent"; and it directed the Government of the Republic to make them so, expressly disclaiming any disposition or intention to exercise any control over Cuba, except for the purpose of pacification, and emphatically promising that, such pacification achieved, such control should be left to the Cuban people themselves. It was to be simply a war of liberation, of humanity, undertaken without any selfish motive. This we solemnly promised. The whole world was so to understand it. If a republican nation can undertake any war without injury to the prestige of democracy as an agency of peace, it is such a war of disinterested benevolence.

But how if this war of humanity and disinterested benevolence be turned into a war of conquest? How if Cuba or any other of the conquered islands be kept by the United States as a permanent possession? What then? And here let me remark that, from the moral point of view, it matters nothing whether the conquest be that of Cuba, or of Porto Rico, or of the Philippines, or of all of them. The resolution adopted by Congress was meant to be understood as heralding this war to the world, distinctly and emphatically, as a war of liberation, and not of conquest. Only Cuba was mentioned in the resolution, because only Cuba could be mentioned. To say that we may, without breaking the pledge involved in our proclamation, take and keep Porto Rico or the Philippines because they were not mentioned by name in the resolution, while it was in the nature of things that they could not be so mentioned—would this not be a mean piece of pettifogging to cover up a breach of faith? Can a gentle-

man do such things? Can a gentleman quibble about his moral obligations and his word?

What, then, will follow if the United States commit this breach of faith? What could our answer be if the world should say of the American people that they are wolves in sheep's clothing, rapacious land-grabbers posing as unselfish champions of freedom and humanity, false pretenders who have proved the truth of all that has been said by their detractors as to their hypocrisy and greed and whose word can never again be trusted? And how will that cause of civilization fare which consists in the credit of democratic institutions, of the government of, by and for the people, for which the American people are above all things responsible, and the maintenance of which is above all things their duty and mission? Will not those appear right who say that democratic government is not only no guaranty of peace, but that it is capable of the worst kind of war, the war of conquest, and of resorting to that kind of war, too, as a hypocrite and false pretender? Such a loss of character, in itself a most deplorable moral calamity, would be followed by political consequences of a very serious nature.

It is generally admitted that the Monroe Doctrine will virtually go overboard when this Republic becomes actively involved in what may be called old-world interests. The meaning of the Monroe Doctrine is that no old-world Power shall be permitted to found new settlements on American soil over which it is to exercise control, or to interfere with any American state to the detriment of the independence or sovereignty thereof. It made the smaller American republics in that respect look up to the great and strong Republic as their natural friend and protector. How would the turning of this war of liberation and humanity into a war of conquest affect the relations of the United States with their Southern neighbors? It is a

significant circumstance that in this war with Spain the sympathies of the other American republics have, to say the least, been doubtful. One might have expected that the memories of their own struggles for independence from Spain would have revived, and that the Spanish-Americans would have been delighted to see the United States achieve for their Cuban brethren what they in times past had at the cost of much blood achieved for themselves. Yet the southern sister republics not only remained remarkably undemonstrative of such delight, but there has been much to indicate that their sympathies have been rather on the side of Spain. The reason for this may be found partly in race prejudice—the antipathy of the Latin race to the Anglo-Saxon. But there is something more than that.

Various voices have reached us from that part of the world, informing us that many thinking men among the Spanish-Americans see in our war against Spain only the first step in the execution of a vast scheme of conquest embracing first the Spanish West Indies, then all the other adjacent islands that can be got, then Mexico and the other republics down to the inter-oceanic canal that is to be built and a sufficient stretch of land south of that canal to bring it well within the boundaries of the United States, and then nobody knows what more. This may seem a very foolish apprehension, although the scheme is spoken of by some of the new school of American imperialists as a glorious Anglo-Saxon conception. At any rate, will not the Spanish-Americans, who are gifted with a lively fancy, in case the United States, after this boasted war of liberation and disinterested benevolence, really annex Cuba and Porto Rico, or either of them, be apt to regard that act as a verification of such apprehensions? Will they not with a good show of reason argue that a nation capable of turning a war that was solemnly pro-

claimed as a war of emancipation and humanity into a land-grabbing operation, will be capable of anything in the line of deceit and rapacity; that its appetite will grow with the eating; that having once embarked in a career of conquest, it will be urged from one such enterprise into another, on the plausible plea that new conquests are necessary to make the old ones secure and profitable; that nobody can tell how far this will go; and that therefore none of the sister republics will be safe from the perfidy and grasping ambition of the United States? Nobody will deny that there is logic in this; and being started on this line of thought, the American sister republics will cast about for means of protection; and if to that end they do not find a league among themselves against the United States practical or sufficient, it will not at all be unnatural for them to look for that protection to some of the old-world Powers.

This is by no means a mere wild conjecture. A little sober reflection will convince every thinking mind that the first step on our part in this new policy of conquest will be very apt to fill the minds of our southern neighbors with that vague dread of some great danger hanging over them which will turn them into secret or open enemies of the United States, capable of throwing themselves into anybody's arms for protection; and this will not at all be unlikely to encourage, among old-world Powers, schemes of encroachment upon the American continent which, on account of the former relations between the smaller American republics and the United States under the Monroe Doctrine, have so far not ventured forth. This would be to the United States the beginning of incalculable troubles of a new sort. And then these very troubles arising from southern hostility, combining with the ambitious schemes of old-world Powers, would be used by our imperialists as additional proof of the neces-

sity of further conquests, and of the building up of the grand American empire embracing not only all the conquests made in the Spanish war, but reaching down to the Isthmus of Panama, with the islands within reach, and strong enough to meet all those accumulating difficulties.

To do justice to the subject, we have to face this grand imperial conception in its full development; for when once fairly launched, this is the direction in which we shall drift. Imagine, then, the United States to cover that part of America here described, and, in addition, Hawaii, the Philippines and perhaps the Carolines and the Ladrones, and what not,—immense territories inhabited by white people of Spanish descent, by Indians, negroes, mixed Spanish and Indians, mixed Spanish and negroes, Hawaiians, Hawaiian mixed blood, Spanish Filipinos, Malays, Tagals, various kinds of savages and half-savages, not to mention the Chinese and Japanese—at least twenty-five millions in all and all of them animated with the instincts, impulses and passions bred by the tropical sun; and all those people to become Americans!

Some of the most prominent imperialists, by the way, have been in a great flurry about a few thousand immigrants from Italy, Russia and Hungary, because their becoming part of the American people would depress American labor and lower the standards of American citizenship. Now they would take in Spanish-Americans, with all the mixtures of Indian and negro blood, and Malays and other unspeakable Asiatics, by the tens of millions! What will become of American labor and the standards of American citizenship then?

We are vexed by a very troublesome race problem in the United States now. That race problem is still unsolved, and it would be very sanguine to say that there is a satisfactory solution in near prospect. Cool-headed men think that we have enough of that. What will be the

consequence if we indefinitely add to it by bringing under this Republican Government big lots of other incompatible races—races far more intractable, too, than those with which we have so far had to deal?

But more. Owing to the multiplicity of churches, sects and denominations, and to their being mixed together in every part of the country and their pretty well balancing one another, there have been so far hardly any very serious difficulties of a religious nature in the United States. But if the imperial policy prevails, and all those countries, with their populations, are annexed, there will be for the first time in the history of the Republic, large territories inhabited by many millions of people who, with few exceptions, all belong to one church, and who, if they become a political force, may cause conflicts of influences from which the American people have so far been happily exempt.

I mention these things in order to indicate some of the difficulties we have to meet in considering the question how such countries and populations are to be fitted into our system of government. It is hard to see how the Spanish-American republics which are to be annexed could in the long run be refused admission as States, having, nominally at least, been governing themselves for many years. The Spanish-American islands would soon follow. Ambitious partisans, looking out for party votes in Congress and in the Electoral College, would certainly contrive to lug them in. There would then be a large lot of Spanish-Americans in the Senate and in the House and among the Presidential electors—more than enough of them to hold, occasionally at least, the balance of power in making laws not only for themselves, but for the whole American people, and in giving the Republic its Presidents. There would be “the Spanish-American vote”—being occasionally the decisive vote—to be bar-

gained with. Who will doubt that of all the so-called "foreign votes" this country has ever had, this would be by far the most dangerous? It is useless to hope that this population would gradually assimilate itself to the American people as they now are. It might assimilate itself under the influence of our northern climate, but not in the tropics. In the tropics the Anglo-Saxon race is in the long run more apt to assimilate itself to the Spanish-American than the Spanish-American to the Anglo-Saxon. This is common experience.

The admission as States of the Philippines, the Carolines and so on,—that is, the transformation of "the United States of America" into "the United States of America and Asia,"—would, I suppose, appear too monstrous to be seriously thought of even by the wildest imperialist. Those countries, with an aggregate of about ten million inhabitants, would have to be governed as subject provinces, with no expectation of their becoming self-governing States. This means government without the consent of the governed. It means taxation without representation. It means the very things against which the Declaration of Independence remonstrated, and against which the Fathers rose in revolution. It means that the American people would carry on over large subject populations a kind of rule against which their own government is the most solemn protest. It may be said that those countries and populations cannot be governed in any other way; but is not that the most conclusive reason why this Republic should not attempt to govern them at all?

Against such an attempt there are other reasons hardly less vital. No candid observer of current events in this Republic will deny that the exercise of more or less arbitrary rule over distant countries will be apt to produce most pernicious effects upon our public morals. The

farther away those subject countries are from close public observation, the richer and more tempting their natural resources, the more unfit their populations for self-government and the more pronounced the race antagonisms, the more unrestrained will be the cupidity of the governing race, the less respect will there be for the rights and interests of the subject races and the more unscrupulous and rapacious the rule over them—and this in spite of laws for their protection which may be fair on their face and well intended in their meaning. There has been much complaint of the influence wielded in our Government by rich and powerful corporations such as the Sugar Trust. The more or less arbitrary control exercised by our Government over distant countries with great resources will inevitably stimulate the multiplication of speculative enterprises with much money behind them, subjecting the Government in all its branches to constant pressure and manipulation which cannot fail to produce a most baneful effect upon our politics. Of such things we have experience enough to warn us.

But the combinations formed for distant adventure will be the most dangerous of all. Never having enough, their greed constantly grasping for more, they will seek to drive this country into new enterprises of conquest. Opportunities will not be lacking when this Republic is once in the race for colonial acquisitions in which the European Powers are now engaged, and which keeps them incessantly increasing their expensive armaments. And the more such enterprises there are, the greater will be the danger of new wars, with all their demoralizing effects upon our democratic government. It is, therefore, not too much to say—indeed, it is rather stating the fact very mildly—that the governing of distant countries as subject provinces would result in a fearful increase of the elements of profligacy and corruption in our political life.

We are told by imperialists of a very optimistic disposition that the British have carried on a policy of territorial aggrandizement on the grandest scale but have succeeded in maintaining an honest and decent government; that the very necessity of providing for good methods of governing their distant possessions brought on the reform of their civil service, and that we can do the same. The fact is, however, that under the policy of conquest and territorial aggrandizement the British Government did fall into a very grievous state of profligacy and corruption, from which it emerged only after a long period of effort. Whether, or how, our democratic government would emerge from such a state is, to say the least, an open question. In speculating upon what we may be capable of in comparison with other nations, we should never forget that monarchies or aristocracies can do certain things which democracies cannot do as well, and that democracies can do certain things which monarchies or aristocracies cannot do at all. A monarchy or an aristocracy can govern subject populations—it sometimes does it badly, sometimes well—in perfect harmony with its reasons of being, without going beyond the vital conditions of its existence. In doing so it exercises a function suited to its nature. But it cannot institute and maintain among its people complete self-government on the basis of equal rights without breaking itself down. A democracy can maintain complete self-government on the basis of equal rights, for that is its natural function; but it cannot exercise arbitrary rule over subject populations without doing a thing utterly incompatible with the fundamental reason of its own being, without giving up its most vital principle and faith. It will be like a man who has lost the sense of right and wrong. This is in itself utter demoralization, which cannot fail to breed corruption and decay. It never has failed, as history

proves. Recovery from this sort of corruption, which in a monarchy or an aristocracy is not easy, is therefore far more difficult in a democracy. Owing to its constitutional peculiarity, a democracy is far less capable of enduring and of overcoming wide-spread and deep-seated corruption than is a monarchy or an aristocracy.

But suppose we are sanguine and call this not a certainty, but only a danger, what reason have the American people for exposing themselves to a danger so awful? We are told that we produce more than this country can consume, and must have foreign markets in which to sell our surplus products. Well, must we own the countries with which we wish to trade? Is not this a notion ludicrously barbarous? And as to more open markets which we want, will it not, when after this war we make our final peace arrangements, be easy to stipulate for open ports?

It is also pretended that if we liberate the Spanish West Indies and the Philippines from Spanish misrule, we shall be responsible for their future welfare, and shall have to keep them, because we shall not be able to make other satisfactory arrangements for them. This is "pleading the baby act" to justify the keeping of the islands in spite of the most conclusive reasons against keeping them. As soon as this Republic shows itself firmly and irrevocably resolved not to keep the islands, the minds of the imperialists will be relieved of their principal difficulty in finding suitable provision for their future. If there is a will, there will be a way. If there is no will, it is not honest to pretend that there is no way.

It remains to survey the alternative possibilities. Here is what the policy of Imperialism puts in prospect: the annexation to the United States of all the territory conquered from Spain—Cuba, Porto Rico, the Philippines and perhaps the Carolines and the Ladrones. This at once. Then the enlargement of the boundaries of the

United States so as to embrace the inter-oceanic canal, and hence the annexation of the Spanish-American republics down to the Isthmus, and of as many of the West Indian and Caribbean islands as possible, for the sake of safety. These annexations bring on the problem of determining the status in the Republic of large masses of tropical people—perhaps some twenty-five millions of them—who are utterly different from the Americans in origin, language, traditions, habits, ways of thinking and feeling,—in short, in everything that is of importance in human intercourse,—with no hope of essential assimilation, owing to their tropical home. A large number of seats in Congress will be filled with Senators and Representatives from the Spanish-American countries, who will take part in making laws and in determining the character of the government for all of us. The Presidential elections will largely depend upon the Spanish-American vote, which will become a great force in our politics, and not seldom hold the balance of power. The Philippines and other islands, inhabited by many millions of Asiatics, will have to be governed as subject provinces. Our old democratic principle that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed will have to go overboard. Greedy speculation will inevitably seek to seize upon those new possessions, and as inevitably invade the politics of the whole country with its corrupting influence. That spirit of speculation will strive to push the Republic into new adventures, and, the United States being then entangled in the jealousies and quarrels of the old-world Powers, and in the struggles for colonial acquisition, new wars will be threatening. Very large armies and navies will be needed to maintain what has been won by conquest and to win more. Enormous expenditures will be a matter of course. As has been said of the army-and-navy ridden countries of Europe, every American worker, when

at his toil, will have to carry a soldier or sailor on his back. There will be glorious chances for speculative adventure to accumulate colossal fortunes, huge corruption funds and no end of spoil for the politicians and grinding taxation for the people who have to pay the bills.

Meanwhile, by turning the war advertised so loudly as a war of liberation and humanity into a war of conquest, a land-grabbing foray, the American democracy will have lost its honor. It will stand before the world as a self-convicted hypocrite. It will have verified all that has been said in this respect by its detractors. Nobody will ever trust its most solemn declarations or promises again. Our American sister republics will, after so glaring a breach of faith, be alarmed for their own safety, feeling themselves threatened by the unscrupulous and grasping ambition of the American people, and become the open or secret enemies of the United States, ready to intrigue against this Republic with European Powers—a source of more warlike troubles.

And what will become, with all this, of the responsibility of the American people for the maintenance of “the government of the people, by the people, for the people,” and of our great mission to further the progress of civilization by enhancing the prestige of democratic institutions? It will be only the old tale of a free people seduced by false ambitions and running headlong after riches and luxuries and military glory, and then down the fatal slope into vice, corruption, decay and disgrace. The tale will be more ignominious and mournful this time, because the opportunities had been more magnificent, the fall more rapid and the failure more shameful and discouraging than ever before in history.

This may seem an exaggerated picture. I admit that it is lurid. But I ask any candid man to examine it, touch by touch, and then to answer the question whether

it does not fairly represent the possibilities—nay, the probabilities—which will come forth if the imperialistic program be fully carried out; and also whether that program is not likely to be carried out if the first steps in its realization are taken.

Now contemplate, on the other hand, that which is not merely possible, but certain to follow if the Republic remains true to itself, its responsibility and its mission. The war with Spain is carried to a successful issue. In concluding peace the victorious Republic keeps in clear view its solemn declaration and promise that this was to be a war of liberation and humanity, and not of conquest. Firmly discountenancing the thought of annexing any of the conquered countries, it makes the best attainable arrangements to secure the liberated populations in their rights and welfare. It also uses its victory, as much as circumstances may permit, in opening the ports of the countries in question to the commerce of the world. Having conscientiously resisted all temptations of territorial aggrandizement in the hour of triumph, and having proved itself absolutely faithful to its word against the most seductive promptings of ambition, it will enjoy the respect of mankind in a far higher degree than ever before. It will have silenced forever its detractors who accused it of hypocrisy and impure motives. The American sister republics will look up to it with renewed and absolute confidence in the sincerity of its professions, and gladly recognize its primacy in this hemisphere. Having set an unsurpassed example of uprightness and magnanimity in the exercise of great and victorious power, its voice will be listened to in the councils of nations with more than ordinary deference; and although international arrangements are seldom governed by sentimental reasons, a nation so strong and at the same time so just and generous will easily obtain all the accommodations for its commerce

it can decently claim. Its counsel will be sought, and the position so gained will enable it to exercise a potent influence for the maintenance of the world's peace. It will have given "the government of the people, by the people, for the people" the greatest triumph in its history. It will have commended republican government and democratic institutions to the respect and confidence of mankind as they have never been commended before. It will thus have gloriously recognized its responsibility and served its mission as the great republican power of the world. There will be no prouder title than that of being an American—far prouder than the most powerful and costly armaments and the largest conquests can make it.

And now we are told that not this, but the other course is imposed upon this Republic by "manifest destiny" and "the decree of Providence, against which it is useless to struggle." The American people may well pause before accepting a counsel which, in seeking to unload upon Providence the responsibility for schemes of reckless ambition involving a palpable breach of faith, falls little short of downright blasphemy.

This is not the first time that such catchwords have resounded in this country. Some of us are old enough to remember the days when "manifest destiny" and "the irresistible decree of Providence" were with similar assurance invoked in behalf of what was called "extending the area of freedom," which then really meant the acquisition of more territory for the multiplication of slave States. The moral instinct and sound sense of the American people then resisted the seductive cry and silenced it, thus proving that it was neither "destiny" nor "Providence," but only a hollow sound. We may hope that the same moral instinct and sound sense will now resist and silence the same cry, when it means the complete abandonment

of the principles laid down by George Washington in his Farewell Address, under the observance of which our country has grown so prosperous and powerful, and the substitution therefor of a policy of conquest and adventure—a policy bound to tarnish our National honor at the first step, to frighten our American neighbors and to make enemies of them, to entangle us unnecessarily in the broils of foreign ambitions, to hazard our peace, to load down our people with incalculable burdens, to demoralize, deprave and undermine our democratic government and thus to unfit the great American Republic for its true mission in the world.

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## TO BJÖRNSTJERNE BJÖRNSEN

BOLTON LANDING, Sept. 22, 1898.

I have read your open letter, published in the New York *Herald* of September 13th, with the liveliest interest. To be personally addressed by the renowned poet of Norway is to me an unexpected honor. You say that if you were "a German, more especially a German journalist, and a politician in America," you would advocate an "alliance" between America and England and the adoption by the United States of a colonial policy with great armaments. If you were situated as I am you might, perhaps, think differently. I am proud of my German origin, but that origin has nothing to do with my views of American policies. I have been for more than forty years a citizen of this Republic. The citizenship of only a small minority of Americans is as old as mine. I am, therefore, more accustomed than you possibly can be, when forming opinions upon such problems as are now confronting us, to regard the maintenance of those free institutions which Abraham Lincoln defined as the "government of the

people, by the people and for the people," as entitled to the highest consideration.

I believe that this Republic, in that sense, can endure so long as it remains true to the principles upon which it was founded, but that it will morally decay if it abandons them. I believe that this democracy, the government of, by and for the people, is not fitted for a colonial policy, which means conquest by force, or, as President McKinley called it, "criminal aggression," and arbitrary rule over subject populations. I believe that, if it attempts such a policy on a large scale, its inevitable degeneracy will hurt the progress of civilization more than it can possibly further that progress by planting its flag upon foreign soil on which its fundamental principles of government cannot live.

I hail the existing friendliness of feeling between the United States and Great Britain with the warmest satisfaction and am willing to join any demonstration of American sentiment responsive to the cordial sentiments at present manifesting themselves in England. I ardently hope that this friendship will last. But I seriously doubt whether it would last long if the United States and England formed a partnership with a view to the extension of their respective dominion or influence. I see good reason for apprehending that such a partnership would not only not secure the peace of the world, but become ultimately very dangerous to the preservation of peace among the partners themselves. On this subject I have expressed my opinions more elaborately in an article which will appear in the October number of the *Atlantic*. Let me hope that you will not think me presumptuous if I submit that paper to your consideration.

You refer to the Czar's peace proclamation as an inspiring event of great promise. The full realization of the Czar's peace-program would indeed be a measureless

blessing to mankind. So far the American people have enjoyed the inestimable privilege of being exempt from the curse of an increasingly burdensome militarism. They were proud, and had good reason for being proud, not of possessing great and costly armaments, but of not needing any. The Czar's plea is for disarmament. It virtually declares the bankruptcy of militarism. And at this moment you call upon the American people, the only great nation that has so far enjoyed substantially unarmed peace, to adopt a policy which will oblige it to maintain great armies and navies, and thus to put upon its own back the very burden against which the Czar's solemn warning is directed.

What would be the consequence if your wish were fulfilled? An increase of European armaments to offset or outdo the increase of American armaments; and then another increase of American armaments to offset or outdo European armaments, and so on—in short an indefinite aggravation of the very evil to which the Czar admonishes the world to put an end. This is not the kind of peace policy which, as a faithful citizen of this Republic and as one who wishes to further human civilization, I can advise the American people to adopt.

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TO PRESIDENT MCKINLEY

BOLTON LANDING, Sept. 22, 1898.

I have just received from Mr. McAneny a report on the interview you granted to the committee of the Saratoga conference, on which I beg leave to submit to you a few observations.

A majority of that conference were really not in favor of any annexations, but wished this Republic to use this opportunity for exerting civilizing influences upon the populations of the conquered territories, and for opening

markets for our commerce, without burdening itself with any political responsibilities in the regions concerned. And I sincerely believe, the vociferous clamor of the jingoes notwithstanding, that this is to-day the feeling of a large majority of the American people. I go further, and confidently predict that this popular feeling against such political entanglements by the proposed annexations will very much grow in intensity as the burdens which the imperialistic policy will put upon us become more apparent to the public mind.

Permit me to invite your attention to a feature of the case which may bring on grave political consequences. Garrison service in the "colonies" is decidedly unpopular with the volunteers as well as with the regulars. The papers report that the volunteers retained in the service are mostly very unwilling to go to the tropics, and that among the regulars destined for that duty desertions are frequent and new enlistments unusually scarce. (I enclose some newspaper clippings referring to this.) In other words, it becomes questionable whether you will have soldiers enough for the distant garrisons. And if it should turn out that you have not, and cannot get enough, the situation might become extremely humiliating and disastrous.

But if you still have volunteers enough to fill the gap, and they go to the distant garrisons unwillingly, almost every one of them will be among his relatives and friends an agitator, first against the Administration, and eventually against the annexation policy. This is going on now, and it will constantly spread as the volunteers are kept in the ranks against their wish, and as the sickly climate of the tropics tells upon them.

The investigation of the Army management which you have ordered cannot remedy this. It cannot silence the complaints of the returned soldiers. It cannot avert the

effects of the tropical climate nor quell the dissatisfaction of the volunteers still in the service who think that they ought to have been sent home after the close of the war. They will continue to fill the air with their lamentations through their friends and relatives. Neither will the investigation encourage enlistments for the regular Army, at least not for some time to come. In the meantime the financial burdens brought upon the people by the annexation policy will also make themselves more felt, and appropriations will go on increasing, while the expected commercial benefit will necessarily be slow to come in. All these elements of discontent will coöperate to make the great mass of the people heartily sick of the whole business. Disease spreading among the tropical garrisons, or anything like a mutinous demonstration of restlessness among the volunteers, might put the public mind in a state of critical excitement. The political consequences apt to follow, I need not point out. They have so far only partially manifested themselves, but they will grow worse and worse as the obnoxious concomitants of the annexation policy develop themselves, which they will necessarily do.

As you may perhaps remember, at the beginning of the war I ventured to suggest that no opportunity be lost by your Administration for demonstratively declaring that, according to the pledge put forth by Congress, this was a war of liberation and humanity and not for aggrandizement, and that therefore annexations of territory were out of the question. Had that been done, your moral position would have been so strong and unassailable as to command the general support of the people, with the exception, perhaps, of that of the most reckless and unscrupulous jingo element. Then you would have had no trouble at all about the final settlement. When you failed to take that impregnable moral ground, your troubles

began, and I am profoundly convinced that they will go on increasing and finally overwhelm your Administration, unless you avail yourself of your last opportunity to take the same moral ground now.

You are still, although now not without some embarrassment, in a certain sense master of the situation; but you will not be that much longer. You might still instruct your Peace Commissioners, when negotiating about the surrender by Spain of any territory, in no manner to commit the United States to the annexation of any such territory, but to leave the question of the ultimate disposition of it entirely open. You might then in your message to Congress say that with regard to the annexation question you had kept in view the pledge implied in the resolution of Congress as to the cause and object of the war, as well as of your own declaration that "annexation by force cannot be thought of because it would, by our code of morality, [be] criminal aggression"; that the annexation of any of the Spanish colonies would not only involve the repudiation of those declarations, but also require the keeping of large garrisons in tropical regions, which would cause heavy sacrifice of life and treasure; that all desirable commercial facilities could be obtained by international agreement, and that all the naval stations needed could be secured without the annexation of populous territories behind them, by which arrangement burdensome political responsibilities and entanglements would be avoided and only small garrisons would be required, while all material advantage of real importance would be secured.

This would open a prospect of a speedy return of most of the soldiers sent to the tropics, and I am sure by the time the message comes out, a large majority of the people will be in a condition of mind to receive this with a sigh of relief.

I would entreat you not to imagine that any half-way measures will relieve you of your troubles. The keeping of "only" the island of Lùzon with its large and unruly population, or even of "only" the city of Manila, will not settle anything, but become only the source of new and endless complications and perplexities. It is just so with Porto Rico. The annexation of "only" Porto Rico in the West Indies will inevitably cause a constant and troublesome agitation for the annexation of the islands situated between Porto Rico and the United States. There will be no end of restlessness then, while the "strategical position," if such a one is needed, could be obtained by securing a naval station without annexing a populous district behind it, just as England holds Gibraltar without owning Spain or a province of it.

Would it not be perfectly feasible to settle the future status of the Philippines by a conference with the Powers most interested in that region, and at the same time to obtain all the commercial and strategical advantages we require? And would it not be equally feasible, with equal advantage for ourselves, to help Porto Rico to an independent government as we are helping Cuba, and then endeavor to bring about a "Confederation of the Antilles," embracing Cuba, Porto Rico, San Domingo and Hayti—which would give those islands a respectable international standing, while it would, of course, recognize our leadership?

But however that may be, I earnestly hope that it will commend itself to your judgment so to direct the Peace Commissioners that they will leave the question, whether any of the islands or parts thereof shall be or shall not be annexed, entirely open and unembarrassed for future decision when the people will have learned more clearly what such annexations involve.

Mr. McAneny informs me that the question he asked

you in my behalf whether there had really been any matter [?] of difference between the United States and Germany concerning the Philippines, had remained unanswered. I regret this, for it was my purpose to do something toward allaying the unpleasant feeling which at present seems to exist between the German-Americans and a part of their fellow-citizens. But I have to be silent with regard to this matter so long as I am not myself well informed.

I take the liberty of sending you herewith a pamphlet copy of the speech I delivered at the Saratoga conference.

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TO SHERMAN S. ROGERS

NEW YORK, Oct. 18, 1898.

I have finished a letter to Mr. Richmond, our common friend, who anticipated you for a few days in giving reasons for supporting Roosevelt in spite of his vagaries. I have told Mr. Richmond that, painful as the conclusion is to me, I cannot, after Roosevelt's pronunciamento in his Carnegie Hall speech, give him my vote, and in two or three days I intend to say so publicly. Roosevelt has made his own issues in such a way that they cannot be put aside. If he is elected it *will* be an endorsement by the people of New York of his wild imperialistic ideas as put forth in his Carnegie Hall speech. It will be an encouragement to the craziest sort of jingoism and put him on the road to the Presidency, or at least to the Presidential nomination. You say that he will surely kill Platt. I am not so certain of that. What he is doing now is, by his popularity as a hero, to help Platt in stocking the legislature with his tools. The fate of Black shows conclusively enough that the mere opposition of a governor will not kill a boss. Besides, Roosevelt is a candidate for the Presidency, and if as a candidate for

the governorship he makes the concession to the machine which you mention, how far will the concession go when the Presidency is the prize?

All this is exceedingly harrowing to me; for, as you know, my personal relations with Roosevelt have long been those of warm friendship. And I need not assure you that I heartily dislike not to agree with you. I shall vote the Independent ticket with Theodore Bacon at the head. It will be a blessing if that ticket gets votes enough to entitle the independent organization to a place on the official ballot.

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#### TO THEODORE ROOSEVELT

16 EAST 64TH ST., Oct. 18, 1898.

Your letter of the 14th reached me yesterday. We have long been friends, and I ardently hoped to be able to support you for the governorship.

Although I disliked some things you did before and immediately after your nomination, I continued to hope until I read the report of your Carnegie Hall speech. That speech was your keynote utterance for the campaign which would give your election its meaning. Upon it you stand, and it makes it impossible for me to support you, and to write the article you suggest. I cannot tell you, remembering our long and sincere friendship, how painful it is for me to be obliged to say this.

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#### OPPOSITION TO ROOSEVELT FOR THE GOVERNORSHIP OF NEW YORK<sup>1</sup>

NEW YORK, Oct. 21, 1898.

Sir: From various parts of the State I have received letters asking me what I think of Colonel Roosevelt's

<sup>1</sup> An open letter to the Editor of the *Evening Post*.

candidacy. There being more of such inquiries than I can answer separately, you will oblige me by giving me space for a public statement of my views.

Colonel Roosevelt and myself have long been personal friends, and I have always respected his many excellent qualities very highly. When he was first spoken of as a candidate for the governorship, I greatly wished and hoped to be able to support him; and it is no mere empty figure of speech when I say that with painful reluctance I have come to an adverse conclusion. Although somewhat disappointed by some things he did immediately before his nomination, I continued to hope that he would, in opening his campaign, take a position entirely consistent with the character of a champion of good government, and that, if he touched National questions at all, he would at least refrain from making his extreme imperialism one of the issues of the election.

I was much startled when I read that in response to the declaration of the Republican State platform, "We commend the administration of Governor Black; it has been wise, statesmanlike, careful and economical," Colonel Roosevelt, in accepting the nomination for the governorship, went so far in his concession to the Republican party machine as to say: "The record made by the Republican administration in the State of New York is a guarantee that upon all questions involving the property rights and interests and liberty of all citizens the Republican party can be safely trusted." Considering what the record of that administration notoriously is, Mr. Roosevelt's language betrayed a kind of partisan spirit which has been fatal to many good intentions such as Colonel Roosevelt now—no doubt, honestly—avows in general terms.

But, while in this respect we might still be inclined to hope for the best, we can hardly do the same with regard

to certain utterances put forth in his speech at the Carnegie Hall meeting, in which he "sounded the keynote of the campaign." There he told us that the question is not merely whether he or his competitor will make the better governor of New York, but that by electing him we are to declare to the whole world that the State of New York stands behind the National Administration in its annexation policy, how far that policy may ever go. And even more than that. He virtually asks us to endorse, by electing him, his kind of militant imperialism, which has no bounds. According to him, we need a big navy and "a far larger regular army than we now have," not for the purpose of keeping order at home, but for action abroad. The American people who, we have always supposed, have so far enjoyed the reputation of being the most enterprising, active, stirring and energetic people in the world, are, according to him, in danger of "rusting out" and of drifting into stagnation, like that of China. He is afraid lest the "soft, easy life" which, it seems, the American people have been and are now leading, may "impair the fiber of brain and heart and muscle." He thinks that to avoid so sad a fate we must have more occupation—that is, occupation abroad—and that we must constantly "live in the harness and strive mightily," even at the risk of "wearing out"; and, of course, for this "living in harness and striving mightily" big armies and navies—how big nobody can tell—will be very much needed.

I repeat, such a program goes beyond the mere present annexation of the Philippines. But, extravagant as it may seem, every one acquainted with Mr. Roosevelt knows that this is the thing in which he really believes and which is nearest to his heart.

It may be said that as governor of New York he would not have the power to carry such ideas into effect. This

is true enough. But we have to consider that, since those things have been by him injected into this campaign in so prominent—I might say so ostentatious—a way, we cannot elect him without seemingly countenancing this sort of imperialism—at any rate, we cannot elect him without approving and encouraging the annexation policy so far as it may go at present—for that is what he has emphatically told us his election is to mean. We cannot elect him without making him in a large sense the spokesman of the State of New York as to these things—and we may count upon it that he would not be silent.

Moreover, it is by no means improper to point out the fact that an election to the governorship of New York, as it repeatedly has been, may again become, in Colonel Roosevelt's case, the stepping-stone to the nomination for the Presidency. Indeed, it is in everybody's mouth that if Colonel Roosevelt succeeds, it will be so. I am, therefore, not dealing with a vague and remote contingency, but with a question of immediate interest which will call for actual decision in less than twenty months, when I say that we have to consider the probable effect of Colonel Roosevelt's election to the governorship from this point of view.

Colonel Roosevelt deserves much honor for his gallant conduct in the Santiago campaign. He is, no doubt, one of the bravest of soldiers, and if I had the power, I would, in case of another war, give him any number of Rough Riders to command, with perfect confidence that he would acquitted himself gloriously. But I would not put him in a position, nor open to him the way to a position, in which he would exercise any influence upon the foreign policy of the Republic; for I candidly believe that, owing to his exceptionally bellicose temperament and to the sincerity of his fantastic notions as to the bodily exercise the American people need to keep them from Chinese de-

generacy, and as to the necessity always to "live in the harness and strive mightily," he is very dangerously deficient in that patient prudence which is necessary for the peaceable conduct of international relations. I cannot, therefore, consistently with my conception of duty, support Colonel Roosevelt when a vote for him is to mean an approval and encouragement of the manifest-destiny swindle. I call it so because it is a flagrant breach of faith in turning a solemnly proclaimed war of humanity into a vulgar land-grabbing operation, glossed over by high-sounding cant about destiny and duty and what not. I cannot support him when his election is generally admitted to be the stepping-stone to a place in which his hot impulses and his extreme notions of militant imperialism might do the country greater and more irreparable harm than anything I can think of.

I am asked whether the defeat of Colonel Roosevelt might not benefit the silver movement and Tammany. I candidly do not think that it will benefit the silver movement. It may even serve to stir up the Republicans during the short session of Congress to apply themselves more vigorously to a long neglected duty regarding the needed currency legislation. But as a veteran in the fight against unsound currency and against Tammany, whose sincerity and zeal nobody has a right to question, I do not hesitate to express the solemn conviction that there are worse things even than free silver and Tammany, and that one of them is the imperialism which in its effects upon the character and the durability of the Republic I consider as pernicious as slavery itself was, and which we are now asked to countenance and encourage.

I shall vote for the Independent State ticket, which has Mr. Theodore Bacon at the top and Colonel Waring at the bottom. The candidates are men of high character, of correct principles on every point and of patriotic spirit.

Although knowing that they have no chance of election, they courageously assume the leadership of those citizens who have come to the conclusion that the game of the bosses to confine the voters to a choice between two evils must be stopped. At one time it was thought possible to use one boss as a club for annihilating the other. That has turned out a vain hope, for they have too good an understanding among themselves as to the interests they have in common. Nor can I agree with those of our friends who think that Colonel Roosevelt, if made governor, will destroy Boss Platt, who has been pronounced by Dr. Parkhurst to be five times as bad as Boss Croker. The case of Governor Black has shown that a rebellious governor cannot destroy a boss so long as the boss controls the legislature and the party organization. And so far the element of popularity in Colonel Roosevelt's candidacy has only served to encourage Mr. Platt in preventing the renomination of every Republican who in the legislature had given the least sign of an independent spirit, and to substitute for them men who can be counted upon to be his abject tools, so that, if he succeeds, the legislature will be more subservient to him than ever. It does not look as if Boss Platt could thus be shorn of his power. He certainly will never again be afraid of those of our friends who last year execrated him as the arch-enemy of good government, and who now, because he has been clever enough to flatter a popular demand, salute him as "the presiding genius of the Republican party," while he strengthens himself by riveting his chains upon the legislature and the party organization. This sort of intermittent independence is to the boss only amusing.

But bossism can be really crippled if a strong body of men absolutely refuse to be confined to a choice between evils. The present independent force may be small, but those are mistaken who think that it is without immediate

practical usefulness. It will accomplish an important result at this election if it gets votes enough to entitle it, for future occasions, to a place on the official ballot. And of these votes mine will be one.

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## TO JACOB H. SCHIFF

Oct. 25 [1898].

I received your letter this morning and at the same time read it in the newspapers. Permit me to overlook the acerbity of some of your expressions, which I regret, and to say that the risk of incurring the displeasure of old friends which was clearly before my eyes when I took my position in this campaign, and which at my time of life I greatly dislike, may be proof to you of the sincerity of the conviction of duty which impelled me to do what I have done. Before the campaign closes I expect to have an opportunity for answering the objections made to my course and you may be assured that I shall do it without the slightest personal irritation. Perhaps at some future time you will see that in my present position I was right after all. In my public life I have not seldom seemed to stand alone, and deserted, but never long.

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## FROM GEORGE F. HOAR

WORCESTER, MASS., Oct. 26, 1898.

*Confidential.*

I don't know whether you will think that the rather sharp political differences which have existed and which, I suppose, are likely to exist hereafter between your opinions on public questions and mine may not render it improper for me to write to you now. Indeed I ought to say frankly that if I were in New York I should zealously support Mr. Roosevelt now. I do not think there is the slightest possibility that he

will ever be nominated for the Presidency, and if he were nominated and elected I think he would make a very good President. I think he would be a vigorous combatant of existing abuses and that all questions of imperialism would have got settled long before he would have a chance to influence them, for good or evil.

Having said this, which is due to frankness, I write to say that it seems to me the great need to defeat the present attempt to prevent our acquisition of a distant empire, with the complete change in our Constitutional and political methods, principles and opinions which will be the result, is to satisfy the people what ought to be done with the Philippines if we do not take them. There is a strong feeling that it would be alike humiliating and dishonorable to give them back to Spain, or to let them become the prey of European Powers, and that they are not fitted for self-government. If you have any decided views on this question you can state them with a power and effect which no other man in the country can surpass. I should be glad for my own instruction to know what you think in this matter, and to have the public know it if you think fit.

I am, with great regard, faithfully yours.

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TO GEORGE F. HOAR

NEW YORK, Oct. 30, 1898.

Many thanks for your letter of the 26th inst. Why should our differences on other points prevent us from heartily coöoperating for a purpose on which we are agreed?

In a speech which I expect to make next Thursday I shall suggest as to the future disposition to be made of the Philippines a conference of the Powers most immediately interested. I shall send you a copy of the speech. But such suggestions will hardly be of any avail unless those in power be made aware of the fact that a majority of our people do not desire a policy of reckless expansion.

You are a strong party man, which I am not; and what

I am now going to say may possibly shock you. I believe that the only thing that can save the Republic from being rushed over the precipice is the defeat in the coming election of all, or nearly all, of the Republican candidates, either for State offices or for Congress, who have conspicuously come out in favor of that expansion policy. Such a defeat may bring the Administration as well as Congress to a sober consideration of the question, if anything can. This is the *main* reason for my opposition to Roosevelt.

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## FROM GOLDWIN SMITH

"THE GRANGE," TORONTO, Nov. 6, 1898.

*Private.*

It is true, I hope, that you are opposing Imperialism. In a fight with a military mania the leadership of a distinguished soldier is invaluable.

Let me suggest to you, as an argument which may have weight with some, that Imperialism will be the death of Continental Union, which otherwise, as I firmly believe, is within the reach of American statesmanship. No Canadian, however desirous of incorporation with the American Commonwealth, would desire incorporation with a Negro and Malay Empire. As an advocate of Continental Union, believing it to be the best thing for my own country as well as for Canada and the United States, I have cheerfully undergone a good deal of obloquy and annoyance; but I should vote against Union with an American Empire.

The incorporation of Canada with the United States would surely be of all "expansions" not only the most natural but the best.

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## TO GOLDWIN SMITH

NEW YORK, Nov. 9, 1898.

Thanks for your kind letter of the 6th. Most assuredly do I oppose the policy of Imperialism. I regard that

question as by far the most important before the American people. All other questions are, in my opinion, subordinated to it. There is some hope that the calamity may still be averted.

The argument you suggest is certainly a very weighty one. But it ought to come from your side of the line, not from ours. Can you not find an opportunity for launching it in a manner to attract general attention in the United States? All you write about such matters is read with the greatest respect by our people. You can speak to them on the subject of Continental Union with that authority which high character and universally recognized sincerity commands. I hope you will.

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TO GEORGE F. HOAR

16 EAST 64TH ST., Dec. 1, 1898.

Permit me to submit to your consideration the following suggestion:

The annexation to the United States of tropical countries with their mixed population being the gravest question that has ever been before the American people since the foundation of our Constitutional Government, and it being uncertain whether a majority of the American people really desire that this annexation be consummated, the people have a clear right to ask that an opportunity for manifesting their will be given them. Such an opportunity would be afforded if Congress passed an act submitting to a popular vote, unembarrassed by any other issues, the question whether the citizens of the United States favor such annexation of tropical countries.

I know, such a plebiscite would be a new thing. But the question before us in its present magnitude is no less a new thing. And it seems to me that an act providing for

the taking of such a plebiscite might be so formed as to avoid all Constitutional difficulties.

Will you be so kind as to take this suggestion into consideration? And if it commends itself to your judgment, you would, I think, render an immense service in this supreme crisis by drafting and introducing such a bill as promptly as possible. If it presents the proposition in a manner Constitutionally unobjectionable, it is hard to see how the Imperialists in Congress can reject it without virtually admitting that they doubt whether they have the people really on their side.

I sincerely believe that if such a bill were passed giving us three months' time for public discussion before the taking of the popular vote, the annexation scheme would be defeated by an overwhelming majority.

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FROM ANDREW CARNEGIE

5 WEST 51ST ST., NEW YORK, Dec. 27, 1898.

My dear Friend: Print your speech<sup>1</sup> in pamphlet form and distribute it and I will be your banker. That is the way in which I can aid the good work. You have brains and I have dollars. I can devote some of my dollars to spreading your brains. I wish to fate you could spread some of your brains over your friend.

Do you notice how Labor is speaking out, and how the Farmers are taking it up? If you could get a plebiscite to-day your Government would be drowned deeper than plummet ever sounded.

Do not lose faith in the Republic or in Triumphant Democracy. It is sound to the core.

Many long and happy years be yours.

<sup>1</sup> Presumably the speech to be delivered in Chicago a few days later.









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